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Abstract
The pillar structure of EU politics dates back to the Maastricht Treaty and has since 
then been subject to several reforms but has never been formally abolished. 
According to a standard view, there is a fundamental distinction between the 
allegedly ‘supranational’ first pillar and the ‘intergovernmental’ second and third 
pillars. This standard view asserts that policy making in foreign and interior affairs — 
those areas which are partly located in each of these pillars — also follows two 
different institutional logics.
This thesis proposes a different perspective on foreign and interior policies 
and analyses the role of EU actors - the Commission, the European Parliament, the 
Council Secretariat, the Court of Justice and the Court o f Auditors - in these two 
areas. It argues that policy making is not primarily characterised by the supranational- 
intergovernmental divide but rather by functionally induced cross pillar dynamics 
applying equally to both policy areas. It shows that EU actors were able to shape 
‘intergovernmental’ bargains and that the p rim ary division in foreign and interior 
policies is not on the supranational-intergovernmental dimension but rather between 
executive actors and those controlling the executive. Middle East and migration 
policies serve as case studies for this analysis.
The thesis shows that both areas have since the Maastricht Treaty become an 
integral part o f the political system of the EU. Moreover, the centralisation process 
in foreign and interior policies, which stretches beyond the pillar confines, has 
consolidated the specific functional feature o f both areas. It is argued that both areas 
constitute one policy type, referred to as macro political stabilisation. The functional 
dynamics o f macro political stabilisation policies affect the way in which capabilities 
have been delegated to EU actors within the cross pillar institutional setting of EU 
foreign and interior policies. Moreover, the preferences of actors as well as the 
specific patterns of interaction in the policy making process also have to be 
understood against this functional background.
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EU Actors and the Centralisation of 
Foreign and Interior Policies
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Ch a p t e r  1
Introduction
If we were to regard foreign and interior policies as two sides of one coin, the name 
of the currency would be ‘sovereignty'. And, it would be a national coinage. At 
present, there are 15 o f these national ‘sovereignty currencies' traded on the market 
of the European Union (EU). Yet, in parallel to these traditional national 
frameworks, also the EU itself has emerged as a political authority with an own right 
of coinage. To take this analogy with numismatics one step further, one could draw 
an analogy between developments in EU foreign and interior policies with European 
policies on monetary union prior to the Maastricht Treaty. This does not suggest that 
EU foreign and interior policies will ultimately culminate in a ‘single European 
sovereignty currency', comparable to the Euro. Indeed, many different paths for the 
future development o f EU foreign and interior policies could be reasonably 
imagined, the emergence of single policies only being one among many options, and 
probably not the most likely one.
Notwithstanding this objection, the relationship between EU foreign and 
interior policies, on the one hand, and member states' foreign and interior policies, 
on the other, could be imagined as an attempt to provide for incremental 
convergence through the establishment of a common standard closely linked with 
but autonomous from national approaches (Tsoukalis 1996). Seen from that 
perspective, EU foreign and interior policies would have a similar function as the 
European currency unit (ECU) in the framework of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) set up in 1979. What matters, then, is not primarily the scope o f decisions on 
EU foreign and interior policies but rather the inherent pressure for convergence 
emanating from the gradual establishment o f a common European ‘central rate’ for 
these two areas. Just like the currency ‘snake', a metaphor used to illustrate the 
fluctuation o f national exchange rates vis-a-vis the ECU in the EMS, also the snake of
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national foreign and interior policies could be observed as ‘wriggling its way through 
the chaotic zoo* of international politics (ibid.: 282).
This thesis explores the way in which foreign and interior policies have been 
dealt with at the EU level from the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 
November 1993 until the entry into force o f the Nice Treaty in February 2003. It 
identifies the key functional, institutional and actor related features that shape policy 
making in both areas. In the words of the analogy suggested above, the thesis thus 
accounts for how head and tail o f the EU ‘sovereignty currency> look like. The 
specific focus of this thesis is laid on analysing the role of the Commission, the 
European Parliament, the Council Secretariat, the Court of Justice and the Court of 
Auditors in both areas. These actors, often referred to in the literature as 
‘supranational’ actors, contribute to the coining process, yet their concrete role in 
both areas, in particular from a comparative perspective on both foreign and interior 
policies, has not yet been subject to a detailed study. For that purpose, this thesis 
draws from empirical examples derived from the study of two concrete case studies, 
namely Middle East policies as far as EU foreign policies are concerned, and 
migration policies regarding EU interior policies.
While it is not argued here that national policies have merged into single EU 
foreign and interior policies, the argument is espoused that EU foreign and interior 
policies are much more than largely non-compulsory settings of intergovernmental 
cooperation among sovereign states with only minimal integration at the EU level. In 
contrast, this thesis claims that both areas have been subject to considerable 
centralisation at the EU level. Foreign and interior policies have become an integral 
part of the political system of the EU. While centralisation has not resulted in the 
establishment of single foreign and interior policies, it has nevertheless led to the 
emergence of concrete, genuine EU policies, which cannot adequately be described 
as the (lowest) common denominator of the 15 member states. The focus of this 
study on the role of the aforementioned ‘supranational’ actors — referred to in this 
thesis as EU actors — in policy making processes in both areas reveals that they have 
been delegated considerable capabilities across those three pillars which formally
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separate foreign and interior policies into seemingly ‘supranational* and 
‘intergovernmental* settings.1 One of the key arguments of this thesis, therefore, is 
that it is in particular the analysis o f the role o f EU actors in foreign and interior 
policies that helps to identify the characteristic features of the factual cross pillar 
institutional setting o f both areas. It is against this background that the thesis yields 
scepticism regarding the attribution of the terms ‘supranational* and 
‘intergovernmental’ with regard to policy orientations o f different actors in EU policy 
making. For the same reason, it is also highly sceptical about ascriptions o f a 
‘supranational’ or ‘intergovernmental’ logic of integration (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1998; Moravcsik 1998). As is shown in subsequent chapters, this 
distinction remains imprecise with regard to the underlying dynamics o f European 
integration and does also conceal significant differences within the actually diverse 
groups of ‘supranational* and ‘intergovernmental* actors. As is argued at length, the 
orientations of EU actors are far from being coherent. Moreover, these different 
orientations are also not intrinsically opposed to those of member states, as if  these 
were a somewhat united bloc.
This thesis proposes new empirical and theoretical perspectives on EU 
foreign and interior policies. As far as the empirical results are concerned, the 
following analysis provides evidence for the claim that foreign and interior policies 
have been subject to a centralisation process within the EU political system. While it 
is true that foreign and interior policies, from a formal perspective, continue to be 
divided into ‘supranational* and ‘intergovernmental* pillars, this thesis asserts that 
such a legal distinction has not been able to impede upon a factual cross pillar 
centralisation of both areas. Thus, by arguing that even without the classical 
Community method at work in most parts of foreign and interior policies, there are 
some underlying functional dynamics o f policy making, which led to incremental 
centralisation of these policies at the EU level, the thesis directs attention towards 
the functional context within which institutions and actors operate. Its central
1 See chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation on the usage o f the term *EU actor* in this thesis.
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theoretical claim, therefore, is that the precise shape of institutions and actor 
preferences in EU foreign and interior policies has to be understood against the 
background of such a ‘functional frame’, referred to in this thesis as ‘macro political 
stabilisation\
This functional context has shaped the way in which national actors and EU 
actors interrelate with each other in the policy making process. Hence, as far as the 
institutional setting o f EU foreign and interior policies is concerned, the thesis 
identifies the distinction between executive actors, on the one hand, and 
parliamentary and judicial ‘control actors’, on the other, as the main institutional 
feature of macro political stabilisation policies. In particular, the thesis stresses that 
what characterises EU foreign and interior policies is not so much the mere existence 
of this divide but rather the substantially unequal distribution of powers between the 
two sides. Thus, there is a strong dominance of executive actors in both areas, at the 
expense o f firm parliamentary or judicial control. On the same note, the two sides of 
this ‘executive-control divide’ of EU foreign and interior policies should themselves 
not be considered as quasi-homogenous monoliths. Nevertheless, joint decision 
making mechanisms provide for a strong institutional impetus for consensual 
agreement between executive actors. An analysis of inner executive coordination 
demonstrates that interaction between the Commission and the Council — Secretariat 
and member states alike — is structured by an elaborated system of checks-and- 
balances within which opposing orientations and preferences are at all stages of the 
decision making process constantly jointly negotiated. These dynamics significantly 
increased the likelihood o f consensual agreement among executive actors, although 
at the price o f highly incremental decision taking and implementation of policies on 
the ground.
The ‘functional frame’ thesis put forward here leads to the overall conclusion
\
that the actual impact o f the pillar structure on policies has been much less 
pronounced than often assumed, for example by those national governments which 
are reluctant to transfer all policies to the Community pillar but also by 
intergovemmentalist approaches to the study of the EU. Thus, it was even without a
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formal revision of the Maastricht Treaty pillar structure, that political processes in 
EU foreign and interior policies have transcended the officially enduring pillar divide. 
Two main reasons can be identified for this de facto ‘de-pillarisation’. First, foreign 
and interior policies are an integral part of the EU political system. Hence, 
institutional mechanisms and actor constellations are nothing special to the second 
and third pillars but have to be seen in the way in which they relate to the wider 
context of EU policy making. Second, foreign and interior policies, although being 
formally divided across three pillars, are subject to a centralisation process which is 
triggered from the specific functional features pertaining to these two policy areas. 
Thus, a new policy type has emerged at the EU level, which is referred to in this 
thesis as ‘macro political stabilisation* and this policy type sets the functional frame 
to which actors primarily relate in the policy making process.
Having said this, it must be emphasised that while the factual significance of 
the pillar structure on policy making has remarkably decreased over time, the 
symbolic relevance, which some member states continue to attribute to this formal 
division, remains high and it is this symbolic significance rather than clear-cut 
interests which explains the relative steadfastness of the pillar structure. However, 
notwithstanding its outward appearance, the pillar structure is gradually hollowed out 
by the dynamics of day-to-day policy making in both areas.
What stems from this analysis is the argument that some ten years after the 
Maastricht Treaty the ‘snake* o f national foreign and interior policies has found a 
branch around which to bend and this branch has, very gradually, grown thicker and 
more solid. While EU foreign and interior policies coexist with enduring national 
policies in both areas they are no longer a quantity negligeabk. Both areas have become 
centralised at the EU level and bequeath the EU with ‘sovereignty* by providing a 
functional frame of ‘macro political stabilisation* within which actors operate. During 
the last ten years, a functionally induced stabilisation of the institutional setting of 
EU foreign and interior policies has taken shape that is characterised by hybrid, cross 
pillar institutions, which allow not only member states but also EU actors to play, 
with varying degrees, a quite considerable role in policy making across the three
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pillars. Based on these observations, the subsequent chapters o f this thesis will shed 
light on how, even without the full communitarisation of foreign and interior 
policies, these underlying functional dynamics o f policy making in both areas have 
paved the way for a cautious yet significant centralisation process of EU foreign and 
interior policies.
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Ch a p t e r  2
Shaping ‘Intergovernmental’ Bargains? 
Research Questions and Research Design
Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 increased the levels of politicization’ within the EU 
by integrating two important policies, which hitherto were not part of the formal 
governance structure, into the Treaties (W Wallace 2000: 525). These policies became 
known under the acronyms of CFSP and JHA or — with reference to either ancient 
Greek architecture or their location in the Treaties — as the second and third pillar of 
the EU.2 Notwithstanding this significance of the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions, the 
origins of joint policies in both areas date back to the early 1970s when member 
states established Europeanised frameworks for cooperation in foreign and home 
affairs, albeit on a purely intergovernmental basis (Lobkowicz 1994; M E Smith 1998; 
Wallace and Wallace 2000). While these foreign and interior policy settings had 
already before the Maastricht Treaty gradually been linked with institutional 
structures of the EC, intergovernmental paths endured and significandy shaped the 
provisions on CFSP and JHA.3 This path dependence was also replicated on a 
linguistic level. Thus, most commentators used to refer to the ‘two 
intergovernmental pillars’ when analysing foreign and interior policies despite the 
existence of a European ‘single institutional framework’ which was meant to cover
2 CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy; JHA: Justice and Home Affairs. Following the Greek 
Temple metaphor the overarching ‘roof o f die European Union is carried by the three ‘pillars’ o f the 
European Community (EC), the CFSP and JHA.
3 Foreign policies were for the first time linked with the EC in 1986 through the Single European Act 
(SEA). However, as opposed to the provisions o f the Maastricht Treaty, the SEA did not provide for 
a ‘single framework’ covering all aspects o f EC foreign policies. In contrast to the ‘single institutional 
framework’ referred to in the Maastricht Treaty, ex-Article 30 3(a) SEA (Tide III) only mentioned the 
‘framework o f European Political Co-operation’ (EPQ and contained no overarching substantial 
linkage with the EC, save references to die Commission and Parliament. Therefore, EPC *was clearly 
separated from the provisions o f the Act which amended or related to the Community Treaties’. 
Consequendy, *EPC, pursuant to Tide III, remained an intergovernmental process governed by 
international law’ (MacLeod, Hendry and Hyett 1996: 411). On the SEA see also Moravcsik 1991.
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policies across the three pillars (Bieber and Monar 1995; Regelsberger et al. 1997; 
Wallace and Wallace 1996). This terminology mirrored the ‘official’ pillar terminology 
on which member states agreed upon during the Maastricht Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) (Majer 1999).
Yet, as already indicated, CFSP and JHA were never stricdy 
intergovernmental fora, but were from the outset characterised by an inherent 
tension between the attempt to continue with established intergovernmental 
practices on the policy making level and the integration of both areas into the ‘single 
institutional structure’ o f the ‘new overarching entity — the European Union’ 
(McGoldrick 1997: 13). Thus, both areas can best be characterised as institutional 
hybrids which allowed for collective decision making in both areas under the 
umbrella of the EU while at the same time keeping policy making as separate as 
possible from the classical EC working methods of the supranational first pillar 
(Moravcsik 1998). On the face of it, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 did provide for 
significant changes to the way in which both policy areas are dealt with at the EU 
level (Weidenfeld 1998). However, in substance it did not fundamentally change the 
three pillar design since even those policy areas, which were transferred to the first 
pillar, were not communitarised in the ‘classical’ sense (Duff 1997; Moravcsik and 
Nicolai’dis 1998 and 1999).4
Thus, migration policies shifted from the third pillar to the first pillar, yet 
with regard to decision making and, arguably, implementation and judicial overview, 
there have been rather minimal changes to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Only after a five year period, by May 2004, can member states decide — by unanimity 
— to regulate this policy area with the ‘classical’ Community method. At least until the 
end of this transitory period, migration policies are part o f a semi-communitarised 
institutional setting which still contains many features of the third pillar, such as 
unanimity requirements in the Council, a shared tight of initiative of both the
4 Given the variety o f institutional arenas in the first pillar, the term ‘classical’ Community method 
should be regarded as an ideal type notion (Wallace and Wallace 2000). See chapter 4 on the actual 
plurality o f various institutional settings — also within the EC framework - in the areas o f foreign and 
interior policies.
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Commission and member states, a weak role of Parliament in the legislative process 
and restrictions to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (den Boer 1997; Stetter 
2000).
Intergovernmental bargains?
This formal separation of policy areas into three pillars — one supranational and two 
intergovernmental — has led many scholars to assert that there are indeed ‘pillafised* 
political processes at the EU level, thus assuming a relatively clear-cut separation 
between the pillars. As Ramses Wessel has noted, ‘the three-pillar structure of the 
European Union [...] is often used as a justification for separate analyses of the three 
pillars. To this very day one can observe the existence of largely isolated [...] research 
communities* in studies on the three pillars (2000:1135).
This underlying consensus on a separation of the pillars has even been able to 
bridge the otherwise deep divide between intergovemmentalist approaches to the 
study o f the EU, on the one hand, and those studies which analyse the EU from a 
neofunctional or comparative politics perspective, on the other. Andrew Moravcsik, 
for example, notes that the Maastricht IGC created ‘the three-pillar structure, in 
which these policies [CFSP and JHA; SS] remained intergovernmental* (1998: 467). 
Following this statement, Moravcsik*s ‘basic explanation of the process and outcome* 
of IGCs can mutatis mutandis be applied to the study of decision making in CFSP and 
JHA as well (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999: 59). The institutional features of the 
second and third pillars — such as unanimity requirements between member states 
and seemingly severely restricted roles for EC institutions — resemble those during 
IGCs. Therefore, Moravcsik*s famous statement that ‘the EC has developed through 
a series o f celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an 
intervening period o f consolidation* could be refined as a liberal intergovemmentalist 
perspective on the second and third pillars (1993: 473). Thus, similar institutional 
rules for IGCs, on the one hand, and CFSP and JHA, on the other, would render 
domestic preference formation on the basis of economic interests, interstate 
bargaining on the basis o f asymmetrical interdependence and institutional choice on
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the basis of the need to ensure credible commitment between member states, the key 
variables for explaining outcomes in the intergovernmental pillars (Moravcsik 1998: 
24).
Also those scholars who view the EU as a system which is less dominated by 
intergovernmental factors, have reached conclusions comparable to Moravcsik’s 
when theorising about CFSP and JHA. Thus, Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis 
have made predictions with regard to outcomes in the two ‘intergovernmental5 
pillars. They argue that ‘the dynamics o f decision making in these areas are identical 
to that in the era of the Luxembourg compromise5 (1996: 282). Their institutional 
critique of intergovemmentalism does, therefore, not cover CFSP and JHA. These 
areas are indeed dominated by the Council and decision making power rests 
‘effectively with the government with the least interest in changing the status quo.5 
While being less sceptical than Moravcsik about the prospect for further integration, 
they nevertheless conclude that for the areas of CFSP and JHA it is ‘reasonable to 
conceive o f decision making in terms o f the Luxembourg compromise period and to 
ignore the roles played by other EU institutions5 (ibid.: 283). In fact, Garrett and 
Tsebelis echo a widespread scepticism in EU studies about the extent to which 
insights from the study of policy making in the first pillar can be applied to the EU at 
large. Thus, Mark Pollack notes that his hypotheses on supranational influence only 
apply to the EC pillar and not to the ‘two strictly intergovernmental pillars5 (1997: 99; 
emphasis added). Also Simon Bulmer points out that the ‘diversity o f governance 
between the three pillars o f the EU is striking5 (1998: 367). He concludes that his 
findings on governance in the EU cannot, without recalibration, be applied to the 
second and third pillars o f the EU (ibid.: 382).
Scholars who have focused on the two areas of CFSP and JHA have always 
been sceptical with regard to such far reaching conclusions regarding the differences 
between the pillars.5 The specialised literature cites many examples which show that
5 The emphasis in this thesis on the functional similaiities between both areas should not lead to an 
underestimation o f differences between both policy areas. The subsequent chapters o f this thesis will 
address such differences.
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the relationship between the pillars on the Treaty level and in day-to-day policy 
making is stronger than suggested by the aforementioned body of literature. Yet, 
while most CFSP and JHA experts acknowledge that there is some kind of 
interrelationship between the three pillars, the precise shape o f ‘interaction and 
overlap’ between the Union’s alleged supranational and intergovernmental legal 
orders remains ‘often hody disputed’ (Peers 2000: 1). There is, thus, a widespread 
assumption even in the CFSP and JHA literature that ‘the distinctions between the 
three pillars are quite substantial’ (ibid.: 13). John Peterson, notes that ‘the CFSP is 
distinct from the rest of what constitutes the “European Union’” and emphasises 
that the special character o f the second pillar stems from the quasi-constitutional 
character, which even technical decisions in this sensitive policy area have (1998: 15). 
Also Reinhardt Rummel and Jorg Wiedemann argue that in CFSP ‘any political issue 
will automatically be viewed as a means for bargaining over institutional 
arrangements’ (1998: 63). For these two authors, the pillar structure is foremost 
characterised by institutional paradoxes and dichotomies which are ‘contradictory 
rather than complementary’ {ibid.: 53). Thus, despite the provisions of both the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty that all three pillars shall be governed 
by a single institutional framework, scholars continued to refer to both areas as 
belonging to ‘the sphere o f intergovernmental cooperation’ (Hailbronner 1995: 95; 
Hailbronner 2000: 47-50).
Consequently, those political science approaches, which have emerged in the 
1990s and which analyse first pillar policy making from a perspective which assumes 
that the EU is a quasi-governmental system, remain rather marginal for research on 
CFSP and JHA Qachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996a; Marks et aL 1996; Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank 1996; Richardson 1996b; Scharpf 1994). Most CFSP studies are 
still based on international relations approaches, while the analysis of JHA continues 
to be dominated by international law researchers as well as law practitioners (Peers 
2000; Zielonka 1998a). Such approaches have led to an emphasis on the alleged sui 
generis character of both areas and to relatively little communication with, for 
example, first pillar research. This relates to the aforementioned criticism expressed
by Wessel about largely isolated [...] research communities* on the three pillars, 
which render research ‘frequently “content driven’” rather than starting from an 
institutional analysis o f policy making (2000:1135).
Shaping ‘intergovernmental* bargains
This thesis aims to challenge these explicit or implicit assumptions of pillarised 
political processes at the EU level and also attempts to foster the linkage between 
comparative politics approaches to the study of the EU and research on CFSP and 
JHA. It argues that the functional dynamics of EU policy making, in general, and o f 
EU foreign and interior policies, in particular, have led to the emergence of a cross 
pillar institutional setting in these two areas and this cross pillar setting reflects the 
gradual erosion o f the three pillar design of the Maastricht Treaty, without its formal 
abolishment. This empirical observation has some far reaching theoretical 
consequences, for it challenges intergovemmentalist assumptions which hold ‘that 
European integration was a series o f rational adaptations by national leaders to 
constraints and opportunities stemming from the evolution of an interdependent 
world economy, the relative power of states in the international system, and the 
potential for international institutions to bolster the credibility of interstate 
commitments* (Moravcsik 1998: 472).
In stark contrast with these arguments, this thesis provides evidence that 
European integration has led to the emergence of its own functional dynamics which 
provide the primary reference point for actors, national governments and European 
institutions alike. This functional frame of EU politics renders policy making at the 
European level closely interlinked but structurally autonomous from the national 
level and international developments as well as from mere interstate bargaining. This 
claim is supported by the subsequent analysis of EU foreign and interior policies, 
thus two policy areas which are by definition closely linked to traditionally national 
notions o f sovereignty. The arguments of this thesis on a ‘functional frame* o f EU 
foreign and interior policies, which shapes the space in which actors operate, thus, 
from a conceptual perspective, stretch beyond these two areas and direct attention
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towards the underlying functional dynamics o f European integration at large. This 
‘functional frame thesis’ also relates to some of the key insights provided for by the 
schools o f historical and sociological institutionalism (Pierson 1996 and 2000a; 
Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996). It must be noted that the existence o f an 
autonomous ‘functional frame’ at the EU level does in no way mean that future 
developments or actor choices are determined. What it does, however, claim is that 
actors operate within a functionally structured space and that the specific ‘policy 
logics’ o f EU foreign and interior policies render, first, certain policy agendas more 
likely than others, second, structure the way in which institutional provisions work in 
the political process and, third, shape the set of policy options available to all actors. 
EU foreign and interior policies are therefore characterised by a ‘functional frame’, 
referred to in this thesis as ‘macro political stabilisation’, and the impact o f this frame 
on policy making can be studied when analysing the institutional provisions and actor 
preferences in these two areas.
These arguments build upon those studies — either case oriented or 
theoretical - which have highlighted the interrelationship between the three pillars. 
Thus, William Wallace has suggested that while CFSP and JHA ‘remain distinctive 
from other fields of EU policy’ the main dividing line in EU politics does not derive 
from the pillar design (W Wallace 2000: 537). Nevertheless, he emphasises the special 
character o f CFSP and JHA and notes that both areas share a similar policy mode 
which he identifies as ‘transgovemmentalism’ {ibid.: 525). Notwithstanding this 
emphasis on the importance of national governmental actors, the ‘flow of policies’ in 
both areas takes place within a single EU system of collective government, thus 
weakening the differences between the pillars {ibid.: 530). Accordingly, Elfriede 
Regelsberger et al. have pointed out that the CFSP is subject to a ‘viability o f an 
increased interconnectedness between the second and first pillars’ (1997b: 9). Similar 
observations have been made with regard to the interconnectedness between the 
third and first pillars, which are characterised by a *highly heterogeneous field [of] 
considerable overlap’ between the provisions o f the EC Treaty (TEC) and the Treaty 
on European Union (l'EU) (den Boer and Wallace 2000: 499).
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This thesis traces the various substantive, legal, institutional and 
organisational linkages between the three pillars in a systematic way, arguing that 
policy making in the EU after the Maastricht Treaty was characterised by a process 
of a de facto merging of the pillars, despite the on-going formal separation between 
them. As subsequent chapters will show, this merging process has resulted from an 
unfolding of the functional dynamics of European integration in foreign and interior 
policies. The merging proposition, which is further outlined below, is tested on the basis 
o f two case studies from each area, these being EU Middle East policies, on the one 
hand, and EU migration policies, on the other.6 In an attempt to test the validity o f 
the merging proposition, this thesis looks at the way in which EU actors, thus those 
actors explicitly referred to by Article 7 TEC and Article 5 TEU, were able to shape 
allegedly ‘intergovernmental’ bargains in foreign and interior policies. Therefore, the 
prime focus o f this thesis is to provide an analysis on the role of the European 
Parliament (EP), the Council Secretariat, the Commission, the European Court o f 
Justice (ECJ) and the Court of Auditors in policy making in foreign and interior 
policies, in general, and Middle East and migration policies, in particular.
The usage in this thesis o f the term ‘EU actors’ requires some additional 
specifications, in particular with regard to the inclusion o f the Council Secretariat in 
the analysis. Acknowledging that studies ‘of the EU can often present the reader with 
a baffling array of terminology’ the choice to refer to EU actors (as opposed to 
national governmental actors which are also an important part o f the EU system of 
governance) is better suited to describe their role in policy making than alternative 
terminologies (Geddes 2000: 11). Take, for example, the term ‘EC actors’, which 
would be too limited, since it exclusively refers to the first pillar and would, 
consequently, be less appropriate to describe the inclusion of various actors across the 
pillars. Another alternative term could be ‘supranational actors’ which is, however,
6 This thesis does not cover some other important parts o f the second and third pillars, such as 
defence policies or police and judicial cooperation. It would, however, be worthwhile to study the 
extent to which the concepts and arguments in this thesis also apply to these areas, in particular how  
they relate to issues o f internal and external security. A case in point could be the study o f emerging 
transgovemmental networks relating to Europol or the European Security and Defence Policy
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not used here due to the aforementioned conceptual scepticism about the actual 
usefulness of the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy for describing 
developments in EU politics.
The term ‘EU actors’, as it is used in this thesis refers to those actors which 
are explicitly referred to by the Treaties, which are from an organisational perspective 
permanently based at the EU level, either in Brussels (EP, Commission and the 
Council Secretariat) or, as the ECJ and the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg and 
which are not primarily made up by representatives of national governments - such 
as the Council of Ministers, Presidencies or Council Working Groups.
As Christiansen notes, the ‘inclusion of the Council Secretariat may require 
further justification since it is usually not regarded as either “supranational” or as an 
“institution” [...] However, in spite o f the official nomenclature, the Council 
Secretariat is clearly an institution, possessing a formal structure with a set of internal 
rules and administrative practices which regulate the work of a body of permanent 
staff. And it is located at the European level, possessing a high degree o f institutional 
autonomy and may therefore be regarded as supranational’ (2002: 35). This view is 
supported here, yet for the reason stated above the term ‘supranational’ is replaced 
by the more neutral reference to ‘EU actors’. This perspective also takes note of the 
observation that the functions o f the Council Secretariat in the policy making process 
have gradually been extended since the Maastricht Treaty. As subsequent chapters 
will show in greater detail, the traditional functions of the Secretariat to support the 
Presidencies and being the ‘institutional memory’ of the Council, have been 
supplemented by a gradual politicisation o f the Secretariat, which has become - in 
particular in the area o f foreign policies - a more autonomous actor.
As a word of caution it should be noted, that articles 7 TEC and 5 TEU refer 
to the Council as a whole. This thesis, however, merely looks at the Council 
Secretariat and not at those parts o f the Council’s structure - such as Presidencies, 
specialised Councils, Working Groups, the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER), the Political Committee, the K.4 Committee or other institutions - that 
are primarily constituted by national governmental actors. Since the Secretariat is not
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such a nationally constituted institution, it is reasonable to compare it with the other 
EU actors and to ask how the Secretariat was involved in shaping 
‘intergovemmentar bargains — while acknowledging that in its day-to-day operations 
the Council Secretariat is closely linked with other actors in the Council’s complex 
institutional structure.
The usefulness of such a distinction between the Council Secretariat, on the 
one hand, and the other aforementioned actors within the Council structure has been 
acknowledged by other scholars who have analysed the evolution o f the role o f the 
Secretariat, in particular with regard to EU foreign policies (M E  Smith 2003; 
Christiansen 2002; Hayward-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). This should, however, not 
lead to the conclusion that the distinction between the Council Secretariat and other 
Council institutions is ‘clear-cut’ (Christiansen 2002: 35). While some actors within 
the Council structure, such as the Presidency, the Council of Ministers and the 
Working Groups are characterised by a ‘duality’ of being both EU and national 
actors, the role o f the Council Secretariat is less blurred (ibid.) Thus, as Michael E 
Smith has argued with a view to EU foreign policies, the establishment o f the CFSP 
Secretariat with the Maastricht Treaty has rendered this institution ‘an arm of the 
Council Secretariat General [...] a Community institution’ (2003: 188). This delegation 
o f powers to the Council Secretariat must not be mistaken for an abdication of 
political power by member states. In fact, the delegation o f powers to the Council 
Secretariat has been used by member states in an attempt to avoid delegation to 
another EU actor, namely the Commission. The establishment o f the offices o f the 
CFSP Secretariat, the High Representative for the CFSP (who also acts as Secretary 
General of the Council), the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) and 
the Special Representatives with the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties points to an 
increasing shift o f power between EU actors from the Commission to the Council 
Secretariat7 Thus, ‘the Council Secretariat has gained additional powers and 
responsibilities in recent rounds o f treaty revision, in particular with respect to the
7 See also chapter 4 in which the delegation o f capabilities to the Council Secretariat is discussed in 
greater detail
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establishment o f the EU’s foreign, security and defence institutions — a development 
that, while reflecting concern among member states that such powers should not be 
accrued by the Commission, also underlines the ability o f the Council Secretariat to 
provide institutional solutions in such a context? (Christiansen 2002: 46).
The inclusion o f the Council Secretariat in this analysis does, therefore, not 
suggest that it is the most powerful actor within the complex institutional structure 
o f the Council (cf. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). Neither does it imply that the 
distinction between Secretariat and other Council actors is sharp. For example, the 
Council Secretariat — but also the EPC Secretariat from 1986 to 1993 — is 
characterised by a strong institutionalised interrelationship with and dependence on 
the rotating Presidencies. Thus, the ‘Secretariat’s relationship with the Presidency 
[...] is a flexible one. Much o f [...] the significance of the Council Secretariat’s role in 
drafting agendas and meetings, providing legal and other advice, and fine-tuning the 
detail o f negotiations crucially depends on the permissiveness of the Presidency to 
provide such opportunities for influence’ (Christiansen 2002: 47-48). This form of 
intense structural coupling between the Council Secretariat and other Council actors 
must, however, not only be seen as a limitation to the influence o f the Secretariat. In 
fact, its dose institutional relationship with member states in parallel to its overall 
political responsibility to the EU as such (and not to Presidencies or member states) 
actually provides the Council Secretariat with a strong institutional backing vis-a-vis 
both member states and other EU actors, in particular the Commission. Hence, the 
argument o f this thesis about the growing importance of the Council Secretariat in 
policy making, in particular in the area of foreign polides, must be viewed against the 
background o f both the Secretariat’s dose linkage with member states and the 
Presidendes, on the one hand, and its role as an executive counter-weight to the 
Commission, on the other.
Having said this, it is essential to note that while being closely linked to other 
actors within the Council’s institutional structure, the Secretariat differs from these 
other actors in a crucial way, for the Secretariat does not fully or pardy represent 
individual member states’ governments but, as Michad E Smith argues, represents
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the ‘power o f the Community's bureaucratic machinery’ (2003: 148). This does not 
neglect the sense of hierarchy ingrained in the Treaties between the Secretariat and 
other Council institutions, for example in the area of EU foreign policies. Thus, 
Article 18 TEU emphasises that it is the Presidency that represents ‘the Union in 
matters coming within the common foreign and security policy’. In this context, the 
High Representative ‘only5 has the task to assist the Presidency. However, in contrast 
to the provisions prior to the Maastricht Treaty, in which the then-EPC Secretariat 
was directly responsible to the rotating Presidency, the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties have fostered the autonomy of the Secretariat — and the High Representative 
— as EU actors. Thus, the new directive for the CFSP Secretariat (which became part 
o f the Council Secretariat) and, with Amsterdam, the High Representative and the 
PPEWU, was ‘to serve the CFSP (rather than the EU Presidency)’, thereby 
consolidating the status of the Council Secretariat as an EU actor (M E Smith 2003: 
188).8
The distinction which this thesis draws between national governmental actors 
(member states), those actors representing both member states and the EU 
(Presidency, Council of Ministers, COREPER, the Political Committee, the K.4 
Committee, Working Groups) and EU actors is not an argument about the 
distribution o f power between these actors in the policy making process. As this 
thesis argues again and again, member states continue to play the key role in policy 
making in the two areas of foreign and interior affairs, thus reflecting the close link 
o f these two areas with traditional national prerogatives. Yet, while there is ample 
evidence in the literature on the decisive role of national governments and Council 
institutions in EU foreign and interior policies, no study has until today focused from 
a comparative perspective on the role o f EU actors in this context. The thesis hence 
follows the conceptual demand raised by Christiansen who has argued that a
8 Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the EPC Secretariat was clearly separated from the Council 
Secretariat Although both Secretariats were, since the establishment o f the EPC Secretariat with the 
SEA, located within the same building, yet they remained detached from each other. N ot only were 
they placed in different wings o f the Council building, but the EPC Secretariat was separated horn the 
Council Secretariat by doors with special locks on them* (Smith 2003:168).
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‘systematic analysis o f the role of supranational institutions [...] is not only 
promising, but indeed necessary’ (ibid:. 34). While not neglecting the central role of 
national governments in the policy making process — for example in providing 
political leadership and continuity of policy making - the permanent and systematic 
involvement of EU actors in foreign and interior policies endows ‘the EU bargaining 
context with a rich normative environment that cannot be explained away as 
epiphenomenal or a mere lubricant of intergovernmental negotiation’ (Lewis 2000: 
261) A t this point, a second conceptual clarification must be introduced, namely that 
there is an important difference with regard to both case studies. While Middle East 
policies are pursued in all o f the various issues areas relating to EU foreign policies in 
both the first pillar and the CFSP, migration policies are only one amongst several 
issue areas in the interior policy setting of the EU. Thus, JHA cooperation also 
encompasses issues such as drug prevention policies, the combat of fraud, judicial 
cooperation in both dvil and criminal matters, customs cooperation and, in 
particular, police cooperation in order to prevent terrorism and international crime. 
While, hence, from the outset the ‘subject-matter [of JHA] was heterogeneous’, there 
is nevertheless an important linkage between these various JHA issues which allows 
us to concentrate on migration policies in order to detect more general trends in the 
development of interior policies at large (W Wallace 2000: 494).
Thus, all o f these *law and order* issues were traditionally considered as 
‘matters of executive control in all states’ and, consequendy, as central components 
of national sovereignty (ibid.: 501; cf. Geddes 2000). However, European integration 
and, in particular, the economically motivated relaxation o f border regimes between 
EU member states, brought to the fore the requirement to coordinate policies in law 
and order issues at the European level and to collectively respond to new cross 
border challenges. Notwithstanding their partially different institutional frameworks, 
this shared cross border context o f law and order issues is relevant for as different 
phenomena in the area o f interior policies, such as cross border movements of 
migrants, cross border litigation, cross border marriages, cross border drug 
trafficking or cross border crime. Given the linkage o f all these areas with (internal)
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sovereignty and erstwhile national prerogatives, EU policies in all areas of JHA 
contribute to the construction of an ‘internal law and order identity* of the EU and, 
consequently, a nascent political sovereignty.
In the light o f these functional similarities between the heterogeneous 
subject-matters of JHA, migration policies seem to be a particularly useful case for a 
detailed analysis of cross pillar politics. This is because migration policies - 
understood as those policies which regulate conditions o f entry and sojourn o f non 
EU citizen - not only establish EU specific law and order practices, but do so in 
relation to a clearly demarcated outside, namely third country nationals (TCN).9 
Thus, migration policies are a particularly visible example of the stabilisation o f an 
internal identity of the EU induced by policy making in interior policies in general.
Given this thesis’ focus on the role o f EU actors in foreign and interior 
policies, the particular objective here is to show that EU actors were indeed able to 
establish and to exploit various linkages between the pillars and to shape policy 
outcomes across all three pillars, thus at least partially overcoming their formally 
negligible role in CFSP and JHA on the Treaty level. EU actors were thus able to 
shape ‘intergovemmentaT bargains since the functionally induced cross pillar 
institutional setting provides a stable, EU-specific frame within which the 
preferences o f EU actors — alongside those o f national governments — are constantly 
channelled into the EU decision making process. The analysis covers the years from 
1993, when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, until February 2003, when the 
Nice Treaty entered into force. Turning the spotlight on policy making processes in 
the two areas, this thesis argues that EU foreign and interior policies cannot 
sufficiently be explained by looking solely at member states’ preferences and bargains 
between them but are to a significant extent shaped by the inputs o f EU actors as 
well. This does not imply that EU actors were able to dominate policy making. 
Indeed, member states continue to hold the most powerful institutional resources in
9 Notwithstanding the significance o f this basic distinction between EU citizen, on the one hand, and 
TCNs on the other, it should be emphasised that EU law provides for a multifaceted system o f rights 
o f TCNs. Thus, the legal status o f those TCNs, which are permanent residents in the EU, often 
approximates the status o f EU citizen, at least in the economic sphere (cf. Peers 2000).
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both areas (Hill 1996 and 1997; Kuijper 2000). Notwithstanding these limitations to 
the role o f EU actors, a systematic analysis o f the conditions under and the extent to 
which they can make use o f their formal and informal powers in policy making, 
which often stem from first pillar prerogatives, is well suited both to account for the 
centralisation process in the two areas and to capture the institutional complexities of 
cross pillar politics.
While it is, thus, argued that an analysis o f policy making in both areas 
supports the hypotheses o f both a gradual merging o f the pillars in everyday policy 
making and o f a significant influence of EU actors in shaping policies, it is not 
claimed that this development has led to a supranationalisation of foreign and 
interior policies. Member states and the Council continue to be the central players in 
both areas and the Treaties, in particular in the area o f foreign policies, have codified 
the centrality of the (European) Council and the rotating Presidencies in the policy 
making process. In fact, the price EU actors had to pay for shaping policies across 
the pillars, has been the assertion by member states within the framework o f the 
Council and the European Council to provide for collective executive leadership in 
both areas. By doing so, also member states embarked upon the opportunities 
provided for by the merging o f the pillars. Thus, the inroad EU actors made into 
formally intergovernmental domains has been mirrored by the attempt of member 
states to gain more control over both the cross pillar policy agendas in foreign and 
interior affairs — including erstwhile ‘supranational’ policy domains of the first pillar 
and the implementation o f policies across all three pillars (Fligstein and McNichol 
1998).
One of the immediate implications o f the argument put forward here relates 
to terminology. It is based on scepticism regarding the distinction in most literature 
between first pillar foreign policies and CFSP, on the one hand, and first pillar 
interior policies and JHA, on the other hand. The strict delineation between the 
different parts o f these policy areas, as they are spread across the pillars is, according 
to the findings presented in this thesis, less important than suggested by a 
terminology that reproduces this very pillarisation by imprecise and often normatively
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laden labels such as ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘supranational’. In particular, the 
interchangeable usage of the terms foreign and interior policies with the acronyms 
CFSP and JHA is rejected. Acknowledging the implications of the merging 
proposition, the terms EU foreign and interior policies cover the whole spectrum of 
policies in both areas including first pillar provisions, whereas CFSP and JHA are not 
distinct policy areas but specific decision making rules for parts o f EU foreign and 
interior policies.
Institutions: Cross pillar politics
The merging proposition put forward here builds upon two key insights into EU 
politics provided by recent political science and legal studies literature, which both 
make the case for a unity o f the EU on a political and legal level. With regard to the 
political unity thesis, scholars have argued from a comparative politics perspective, that 
politics and policies of the EU are by and large comparable to other (national) 
political systems (Lindberg 1969; Wallace 1982; Hix 1999). While this political system 
perspective has been advocated by Hix, it can, in fact, be found as an underlying 
assumption for the majority of political science research on the EU (Jachtenfuchs 
2001; Hix 1994 and 1998). Thus, scholars have in particular for those policy areas 
covered by the TEC used methods, which were traditionally applied to the analysis of 
national political systems, to the study o f EU politics and policies. Hence, they have, 
first, identified a ‘stable and clearly-defined set of institutions for collective decision- 
making’ comprising the (European) Council, the Commission, the EP and 
jurisdiction by the ECJ.10 Second, scholars have looked at the way in which ‘citizens 
and social groups seek to achieve their political desires through the political system’.11 
Third, various studies have shown that ‘collective decisions [at the EU level] have a 
significant impact on the distribution of economic resources and the allocation of 
social and political values’, and, finally, that ‘there is a continuous interaction
10 See among others for the Council Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Hosli 1996; for die EP 
Tsebelis 1994; Eamshaw and Judge 1996; and for the ECJ Alter 1998.
11 For these state-sodety relations see among others Gabel 1998; Hix and Lord 1997; Reif and Schmitt 
1980.
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(“feedback”) between these political outputs, new demands on the system, new 
decisions, and so on’12 (Hix 1999: 8). Thus, at least with regard to politics o f the first 
pillar, there is an emerging consensus that the EU is indeed a ‘polity’ sharing 
structural similarities with traditional national polities.13 Notwithstanding this 
observation, it should be stressed that due to its relatively unstable and contested 
institutional setup and due to the contested dimension of democratic accountability 
and legitimacy, the EU is predominantly considered a polity-in-the-making rather 
than a fully fledged political system (Weiler 1997; Wallace 1999). Having these 
remarks in mind, the EU can thus be characterised as a political system, while still 
being different from national political systems of other Western liberal democracies 
due to the ‘incomplete’ or ‘partial* character of its polity (H Wallace 2000b: 66; W 
Wallace 2000: 533).
Second, scholars o f EU law have following the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Amsterdam Treaty developed a new holistic perspective on the interplay between the 
various Treaties.14 Thus, Armin von Bogdandy argues, that the significance o f the 
Maastricht Treaty goes beyond the establishment o f three only loosely connected 
pillars. Challenging mainstream legal perspectives which assume a separation between 
the pillars, he notes that the establishment of the EU led to the emergence of a 
‘single organisation [...] called the “European Union’” and that, therefore, the ‘terms 
“Communities” and “pillars of the European Union” do not demarcate different 
organisations but only different capacities with partially specific legal instruments and 
procedures’ (1999: 1). This thesis has some far reaching consequences for policy 
making in all three pillars since ‘all the Treaties and secondary law form a single legal 
order* (ibid1). Therefore, legal principles developed for the first pillar can, under 
certain conditions, be equally applied to the second and third pillars.15 It is worth
12 For this allocation function see Ireland 1996 or Majone 1991,1993 and 1996a and 1996b.
13 As this thesis will argue at length, also policy making in EU foreign and interior policies is an 
integral part o f this EU polity (Guehenno 1998).
14 See Lenaerts 1991 for an account on pre Maastricht legal perspectives on the EC. See also 
Bardenhewer 1998; Barents 1997; Bogdandy and Ehlermann 1998.
15 This legal unity diesis is not mere legal abstraction but has been applied by the ECJ in its Airport 
Transit Visa judgement on migration policies in 1997. This judgement will be analysed in greater detail 
in chapter 6.
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noting, that von Bogdandy’s analysis reveals the existence of a legal environment at 
the EU level that was neither planned nor foreseen by member states during the 
Maastricht IGC. Quite on the contrary, at Maastricht member states agreed upon the 
pillar design since (some) member states wanted to avoid a ‘contamination’ of CFSP 
and JHA with traditional EC practices (Moravcsik 1998: 467). Following the 
arguments of the political and legal unity perspectives, this thesis asserts that such an 
objective has largely failed, thereby challenging the view that the time between IGCs 
should be considered as merely an ‘intervening period o f consolidation’ rather than 
as a period with its own functional dynamics (Moravcsik 1993: 473).
These two key arguments, namely that the EU both is a political system and 
is equipped with a single legal order, are thus regarded as the conceptual starting 
points o f this thesis. The empirical studies on Middle East and migration policies will 
further explore the precise conditions under which and the extent to which these 
assumptions can be applied to policy making processes across the three pillars. The 
merging proposition can, thus, be summarised as follows.
Proposition 1 If the EU is characterised by one legal system stretching across all three pillars and 
if  politics and policies o f the Union resemble those o f a political system, then CFSP 
and JHA cannot be separated from those parts o f foreign and interior policies 
contained in the first pillar. In that case, foreign and interior policies are expected to 
be characterised by a significant cross pillar dimension, which also renders them an 
integral part o f the political system o f die EU.
Notwithstanding this argument, it should be emphasised that it is not claimed here
that the merging of foreign and interior policies from the first pillar, on the one
hand, with those from the second and third pillars, on the other, is an automatic,
predetermined process. The degree to which merging takes place rather depends
upon concrete decision in day-to-day policy making in foreign and interior policies
and on the extent to which the merging potential offered by the Treaties is made use
o f politically. Moreover, since this merging of foreign and interior affairs is an
unintended consequence o f the institutional choice to establish a pillarised system for
both areas, the occurrence of such processes is likely to provoke conflict between
those member states with preferences for a formal separation o f the pillars, on the
one hand, and those member states (and, supposedly, EU actors) which support
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merging, on the other. Against this background it can be explained that also after the 
Amsterdam IGC there is a continuity at the Treaty level with regard to the guiding 
principles of the original pillar structure, including the semi-communitarisation of 
migration policies. Therefore, in spite o f merging processes at the policy making 
level, a persistence o f (some) member states’ preferences, as expressed during the 
Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice IGCs, can safely be assumed. In other words, the 
formal linkage between sensitive policy areas such as foreign and interior affairs, on 
the one hand, and intergovernmental institutions for cooperation, on the other, has 
not been entirely abandoned until today. Consequently, the legal and political set up 
of EU foreign and interior policies continues to reflect the reservations held by some 
member states with regard to a communitarisation of both areas (Hill 1998a; Hix 
1995; Hix and Niessen 1995).
Function: Macro political stabilisation
While the cross pillar politics proposition outlined above is based on the assumption 
that CFSP and JHA are subject to, first, linkages with ‘parallel* foreign and interior 
policy provisions o f the first pillar and, second, a ‘centralisation’ o f both areas at the 
EU level, it does also acknowledge that merging is likely to be constrained by the 
sovereignty concerns some member states attach to both areas (Dunleavy 1997). This 
argument, thus, insinuates that there are also certain shared policy characteristics 
between both areas. Embracing this idea of shared characteristics, a second 
proposition is suggested, which will be referred to as the macro political stabilisation 
proposition. It is argued that both EU foreign and interior policies are characterised by 
a functional similarity shared between both areas, namely their relevance for the 
stabilisation o f an internal and external identity of the EU, and that it is this 
functional similarity which distinguishes both areas from other areas of EU policy 
making. Thus, both foreign and interior policies constitute a distinct policy type, 
described as macro political stabilisation, and these policy similarities also result in 
similar patterns of policy making. Also this proposition will be tested in the empirical
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chapters of this thesis on the basis of the two case studies on Middle East and 
migration policies.
The attempt to classify policies into typological categories, although not yet 
applied to EU foreign and interior affairs, is a quite common exercise for the study 
of other policy areas at the EU level. The basic idea behind the concept of policy 
types is to replace ‘the descriptive, subject-matter categories* of many case studies 
with a junctional approach that identifies arenas comprising different policy areas with 
each arena ‘developing its own characteristic political structure, political process, 
elites, and group relations* (Lowi 1964: 689-690). Theodore Lowi argued in his 
seminal work that policies determine politics, thereby demonstrating that shared structural 
features of different policy areas on the policy dimension lead to similarities in the 
way in which these areas are dealt with in the political process. Following Lowi*s 
basic typology, scholars of EU politics have most commonly distinguished between 
regulatory, distributional and redistributional policies. Hix has used another related 
categorisation, namely Richard Musgrave’s typology of regulatory, redistributional 
and macro economic stabilisation policies to account for political processes at the 
EU level (Musgrave and Musgrave 1959; Hix 1999).
Notwithstanding the popularity o f policy typologies in EU studies, they have 
mainly been used in order to account for socio economic policies and have not yet 
been extended to cover foreign and interior affairs as well. Also Lowi*s and 
Musgrave’s typologies, if applied to the EU, relate to first pillar areas. Policies 
covered by the second and third pillars do not easily fit into one of these categories, 
although they might comprise elements o f the aforementioned policy types, such as 
regulatory features o f migration policies (Stetter 2000). Yet, it is argued here that 
foreign and interior/migration policies can be understood as constituting a distinct 
policy type. Both areas share a similar allocation function since they provide for 
policies which define the relations o f the EU vis-a-vis third parties, be they third 
countries or third country nationals, thereby consolidating an internal and external identity 
o f the EU. Both areas are, thus, contributing to the emergence of a political 
dimension of EU sovereignty since decisions in both areas construct the EU vis-a-vis
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‘others’, thus, fostering the insider-outsider dimension of the Union which is a 
central element in the emergence o f a European identity (Jenkins and Sofos 1996; 
Leitner 1997; Ugur 1995).
This allocation function o f foreign and migration policies is the reason why, 
as many scholars have noted, the emergence of Europeanised settings in both areas 
stands in a direct tension with traditional national sovereignty. By providing policies 
which construct new identities o f insiders and outsiders with the poles of the EU and 
EU citizens, on the one hand, and third countries and third country nationals, on the 
other, not only the distinction between EU member states themselves and their 
citizens gradually diminishes, but the EU also becomes the bearer of the two main 
principles of what Max Weber has identified as the central elements of sovereignty 
and, indeed, of statehood itself. In his famous Munich lecture on Tolitics as a 
Vocation’, Weber has argued that ‘today, however, we have to say that a state is a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopojy of the Ultimate use of physical 
force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics o f the 
state’ (Weber 1988: 506; second emphasis added).16 Indeed, the inherent tension between 
a traditional notion of territory and authority with emerging processes at the EU level 
is of particular relevance in those areas linked to member states’ external and internal 
sovereignty. As Nohlen has argued in line with the aforementioned Weberian 
definition, sovereignty can be understood as ‘those claims which constitute the 
modem state on the basis of authority within and vis-a-vis the outsidi (Nohlen 1992: 
902; emphasis added)}1 While it is not argued that the EU is a state, this thesis 
nevertheless asserts that by providing public policies in foreign and interior affairs, 
the EU is embarking upon erstwhile constitutive prerogatives o f the state.
Thus, the EU is, first, developing a single territorial dimension and, in a 
second step, centralised institutions of this territory provide for authoritative decisions
16 Translation SS. In the original version o f Politik als Benfi Weber argues that ‘Staat ist diejeniege 
Gemeinschaft, welche innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebietes — dies: das „Gebiet“ gehort zum 
Merkmal, das Monopol kgttimerphysischer Gewahsamkeit fur sich (mit Erfolg) beansprucht’ (Weber 1988: 
506; emphasis in the original version).
17 Translation SS.
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within the EU and vis-a-vis the outside world.18 However, this development o f an 
insider-outsider dimension, which strengthens the territorial and authoritative 
significance of the EU, develops in parallel to the persistence of national prerogatives 
in foreign and interior policies and, therefore, the EU is not claiming a Weberian 
monopoly to regulate both areas — but no longer is the state. To use the terminology 
of the German constitutional lawyer Georg Jellinek, foreign and interior policies are, 
nevertheless, valuable examples for the establishment of Staatsgebiet and Staatsgervalt at 
the EU level (1919). The third category developed by Jellinek, namely the existence 
of a Staatsvolk is, when compared to the emerging territorial and authoritative 
dimension, least developed. Along these lines, Joseph Weiler has argued that there is 
no European demos the existence o f which he considers a prerequisite for providing 
the political system of the EU with statal legitimacy (1997). This thesis does not 
attempt to further expand on this — fascinating but also challengeable — assertion. It 
simply derives from the aforementioned argument regarding the territorial authority 
of the EU, that policies in foreign and migration policies do contribute significantly 
to the allocation o f political and social values in the Union, inter alia stabilising the 
political system properties o f the EU by stepwise consolidating its internal and 
external identity.19
Consider again Hix’s adaptation o f Musgrave’s typology. Hix argues that 
there are five different policy types at the EU level, these being regulatory, (re-) 
distributional, macro economic stabilisation, citizen rights and global policies (Hix 
1999: 8). While not neglecting the differences between EU foreign and interior 
policies, this thesis proposes that both areas can be defined as belonging to one 
policy type. This policy type has as its main elements the two Weberian categories o f 
‘authority5 and ‘territory5. As opposed to the traditional policy types analysed in EU 
studies, foreign and interior policies are not mainly o f a socio economic nature.
18 It is suggested here to equate Weber's terminology o f ‘physical force’ with ‘authority.
19 EU policies in foreign and interior policies are also relevant for fostering the aforementioned other 
dimension o f a political system. Thus, since 1993 the set o f institutions for collective decision making 
has stabilised, interest groups and political parties at the EU level, which engage iri policy making in 
both areas, have developed and, finally, policies in both areas are subject to a constant ‘feedback’ 
mechanism.
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Nevertheless, both areas share a specific allocation function and, in line with 
Musgrave’s argument, the provision o f public policies in foreign and interior affairs 
rests on ‘the proposition that certain goods — referred to [...] as social as distinct from 
private goods — cannot be provided for through the market system’ (Musgrave and 
Musgrave 1959: 7). Musgrave and Musgrave have shown that political systems 
depend not only on the allocation o f specific ‘technical’ policy provisions, but also on 
the formulation, maintenance and achievement of wider policy goals and objectives 
which form the context for the continuous allocation of more specific policy 
provisions. In the fiscal realm, they have therefore distinguished between (re-) 
distributional policies, on the one hand, and macro economic stabilisation policies, 
on the other. The policy goals and objectives, which are usually associated with 
macro economic stabilisation policies are lower unemployment, lower inflation and 
higher productivity’ (Hix 1999: 241). In the context of the EU, for example, the 
primary goal of macro economic stabilisation policies is, according to the Treaties’ 
provisions, the goal o f price stability. What is furthermore important is that these 
goals and objectives require a political setting from which they can emerge. This 
holds true for macro economic stabilisation policies in which there is ‘no adjustment 
process by which the economy is automatically returned to high employment and 
stability’ (Musgrave and Musgrave 1959: 13). In the EU it is in particular the 
European Central Bank and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (with a 
special role for the informal Euro-11 group of those states which are members of the 
Euro zone) which define and maintain these wider policy objectives. This 
corresponds with the observation that ‘the stabilization [...] function must be largely 
performed at the central or federal level’ {ibid.: 19). The same arguments can now be 
applied for non economic policies of the EU.
Thus, decisions in foreign and interior policies allocate ‘authority’ on the 
issues of political relations (foreign policies) and political rights (interior policies). 
Moreover, since policy making in foreign and interior policies fosters the insider- 
outsider dimension of the Union, decisions in both areas also give substance to the 
nascent political sovereignty o f the EU. Thus, EU foreign and interior policies serve,
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through decisions stemming from the central level, the shared objective to formulate, 
achieve and maintain an - external and internal - identity o f the EU. Such a goal is 
expliddy recognised by the Treaties. For example, Article 2 TEU, which refers to the 
objectives o f the EU, states in its second indent that it is one of the objectives o f the 
EU ‘to assert its identity on the international scene’. In a similar way, Article 2, fourth 
indent TEU formulates the objective of an internal identity of the EU by calling for 
the development of a border free ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ within the 
EU in parallel to the establishment of rules for ‘external border controls, asylum, 
immigration’, thus the drawing of a distinction between the internal and the external 
(both territorially and personally).
Seen from that perspective, the allocation of policies in foreign and interior 
policies indeed serves die purpose to give substance to the aforementioned policy 
function of distinguishing the EU /  EU citizen from non-EU states /  TCNs, in 
other words to foster the internal and external identity o f the Union and, thereby, 
EU sovereignty. Foreign and interior policies thus constitute a fourth policy type 
additional to the classical typology applied to EU studies. In both areas the EU 
allocates, through decisions made at the central level, political rules which construct 
an inside and an outside, i.e., as far as the two case studies are concerned, Middle 
Eastern states and territories, on the one hand, and TCNs, on the other.20 Due to this 
identity formation function of foreign and interior policies, this policy type will be 
referred to as ‘macro political stabilisation*, drawing analogies to the way in which 
monetary politics set the (macro economic) framework for regulative and (re-) 
distributive policies in the sodo economic sphere.
Being aware o f these substantial functional similarities between foreign and 
interior polides and recalling Lowi’s verdict, that polides determine politics, it is not 
surprising that the policy making frameworks for EU foreign and interior polides do
20 Another structural feature shared by both areas is that both depend heavily on events and actors 
outside the EU and are thus under limited control o f the Union. This thesis is not investigating these 
external dynamics in greater detail but rather focuses on the inside dimension o f EU politics.
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indeed share many institutional properties.21 As has been the case with macro
economic stabilisation policies, also macro political stabilisation policies are
characterised by an increasing centralisation of policies at the EU level. As this thesis 
will argue at length, policy making in macro political stabilisation policies is — in 
contrast with regulatory and (re-) distributive policies -characterised by the centrality 
o f executive actors, such as the Council, the member states but also the Commission 
and, in some areas, the Council Secretariat at all stages of the decision making 
process. Indeed, some studies on both areas have indicated such similarities and have 
identified the Treaty rules of both the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties on foreign 
and interior polides as having quite parallel structures with regard to actor 
involvement, interaction rules, legal frameworks and financing provisions. Based on 
these substantial and institutional similarities between both areas, therefore, the 
second proposition reads as follows.
Proposition 2 The functional similarities between both areas on the policy dimension explain the 
similarities on the institutional dimension. Foreign and interior policies do thus 
constitute a single policy type and provide for macro political stabilisation o f the 
EU political system by fostering the internal and external identity o f the Union,
thereby consolidating a nascent political sovereignty. Additionally, both areas are
expected to be characterised by similar structural features on the politics dimension
Patterns o f policy m aking and E U  actors
On the basis o f these two propositions, which assume a merging of the pillars into a 
cross pillar institutional setting, on the one hand, and functional policy similarities 
between both areas, on the other, the overall research design can now be outlined. 
As argued above, the merging proposition applies to day-to-day policy making and 
also the functional similarities between both areas are expected to be visible in
21 This emphasis on the similarities between foreign and interior policies — both on the functional and 
die politics dimension — should, however, not lead to the condusion that differences between the two 
areas are negligible. As subsequent chapters o f this thesis illustrate, each area has its specific 
institutional mechanisms and also partly different sets o f actors engaged in policy making. 
Notwithstanding, this observation, the thesis does assert that the functional similarities -  which also 
lead to many shared features on the politics dimension — justify to consider both areas bdonging to 
one policy type, namely macro political stabilisation.
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everyday policy making. Therefore, the two propositions can be tested when looking 
at concrete policy making processes in the two areas. This thesis, therefore, attempts 
to account for patterns of policy making in foreign (Middle East) and interior (migration) 
polides.
But why should such an analysis focus on the role of EU actors? Consider 
what Hinich and Munger have described as the ‘fundamental equation of politics’ 
(1997). Thus, policy outcomes are generally regarded as the result o f a (complex) 
interplay between actor preferences and institutional provisions. In fact, scholars of 
EU foreign and interior policies have already identified patterns of the interplay 
between actors and institutions in policy making in both areas and this body of 
literature will also be referred to in subsequent chapters when dealing with functions, 
institutions and actors in foreign and interior policies (Geddes 2000; Hill 1996). What 
matters at this point is rather the provision of a solid justification for choosing the 
role o f EU actors as the main research focus. In other words, what institutions and 
what actors do explain policy outcomes in both areas?
As will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, policy making processes 
in Middle East and migration policies have predominantly be explained by looking at 
the intergovernmental institutions o f the second and third pillars, on the one hand, 
and preferences of member states, on the other. Scholars, thus, took note both o f the 
particular sovereignty concerns o f member states in these two areas as well as o f the 
weakness of the classical Community method in policy making in foreign and interior 
affairs. When relating these two elements to the aforementioned ‘politics equation’, 
the following null-hypotheses of patterns of policy making in foreign and interior 
politics can be derived.
Figure 2.1 Null-hypotheses of intergovernmentalpolitics
H 0a* Policy making Foreign policies institutions intwgnwnmwml (CFSP) "t* preferences member states 
H Ob' P o l i c y  m a k i n g  Interior policies— i n s t i t u t i o n s  intergovernmental (JHA) p r e f e r e n c e s  member states
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Indeed, as has been emphasised in the introductory part of this chapter, explanations 
on outcomes in both areas often view policies as the result o f the interplay between 
the different preferences o f member states in both areas and the various 
intergovernmental institutions of the second and third pillars, thus coming dose to 
intergovemmentalist assumptions on EU politics (Moravcsik 1999). While this thesis 
does also assume that member states and intergovernmental institutions are central 
for explaining patterns o f policy making in both areas, the two key propositions 
developed above, suggest that the two null-hypotheses might not be able to account 
for all variance with regard to policy making. Thus, if there are cross pillar 
institutions then policy making processes must reflect this *EU context* rather than 
the intergovernmental institutional framework suggested by the null-hypothesis. 
Moreover, if, as suggested by the macro political stabilisation proposition, the 
functional similarities of both areas lead to shared structural features on the politics 
dimension, there should be considerable overlap between the two key variables ‘actor 
preferences’ and ‘institutions’ in both areas. Having said that, this thesis, therefore, 
assumes that the cross pillar institutional context of the EU political system allows 
also actors organised at the EU level to significandy influence policy making in both 
areas — in particular if they are able to exploit linkages between the pillars. Moreover, 
the way in which EU actors try to shape ‘intergovernmental’ bargains should show 
similar structural features in both areas. It is, thus, argued that patterns o f policy 
making in foreign and interior affairs cannot solely be explained by looking at the 
interests o f and action by the member states within intergovernmental institutional 
settings. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis can be formulated as follows.
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Figure 2.2 Alternative hypothesis of cross pillarpolitics andpolicies22
H  1 a/b* Policy making Foreign /  Interior policies
functional features macro political stabilisation h  institutions cross pillar h  preferences member states /  HU actors
Thus, the hypothesis which is tested in this thesis is that policy making processes in 
foreign (Middle East) and interior (migration) policies are the result o f the complex 
interplay between preferences o f member states and EU actors within the cross pillar 
institutional setting of both areas and that the interplay between these two variables 
is shaped by the specific functional features of macro political stabilisation policies.
It should be noted that the two null-hypotheses are actually included in H t. In 
other words, it is assumed that member states and intergovernmental institutions do 
indeed explain some variation regarding patterns of policy making in both areas. 
Given member states* veto power on many parts of the policy agenda in both areas 
and given the strong relationship between foreign and interior policies with the issue 
o f sovereignty, it is safe to assume that preferences of member states account for a 
significant amount o f variation (Tsebelis 2000). Moreover, even in entirely 
communitarised settings, member states do hold considerable institutional resources. 
While not neglecting the important role of the Council and member states, this 
thesis, however, also argues that in order to obtain the ‘full picture* on the dynamics 
o f policy making in the two areas, such an intergovemmentalist approach does not 
suffice and that one has to account as well on the role of EU actors acting within the 
functionally structured cross pillar institutional setting o f macro political stabilisation 
policies. This explains the focus o f this thesis on the role of EU actors in foreign and 
interior politics. Following the merging proposition it is, thus, argued that EU actors
22 Note that this is an ideal typical equation o f policy making in EU foreign and interior policies. As 
has been mentioned before, both areas are highly dependent on external events, thus factors different 
from ‘functional features’, ‘institutions’ and ‘actors’. While this thesis asserts that macro political 
stabilisation functions, cross pillar institutions and the orientations o f national and EU actors do 
explain the shape o f EU foreign and interior policies, it nevertheless recognises that some variance in 
both areas must be credited to variables not considered in this equation, such as, for example, 
international developments in Middle East and migration policies. See also chapter 3 which briefly 
discusses the role o f these external variables.
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can make strategic use of ‘parallel’ powers from the first pillar in an attempt to 
influence policy making processes across the pillars. Following the macro political 
stabilisation proposition it is, moreover, claimed that the way in which EU actors 
influence policy making should be similar due to the shared functional characteristics 
o f the two policy areas. What sets apart these two areas from other areas o f EU 
politics are then the particular features of macro political stabilisation policies which 
provide the functional frame within which both institutions and actors operate (Lowi 
1964).
In spite of the functional and institutional similarities between foreign and 
interior policies, i.e. their parallel integration into the Treaty framework as well as 
their shared functional features, there has been, to the best of the knowledge of the 
author, no study which has analysed both areas from a comparative perspective. 
However, some scholars have pointed to these similarities and have encouraged 
further efforts to establish ‘pillar studies’ in EU research (Majer 1999; Monar 1997b; 
W Wallace 2000). A word of caution is, however, advisable since notwithstanding 
these structural similarities a variation in the observed patterns of policy making in 
both case studies does exist Thus, why were migration policies with the Amsterdam 
Treaty transferred to the first pillar, albeit with institutional rules until 2004 that in 
many ways resemble those which previously existed in the third pillar rather than 
those of ‘traditional’ first pillar areas? Why did a similar change not occur with regard 
to Middle East and foreign policies? Why is the Council Secretariat (through the 
establishment of the offices of the Special Representative and the High 
Representative) a more active player in foreign policies than in interior policies? How 
can the differences in the influence o f the EP, the Commission, the ECJ or the Court 
of Auditors in both areas be accounted for? It should thus be kept in mind that while 
the case studies do share certain key characteristics, foreign and interior policies are 
nevertheless distinct policy areas with their own ‘policy histories’. The empirical
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chapters will, therefore, not only discuss the validity of the two propositions but also 
account for variation in the influence o f EU actors with regard to the case studies.23
One obvious reason for this expected variation is that from an organisational 
perspective there are partially different sets o f EU actors engaged in policy making. 
First, in Middle East policies these are various Directorate Generals (DG) of the 
European Commission with foreign policy capacities, the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the EP and, since 1996, the Special Representative to the Middle East Peace 
Process, and after 1999 the High Representative. Second, in migration policies the 
relevant actors are the D G  JHA of the European Commission and the Civil Liberties 
Committee o f the EP. Moreover, the ECJ has made two important judgements on 
migration policy cases, whereas the Court o f Auditors has been particularly active in 
the area of foreign policies. The role of the Council Secretariat in migration policies 
is more based on its ‘traditional’ functions as a ‘politically neutral’ actor than in 
foreign affairs (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 101). This partially different set o f 
actors is one of the reasons why a certain variation of patterns o f policy making can 
safely be assumed without, however, harming the overall conclusions drawn from the 
two key propositions.
A second reason for some variation between both policy areas relates to their 
partially different forms of decision making. This corresponds with the observation 
that ‘there is no single pattern o f policy-making in the EU. Different modes of 
policy-making [...] have emerged in different policy domains’ (W Wallace 2000: 524). 
These partially different modes o f policy making in foreign and interior policies can 
be exemplified by using Nugent’s classification of eight different categories of EU 
decision making procedures (Nugent 1999: 144).24 As subsequent chapters will show
23 Subsequent chapters draw from institutionalist literature on die role o f the various actors in EU 
politics. To cite but a few, the literature on the Court o f Justice has profited from insights derived 
from the debate on the role o f the court as a political actor in EU polides (Alter 1996; Burley and 
Mattli 1993; Garret, Kelemen and Schulz 1998; Mattli and Slaughter 1998 or Stone Sweet and 
Caporaso 1998). The role o f die various legislative procedures is, for example, discussed in Crombez 
1996, Garrett 1995, Tsebelis 1996 or Moser 1996. On the Commission see, among others, 
Christiansen 1996 and Schmidt 2000.
24 Nugent proposes ‘a basis o f classification that is especially useful in helping to draw out the sheer 
number and variety o f procedures that exist is the type o f decision that procedures produce. Taking 
this as the basis for classification, the main categories o f decision-making procedures are those leading
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in greater detail, interior policies rest to a larger extent on legislative decision making 
when compared with foreign policies in which executive decisions, framework 
decisions and budgetary decisions dominate. This argument should, however, not 
divert attention from a shared characteristic, namely that despite a somewhat 
different balance between these various decision making procedures, both policy 
domains are characterised by a dominance of ‘soft institutions, (H Wallace 2000a: 
34). Thus, even most legislative decisions in foreign and interior policies — for 
example in the second and third pillars but also, to a lesser extent, in external trade 
and in the semi-communitarised migration policy regime after the Amsterdam Treaty 
- do not have the same ‘hard law’ character as do legislative decisions in classical first 
pillar areas.25
This corresponds with Helen Wallace’s argument that different patterns of 
policy making should not prevent a combined perspective on joint structural features 
between policy domains. Thus, foreign and interior policies have been identified as 
two domains which ‘were among the most dynamic areas of EU policy development 
at the end of the 1990s’. Moreover, they are characterised by a shared policy mode 
which allows us to regard these ‘new areas of sensitive public policy’ as belonging to 
one policy making type, namely ‘intensive transgovemmentalism’ (H Wallace 2000a: 
34). This thesis argues from a similar point o f departure that in spite o f the relevance 
o f partially different modes of decision making, the functional unity of both areas, 
which centres around the shared identity formation dimension of macro political 
stabilisation policies, provides a solid justification for a comparative perspective on 
both foreign and interior policies.
to: decision on the content o f the treaties; broad directional decisions — that is decisions laying down a 
framework for EU policy development; legislative decisions; common commercial policy (external 
trade) decisions; pillar two and pillar three decisions (arguably two separate categories, especially since 
the Amsterdam Treaty); budgetary decisions; and administrative decisions. Each o f these procedures is 
distinctive, not least in terms o f their institutional mix and balance’ (Nugent 1999:144).
25 On the specific migration policy provisions o f the Amsterdam Treaty see chapter 4.
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Research design
A study on the role o f EU actors in policy making in foreign and interior policies 
does not have to start from scratch. The influence of the EP, the Council Secretariat, 
the Commission, the ECJ and the Court o f Auditors in EU policy making have been 
subject to intensive scholarly research (Richardson 1996a; Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace 1997; Hix 1999). While drawing from these and other studies, this thesis 
deals with the analysis on the role of EU actors in these two policy areas from a 
systematic approach, that analyses in turn the functional, institutional and actor 
related variables which account for the specific patterns of policy making in foreign 
and interior affairs. In other words, to borrow a phrase by Fritz W Scharpf, the thesis 
looks at the ‘games real actors play* in order to detect the structural features o f EU 
foreign and interior policies (Scharpf 1997; Zangl and Ziim 1999).
The research design of this thesis makes use of some recalibrated conceptual 
lenses’ as they have been developed by Scharpf but also utilises insights provided for 
by institutionalist approaches in political science, in general, and historical and 
sociological institutionalism, in particular (Scharpf 1997; March and Olson 1989; Hall 
and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Koelble 1995; Pierson 2000b). Actors thus operate 
under the constraining and enabling impact of a specific historical or functional 
context The precise impact o f this context can be seen when looking at the way in 
which actor preferences relate to such a ‘frame’ and how this frame, in a second step, 
structures ‘real world’ interaction amongst a variety of actors. According to the 
hypotheses developed above, the first part of this thesis attempts to specify the 
precise way in which the variable o f functional characteristics of the two policy areas can 
be conceptualised. For that purpose, the thesis looks in greater detail at the policy 
history o f EU Middle East and migration policies, assuming that this history helps to 
detect the shape of the ‘functional frame’ o f foreign and interior policies within the 
political system of the EU. As mentioned before, migration policies are defined here 
as those policies which regulate conditions of entry and sojourn o f TCNs (in 
particular non-permanent residents) in the EU. The movement of TCNs into and 
within the EU is regulated by the specific provisions o f the Treaties on external and
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internal border controls, on the one hand, and those policies dealing with TCNs 
directly such as asylum policies, visa policies, policies on legal and illegal immigration 
as well as policies on refugees and displaced persons, on the other. An analysis o f the 
policy history of both areas allows us to elaborate the historical paths which have led 
to the emergence and consolidation o f the policy type of macro political stabilisation. 
It is argued that the decision at the time of die Maastricht Treaty to integrate foreign 
and interior policies into the EU framework has created a path dependency towards 
(incremental) centralisation.26 Noting that ‘political power must create visibilities’ 
such as ‘internal/external borders’, the analysis of these functional features also sheds 
light on the dynamics stemming from the emerging territorial and authoritative 
dimension o f the EU, in spite of the formal persistence of the three pillar framework 
(Nassehi 2002: 47) .27
In a second step it can then be studied how, on the basis of these functional 
characteristics, the institutional features in both areas have developed. Due to the 
focus upon the role o f EU actors, attention is directed towards the institutionalised 
capabilities o f these actors, i.e. the formal powers they possess in foreign and interior 
policies. Capabilities are defined as the ‘action resources that allow an actor to 
influence an outcome in certain respects and to a certain degree’ (Scharpf 1997: 43). 
Regarding the two case studies, the proposition that EU actors are able to use their 
competencies from the first pillar, but also from the second and third pillars, to 
shape policies across the pillars will be investigated in this part of the thesis. Given 
the paradox that the Treaty level continues to reflect the original pillar division while 
actual policy making to some extent transcends these formal characteristics, it is 
proposed here to distinguish between two kinds of capabilities. According to this 
perspective, primary capabilities are those institutional powers delegated to EU 
actors on the basis o f Treaty provisions, whereas secondary capabilities are those
26 For this policy history in EU foreign and interior affairs see also the Annual Reviews o f the Journal of 
Common Market Studies since 1994 on ‘External Policy Development’ by David Allen and Michael 
Smith, on ‘Internal Policy Developments’ (from 1994 to 1999 by John Redmond and since then by 
Hussein Kassim) as well as on ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ (since 1998 by Jorg Monar).
27 Translation SS.
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powers delegated as a result of secondary decisions, such as regulations, directives, 
joint actions or other legislative and executive instruments.28
The third step, then, is to assess the orientations and preferences of EU 
actors and the way in which these relate to the functional characteristics of the two 
areas. While acknowledging that functional frames do account for some variation in 
the overall preferences of EU actors in the two areas, preferences must not be 
regarded as entirely determined. EU actors are not passive ‘recipients’ of capabilities 
but actively form and adapt their polity preferences in the two area. These orientations 
take the form of more narrow day-to-day orientations towards Middle East and 
migration issues as well as long term, normative orientations towards the preferred 
institutional design of EU foreign and interior policies at large. When looking at the 
preferences o f EU actors in foreign and interior policies the thesis, thus, focuses in 
particular on ‘the players involved, their strategy options, the outcomes associated 
with strategy options, and the preferences of the players over these outcomes’ (ibid.: 
44). Given the central role o f member states in both areas, it is particularly interesting 
to find out how the preferences o f EU actors relate to those of the member states 
and the Council. Assuming that the Council as a collective actor does not support 
major changes to the status quo due to the unanimity requirement on most Middle 
East and migration policy issues, it seems safe to argue that the Council’s preferences 
for new policies will be located close to the status quo (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996). 
From the description of the Council’s preferences, ‘the level of potential conflict’ 
between EU actors, member states and the Council can then be identified (Scharpf 
1997: 72).
This analysis o f functions, institutions and actor preferences allows, finally, to 
identify the patterns of interaction between these various actors in the two areas. 
Generally speaking, patterns of interaction can range from policy networks in which 
actors aim for consensual agreement and the floating of ideas, to unilateral action
28 This distinction between primary and secondary capabilities is based on the legal distinction 
between ‘"primary acts” between the governments o f the EU member states' (Treaties and other 
conventions) and "’secondary” legislative and executive acts o f the European Parliament, the Council, 
and the Commission, that derive from the articles in these Treaties’ (Hix 1999:103).
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with recourse to hierarchical direction {ibid.'. 46). As far as Middle East and migration 
policies are concerned, the patterns o f interaction chosen by EU actors are expected 
to be closely related to the degree with which these actors are incorporated in actual 
decision taking o f the Council. Those EU actors, which have direct access to the 
Council’s negotiating networks are more likely to opt for cooperative interaction 
strategies relying on ‘arguing’ and consensus, whereas peripheral EU actors will 
attempt to substitute their lacking network relations with non-cooperative means 
such as hierarchical direction (e.g. filing charges at the ECJ), cross issue linkages or 
threats (Risse 2000).
The theoretical implications of this research programme stretch beyond the 
mere analysis o f EU Middle East and migration policies. The theoretical core o f this 
thesis is that EU politics and policies are characterised by some undedying dynamics 
that equally apply to all three pillars of the Union. These dynamics of the political 
system of the EU can be detected by looking at the functional, institutional and actor 
related features at work in specific policy areas. What, then, sets apart foreign and 
interior policies from other (first pillar) policies is not so much institutional 
provisions, such as specific rules on agenda setting, voting in the Council or 
interinstitutional relations, nor actor preferences, such as preferences for 
intergovernmental forms o f cooperation on the side o f some actors versus 
preferences for Communitarisation on the other side o f the extreme. The main 
differences with regard to politics in foreign and interior affairs primarily relates to 
the specific functional features o f both areas, namely o f providing the EU with 
macro political stabilisation. It is this functional frame which brings up a particular 
‘policy logic’ and which structures the way in which institutions and actors operate. 
In other words, the same institutions and actors operate differently, if other 
functional frames, such as, for example, regulatory or redistributional policy types are 
in place. Having said this, it has to be clearly emphasised that the primacy accorded 
to ‘functional frames’ does not mean that institutional roles or actor preferences do 
not matter. What it does, however, mean, is that institutions and preferences cannot 
be seen in isolation from the functional context to which they relate and which
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structures the space within which they operate. This theoretical core challenges some 
underlying assumptions o f other theoretical approaches. On a general level, it 
questions those institutionalist approaches that assume a primacy of institutional 
rules vis-a-vis the preferences of actors while ignoring the functional frames within 
which both institutions and actors are embedded (Shepsle 1986). More specifically, 
however, it is critical of those static approaches to the study of EU politics and 
policies which, such as liberal intergovemmentalism, induce directly from 
preferences to outcomes without properly laying out the dynamic features of the 
constantly evolving functional space of EU politics.
The analysis is based on a qualitative research design (King, Keohane and 
Verba 1994). Around 50 interviews with experts on both areas were conducted, most 
of them in Brussels.29 Moreover, the study has drawn from a wide range of 
documents from the various EU institutions. This empirical basis was supplemented 
by a comprehensive coverage of all articles on the two areas from Agence Europe since 
1993.
Thesis structure
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapters 3 to 6 analyse the three 
dimensions, which are referred to in figure 2.2, and which account for the patterns of 
policy making in both areas. Chapter 3 discusses the functional policy dimension of 
both areas. By looking at the policy history in Middle East and migration from 1993 
until 2003, it attempts to give substance to the claim that both areas share key 
functional features and can, indeed, be identified as belonging to one policy type. 
This policy type is referred to as macro political stabilisation. Chapters 4 and 5 
discuss the institutional dimension of both areas, depicted in figure 2.2. Arguing that 
these institutional features are shaped by the functional features of both areas, it 
analyses the cross pillar institutional setting with particular reference to the 
capabilities o f EU actors in the two areas. Chapter 4 looks at those capabilities in 
foreign and interior policies which have been delegated to EU actors directly by the
29 See list o f interviews in the Annex.
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Treaties. As mentioned above, these are referred to as primary capabilities since they are 
established by primary law. Chapter 5 examines those capabilities derived from 
secondary legislation in Middle East and migration policies, which accordingly are 
referred to as secondary capabilities. Chapter 6 then turns directly to EU actors and 
studies the preferences of these actors in the two policy areas and how these relate to 
the functional frame of macro political stabilisation policies. Chapters 7 and 8 
conclude this thesis by accounting for how these three dimensions have an effect on 
patterns o f policy making in both areas and, therefore, to what extent EU actors 
were able to shape ‘intergovernmental’ bargains.
By arguing that EU foreign and interior policies are characterised by an 
incremental process of centralisation around the functional frame of ‘macro political 
stabilisation’, the thesis is able to account for the emergence o f cross pillar 
institutional settings and a significant role of EU actors in policy making in the two 
areas. This argument supports the aforementioned scepticism with regard to the 
factual importance of the pillar structure in everyday policy making. While 
centralisation has certainly not led to a supranationalisation o f both areas, it has 
nevertheless strengthened the centre (EU level) vis-a-vis the periphery (member 
states). Furthermore, the thesis asserts that EU actors are actively participating in that 
process across the three pillars and that they were on many occasions able to shape 
‘intergovernmental’ bargains. Notwithstanding the claim of a significant role o f EU 
actors in policy making in the two areas, it must be emphasised that the divergence 
between the preferences o f EU actors has been greater than is often a priori assumed 
(Tallberg 2000). Indeed, the main dividing line in EU foreign and interior politics on 
the actors’ dimension is not on the supranational-intergovernmental divide, but 
rather between executive actors, on the one hand, and those actors controlling the 
executive (subsequently referred to as ‘control actors’), on the other. It is only within 
this dominant setting that conflicts over authority emerge between national and EU 
executive actors, such as in inner executive relations between Council and 
Commission. Having regard of these main characteristics of policy making in both 
areas, it could be argued that policy making in macro political stabilisation policies
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shows features of a Lijphartian ‘consociational democracy* or a ‘confederal 
consociation* (Stavridis 2000). Thus, with the advent of foreign and interior policies 
at the EU level a new policy type of macro political stabilisation has emerged, 
confronting the EU with the dilemma of increased centralisation of both areas 
alongside an increasing politicisation of its political system, on the one hand, and 
unresolved questions concerning the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of 
transferring such sovereignty related policies to the EU level, on the other (Geddes 
1995; Scharpf 1999).
54
Ch a p t e r  3
Policy Function 
The Centralisation of Macro Political Stabilisation Policies
Introduction
The analysis of this chapter is based on propositions 1 and 2, outlined in the previous 
chapter, which state that the integration of foreign and interior policies signals the 
emergence o f a new policy type within the context of the political system of the EU. 
The chapter focuses on how these functional features have shaped the way in which 
these two policy areas have become integrated at the EU level. Since both areas are, 
from a functional perspective, fostering the territorial and authoritative construction 
o f an ‘inside-outside* dimension o f the Union, this policy type is referred to as macro 
political stabilisation. It is argued here that the institutional setting as well as the actor 
preferences, both of which will be analysed in subsequent chapters, have to be 
understood against the background of this functional frame. On the basis of this 
observation, this chapter attempts to explain several processes related to the 
centralisation of policies so closely linked with sovereignty. How is integration of 
both areas at the EU level proceeding and what is the precise relationship between 
macro political stabilisation policies and the pillar design of foreign and interior 
affairs? Moreover, what kind o f policies in foreign and interior policies does the EU 
actually provide for? What are the dynamics o f centralising macro political 
stabilisation policies in contrast to other policy types?
A mere institutional analysis of decision making rules in both areas would 
hardly suffice to explain the fundamental process o f integration in two areas so 
closely linked with a traditional understanding of national sovereignty. As Vivienne 
Jabri has argued, such a traditional perspective regards the nation as the primary 
‘location for discursive and institutionalised practices, which at the same time lead to 
the emergence of both legitimacy and exclusion, (cited in Diez 2002: 191).
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Integration in foreign and interior policies is challenging these practices. As already 
argued in chapter 2, centralising macro political stabilisation policies at the EU level 
establishes entirely new patterns o f inclusion and exclusion. Accordingly, this new 
location for discursive and institutionalised practices’ differentiates between the EU 
and EU citizens, on the one hand, and third countries and third country nationals, on 
the other (Morris 1997b; Mitchell and Russell 1996). Antje Wiener has demonstrated 
how the incorporation into the Treaties o f such ‘constituent policies’ opens up new 
and often unintended pathways on the dimension of the ‘social construction of 
Europe’ (Wiener 2001; Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener 2001). Hence, when 
analysing the centralisation o f ‘constituent’, or macro political stabilisation policies, 
not only the function o f communication as a provider of meaning regarding material 
factors such as finance or power related aspects should be taken into consideration. 
What also has to be accounted for are the associative factors o f communicatively 
constructed ascriptions of meaning since 1)0111 factors influence the behaviour of 
actors in the process o f policy-implementation* (Wiener 2001: 79).30 This chapter 
therefore argues that the actual significance of the centralisation process of foreign 
and interior policies cannot only be measured against the background of its 
incremental, piecemeal and overtly cautious nature on the ‘material factors 
dimension’.31 Additionally, the associative function of constructing a new inside- 
outside dimension has to be elaborated. This analysis thus takes note o f the insight 
that ‘social order presupposes [...] some underlying mental order based on 
fundamental distinctions between that which is included and that which is excluded’ 
(Lapid 2001: 13). The institutional and actor related aspects o f EU foreign and 
interior policies cannot be sufficiently accounted for without a prior analysis o f the 
functional frame of these policies, as it is provided for by the construction of the EU 
as a location o f ‘foreign’ and the ‘interior’, Le. ascriptions traditionally associated with 
the Westphalian state (Caporaso 1996). The characteristic features o f this functional
30 Translation SS.
31 On these institutional rules see in particular chapters 4 and 5.
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frame will be detected by analysing the way in which both areas have, from the policy 
perspective, become integrated at the EU level.
The emergence of an insider-outsider dimension of the EU is thus regarded 
as a critical juncture o f EU politics since it introduces an additional notion of 
sovereignty, on top rather than instead of a hitherto nationally defined understanding 
of ‘foreign’ and ‘interior’. The centralisation of these two policy areas at the EU level, 
based on the ‘associative factor dimension’ of an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ has some 
far reaching consequences which are more than the sum total of the acquis in both 
areas. Or, to use a phrase by Etienne Balibar, ‘what can be demarcated, defined, and 
determined maintains a constitutive relation with what can be thought7 (1998: 216).
This gradual shift of policy making in foreign and interior policies to the EU 
level has, to use an example from the foreign policy literature, been described as a 
process in which national governments, following the SEA, have given up the 
‘pretence that foreign policy activity could be kept away from Brussels’ and that this 
process can, therefore, be understood as a dynamic process o f ‘’’Brusselisation” of 
national foreign policies’ (Allen 1998: 49-50). This ‘Brusselisation’ — a process which 
can equally be observed in interior policies — has been the result of the 
acknowledgement that in order to ensure consistency of EU policies across the 
pillars, a greater coordination and, hence, more ‘Brussels-based activity7 than 
originally intended by member states at the time o f the design o f the SEA or o f the 
‘intergovernmental’ pillars was required. Thus, processes of ‘intensive 
transgovemmentalism’ not only emerged in Bmssels but got also gradually 
interwoven with traditional EC policy settings both on the actor and on the policy 
dimension (den Boer and Wallace 2000). This development, however, must not be 
mistaken for a smooth or coherent process. In fact, inconsistencies between 
institutional frameworks, hesitation by some member states regarding the overall 
need to shift the policy focus to Bmssels as well as a fragmented application of 
‘Brusselisation’ with regard to specific aspects o f foreign and interior policies point to 
the overall piecemeal and cautious shift to the European capital. Hence, 
*Brusselisation’ affects certain parts of foreign and interior policies to a larger extent
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than others. While, for example, in diplomatic relations agreement on the 
establishm ent of Brussels-based offices for Special Representatives was soon reached 
after the Maastricht Treaty, ‘issues still dear to foreign policy establishments in 
national capitals’ such as ‘nuclear testing [or] arms sales’ have until today been largely 
immune against this process (Allen 1998: 56). Similarly, to take the example of EU 
migration policies, ‘Brusselisation’ seems to be more apt to describe developments in 
asylum policies, while the more limited progress on issues of immigration shows that 
the ‘various interrelated policy-making areas have reached rather uneven stages o f 
common policy development’ (Monar 2001: 761).
Notwithstanding the empirically compelling observation o f *Brusselisation’, 
this thesis prefers to use the analytically more convincing concept o f a centralisation of 
macro political stabilisation policies. As much as the EU as such is not sui generis but 
rather one specific political system among a wide variety of political systems, so 
should also analytical concepts o f EU politics and policies be supportive to 
generalisable and comparative perspectives (Hix 1998). This necessarily involves the 
usage of analytical and theoretical concepts that do not lead to a methodological ‘sui 
generisation’ of EU politics. Therefore, the process of integration of foreign and 
interior policies at the EU level is understood in this thesis as a centralisation process 
of macro political stabilisation policies, in line with the theoretical arguments set out 
in chapter 2. What is important is that centralisation should not be misunderstood as 
a homogeneous and prescriptive model, but rather as a flexible analytical concept 
which is sensitive not only to further centralisation but also to possible set backs and 
fragmentation of such centralisation processes.
The central role o f this emerging functional frame in no way suggests that 
centralising foreign and interior policies is a smooth, ‘coherent’ or predetermined 
process. Quite on the contrary, the fundamental political significance of macro 
political stabilisation policies renders integration of this policy type inherently 
difficult Indeed, both foreign and interior policies are characterised by a gradual, 
cautious, often incoherent and highly incremental centralisation process. A focus on 
the general path of integration, however, supports the notion o f a centralisation
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process, staring from an initially intergovernmental focus towards the consolidation 
o f an explicit EU framework. The role ascribed here to functional frames should, 
however, not be confused with (neo-) functional theories of European integration 
(Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). While it can be argued that spill over effects from 
market integration have had a certain share in bringing foreign and interior policies 
on the EU agenda, they cannot suffidendy account for the underlying dynamics 
within these spedfic areas. The functional perspective suggested by this thesis is 
based on a different understanding o f what the concept o f ‘function’ entails. 
Function is henceforth defined as the ‘policy logic’, which stems from the functional 
frame within which specific policy areas are embedded, i.e. the functions a policy area 
has for a specific political system such as macro political stabilisation in the case of 
EU foreign and interior affairs. By analysing EU foreign (Middle East) and interior 
(migration) policies from the Maastricht Treaty onwards, this chapter argues that 
when looking at the policy history of both areas a centralisation process can be 
observed which gives substance to the policy function of bequeathing the Union 
with macro political stabilisation. As already mentioned in chapter 2, this approach 
bears resemblance with elaborated notions of ‘path dependency’ or ‘cultural frames’ 
as they have been put forward by historical and sodological institutionalisms in 
political sdence (Pierson 1996, 2000b; Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Mahoney 
2000). In a similar way to the schools o f historical and sodological institutionalism 
also this thesis argues that formal rules, institutions and actors do not operate in a 
quasi-vacuum. Hence, ‘time’ and ‘construction’ matter and structure both institutions 
and interaction within these institutions to the extent that actual policy choices are 
made within these particular frames (Aspinwall and Schndder 1997).
This chapter is divided in four main sections. The following part takes a look 
at the internal and external factors which initially brought foreign and interior 
polides on the European policy agenda. It deals both with spill over effects from 
market integration on both areas as well as external stimuli. While both factors 
certainly had some share in explaining why foreign and interior polides emerged on 
the E C /E U  policy agenda, they alone do not suffice to identify the predse
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characteristics of policies in the two areas. Therefore, the second section of this 
chapter then accounts for the way in which foreign and interior policies have become 
formally integrated at the Treaty level. It argues that macro political stabilisation 
policies are characterised by a Treaty paradox’. The actual incoherence of foreign 
and interior policies at the policy dimension, exemplified by the pillar divide, is 
matched by a coherence on the polity dimension, as provided for by the concept of 
the ‘single institutional framework*.32 While changes to the initial Maastricht model 
towards greater centralisation have occurred, these changes have, on the Treaty level, 
been highly incremental. Third, and notwithstanding this observation, the acquis in 
both areas points to multiple overlaps between the pillars. The development of a 
cross pillar policy history in both areas, which is more than just the accumulated 
‘stock’ o f single decisions, can thus be understood as the gradual emergence of a 
functional frame of macro political stabilisation policies. Hence, while also 
integration on the dimension o f concrete policies has been cautious and rather 
piecemeal, a notion of the ‘common* has emerged which allows us to construct the EU as 
the location o f Union wide macro political stabilisation. The final section then turns 
to the way in which the development of macro political stabilisation policies at the 
EU level has impacted the budget of the Union. It is shown that the general patterns 
of centralising macro political stabilisation policies have also left their mark on this 
dimension. While there has been a significant increase of budgetary resources in the 
two areas, this increase at the same time reflects the cautious and incremental 
approach of giving solid substance to macro political stabilisation policies.
On the basis of these four key observations this chapter, therefore, attempts 
to specify the development and precise shape o f the functional frame evolving from 
the gradual centralisation of foreign and interior policies. Noting that this 
centralisation process is a highly incremental endeavour, the integration of foreign 
and interior policies into the ‘single institutional framework’ with the Maastricht
32 The coherence introduced by the single institutional framework does, however, not mean that there 
is a coherence with regard to the capabilities o f (EU) actors across the three pillars. See chapters 4 and
5 on these capabilities.
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Treaty, can nevertheless be seen as a ‘critical juncture* in EU history. N ot so much 
because these ‘new* policy areas have in any way replaced national policies in foreign 
and interior affairs or because these policies would be very efficient, but rather 
because the provision o f policies in both areas at the Union level is a key element in 
the construction of a territorial and authoritative dimension o f the EU vis-a-vis the 
outside world.
The internal and external context ofEU  foreign and interiorpolicies 
The alternative hypothesis depicted in figure 2.2 suggests that patterns o f policy 
making in foreign and interior policies can be analysed by focusing on the functional 
characteristics of macro political stabilisation policies within the political system of 
the EU and the way in which these characteristics provide a frame for both the cross 
pillar institutional setting in both areas as well as the orientations o f actors. However, 
it has also been emphasised that such a perspective leaves certain other factors, 
which account for developments in both areas, outside o f the main analysis. There 
are, o f course, factors beyond these three variables which are relevant for the 
development o f EU foreign and interior policies and in particular the original 
appearance of these policies on the EC /EU  policy agenda. Two of these additional 
factors will be briefly outlined in this section, namely the internal context of spill over 
effects from market integration as well as the external context o f international 
developments.
Spill over effects
Spill over effects from market integration had a considerable impact on bringing 
both foreign and interior policies on the European policy agenda. As far as foreign 
policies were concerned, policies on the so-called low  politics* dimension of foreign 
economic relations have gradually developed at the EC level. With some resistance, 
particularly from the French government, the Commission has for example already in 
the late 1960s ‘sought to enhance its status through formalizing diplomatic relations 
with missions from third states in Brussels* (Forster and Wallace 2000: 463). As 
Michael E  Smith has argued, the ‘initial creation* of cooperation in the area of ‘high
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politics’ in the intergovernmental framework of the ‘EPC could be viewed in part as 
a product o f functional or sectoral “spillover” [since] it was intended to augment the 
expanding economic policies of the EC* by an intergovemmentally dominated setting 
(1998: 305). In time, various linkages between the EC and EPC frameworks 
developed and were somewhat codified by the SEA of 1986. However, both settings 
were not formally integrated under one roof until the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. This 
also points to the limits of a mere neofunctionalist account on developments in 
European foreign policies. Thus, in spite of the spill over potential, the economic 
and diplomatic settings of EU foreign affairs reveal until today significant differences 
both with regard to institutional rules and the content of policies.33 In other words, 
developments ‘can not be treated in terms of supranational institutionalism or 
federalism’ {ibid.: 332). What can be argued, however, is that the institutionalisation 
of ‘an intensive transgovemmental network’ in EPC and CFSP as well as the increase 
of linkages between these settings and the EC proper can be understood against the 
background of the various functional overlaps between the various parts of foreign 
policies stretched across quite divergent institutional settings (Forster and Wallace 
2000: 489; M E Smith 1998: 311-315). Such arguments on institutionally fragmented 
yet functionally connected policies can also be brought up when looking at EU 
interior policies. Thus, as Geddes has pointed out, ‘free movement is central to the 
contemporary EU, while immigration and asylum are not* (2000: 43). The functional 
logic can indeed account for linkages between economic policies and these two 
settings. Hence, integration of interior policies into the EU framework has brought 
the EC setting, on the one hand, and the intergovernmental or transgovemmental 
settings, on the other, closer to each other. This movement, however, occurred 
‘against all the conventional wisdom of neofunctionalist theories, yet driven by 
functionalist imperatives’ (den Boer and Wallace 2000: 518). Spill over effects might 
have initiated and sustained integration across the pillars but cannot account for the 
direction, shape and speed of centralisation.
33 On the institutional provisions see chapters 4 and 5.
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Tree movement chimes with the EU’s fundamental m arket-m aking purposes, but has brought 
with it immigration and asylum policy cooperation and limited integration. These connections 
between free movement and immigration and asylum demonstrate the blurred distinction 
between ‘low ” and “high” politics that arises because o f the ways pressure can build for 
integration in policy areas that impinge directly on state sovereignty as a result o f integration in 
areas where national sovereignty issues are less pronounced and where economic 
interdependence is more clearly evident (Geddes 2000: 43).
It is to this limited extent that spill over effects had a role in initiating the 
centralisation processes of macro political stabilisation policies.34 Neofunctionalist 
accounts thus rightly point to patterns of sectoral coherence of specific policy areas 
but largely fail to reflect upon the specific functional features o f different policy
35areas.
External developments
It was not only developments within the EC or the EU that shaped the centralisation 
of foreign and interior policies. In addition, developments external to the EU also 
had an impact upon policies o f the Union. For example, the evolution o f the 
Yugoslav crisis during the 1990s functioned as a ‘painful learning process* of EU 
foreign policies and provided a reference point for subsequent internal reforms with 
regard to both policies and institutional provisions (Forster and Wallace 2000: 477). 
A similar impact o f events in the ‘outside world’ on the shape o f European policies, 
can be observed in Middle East policies. Thus, it has been attributed to objections 
from the Unites States (US) and Israel to EC Middle East policies, mainly on the 
issue of the inclusion of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) into peace 
negotiations, that the EC was kept on the sidelines throughout the 1980s 
(Greilsammer and Weiler 1988; Hollis 1997; Robin 1997). It was only after the Oslo 
Agreement between Israel and the PLO, that the US and Israel softened their stance 
on a European role in Middle East politics. Indeed, the multilateral setting of the 
peace process, set up at the 1991 Madrid conference, was the (economic) platform
34 On the legal aspects related to free movement see Handoll 1995.
35 On (neo)functionalism and the role o f  Community-building see, among others, Deutsch 1957, Hass 
1958, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998 and Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, respectively. For an 
institutionalist critique on neofunctionalism see Tsebelis and Garrett 1998.
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on which the EC and later the EU could place its efforts to increase its leverage in 
the region (Hollis 1994).36 The external stimulus provided for by the peace process 
equipped the EU with various other opportunities to become engaged in Israeli- 
Palestinian relations (Peters 1996; Salame 1994). EU policies on the Middle East are 
also affected by the actual state of bilateral relations with the US (Watzal 1995). 
Volker Perthes has argued that tUS-European differences on the Middle East, and on 
Middle East policies, are largely linked to developments in the region* (2002b: 53). It 
is suggested that EU-US differences have in particular emerged in periods o f a 
stalemate of the peace process when the EU blamed the US o f not sufficiendy using 
its alleged influence on Israeli politics (Hadar 1996; Marr 1994). In contrast, the EU 
had a modest political role in the peace process in particular during periods of Israeli- 
Palestinian rapprochement when a policy consensus between the Union and the US 
could more easily be evoked. This was the case prior to the drafting o f the 1999 
Beilin declaration o f the European Council or during the establishment o f the 
Mitchell commission in the year 2000 (Perthes 2002b: 54).
A similar impact o f external developments can also be detected with regard 
to interior and migration policies (Collinson 1994). International migratory 
movements are not under the control o f the EU and due to its geographical and 
economic disposition ‘one has to expect constantly high immigration pressure* 
towards the Union (Klos 1998: 21; Sassen 1996).37 Indeed, the various waves of 
intergovernmental cooperation on migration policies had ‘over the two decades 
before Maastricht been largely responsive to perceived threats and public anxieties* as 
well as to ‘changing patterns o f migration [which] provided a second set o f pressures 
for closer cooperation* (den Boer and Wallace 2000: 495). The fall o f the Iron 
Curtain as well as migratory pressures resulting from the Yugoslav wars underline the 
significance o f these external variables. But also an increase o f clandestine migration 
in southern regions o f the EU, originating mainly from the Arab world, Kurdish-
36 On the role o f the EU as an international actor see, for example, Ginsberg 1999, Jorgensen 1998, 
Rosecrance 1998 or M Smith 1996. From a theoretical perspective this issue is covered by Jupille 
1999.
37 Translation SS.
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populated areas and Albania, has added yet another stimulus on previously less 
concerned member governments to seek cooperation on migration policy issues at 
the EU level (Baldwin-Edwards 1997).
Treaty dimension: single institutional Homework -  m ultiple policies 
Homework
Macro political stabilisation policies are, on the Treaty level, characterised by the 
fragmentation of policies across quite divergent institutional regimes. Indeed, the 
pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty splits up the two areas of foreign and interior 
policies into two main blocs — one located in the ‘classical* EC pillar one in the newly 
established ‘intergovernmental* pillars o f the CFSP and JHA.38 While the following 
chapters will in greater detail elaborate the institutional provisions within these three 
pillars, this section aims to outline how the Treaties* provisions structure on a general 
level the two areas of foreign and interior policies.
EU foreign and interior policies are subject to an inherent tension which can 
be identified as the policy-polity paradox. The Treaties divided both areas into two 
(rather than three) separate pillars with the objective to avoid a ‘contamination* 
between the two separate ‘pillar logics*. At the time of the Maastricht Treaty, as far as 
foreign policies were concerned, external economic relations and developmental 
assistance measures were part of the EC pillar whereas diplomatic foreign policies 
(and security measures) were integrated into the CFSP framework. In interior 
policies, economic free movement provisions and parts o f visa policies belonged to 
the EC pillar while asylum and immigration (as well as policing and judicial 
cooperation measures) were part o f the JHA pillar. Subsequent Treaty reforms did 
change little to this multiple policies framework. Hence, the Amsterdam Treaty 
upheld the clear cut division between the EC and CFSP in foreign policies. As 
regards JHA, migration policies did shift to the EC pillar but — as argued above — this 
area still resembles key features o f the third pillar. While the pillar logic has thus to
38 It should be noted that talking about the <classical’ EC pillar is only an ideal typical notion. In 
practice, the first pillar is characterised by a variety o f institutional regimes. This will be at length 
discussed in the following chapter.
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some extent weakened in interior policies — note that police and justice cooperation 
still belong to the third pillar — it continues to provide third pillar path dependency 
on migration policies (Majer 1999: 123-124). The Nice Treaty, at last, did not provide 
for further changes to this pillar divide and has had no further impact on the 
fundamental principle of a divergent policies framework for macro political 
stabilisation policies.
The pillar metaphor is useful to describe the principle o f solid, separate and 
independent frameworks on the policy dimension as they exist in theory (Moravcsik 
1998: 449-452). The aforementioned objective to avoid a cross pillar contamination, 
is even explicidy referred to in the Treaties. Hence, in the view o f the drafters of the 
Treaty, ex-Articles L and M TEU provided for a clear cut division between 
‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ frameworks.39 Ex-Article L TEU restricted 
the powers of the Court of Justice mainly to the EC pillar, with the only possible 
exception being conventions in the JHA framework thus ‘protecting’ the second and 
third pillars from encroaching EC powers. In a similar way, ex-Article M TEU aimed 
to ensure the ‘integrity’ of the EC pillar by providing that nothing in the TEU ‘shall 
affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities or the subsequent 
Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them’. The Amsterdam Treaty 
changed these provisions only in detail. Thus, Article 46 TEU (ex-Article L) 
continues to limit the powers of the Court of Justice, most notably in the second 
pillar. The reach o f the Court’s jurisdiction was only marginally extended to cover, 
with clear restrictions, the remaining third pillar, the (newly incorporated) provisions 
on closer cooperation and the provisions of Article 6(2) on respect of the EU on 
fundamental rights.40 The newly acquired competencies o f the Court of Justice on 
migration policies were subject to considerable limitations, which shall be analysed in 
the following chapter. No changes to these provisions were, finally, made by the 
Nice Treaty.
39 As discussed further in chapter 6, the concept o f a strict legal separation between die pillars has 
been undermined by the Court o f Justice in its Airport Transit Visa judgement
40 In this thesis, references to the Treaty on European Union are marked with the abbreviation TEU. 
Treaty articles for which no reference is made, originate from the TEC.
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This multiple policies framework is, however, less solid and less exclusive than the 
pillar metaphor suggests. It stands in an inherent tension with the parallel concept of 
a single institutional framework on the polity dimension. The provisions on this single 
institutional framework are set out in Article 3 TEU. This article states that ‘the 
Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the 
consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its 
objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire’. This 
suggests, that the separation between the pillars is less strict than it appears when 
looking at the aforementioned policy provisions only. Article 3 TEU establishes 
connecting points between the pillars on two dimension. First, on the policy 
dimension it calls for ‘consistency* o f EU policies, independent of their Treaty base. 
While this provision applies to all pillars, it is elaborated further by the second 
paragraph of Article 3 TEU regarding foreign policies. This article lays out that ‘the 
Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in 
the context o f its external relations, security, economic and development policies* 
(emphasis added). Second, on the institutional dimension the provisions of Article 3 
TEU ensure the participation of various actors across the three pillars and refer to 
the European Council (Article 4 TEU) as well as the EP, the Council, the 
Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors (Article 5 TEU). 
Moreover, Article 3 TEU provides for the joint responsibility of two different 
executive actors for EU foreign policies. ‘The Council and the Commission shall be 
responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall 
ensure the implementation o f these policies, each in accordance with its respective 
powers*.
The concepts of the single institutional framework o f the Maastricht Treaty 
and o f the consistency of EU policies, first introduced in the EPC provisions of the 
SEA, were meant to solve coordination and power problems arising from the 
aforementioned policy-polity paradox (Nuttall 2000: 25-27). In contrast to the 
Maastricht Treaty, the provisions o f the SEA on EPC were careful in clearly 
separating foreign policy cooperation from traditional EC tasks. However, it was
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already Article 30(5) SEA, which addressed the problem of split competencies in 
foreign policies between EPC and EC frameworks, and which delegated to both the 
Presidency and the Commission the task to seek and maintain the ‘consistency’ of 
European foreign policies (Macleaod et al. 1996: 412). Consistency, thereby, took on 
at least three different connotations. First, policies in both settings should not be 
‘inconsistent with each other’; second, policies in both settings should be coordinated 
‘in the service of an overriding purpose’ and, thirdly, policies should reflect the 
ultimate authority on European policies and, therefore, ensure that ‘EC external 
policies were to be subordinated to the political control of [...] the Member States’ 
(Nuttall 2000: 25-26). The Maastricht Treaty’s provisions on interrelated but separate 
pillars did then not change the general problem of consistency, namely that ‘there 
were still to be two modes o f foreign-policy making’ {ibid.: 181). However, in line 
with the aforementioned arguments on a slow but significant process o f 
centralisation of macro political stabilisation policies, the Maastricht Treaty provided 
for some important changes. First, in contrast to the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty 
brought the three pillars o f the Union under one institutional heading, namely the 
EU. Second, in the area of foreign policies, the task of ensuring consistency was no 
longer the responsibility of the Presidency (thus a single member state) and the 
Commission but rather the joint responsibility o f the Council (thus a collective actor) 
and the Commission. This was more than a mere change in semantics and must, in 
the light o f the arguments presented in chapter 2, be seen as a further step towards 
cautious centralisation o f EU macro political stabilisation policies.
Having said this, it must be emphasised that the Treaties have until today not 
solved the paradox o f two formally separate pillars which at the same time are part o f a 
single institutional setting. Inconsistencies in the application of consistency not only 
occur in day-to-day policy making in cross pillar politics, as for example in the 
coordination o f developmental assistance or in the use of economic sanctions, but 
have even led to obvious contradictions in the Treaties. Thus, Article 13 TEU, which 
sets out the responsibilities of the Council in CFSP, stands in marked contrast to the 
aforementioned joint responsibility of the Council and the Commission for the
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consistency of EU external activities as set out by Article 3 TEU. Thus, Article 13 
TEU, surprisingly, states that it is the Council alone that ‘should ensure the unity, 
consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union*.
As this discussion on the Treaties* provisions show, the ultimate relationship 
between the pillars and, consequently, the shape of macro political stabilisation 
policies cannot be determined from mere Treaty exegesis. Treaty provisions are 
neither self explanatory nor coherent. They rather institutionalise the aforementioned 
policy-polity paradox. What the Treaties, however, do is to recognise the 
indivisibility, from a functional perspective, o f foreign and interior policies as an 
integral part o f the political system of the EU. At the same time, the Treaties do 
leave, to some extent, open the question of how the linkage between the pillars 
should in practice look like. This underlying tension or paradox between a multiple 
policies framework, on the one hand, and a single institutional framework, on the 
other, points to the dynamic potential of EU foreign and interior. While a certain 
distinction between the two kinds o f pillars has been codified and been upheld by the 
Treaties, the Treaties integrate all parts o f both policy areas into the EU framework, 
thus formally ending the division o f macro political stabilisation policies into an EC 
setting and a strictly intergovernmental framework. The task to define the precise 
shape o f the exact delineation between the pillars has, then, been delegated to the 
institutions involved in future policy making.
Policy history: the notion o f the common
When looking at the policy history in Middle East and migration policies, three main 
features come to the fore. First, die pillar distinction shapes but not determines the 
development of cross pillar foreign and interior policies. Second, a process of 
centralisation of policies in both areas as well as a modest convergence across the 
pillars can be observed. This has not culminated in a harmonisation o f policies into 
‘single* foreign and interior policies but has fortified a notion of the common and 
documents the emergence of a functional frame for macro political stabilisation
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polides. Third, the centralisation process is characterised by its incremental and 
piecemeal nature rather than by grand dedsions.
Middle East
European foreign polides towards the Middle East were prior to the Maastricht 
Treaty based on two only loosely connected policy tracks in the frameworks of the 
EC and the EPC and characteristic features of these two settings also provided the 
background against which Middle East polides within the ‘single institutional setting, 
developed. Thus, the origins o f EU Middle East polides can be traced back to the 
1970s. Two main approaches can be identified and this chapter argues that the 
noteworthy development o f the post Maastricht period was not so much the 
continuation of these approaches but rather the incremental process o f centralisation 
across the pillars fostering a notion o f the common.41 The first policy approach had 
been developed within the EPC setting and builds upon the ‘classical’ 
intergovernmental EPC method of declaratory polides. It is based on consensual 
agreement between member states and resembles working features typical of 
international organisations, such as emphasis on consensus and declarations rather 
than concrete action. It not only defined the European approach to certain issues, 
but was meant to over time to lead to convergence of national interests in the area of 
foreign affairs. The second approach shows a striking similarity with what has been 
identified as a key feature of West German foreign policies prior to unification 
(Paterson 1996). Along the lines o f this analogy, the EU is also characterised by its 
economic weight, on the one hand, and its constrained political reach within the 
international arena, on the other, and could, therefore, be described as an ‘economic 
giant* and a ‘political dwarf. Indeed, bilateral relations o f the EC with Middle 
Eastern countries were mainly based on trade relations, as well as a ‘cheque book 
diplomacy* via considerable financial assistance towards less developed countries. 
Having these policy paths in mind, Middle East policies had after the Maastricht 
Treaty not to be reinvented. What did, however, happen was that these different
41 See also for policy instruments o f the EU in the area o f foreign affairs K  Smith 1998.
70
policies were gradually linked and synchronised with the objective to establish a 
centralised, common appearance of EU foreign policies.
It was already prior to the Maastricht Treaty that Middle East policies figured 
prominently on the European policy agenda. Within the EPC framework, the Middle 
East has since the inception o f EPC been a key area o f European foreign policies. It 
was in the immediate aftermath of the 1969 Hague Summit that member states were 
seeking to define priority areas for increased consultation and cooperation (European 
Parliament 1999e: 14-16). Following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, efforts among 
member states to develop a common position on the Middle East conflict increased. 
In an EPC resolution o f 1973 member states for the first time ‘recognised the need 
to take into account “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”, and to no 
longer treat the Palestinian question solely as a refugee issue’ {ibid.: 14). Moreover, in 
the mid 1970s two interlinked institutionalised processes towards the Middle East 
were established, namely the Euro-Arab Dialogue, which provided for action both in 
the EPC and EC frameworks, and the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in the 
EC setting (Rhein 1999). However, action in both settings — the GMP was slighdy 
reformed in 1989 and renamed as the Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP) — has 
overall been criticised as doing litde in actual results and only slighdy improving the 
quest for a coherent common approach towards the region. Consequendy, both 
settings were depicted as manifestations o f what Christopher Hill has termed the 
‘capability-expectation gap’ of European foreign policies (1993; Hill 1998b; 
Regelsberger and Wessels 1996; Gomez 1998). Notwithstanding these shortcomings 
regarding the content of policies, the period prior to the Maastricht Treaty 
nevertheless documents the relative importance attached within the EC and EPC 
frameworks on the Middle East. Thus, between 1985 and 1992, 73 out of 742 
working group meetings of the Council dealt with the Middle East, a total of almost 
10 per cent If the 22 meetings for Euro-Arab dialogue are added to that list, than ca.
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15 per cent of all meetings dealt with this part of the world. No other policy area or 
region even approached these figures.42
The strong focus on the Arab world reflected by various EPC statements, the 
Euro-Arab dialogue and also the GMP did impact the European stance regarding the 
Israeli-Arab conflict and culminated in the Venice Declaration of 1980 which set out 
the major guiding lines o f European Middle East policies until today. With this 
declaration, the EC was the first international actor that called for an inclusion of the 
PLO in future peace negotiations. On the one hand, the Venice Declaration has been 
severely criticised by Israel and the US. Opposition from these two countries on a 
stronger political involvement of the EC and later the EU in the conflict can be 
related to their critical assessment o f the content of European policies as expressed 
by the Venice Declaration (Greilsammer and Weiler 1988). On the other hand, the 
interest of Arab states and the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a stronger role of the 
Union in the peace process can only be understood against the background o f ‘trust’ 
created by inter alia the Venice Declaration.
Within the EC setting, the GMP and later the RMP were the most important 
frameworks. As part of the GMP, the EC concluded on a bilateral basis free trade 
agreements with all Mediterranean countries except Iibya and Albania (Tovias and 
Bacaria 1999; Tovias 1997). The free trade agreement between Israel and the EC 
dates from 1975 while in 1986 the Community concluded an agreement for 
preferential trade for products originating from the Occupied Territories (Ahiram 
and Tovias 1995). These two agreements also included protocols on financial 
assistance which were regularly updated throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
Notwithstanding the significance o f economic linkages between the EC and Israel, 
which made Israel increasingly dependent on imports from and exports to the 
Community, the political role o f the EC in the region was hardly strengthened during 
that period {ibid.\ Giersch 1980).
42 Data calculated from Regelsberger 1997: 70.
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It was an external event, namely the signing of the Declaration of Principles 
between Israel and the PLO, that provided a new access point for a collective 
European role on the political dimension (Anderson 1999). Hence, in the framework 
o f the Madrid Peace Conference, which was convened after the Gulf War o f 1991, 
the EC took over a key role in the framework of the multilateral dimension o f the 
peace process. Europe remained excluded from the bilateral dimension on which the 
US and, ironically, a small European country and non member state like Norway 
played an important broker role (Ries 2000). However, within the multilateral track 
the EC and later the EU chaired the working group on regional economic 
development (REDWG) which became the most active and ambitious segment of 
the multilateral setting (Peters 1996; Stetter 1997). The EU had a quite proactive 
interpretation o f its mandate in REDWG. A permanent secretariat in Amman was 
established which comprised representatives from the governments o f Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan and from the PA as well as a representative from the EU. A thick institutional 
framework of various working groups was established and several concrete 
multilateral projects on economic cooperation were developed. Yet, while the 
secretariat formally operates until today, REDGW has effectively stopped producing 
results, in particular on the level o f implementation, since the first major crisis of the 
Middle East peace in early 1996.43
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty did not change EU Middle East 
policies overnight but rather created the institutional prerequisites, which, supported 
by favourable external circumstances, allowed the Union to foster the linkages 
between its multiple policies towards the region and incrementally provided for 
further convergence and centralisation o f these policies. The first three years after 
Maastricht can be understood as a period of adaptation to the new institutional 
setting o f the TEU. Initially, the EU made litde use of the new instruments provided 
for by the Maastricht Treaty. For almost two years after the entry into force o f the
43 The Commission has attempted to revitalise REDWG by organising a meeting o f the REDWG 
steering committee in Moscow in January 2000. However, the decisions o f  this meeting were not able 
to unblock the deadlock o f  REDWG cooperation caused by the stalemate o f the peace process 
(European Union 2000).
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TEU the Council only once adopted one of the new instruments provided for by the 
CFSP. And also the Joint Action of 1994 in support for the Middle East peace 
process remained declaratory and resembled much more an EPC statement than a 
legal act (Council 1994a). This initial period furthermore bears similarities with 
another feature o f the EPC period, namely the issuing of consensual declaratory 
policy instruments, such as Presidency declarations and statements. They still served 
the old EPC purpose o f documenting and invoking consensus amongst member 
states rather than triggering a particular activity. The huge amount o f declaratory 
statements without any implementation aspects, which were published by the EU in 
this initial period, documents the lack of real political influence as well as the ongoing 
internal quest for consensus (European Parliament 1995).
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the period from 1993 until 1996 also 
laid the foundations for more centralised cross pillar foreign policies and by the end 
of 1996 the EU had set in place the key institutional structures o f its post Maastricht 
Middle East policies. For example, in late 1995 the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) was launched which, while being formally organised as a multilateral forum, 
mainly operates as an EU policy towards the region (Joffe 1999; Stavridis and 
Hutchence 2000). Moreover, by 1996 the EU had also become the biggest donor o f 
financial assistance to the PA, while it has concluded two trade agreements with the 
PA and Israel which transcended the mere economic foci o f prior agreements. 
Finally, by the end o f 1996 the EU had also appointed, within the CFSP setting, a 
Special Representative to the Middle East peace process.
Leaving aside for a moment the actual success of these different policies, the 
significance of their mere consolidation should not be underestimated. For example, 
the EMP is indeed a much more ambitious project than its predecessors. TIaving 
spent several decades as not much more than a preferential trade deal, the EU’s new 
Mediterranean policy at least allows for the pursuit o f economic and political goals in 
a reasonably coherent institutional framework’ thus documenting the functional unity 
of cross pillar foreign policies (Gomez 1998: 150; emphasis added; Edis 1998). It 
should, however, also be mentioned that the EMP did raise expectations, in
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particular on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, which could not be met by 
the constrained internal capabilities o f the EU (Stetter 2003). Second, the remarkable 
financial assistance of the EU towards the PA was for some time an ‘eminently 
political support* although it has ultimately not been able to stabilise the peace 
process. Yet, it has established a division o f labour between the US and the EU. 
From that perspective, the EU acted ‘as the “payer” and the United States as the 
“player” in this region* (Sterzing and Bohme 2002: 39).
Third, the new Association Agreement between the EU and Israel had a 
substantially wider scope than all its predecessors and was supplemented by 
intensified scientific cooperation. Indeed, Israel is the only non European country 
which has the status of a member state within the EU framework programmes for 
research and development The Association Agreement is not restricted to cover EC 
foreign policy competencies but includes national competencies as well, thus, 
pointing to further cross pillar linkages. The Interim Association Agreement between 
the EC and the PLO has mainly a political significance and documents the indirect 
recognition by the EU of the PA as the government of a future state o f Palestine 
(Paasivirta 1999). The intensification of economic relations did, however, not lead to 
an automatic increase o f political weight Finally, the appointment of the Special 
Representative has made EU policies in the framework of the CFSP more visible and 
documents the cautious centralisation process of EU foreign policies beyond the first 
pillar. However, the significance o f this decision should, at the same time, not be 
overstated. As far as the internal dimension of the EU was concerned, the mandate 
o f the Special Representative has been carefully circumscribed by the Council, while 
concrete results on the ground remained the exception rather than the rule.
By the end o f 1996 EU foreign policies towards the Middle East were, thus, 
characterised by the establishment o f various cross pillar institutional settings which 
point to the emergence o f a functional frame within which macro political 
stabilisation policies could evolve. Policies pursued within the EMP as well as the 
Association Agreement with Israel had such an explicit cross pillar design. Moreover, 
the mandate o f the Special Representative was on a practical level also linked with
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the activities o f the Commission in the first pillar. And, assistance measures from the 
EU level had to be coordinated with parallel national assistance by member states. 
The institutionalisation of these various cross pillar settings points to a cautious 
centralisation o f EU Middle East policies - without a parallel abandoning of national 
competencies. The concrete policies which emerged out o f these various institutional 
settings after 1996 resembled this piecemeal and cautious approach to centralisation. 
First, it was only by mid 1995 that the EU started to make consistent use of the new 
policy tools provided for within the CFSP framework. Since then, however, a total of 
13 Joint Actions have dealt with the Middle East All of these Joint Actions direcdy 
deal with the implementation of policies thus documenting the shift from the 
declaratory style of policy making during the EPC and the early CFSP period towards 
a cautious yet active understanding o f CFSP instruments. Two Joint Actions dealt 
with the establishment of a European Electoral Unit to oversee the first Palestinian 
elections of January 1996 and provided for a budget o f € 10 million to cover the 
expenses o f the unit. The bulk of Joint Actions, seven in total, addressed the 
mandate of the Special Representative. The mandate o f the Special Representative 
dates from November 1995 and has since then been prolonged on a yearly basis. The 
budget at the disposal of the Special Representative has increased from € 2.1 million 
in 1996 to € 3 million in 1998 and € 2.8 million in 1999 but has since then 
considerably diminished to € 1.1 million in 2001, mirroring the collapse of the peace 
process. Notwithstanding this development, the mandate of the Special 
Representative has on several occasions been widened, mainly to enable the inclusion 
of security issues among his responsibilities. This corresponds with the mandate of 
the EU Special Adviser on counter terrorism which has been laid down by three 
Joint Actions in 1997, 1999 and 2000. Operating on a less visible basis than the 
Special Representative the EU Adviser, who reports direcdy to the Council, has 
received budgetary resources o f € 13.6 million. Regarding die impact in the region, 
the appointment of a Special Representative has not caused a dramatic increase o f 
leverage of the EU on the political track. ‘While at least some Middle East leaders 
and diplomats involved in the process consider Moratinos [the Special
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Representative; SS] naive and inexperienced, it appears that thus far he has avoided 
making serious mistakes, and has contributed to the process within the modest 
parameters that he has defined for his mission’. While the Special Representative has 
‘neither challenged American supremacy nor sought in any way to pressure Israel’ he 
was not able to firmly establish the EU as an ‘acceptable primary mediator’ for the 
peace process (Alpher 2000: 198-201; Alpher 1998; Heller 1998). Assessments on the 
work of the EU Adviser have been more enthusiastic than those on the Special 
Representative but there are rare public accounts due to the secretive approach 
adopted by the EU Adviser (Economic Cooperation Foundation 2002).44
Second, on the dimension of declaratory Council statements the Berlin 
Declaration of April 1999 has been identified as a rare occasion of direct diplomatic 
impact of the Union. In order to prevent the Chairman o f the PA, Yasser Arafat, 
from proclaiming a Palestinian state after the expiry of the Palestinian-Israeli interim 
agreement on 4 May 1999, for the first time an official EU document referred not 
only to the ‘right o f the Palestinians to exercise self-determination’ but explicitly 
stated that this right ‘includes the option of a state’ (European Council 1999a).45 This 
statement corresponded with a rare convergence of US and European approaches to
44 Interview 47, Berlin, July 2002. One Common Position o f the Council is not discussed here. It dates 
from April 2002 and outlines the conditions for the reception by some members states o f Palestinians 
expelled by Israel following their participation in the occupation o f the Church o f the Nativity in 
Bethlehem.
45 The analysis o f statements from the Council level on the issue o f Palestinian statehood is a 
fascinating exercise. They often read like mysterious sentences from the oracle o f Delphi and have the 
hermeneutic appeal o f Kremlology or Vatican studies. The November Declaration o f  member states 
o f 1973 for the first time dealt with that issue and referred to the legitimate rights o f  the Palestinians’ 
thus ‘no longer treating die Palestinian question solely as a refugee problem’. In the London 
Statements o f 1977, then, ‘the right o f  the Palestinians to a homeland’ has been recognised thus giving 
a territorial notion to the Palestinian cause. The Venice Declaration then ‘emphasises the right o f the 
Palestinians to self-determination’ thus adding a notion o f authority to prior positions. This support 
became more concrete after the Palestinian elections o f 1996, and since then the EU started to speak 
in official declarations o f ‘self-determination for the Palestinians, with all that this implies’, without, 
however, specifying what it does imply. But the EU did not leave it to die fantasy o f the addressees of 
these statements to find out what self-determination ‘implies’. After the stalemate o f the peace process 
since summer 1996 the EU became more explicit about its approach. One Council conclusions of 
1997 referred to ‘the right o f the Palestinians to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option 
o f a state’ (emphasis added). It was, finally, the Berlin Declaration which direcdy recognised ‘the right of 
the Palestinians to exercise self-determination, including the option o f a state’ {emphasis added). In the 
summer o f  2000, expecting the success o f  the Camp David meeting, the EU already considered 
Palestinian statehood a fait accompli and supported US mediation efforts by ensuring its support for the 
Viability o f any resulting Palestinian state’. For internal developments in Palestine see Jamal 2001.
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Middle East policies between mid 1998 and the end of 2000 when, almost in parallel, 
a change of leadership occurred both in Israel and in the US, which again estranged 
both the transatlantic partners as well as the EU and the new Israeli government 
However, in mid 1998, during the first major crisis of the peace process between 
1996 and early 1999, ‘the US administration became more responsive to Palestinian 
grievances and demands, thus inter alia documenting a convergence of perceptions 
from the EU und the US. ‘US and European officials agreed, silendy, in their wish 
for a change of government in Israel. They were also concerned about the possibility 
o f a Palestinian declaration o f statehood on 4 May 1999’. The Berlin Declaration is 
the visible product of this shared concern. ‘US and European officials effectively co­
ordinated their positions on the issue, with both sides working on Arafat to dissuade 
him from a state proclamation before the Israeli elections’ (Perthes 2002b: 56).
Third, regarding the new mixed agreements between the EU and partner 
countries to the EMP, the Association Agreements with Israel and the PLO reflect 
the new cross pillar approach o f EU foreign policies since these (mixed) agreements 
address both political and economic issues o f bilateral relations. Thus, a member of 
the legal service o f the Commission has argued that the EC-PLO agreement, 
although formally not a mixed agreement and being confined to first pillar policies, 
fulfils ‘political purposes’ by alleviating the Palestinian self administration to the same 
status which otherwise applies to states in the framework of the EMP (Paasivirta 
1999). Also the EU-Israel Association Agreement documents a politicisation o f cross 
pillar foreign policies. It was the 1994 Essen European Council that had proposed 
the establishment of a ‘special relationship’ between Israel and the EU (European 
Council 1994). However, what seemed to be special in EU-Israeli relations was the 
dependence o f economic relations upon the actual state of the peace process. In 
periods o f Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement, economic relations were smooth and 
led to the quick conclusion o f agreements, such as in 1995 on the Association 
Agreement and the acceptance of Israel as a member state o f the EU scientific
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framework programmes.46 However, economic relations suffered blows during crises 
of the peace process. Hence, the Association Agreement only entered into force in 
February 2000 since the French and Belgian parliaments, supported by the 
Commission, had prevented ratification for political purposes. Also public quarrels 
between the Commission — supported by several member states — and Israel on an 
alleged breach o f the rules o f origin provisions o f the agreement concerning imports 
to the EU of Israeli orange juice served, according to a Commission official, such 
political purposes.47
Fourthly, also the significant financial assistance o f the EU to Palestine has 
not been a smooth operation. On the one hand, the EU has been, as already 
mentioned the biggest donor to the PA. Indeed, there is no other country in the 
world which has received a similar amount o f assistance from the EU as Palestine 
(Brynen 2000). When looking at the combined assistance from the EU and its 
member states to Palestine, the EU has during the period 1994-99 committed more 
than €  2 billion, which covers approximately half o f all international contributions 
(West Bank and Gaza 2000: 6). Moreover, the funds allocated in Palestine amount to 
more than 10 per cent of the overall MEDA budget in the framework o f the EMP. 
This is by far the largest per capita support the EU grants to any country in the 
world, including those in central and eastern Europe. The ratio between per capita 
contributions to Palestine in comparison with the average per capita assistance for all 
Mediterranean countries is around 23:1. On the other hand, this remarkable 
assistance programme has come under criticism. It was neither able to prevent the 
collapse of the peace process and, subsequently, the demolition by the Israeli army of 
the largely EU sponsored Palestinian infrastructure nor to moderate the stance o f the 
Palestinian and Israeli leaderships (Asseburg 2002a and 2002b). Moreover, as far as 
the internal dimension was concerned charges o f mismanagement and even of 
corruption within the Commission have obstructed the smooth allocation o f funds.
46 During the Barak administration, EU member states were, among other European states, 
responsible for incorporating Israel into the West European country group o f the United Nations 
(UN), thus putting an end to Israel's previously non aligned status within the UN.
47 Interview 13, Commission, Legal Service, Brussels, June 2000.
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This only added to the complex internal decision making procedures which rendered 
the implementation o f funding a painstaking exercise.48 Moreover, further allegations 
that the monthly budgetary aid o f € 10 million, which the EU pays to the PA since 
2001, has been used by the Palestinians to finance terrorist activities have further 
deteriorated the credibility o f EU assistance. While these accusations have been 
rejected by the responsible Commissioner they were, however, not refuted until 
today.49
Fifthly, the EMP itself has a rather mixed record. On the face o f it, the EMP 
is a success. Association Agreements have been signed and ratified with most partner 
countries, financial assistance to the region has increased and is also distributed to 
non governmental organisations in these countries (Galal and Hoeckman 1997). 
Moreover, the thick institutional structure has remained intact in spite of the ups and 
downs of the peace process. Indeed, EMP is the only international forum — besides 
the UN — in which Israeli officials participate alongside those from Mediterranean 
Arab countries, including Syria and Lebanon. On the other hand, however, the EMP 
has not fulfilled all expectations. The Arab countries perceive the economic focus as 
one sided and serving EU interests in industrial exports and agricultural 
protectionism, while Israel considers the partnership as preventing the exploitation 
o f the full economic potential of EU-Israel relations. The EMP has also not been 
able to significantly improve regional cooperation among partner countries which 
would be a prerequisite for the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade 
area by the year 2010 (Dessus and Suwa 2000; Zaaffane and Mahjoub 2000). 
Moreover, EMP has not really stabilised the political relations between Israel and the
48 See chapter 7.
49 In the light o f  the freeze o f  transactions by Israel o f custom duties revenues since the beginning o f  
the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the EU decided to transfer direct budgetary support o f  € 10 million a month to 
the Palestinian Authority. These transactions started in July 2001 and document die changing 
priontisation o f  the EU from project funding towards government stabilisation. Investigations by the 
German weekly Die Zeit have revealed that these transactions have been used by the Palestinian 
leadership to support terrorist activities. This accusation has, however, been strongly rejected by the 
Palestinian Authority and the Commission (Kleine-Brockhoff and Schirra 2002). This rejection has, 
however, not silenced criticism on these payments. Thus, tensions between the Commission and 
Parliament on this issue are currently increasing while only recendy the EU anti fraud agency has 
taken over investigations on these payments.
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Arab world, while the collapse o f the peace process has halted progress on the 
political dimension of the EMP, for example with regard to the drafting o f a Euro- 
Mediterranean security charter (Hollis 2000; Behrendt and Hanelt 1999).
Finally, the Common Strategy o f the EU on the Mediterranean region of 
June 2000 reveals a mixed picture (House of Lords 2001). With this document the 
European Council recognised the Mediterranean as a region of prime strategic 
importance to the EU’s interests, thus fostering a notion o f the common amongst 
EU member states. The Common Strategy also acknowledged the multiple cross 
pillar linkages o f EU policies.50 Yet, it documented at the same time the limitations to 
EU foreign policies. The Common Strategy did not really add anything new to the 
objectives already contained in the multilateral Barcelona Declaration o f 1995 
(Hakura 1997). The only remarkable feature was that, while itself being adopted 
unanimously by the European Council, the Common Strategy allowed for 
subsequent decisions to be taken by qualified majority. However, this general rule 
does not apply to decisions on the Middle E ast ‘Apparently the member states are 
afraid that the “Common Strategy” could mean that decisions concerning the Middle 
East in the future [...] could not be prevented by one member state with its veto*. It 
seems that ‘the Israeli-Palestinian conflict bears potential for conflict within the EU 
as well’ (Sterzing and Bohme 2002: 43).
Migration
Comparable to developments in EU Middle East policies, migration policies 
witnessed after the Maastricht Treaty an incremental centralisation process at the EU 
level. Moreover, previously only very loosely connected policies, such as migration 
policies at the intergovernmental level, the EC level or within the Schengen 
cooperation, were cautiously merged, thereby attempting to develop a notion of the
50 It is quite interesting to note that the Common Strategy also provides for linkages between foreign 
and interior policies. Thus, an entire section o f  the Common Strategy deals with the issue o f Justice 
and Home Affairs and how these policies relate to EU Mediterranean policies. This corresponds with 
die increased focus o f Euro-Mediterranean conferences on this area, such as during the 2002 Valencia 
meeting, which “has firmly implanted the JHA dimension within the third chapter o f  the Barcelona 
process’ (Gillespie 2002: 111). Notwithstanding this increase o f declaratory linkages between foreign 
and interior policies on the paper, actual results on the ground have, however, until now been meagre.
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common also on these issues (Favell 1998). This centralisation process o f macro 
political stabilisation policies can be documented by looking at the conclusions o f 
Tampere European Council as well as the concept of deploying a scoreboard to the 
regulation of migration policies.
Prior to the Maastricht Treaty there was only very limited action on migration 
policies in the EC framework and most activities remained limited to provisions on 
the free movement o f workers. These rules however, only partially applied to TCN 
and were mainly directed towards citizens o f the EC member states. As Geddes 
notes ‘the Treaty's provisions did not cover TCNs qua TCNs' (2000: 46). Attempts to 
link EC provisions with migration policy action, as they were pursued by the 
Commission and the EP failed prior to the Maastricht Treaty. In 1976 the Council 
rejected a Commission proposal for a directive against clandestine migration and in 
1985 the Court o f Justice issued a judgement which prevented the adoption of 
migration related matters under the social policy provisions of the TEC. The Court 
o f Justice consented only with the policy of the Commission to collect, as long as the 
EC employment situation was concerned, national information regarding TCNs. 
Beyond the narrow confines o f these free movement and employment provisions as 
well as the provisions in bilateral association agreements, ‘the majority of 
developments remained intergovernmental’ (Peers 2000: 66). This intergovernmental 
cooperation, which emerged from the Trevi setting, did primarily deal with issues 
related to free movement, terrorism and policing but did not, until the mid 1980s 
tackle migration policies as such (den Boer 1996).51
It was then the SEA of 1986 that triggered intergovernmental cooperation 
also on migration policy issues (Lobkowicz 1994; Korella and Twomey 1993). The 
provisions of the SEA ‘for the creation of a single market made it clear that free 
movement had unavoidable immigration and asylum implications' which, as most 
member states agreed, should be dealt with outside the EC setting (Geddes 2000: 
67). Hence, linked with the Trevi setting, member states established in 1986 an ad hoc
51 Trevi was ‘cryptically named after its first chairman, A.R. Fonteijn, and the Trevi fountain in Rome 
(where its first meeting was convened)’ (den Boer 1996: 394).
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working group on immigration. However, actual results within this setting remained 
meagre and subsequent attempts to streamline cooperation at the intergovernmental 
level, such as the establishment in 1988 of a group of coordinators as well as the 
drafting o f the Palma documents o f 1989 on priority action on free movement and 
migration issues, did not lead to extensive action.
Notwithstanding this development, the period prior to the Maastricht Treaty 
witnessed two important institutionalisation processes on the intergovernmental 
level, namely the Schengen framework, on the one hand, and the elaboration of two 
conventions dealing with asylum and external border provisions, on the other 
(Callovi 1992; Nanz 1995). The Schengen acquis was formally integrated into the EU 
framework by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. But also prior to that date Schengen 
was on an institutional and policy level linked with the EC framework (Convey and 
Kupiszewski 1995). Against the background of the deadlock on achieving an 
abolishment of internal border controls in the EC due to the resistance of some 
member states, five of the then 12 member states agreed in 1985 to move ahead, 
with an early form of closer cooperation, with the abolishment o f internal border 
controls between them. In order to compensate for the loss o f internal border 
controls, which was the main objective of Schengen cooperation, flanking measures 
were adopted which related to determining common principles governing the entry 
into Schengenland, such as rules on external border controls, the issuing of visas as well 
as entry and procedural issues concerning asylum seekers (Kostakopoulou 1998). 
Until the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force all other member states except for the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, being linked by the Common Travel Area, became 
member states o f the Schengen agreement, which now forms part o f the EU acquis\2 
With Norway and Iceland also two non member states participate in the Schengen
52 The special provisions on the application o f  Title IV and Schengen provisions for the UK, Ireland 
and Denmark can be related to arguments on variable geometry and differentiation within specific 
policy areas (Cullen 1995; Ehletmann 1998).
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cooperation, while the United Kingdom and Ireland have in the meantime opted in 
to most provisions o f the Schengen setting.53
Second, the Dublin Convention o f 1990 as well as the External Frontier 
Convention o f 1991 were meant to establish com m on rules on asylum and external 
border policies, thereby putting in place flanking measures for the attainment of the 
free movement o f person provisions of the SEA (Miiller-Graf 1995). Both 
conventions documented the willingness of member states to establish joint 
provisions on migration policy issues but also revealed the inherent problems of 
intergovernmental cooperation. The Dublin Convention, which took note of the 
objective raised by the Palma document to establish *a European system of 
responsibilities for the adjudication o f asylum claims’, was signed in 1990 but only 
entered into force in 1997 when, at last, it was ratified by the French assemblee nationale 
(Guild 1996; Hailbronner 1997). The Dublin Convention became the ‘core’ of the 
EU asylum policy regime and set out a ‘hierarchically ordered catalogue’ which 
defined criteria for determining the exclusive responsibility of one member state to 
consider an asylum application (Hailbronner 2000: 385; Hailbronner and Thiery
1997). Notwithstanding the slow ratification process, the Council adopted between 
1993 and 1997 several legal acts related to the convention, most o f them linked to its 
implementation.54 Already prior to the Maastricht Treaty, member states agreed in 
the 1992 London Resolutions on asylum related matters, which built upon provisions 
contained in the Dublin Convention, and set up clearing houses to deal with 
information exchange on asylum (CIREA) and immigration (CIREFI) related 
matters. When compared with the already protracted implementation o f the Dublin 
Convention, the External Frontier Convention did even fare worse. Although the
53 Due to the development o f  positive law on migration policies in the formal EU setting o f the third 
and first pillars after the Maastricht Treaty and due to the increasing number o f  EU member states 
participating in die Schengen cooperation even before the formal integration o f Schengen into the EU 
framework in 1999, there has been a de facto approximation between both settings prior to the 
Amsterdam Treaty.
54 The slow ratification process can be related to reservations in some member states on the exclusion 
o f  burden sharing provisions, on the one hand, and the limited role o f the Court o f  Justice, on the 
other. See also Agence Europe, N o 6436, 9 March 1995: 6 and Agence Europe, N o 6610, 22 
November 1995:10-11.
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principal agreement was ensured by 1991, the ratification process was permanently 
halted since the United Kingdom and Spain disagreed over the application of the 
convention with regard to the status of Gibraltar, while some member states raised 
objections regarding the Commission’s proposals on the role o f the Court o f Justice 
in the framework of the convention.
The TEU for the first time brought all migration policy related issues within a 
formal Europeanised framework (Weber-Panariello 1995; Baldwin-Edwards and 
Schain 1994; Butt Philip 1994). Indeed, in the time between the Maastricht and the 
Amsterdam Treaties, member states made regular use o f tbe instruments provided 
for by the first and third pillars. Table 3.1 depicts all decisions adopted with regard to 
migration policies during this period and reveals the amount o f legal acts concluded 
(all from the third pillar except for one decision on visa policies adopted in 1999 in 
the EC framework). The number of legal acts adopted increased when compared to 
the pre Maastricht period. Moreover, in this period the Schengen member states 
adopted additional migration related measures in this intergovernmental setting.
Table 3.1: Amount of migration policy decisions, 1994-1999
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 (May) Total
Number o f decisions 9 8 10 10 6 3 46
Data, own collection from Official Journal, various issues.
Table 3.1 also indicates a decline o f formal decisions following the Amsterdam 
Summit in June 1997 at which member states agreed upon the new Treaty. This 
relates to the informal agreement to shelve the adoption of some legal acts from the 
third pillar until the first pillar setting o f Tide IV o f the Amsterdam Treaty would 
enter into force. Notwithstanding the considerable amount of 46 formal decisions on 
migration policies, which highlights the incremental centralisation of migration 
policies, the Maastricht Treaty framework did not really operate smoothly. As an 
illustration, table 3.2 lists the content o f all formal decisions on migration policies 
from 1993 until May 1999, separated according to issue areas.
Table 3.2 allows us to draw several conclusions regarding the way in which 
migration policies were dealt within the ‘single institutional framework* prior to the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Thus, the 46 decisions address a wide array o f different issues
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and document a centralisation process of macro political stabilisation policies. On the 
other hand, however, the piecemeal character of legislation as well as the fragile legal 
status o f decisions reveals the reluctance on the side of most member states to 
harmonise migration policies. Within these different issue areas, the bulk of 
decisions, namely fifteen, was taken on matters related to asylum and refugee issues. 
The Dublin Convention indeed required the adoption of further legislative acts 
specifying some of its provisions. Furthermore, even those member states that were 
resisting an abolishment o f internal border controls agreed with common provisions 
regarding asylum. However, it should also be noted that the Dublin Convention as 
well as its various implementing decisions did not provide for integration on the 
substance o f asylum procedures or conditions for the reception of asylum seekers 
(Klos 1998).
A cautious step towards a Europeanised setting with regard to the substance 
o f asylum provisions was provided for by the Joint Position o f 1996 on a harmonised 
application o f the term ‘refugee’. The act establishes common rules with regard to 
the question which refugees qualify as asylum seekers in the framework of the 
Geneva Convention. The 1995 Council resolution on minimum guarantees in asylum 
procedures seemed to already assume the existence of such an approximation o f 
policies when stating that asylum decisions must *be taken on the basis o f equivalent 
procedures in all Member States and common procedural guarantees’ (Council 
1995b; Peers 2000: 119). The Council acts referred to in table 3.2 do, however, also 
reveal the obstacles with regard to the establishment of a Europeanised setting on 
asylum policies. Among the 46 legal acts on migration policies, which were published 
in the Official Journal between 1994 and May 1999, only one act was adopted within 
the first pillar, namely a Regulation on a common visa list. All other acts were 
adopted within the framework o f the third pillar and had, consequently, ‘soft law’ 
character.55 Member states were not bound by these decisions and implementation
55 The first pillar act on visa policies was formally adopted by the Council in 1995, but was 
subsequently annulled by the Court o f Justice due to procedural shortcomings relating to the 
consultation o f  the European Parliament. This case will be discussed in chapter 6.
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could not be invoked either by other EU actors or EU citizens. Even more striking, 
most decisions were not adopted on the basis o f the legal instruments provided for 
by ex-Article K.3(2) TEU. This article referred to Joint Positions, Joint Actions and 
Conventions. However, among the 45 third pillar acts, only twelve were adopted 
with such a clear legal basis, and all other decision were termed conclusions, 
recommendations, decisions and resolutions, all o f which did not have a Treaty base. 
Only in the area of asylum policies, thus an area in which a general consensus for 
further legislation existed after the Dublin Convention had been signed in 1990, 
there was a somewhat equal balance between explicit third pillar instruments and 
even softer forms of soft law.
Table 3.2: Content of decisions on migration policies, 1994-1999
Number in 
subgroup
Legal Base Issue Legal form Year of 
adoption
Institutional affairs
1 THA Application o f  article K.9 TEU Conclusion 1994
2 JHA Commission communication Conclusion 1994
3 ]HA Organisation o f CIREA and CIREFI Conclusion 1994
4 JHA Implementation o f third pillar acts Recommendation 1995
5 JHA Publication o f  third pillar acts in Official 
Journal
Decision 1995
6 JHA Setting up o f ‘Sherlock’ training programme Joint Action 1996
7 JHA Priorities o f action Resolution 1996
8 JHA Priorities o f action Resolution 1997
9 1HA Setting up o f ‘Odysseus’ training programme Joint Action 1998
table continued on page 89.
87
Free movement for TCN /  admission
1 THA Admission o f  TCN for employment Resolution 1994
2 JHA Travel for pupils from member states who are 
TCN
Joint Action 1994
3 THA Admission o f  TCN who are self employed Resolution 1994
4 JHA Admission o f  TCN for study purposes Resolution 1994
5 THA Monitoring implementation on admission Decision 1995
6 JHA Status o f TCN who are long term residents Resolution 1996
7 JHA Provisions on unaccompanied minors Resolution 1997
Asylum seekers /  refugees /  displaced persons
1 THA Minimum guarantees for asylum procedures Resolution 1995
2 JHA Burden sharing on displaced persons Resolution 1995
3 THA Emergency procedure on displaced persons Decisions 1996
4 JHA Definition o f term ‘refugee* joint Position 1996
5 THA Implementation o f Dublin Convention Conclusion 1997
6 JHA Monitoring implementation o f Dublin 
Convention
Decision 1997
7 JHA Projects for asylum seekers and displaced Joint Action 1997
persons
8 JHA Projects for asylum seekers and refugees Joint Action 1997
9 THA Dublin Convention Convention 1997
10 JHA Implementation o f Dublin Convention Decision 1997
11 THA Implementation o f Dublin Convention Decision 1997
12 JHA Projects for asylum seekers and displaced Joint Action 1998
persons
13 THA Projects for asylum seekers and refugees joint Action 1998
14 JHA Implementation of Dublin Convention Decision 1998
15 THA Emergency measures for Kosovo refugees Joint Action 1999
Expulsion /  readmission /  illegal immigration
1 THA Standard travel document for expulsions Recommendation 1994
2 JHA Specimen readmission agreement Recommendation 1994
3 JHA Principals for protocols to readmission 
agreements
Recommendation 1995
4 JHA Cooperation on expulsion Recommendation 1995
5 THA Combating illegal immigration Recommendation 1995
6 JHA Combating illegal employment Recommendation 1996
7 JHA Monitoring implementation o f expulsion Decision 1996
8 JHA Exchange o f information on repatriation Decision 1997
Visa /  residence permits
1 JHA Airport transit visa Joint Action 1996
2 THA Consular protection Recommendation 1996
3 THA Uniform format for residence permits joint Action 1996
4 JHA Sharing costs for uniform residence permits Decision 1998
5 JHA Common standards for uniform residence 
permits
Decision 1998
6 JHA Detection o f false visa Recommendation 1999
7 EC Positive visa list Regulation 1999
Data: own collection from Official Journal
It is also striking that in the area of visa policies, thus, the only migration policy issue 
which was already with the Maastricht Treaty transferred to the EC pillar, only one 
first pillar measure entered into force. In fact, the provisions o f the first pillar on
migration policies became after the Maastricht Treaty a field of interinstitutional 
wrangling. A Regulation o f 1995 on a uniform format for visas was annulled by the 
Court o f Justice after the EP had filed a charge against this measure. This decision of 
the Court of Justice effectively halted further decisions on visa policies prior to the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The cautious approach to the integration of migration policy 
issues is also well documented by the Joint Action o f 1996 on airport transit visa. 
Member states choose to adopt this measure in the framework of the third pillar, 
although, on the face o f it, visa policies belonged to the EC setting. The Court of 
Justice rejected an annulment charge by the Commission arguing that the Council 
was justified in adopting this measure under ex-Article K  TEU.56 In the area of 
expulsion, readmission and illegal immigration not a single measure was adopted 
under an official third pillar legal instrument, while on admission policies only one 
out o f seven measures was based on the TEU’s provisions. No single decision on 
external borders was published in the Official Journal in the period under 
consideration, thus providing evidence of the deadlock in this area caused by the 
dispute on the External Frontiers Convention.
The period o f JHA cooperation on migration policies from 1993 to 1999 thus 
reveals a mixed balance regarding the centralisation o f this area at the EU level. On 
the one hand, the amount of decisions increased considerably when compared with 
the cooperation prior to the Maastricht Treaty. The incremental process of 
developing a European migration regime, which started in the late 1980s, has 
therefore gathered speed after 1993. Moreover, the development of a whole set of 
policies dealing exclusively with TCNs provided substance to the creation of an 
‘insider-outsider divide* of the EU and, therefore, signals the emergence of a 
functional frame for macro political stabilisation policies. On the other hand, the 
legal form of these decisions, the piecemeal approach to the various issues, the lack 
of an overarching framework on migration policies as well as the lack o f progress on 
external border policies demonstrated the limits to a centralisation o f this policy area.
56 For a detailed discussion o f these two cases see chapter 6.
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The Schengen cooperation did not really present an alternative to an EU migration 
policy regime. N ot so much because Schengen cooperation as such was not working 
— indeed, for many issues, such as external border provisions, visa policies or asylum 
rules Schengen functioned as a ‘laboratory’ for measures which would later be 
adopted at the EU level (Hailbronner 2000: 141; Monar 2001). Yet, ‘the ongoing 
“widening” and “deepening” of Schengen, as its organs made a number of decisions 
implementing the [Schengen] Convention, meant that the cross-over between 
Schengen and JHA cooperation was continuingly increasing. The convergent 
geographical and material scope o f official European integration under the EU- 
Treaty and “black-market” Schengen integration led some Member States to suggest 
that the two processes should be formally reconciled’ (Peers 2000: 36).
While following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty the 
centralisation of migration policies at the EU level thus gained momentum, the 
general pattern o f incremental integration did not substantially change (Hailbronner
1998). Notwithstanding the significance of the semi-communitarisation of migration 
policies and the *Treaty monument o f the area of freedom, security and justice’, 
actual progress on migration policies lacked behind the determination suggested by 
this formula (Chalmers 1998: 1). On the one hand, the commitment for establishing 
the area of freedom, security and justice as well as the more comprehensive approach 
to deal with migration policy issues, as expressed by the setting up o f a scoreboard, 
point to the gradual centralisation o f migration policies within the EU setting. On the 
other hand, however, the lack o f progress on the detailed legislative objectives 
formulated in this area not only documents the typical incremental nature of 
integration in macro political stabilisation policies but also casts some serious doubts 
on whether the self set deadline o f May 2004 for the adoption o f all legislative 
measures entailed in the scoreboard can actually be attained.
The new ‘policy reference point’ of establishing an area o f freedom, security 
and justice initially triggered the expectation that following the entry into force o f the 
Amsterdam Treaty EU migration policies would move beyond die patchwork 
approach o f prior third pillar cooperation. Being aware that the ‘miscellany o f
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achievements’ in migration policies so far, does not form ‘a single concept’, several 
initiatives, from the Commission, various Presidencies as well as from the Council 
level aimed to predefine how a ‘comprehensive’ overall migration strategy’ should 
look like (Commission 1998a; European Council 1998). The Vienna Action Plan of 
December 1998 aimed to set the guidelines for EU migration policies under the 
Amsterdam Treaty rules.57 The Action Plan was particularly ambitious with regard to 
asylum and refugee issues. It even referred to the need of establishing a ‘single 
European asylum procedure’, thus linguistically underlining  the centralisation 
dynamics o f this area. However, the notion of ‘single’ policies was as quickly 
abandoned as it appeared on the horizon. It was already the Tampere European 
Council Conclusions of October 1999 which more cautiously referred to the 
establishment o f a ‘common European asylum system’ (European Council 1999b; 
House of Lords 1999). It should, however, also be noted that the Tampere meeting 
was the first European Council sum m it which was fully devoted to EU interior 
policies, thus once more underlining the potential provided for by the Amsterdam 
Treaty. In the Tampere conclusions, the European Council enumerated the main 
areas on which action should be taken within the framework of inter alia Tide IV. 
This included action on partnership with countries of origin, a common European 
asylum system, fair treatment o f third country nationals (including admission and 
residence) and management of migration flows. These ‘Tampere priorities’ as well as 
the specific objectives formulated by the European Council on these various areas, 
were subsequendy taken up by the C om m ission when drafting the scoreboard. The 
Tampere provisions structure the scoreboard which has the goal to ensure the 
legislative adoption of those migration decisions by May 2004 which are needed in
57 Some initial drafts o f the Austrian Presidency met with vigorous criticism from non governmental 
organisations and some member states, because Austria made no reference to the Geneva Convention 
raising doubts o f whether a future EU migration policy regime would be based on this provision. In 
subsequent meetings the reference to the Geneva Convention was again introduced in official EU 
papers, Agence Europe, N o 7332, 29 October 1998: 7-8. It should, however, also be noted that the 
Geneva Convention has already been expliddy referred to in the Amsterdam Treaty thus already 
documenting its relevance for a future EU migration regime.
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order ‘to attain the objectives set by the Amsterdam Treaty and Tampere European 
Council* (Commission 2002b: 2).
Yet, as indicated by table 3.3 actual progress on adopting the necessary legal 
measures enumerated at length in the Amsterdam Treaty, the Vienna Action Plan, 
the Tampere Council conclusions as well as in the scoreboard lacked behind the 
widely accepted ambition to give ‘flesh* to the concept o f an area o f freedom, 
security and justice. Legislation on migration policies issues after the Amsterdam 
Treaty continued to reflect the highly incremental, piecemeal character o f policies. 
Thus, not even a single legal measure had been adopted regarding the admission and 
residence of TCNs, while provisions on borders and visa related issues remained 
mainly restricted to highly technical operational provisions, such as adaptation to the 
Schengen com m on consular instructions (House of Commons 2002). Progress was 
only achieved on those issues on which there already was some first pillar legislation 
prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, namely visa lists and the uniform format for visa. 
Highly visible projects such as the establishment of EURODAC or a European 
Refugee Fund (ERF) do document some institutional centralisation of migration 
policies at the EU level but cannot cover the lack of overall substantial 
approximation of migration law.
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Table 3.3. Legal acts adopted in migration policies, 1999-2002
Number in 
subgroup
Issue Legal form Year of 
adoption
Countries o f origin
1 Implementation o f action plans Report to European 
Council
2000
Asylum
1 EURODAC Regulation 2000
2 EURODAC application rules Regulation 2002
3 Minimum standards for refugee status Conclusion 2001
4 Temporary protection for displaced persons Directive 2001
5 European Refugee Fund Decision 2000
Illegal im m igration, readm ission, external action
1 Combating illegal immigration Plan 2002
2 Combating illegal immigration by sea Conclusion 2002
3 Harmonisation o f laws on carrier’s liability Directive 2001
4 Readmission agreement with Hong Kong Agreement 2001
5 Minimum standards on repatriation Directive 2001
6 Combating trafficking in human beings Undertakings 2001
7 Repatriation programme On basis o f a Green Paper 2002
V isas and Internal and external borders
1 List o f
exemptions from visa requirement
Regulation 2001
2 Amending the list o f exemptions from visa 
requirement
Regulation 2001
3 Implementation o f visa applications Regulation 2001
4 Updating o f Common Consular Instructions Decision 2001
5 Amendment to Common Consular Instructions Decision 2001
6 Amendment to Common Consular Instructions Decision 2002
7 Uniform format for visa Regulation 2002
8 Uniform format for forms for affixing the visa Regulation 2002
9 Travel on a long stay visa Initiative 2001
10 Detection o f false documents: exchange o f 
information
Decision 2000
11 Implementing powers on border checks Regulation 2001
12 Amending Common Consular Instructions Decision 2002
13 Amending Common Consular Instructions Decision 2002
14 Development o f SIS II Regulation and Decision 2001
15 Management o f external borders Plan 2002
Data: own collection from Commission 2002b.
Such a sceptical evaluation regarding the implementation o f the repeatedly endorsed 
objective to establish a comprehensive migration policy framework at the Union level 
was recognised by both the European Council and the Commission. However, 
appeals from both institutions to speed up the adoption o f legislative measures in 
order to meet the 2004 deadline did not bear fruits. The Laeken European Council of 
2001 was critical about developments in migration policies arguing that ‘progress has 
been slower and less substantial than expected* and that ‘a new approach is therefore
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needed’ (European Council 2001). An evaluation from the Presidency became more 
specific (Council 2001d). Various obstacles, such as the highly technical nature of 
some measures proposed by the scoreboard, ‘real differences on the scope of the 
instruments to be adopted’ and ‘Member States’ reluctance to go beyond the 
confines of their national laws’ all hampered centralisation of migration policies 
beyond the general will expressed in Amsterdam, Vienna and Tampere on 
‘formulating common policies’ {ibid.: 4). In fact, the Presidency identified the ongoing 
unanimity requirement in the Council on most migration policy measures as a 
‘serious hindrance to progress’ {ibid.: 5). However, the call of the Laeken European 
Council to ‘make good delays’ on the implementation of migration policy issues 
enlisted in the scoreboard did not change the overall slow ‘flow of policies’ (W 
Wallace 2000).
Hence, one year after the Laeken European Council the Commission could 
conclude that the appeal by heads of state and government did not change the 
cautious approach in the Council. Thus, ‘the backlog referred to by the Laeken 
European Council has not been cleared in some areas, notably as regards the 
common policies on asylum and immigration’ (Commission 2002b: 4). The 
considerable divergence o f national migration policies, often intensified by new 
legislative measures from member states, the complex institutional provisions of Tide 
TV, uncertainties stemming from the next round o f enlargement as well as a potential 
legislative congestion in the migration policy pipeline prior to the 2004 deadline were 
identified as major stumbling blocs for the establishment of more than piecemeal, 
often technical legislative acts {ibid).
Budget
The financing of macro political stabilisation policies within the single institutional 
framework has been a contested issue between the Council, the Commission, 
Parliament and the Court of Auditors. This section leaves the discussion on the 
powers of these actors, their policy preferences on budgetary issues as well as 
patterns of interaction between them to subsequent chapters. What will be o f interest
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here, is to provide further substance to the claim that foreign and interior policies 
since 1993 were characterised by a cautious and incremental, yet ongoing 
centralisation process, which anchored this ‘new* policy type at the EU level. This is 
not a mere discussion on figures. ‘Budgets matter politically, because money 
represents the commitment o f resources to the provision o f public goods’, such as, in 
this case, macro political stabilisation policies (Laffan and Shackleton 2000: 212).
As will be further discussed in chapter 4, one of the practical consequences 
o f the single institutional framework related to the financing o f cross pillar policies. 
Thus, ex-Articles J and K  TEU provided for the financing o f CFSP and JHA 
activities from two different budgetary sources. On the one hand, so-called 
‘administrative’ expenditure had to be charged to the EC budget, whereas 
‘operational’ expenditure could be charged to the EC budget by unanimous 
agreement of all member states. Otherwise, ‘operational’ expenditure had to be 
charged to the member states. The financing  of the second and third pillars was, in 
the first years following the entry into force o f the Maastricht Treaty, a contested 
issue both within the Council as well as between the Council, the Commission and 
Parliament.
Following the establishment of the second and third pillars, some member 
states were reluctant to make recourse to the EC budget for the financing o f these 
policies, fearing that this might lead to a creeping communitatisation of foreign and 
interior policies. However, the failure of member states to credibly commit 
themselves to finance ‘intergovernmental pillar’ activities out o f national budgets, 
soon led to such a recourse to EC budgetary resources (Monar 1997b). Table 3.4 
provides data on the development o f the foreign and interior policy budgets in 
relation to the total EC budget for the years from 1992 to 2003.58 Moreover, table 3.4 
includes data on expenditure in the second pillar, enlisted for each consecutive year, 
and for third pillar expenditure up until 1998. It should be noted that data on interior
58 For all data on foreign policy expenditure referred to in this chapter, the appropriations for funding 
enlargement have been excluded. Enlargement expenditure appears in the foreign policy chapter o f 
the EC budget but does not really regulate the EU’s relations with the outside world but rather with 
future insiders.
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policies from 1999 onwards relates to the cross pillar budget for the creation of an 
‘area o f freedom, security and justice, and mainly comprises first pillar migration 
policy expenditure. A comparison of expenditure on CFSP and JHA measures 
reveals the greater reluctance on the side of some member states to finance interior 
policy measures from EC budgetary resources than those involving external action 
(ibid). This correlates with the aforementioned reluctant use of Treaty based legal 
instruments, such as Joint Actions, in particular in the JHA setting. Litde legislative 
activities are, thus, mirrored by reluctant recourse to the EC budget
The financing of foreign and interior policies also affected interinstitutional 
relations. Thus, Parliament has been keen to ensure its ‘power o f the purse’ on non 
compulsory expenditure also with regard to the financing of CFSP and JHA from the 
EC budget and has opposed attempts by the Council to ‘elude parts o f Communitary 
budgetary principles in decisions on the introduction and the implementation of EC 
funding for measures within the intergovernmental pillars’ (ibid:. 77). Thus, 
Parliament has pushed in both areas for the conclusion o f interinstitutional 
agreements which would regulate the relations between the different arms o f the 
budgetary authority. While on the CFSP such an agreement was ultimately agreed 
upon in 1997 and amended in 1999, on JHA no agreement between the Council and 
Parliament could be reached, again documenting the reluctance o f some member 
states for legislative and budgetary commitments in the third pillar (Interinstitutional 
Agreement 1997 and 1999). These interinstitutional agreements contained a 
declaration of intent that the institutions ‘shall annually assure’ (agreement o f 1997) 
or ‘endeavour’ (agreement o f 1999) to agree on the amount of operational 
expenditure to be charged to the EC budget Moreover, they agreed that funds will 
not be entered in a reserve, which escapes the control of Parliament, and that for 
urgent actions a maximum of 20 per cent of yearly CFSP expenditure will be entered 
in the budgetary heading. While the Commission was responsible, under the EC 
budgetary provisions, for the implementation o f all expenditure, thus also those from 
the CFSP and JHA entries, it did not have a political responsibility for acts adopted 
within these areas. This led to a ‘blurring of responsibilities’ and rendered the
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Commission ‘a mere “cashier” of intergovernmental co-operation deprived of 
political responsibility but nevertheless accountable to the European Parliament* 
(Monar 1997b: 77-78). As will be discussed in the following chapters, accusations of 
the Court of Auditors, which were taken up by Parliament, on a mal-administration 
o f budgetary resources, mainly those on first pillar foreign policies, led in 1999 to the 
resignation of the entire college of Commissioners.
The functional relevance of the EC budget for the centralisation of macro 
political stabilisation policies comes to the fore when looking at the expenditure in 
both areas since ‘the budget is a useful yardstick to measure positive integration, 
(Laffan and Shackleton 2000: 213). The absolute figures in table 3.4 reveal the 
differences made in the cautious yet significant use o f CFSP expenditure and the 
extremely reluctant recourse to finance JHA from the EC budget. It was only the 
semi-communitarisation of migration policies with the Amsterdam Treaty which 
caused a major increase o f expenditure on interior (migration) policies. This 
expenditure has been mainly earmarked for the ERF.
Table 3.4 'Expenditure foreign and interior policies, 1992-2003 (Mio €)
year f  
area
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Foreign
Policies
2,433 2,873 3,070 3,410 3,874 3,835 4,223 4,725 4,201 5,043 5,085 4,949
(CFSP)
Interior
(0) (14) (10) (83) (61) (24) (23) (37) (38) (39) (35) (48)
Policies
Total
0 0 0 3 2 7 8 36 80 148 145 154
budget 58,857 65,269 59,909 66,758 77,454 80,003 81,637 84,268 82,868 106,924 95,655 99,686
Data, own calculations from Budget 1992,1993,1994,1995,1996,1997,1998,1999,2000,2001,2002, 
2003.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 aim to illustrate the anchoring of macro political stabilisation 
policies at the EU level. Thus, figure 3.1 shows the steady increase o f the combined 
expenditure on both areas for the years from 1992 until 2003. In proportion, 
however, only a tiny bit o f expenditure related to interior policies, with the bulk of 
budgetary resources spent on first pillar foreign policies, in particular aid. For 
example, in the 2002 budget on foreign policies € 1.3 billion were spent on 
cooperation with countries in central Asia and the Balkans. Commitments o f € 0.9
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billion were devoted to food and humanitarian aid, cooperation measures in the 
framework of the Lome Convention as well as cooperation with Mediterranean 
partner countries to the EMP. Budgetary resources were, furthermore, committed to 
democracy promotion (€ 100 million) and other measures (Budget 2002).
Figure 3.1:
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Data, ow n calculations, see table 3.4.
Figure 3.1 reveals that there has been a steady increase o f foreign and interior policy 
expenditure but no major change which would point to a dramatic juncture. This is 
also reflected by figure 3.2 which relates expenditure in foreign and interior policies 
to the total EC budget. As can already be seen in table 3.4 it was not only foreign and 
interior policy expenditure which modestly increased since 1993 but also the total 
size o f the EC budget (Laffan and Shackleton 2000). Figure 3.2 relates the increase in 
foreign and interior policies expenditure to the increase o f the total EC budget. An 
incremental and small but nevertheless visible increase of the relative share o f macro 
political stabilisation policies vis-a-vis other policy types within the overall EC budget 
can be detected. While in 1992 and 1993, thus the two years prior to the entry into 
force o f the Maastricht Treaty, the share o f foreign and interior policies was 4.1 per 
cent o f the total EC budget, the share increased until 1995 to more than 5 per cent
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and by 1999 already 6 per cent o f the budget were spent on macro political 
stabilisation. In the following years the budget floated between 4.9 per cent and 5.5 
per cent with an overall tendency on modest growth.
As a sum, the development o f the budgetary dimension o f foreign and 
interior policies underlines the conclusions drawn from the prior analysis on the 
cautious approach to integrating these policies with regard to Treaty provisions and 
policy history. O n the one hand, there has been a steady increase o f expenditure in 
both areas both in total figures as well as with regard to the overall budget which 
suggests that both areas have become firmly anchored at the EU level. On the other 
hand, however, this increase has been far from breathtaking and documents once 
more the cautious and incremental approach to centralise macro political stabilisation 
policies.
Figure 3.2: Percentages of foreign and interior policies expenditure o f total E U
budget, 1992-2003
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Conclusion
The analysis o f this chapter has aimed to provide substance to the claim that the 
study o f EU foreign and interiors has to include considerations on the way in which 
the incremental centralisation process o f macro political stabilisation policies has
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fostered the functional frame around which these policies evolve. Since both areas 
constitute a single policy type and provide the Union with macro political 
stabilisation, integration in both areas is subject to conditions that differ from those 
applying to other policy types. The linkage between macro political stabilisation 
policies at the EU level, on the one hand, with traditionally held exclusive national 
competencies on this policy type, on the other, has led to a remarkably cautious and 
piecemeal centralisation process.
At the Treaty level macro political stabilisation policies have been split up 
into different pillars. The combination of a multiple policies framework with a single 
institutional framework has shaped the policy history in both areas. The development 
o f policies in foreign and interior policies has been characterised by a gradual 
increase o f providing macro political stabilisation policies for the Union. However, 
the policy history was also a history of highly incremental and piecemeal measures 
which did not culminate in a ‘comprehensive’, let alone exclusive, EU framework. 
This lack o f comprehensiveness has been emphasised, rather than accommodated 
for, by the ambitious objectives formulated in both areas, such as the Common 
Strategy on the Mediterranean region or the Tampere European Council conclusions. 
What has, however, emerged in the process of integrating both areas at the EU level 
has been a notion o f the common — the objective is not to create single foreign and 
interior policies, in the sense that these policies would replace national policies in 
these areas, but rather to gradually develop a solid, functional frame for EU policies 
on foreign and interior affairs.59
59 This argument closely relates to those approaches that attach importance to ‘ideas* or ‘frames’ on 
which, at a later stage, concrete political action could be built (Garrett and Weingast 1993; Parsons 
2002).
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Ch a p t e r  4
Cross Pillar Institutions I 
Primary Capabilities
Introduction
This chapter investigates the capabilities of EU actors in foreign and interior policies 
as defined by the Treaties, thus turning to the analysis of the institutional variables 
set out in chapter 2. Since these capabilities have been delegated to EU actors by 
primary law, they will be referred to as primary capabilities. Following the key 
propositions outlined in chapter 2, the main questions which are addressed here are. 
How do the functional features o f macro political stabilisation policies affect the 
primary capabilities of EU actors? Hence, to what extent do the capabilities o f EU 
actors reflect the ‘pillar divide’ o f both foreign and interior policies? Given the 
endurance of these two basic institutional arenas, what is the actual difference with 
regard to the powers of EU actors between those parts o f foreign and interior 
policies which belong to the first pillar, on the one hand, and those parts belonging 
to the second and third pillars, on the other? And also, are there differences 
regarding the capabilities of EU actors when comparing their individual role in foreign 
and interior policies?
As outlined in chapter 2, this analysis aims to contribute to a better 
understanding on the interrelationship between the three pillars and, more precisely, 
on the interplay between ‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ institutions in 
foreign and interior policies. In particular, it seeks to shed light on the question of 
what role member states devised in both areas for collective actors at the EU centre 
— such as the Commission, Parliament, the Council Secretariat, the Court o f Justice 
or the Court o f Auditors. As an analytical background to the analysis on primary 
capabilities of EU actors, this chapter — as well as the following chapter on secondary 
capabilities — draws from insights o f delegation theory (Kiewiet and McCubbins
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1991; Pollack 1997). As the previous chapter has shown, market integration and, 
subsequently, negative externalities stemming from (market) integration have been a 
stimulus to initiate cooperation between member states in all institutional arenas of 
foreign and interior policies (Gatsios and Seabright 1989). This has resulted in the 
emergence of a functionally defined new policy type at the EU level, which has been 
defined as macro political stabilisation. This chapter argues that the particular 
functional characteristics o f macro political stabilisation, namely the linkage between 
this policy type, on the one hand, and notions of sovereignty, on the other, explains 
both the cautious delegation o f capabilities to EU actors as well as the noteworthy 
institutional fragmentation o f their capabilities in the two areas.
It was already with the Treaty o f Rome that external economic cooperation, 
developmental assistance as well as provisions on the free movement o f persons 
became part of the EC. In contrast to this communitarisation o f economic foreign and 
interior policies, cooperation on classical diplomatic relations, security policies as well 
as on migration, policing and judicial policies remained prior to the Maastricht Treaty 
outside of the EC context (Peers 2000: 9-15). However, this merely 
intergovernmental cooperation in both areas faced, first, serious credibility and 
coordination problems (Majone 1996b). Second, ‘the economic logic o f market- 
making had political consequences that drew issues of high politics into the EU’s 
remit* (Geddes 2000: 93). Therefore, member states decided in 1993 to bring the 
political arenas of foreign and interior policies within the ‘single institutional setting* o f 
the EU, thus replacing the previous ‘working model o f intergovernmental 
cooperation without formal integration* through a model that tried to reconcile 
intergovernmental cooperation and formal integration (Forster and Wallace 2000: 
466). By doing so, member states also agreed to delegate within the newly created 
fields of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, on the one hand, and Justice and 
Home Affairs, on the other, certain capabilities to EU actors (Regelsberger 1993; 
Monar and Morgan 1994). However, the actual powers of these actors remained 
small when compared to their entrenched capabilities in economic sectors o f foreign 
and interior policies. *The reason is that Member States take the view that JHA
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cooperation, and foreign policy cooperation, are issues so central to their sovereignty 
that the “supranational” approach o f Community law must be set aside7 (Peers 2000: 
13). And indeed, this overall ‘pillar design7 of the EU has not been subject to 
substantial change neither with the Amsterdam nor the Nice Treaty (den Boer 1997; 
Monar 1997a).
Notwithstanding this observation, EU actors have in all three Treaty reforms 
o f the 1990s been delegated new capabilities in all institutional arenas o f foreign and 
interior policies. While member states governments maintain the main sources of 
power and legitimacy in both areas, they have begun to share some of these sources 
with EU actors. Such delegation o f capabilities should not be regarded as a zero sum 
game in which delegated capabilities necessarily mean a loss o f capabilities on the 
side of principals. Principals can thus ‘use delegation to effectively pursue their policy 
objectives7 (Kiwiet and McCubbins 1991: 234). Hence, the focus o f this chapter on 
the capabilities of EU actors is not suggesting that there has been a kind of 
‘abdication7 of member states {ibid.). Instead, member states share power with EU 
actors, notably the Commission and, increasingly the Council Secretariat This 
process resulted in two main features. First, the dominant divide in EU foreign and 
interior politics is between executive and non-executive actors, which are meant to 
control the executive but whose capabilities are more limited than those o f the 
executive. These actors will be referred to in this thesis as ‘control actors7. Second, 
inner executive relations are mainly characterised by cooperative modes of 
interaction. Open conflicts are rare but do, o f course, occur. Chapter 7 will discuss 
these patterns of interaction in greater detail
Authority delegation in foreign and interior policies was necessitated, as the 
previous chapter has argued, by the scope o f and the functional demands from policy 
making in both areas as an integral part o f the EU political system. The precise way 
in which this delegation has materialised institutionally will be the topic of the 
following analysis.
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Prim aty delegation and the role ofEU  actors as agents
At the Maastricht Treaty summit member states put in place the three pillar structure 
o f the EU which is characterised by one ‘supranational’ and two ‘intergovernmental* 
pillars. This division between a ‘classical* communitarised institutional arena, on the 
one hand, and member states* dominated arenas, on the other, has subsequently not 
been subject to a radical change.60 Treaty reforms neither in Amsterdam nor in Nice 
led to a wholesale turn towards one of these two ideal type forms of EU 
government While the Maastricht Treaty, thus, led to the incorporation of two 
previously strictly intergovernmental policies into the EU system of governance, the 
type of Europeanisation in foreign and interior policies was quite different from 
other policy areas. The qualitative gap between the EC, on the one hand, and CFSP 
as well as JHA, on the other, becomes particularly evident when looking at the 
capabilities o f EU actors within these two different institutional arenas.
Thus, as H Wallace has noted, ‘for the new “high politics” issues o f foreign 
and security policy, and justice and home affairs, the price for their inclusion within 
the scope of what would thereafter be the Union was that they would be subject to 
different and weaker institutional regimes* (1996b: 55). Along the same lines, 
Moravcsik has analysed the capabilities o f EU actors in the second and third pillars. 
He has argued that member states had designed ‘this three-pillar structure, a 
metaphor proposed by the French representative Pierre de Boissieu, [...] to restrict 
definitively, through qualitative institutional breaks, the Commission and 
Parliament’s prerogatives in foreign and interior policy* (1998: 450).
However, such an exclusive focus on the second and third pillars does distort 
a policy perspective on foreign and internal affairs. ‘The three-pillar institutional 
structure of the European Union comes under fire [...] because it artificially separates 
external and internal sectors of public life* (Zielonka 1998b: 5). Moreover, a closer 
look behind this dominant pillar structure reveals, as has already been indicated in the
60 TTiis chapter argues that even in the ‘supranational’ first pillar there is not a single institutional 
model that defines the capabilities o f EU actors. The so-called Community method has itself become 
increasingly hybrid and complex as EC coverage and competencies -widened. Therefore, also the first 
pillar is characterised by a multitude o f institutional arenas.
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previous chapters, that both the CFSP and JHA are but some o f the various 
‘institutional regimes’ o f EU foreign and interior policies and these regimes are 
spread across all three pillars. Based on this understanding, this chapter investigates 
the cross pillar capabilities o f EU actors in these two policy areas. Notwithstanding 
this approach, the thesis does not follow a claim which has been made by Michael 
Smith, who has looked at the interrelationship between first and second pillar foreign 
policy provisions, and who has argued ‘that the place to look for “foreign policy” is 
in the development o f external economic policies’ (M Smith 1998: 77). It is rather 
argued that in order to comprehensively grasp developments in both policy areas, 
one must equally focus on the Treaty provisions in all three pillars.
Since the analysis o f this chapter is based on the provisions of the Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the specific kind o f capabilities, which are investigated 
here, will be understood as ‘primary capabilities’. Such a terminology rests on the 
observation that Treaty provisions are not the only source of delegation of 
capabilities.61 Moreover, a study on primary capabilities o f EU actors promises to be 
particularly fruitful for a cross pillar comparative analysis. Indeed, this section reveals 
both important differences but also similarities between first pillar provisions, on the 
one hand, and the more intergovernmental provisions, on the other. Thus, while the 
capabilities of EU actors in foreign and interior policies are much more pronounced 
in the first pillar, these actors nevertheless possess capabilities across all types of 
institutional regimes and pillars. The analysis o f this chapter proceeds in three steps 
thereby focusing on the main domains in which capabilities have been delegated to 
EU actors by the Treaties. First, it considers the legislative powers of EU actors in 
both areas. Thus, it focuses on the powers o f the legislative triangle’ consisting of 
the Council, the Commission and Parliament and their respective roles in the various 
legislative regimes o f both areas. Second, the capabilities o f the Commission and the 
Council (Secretariat) as the two poles of the EU double executive are analysed. Third,
61 Delegation o f capabilities does also occur by secondary decisions as part o f day-to-day policy 
making in the EU. These ‘secondary capabilities’ o f EU actors in foreign and interior policies will be 
dealt with in the next chapter.
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spill over provisions from the first pillar, these being budgetary authority and judicial 
remedy, and their effect on the cross pillar capabilities of EU actors, such as the 
Commission, Parliament, the Court of Justice or the Court of Auditors, form the 
substance of the final section.
Four main insights are the result o f this analysis. First, a study on primary 
capabilities shows that the pillar structure of the EU continues to be highly relevant 
for a proper understanding o f foreign and interior policies at the EU level. Thus, 
there is a clear distinction between the capabilities of EU actors in the first pillar, on 
the one hand, and their powers in the second and third pillars, on the other. EU 
actors are, generally spoken, much more powerful in the former. The Treaty 
provisions, therefore, seemingly support arguments in favour of a ‘pillarised 
perspective* on foreign and interior policies. Even the transfer o f migration policies 
from the third to the first pillar with the Amsterdam Treaty did not result in a 
communitarisation o f this area. Rather, migration policies do present a ‘new 
institutional regime* half way between the two kinds of pillars. As Hailbronner notes: 
*The Member States have been anxious to retain a certain domaine reserve and an active 
say on its definition; Tide IV was framed on this premise* (2000: 36).
Second, despite this general endurance of two parallel institutional 
frameworks, each Treaty reform provided for both more delegation of cross pillar 
capabilities to EU actors and an increasing amount of linkages between the three 
pillars. Therefore, the originally quite strict division between these two different 
institutional arenas is incrementally undermined. Third, these Treaty changes paved 
the way for the nascent ‘hybrid institutional setting* which characterises both areas. 
This new hybrid regime mirrors the centralisation o f macro political stabilisation 
policies at the EU level, which inter alia equipped some EU actors with a considerable 
amount of new capabilities the delegation o f which accompanied this centralisation. 
Thus, the functional frame provided for by macro political stabilisation policies left 
its mark on the precise capabilities which EU actors received through primary 
delegation. Notwithstanding this observation, member states continue to dominate 
and control developments in foreign and interior policies to a much larger extent
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than they usually do in classical first pillar areas. To that extent, the ‘EU remains a 
partial polity, without many o f the features which one might expect to find within a 
fully developed democratic political system’ (W Wallace 2000: 533).
Finally, the ‘pillar perspective’ tends to underestimate the considerable 
differences which exist between EU actors with regard to their individual cross pillar 
capabilities. Since it is argued here that the centralisation process has in particular 
strengthened executive EU actors, it was mainly the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat that were able to increase their leverage vis-a-vis the member states. The 
legislative and judicial branches of the EU political system, on the other hand, have 
not been delegated similar capabilities. While Parliament, the Court o f Auditors and 
the Court of Justice have received some new powers through Treaty reforms, the 
institutional endowment for these three actors does not put them on a footing equal 
to the EU executive, let alone member states.
Primary delegation in legislative domains o f foreign and interiorpolicies 
The legislative process in the EU is based on three main principles. First, legislative 
politics in the EU are embedded within a bicameral system in which the Council and 
Parliament are the key decision makers. However, the legislative system is also 
characterised by a variety of legislative procedures. While a majority in the Council is 
required under each o f these procedures in order to pass a legislative act, the powers 
of Parliament vary considerably. Under some o f these procedures Parliament acts on 
equal footing with the Council, i.e. in the codecision and the assent procedures a 
parliamentary majority is required for the adoption o f a legislative act. Under the 
cooperation procedure Parliament can, under certain conditions, amend legislation 
while the consultation procedure allows at least to delay the adoption o f legislative 
acts. Finally under the ‘information procedure’ as well as for those cases in which it is 
not mentioned at all, Parliament does not really act as a legislature but rather as a 
forum which publicly scrutinises Council legislation, either before or after its 
adoption. Table 4.1 presents an overview on the powers of Parliament in each of 
these six procedures. The ranking in Table 4.1 suggests that the powers o f Parliament
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decrease in descending order. This ranking is based on two observations. First, the 
greatest weight is given to the question if  a parliamentary majority is required for the 
adoption o f a piece of legislation. The second consideration then is whether 
Parliament can propose changes to such a legislative proposal or n o t
A second characteristic of the EU legislative process is that the Commission 
also participates as an active player by taking on the role o f an agenda-setter.62 
Through its right o f initiative the Commission holds a powerful resource in shaping 
future decisions. However, the actual significance of the right of initiative, which the 
Commission enjoys in all institutional arenas of foreign and interior policies save 
defence issues, depends on both the exclusivity of this provision and the voting rules 
in the Council. In some institutional regimes, the Commission is the only institutions 
which can initiate a legislative proposal, whereas in some others it has to share this 
right with the member states. This, o f courses, reduces the Commission’s capabilities 
since member states can rely on their own legislative activism (Pierson 1998: 35-38).
As mentioned before, the third important element in the legislative process is 
the majority requirements within the Council. These rules do, for example, determine 
the actual significance of the Commission’s sole right of initiative. Thus, if the 
Council decides by a qualified majority, the sole right of initiative o f the Commission 
has a greater weight than for cases in which the Council decides by unanimity. This is 
the case, because under qualified majority the C om m ission can propose legislation 
that is closer to its ‘ideal point* than under unanimity. In the former case, the 
Commission can ‘ignore’ those member states that are most distant to its own 
proposals and which are not required for such a majority. In contrast, under 
unanimity the Commission has to incorporate even the positions o f those member 
states that are most distant to its own policy positions (Tsebelis 1994). Having this
62 Agenda setting is understood here in the formal sense and refers to the initiation o f legislation. O f 
course, the setting o f the EU agenda does not depend on the Commission alone. Thus, ‘in treaties and 
reforms, the Council sets the long term policy goals o f the EU’ whereas ‘the European Council (of 
heads o f government) and certain other councils set the medium-term policy agenda’ (Hix 1999: 25). 
Moreover, in the second and third pillars it has in particular been the rotating Presidencies which have 
often taken a lead in agenda setting by bringing their individual policy preferences on the formal EU 
agenda.
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ideal typical model in mind, the actual usage of qualified majority voting in the EU 
policy making process should, however, not be overestimated. Empirical studies have 
shown that the Council often prefers to decide on a consensual basis even in those 
areas in which the Treaty requires a qualified majority only (Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace 1997). This insight has also been confirmed by primary research for this 
thesis. To give but one example, an official from the Council Secretariat, when 
reflecting about the possible use o f majority voting on migration policies, has stated 
that ‘a constant use o f QMV against Germany is not possible on this issue’.63 Table 
4.2 presents a list o f all the legislative constellations for foreign and interior policy 
across the three pillars. It incorporates a ‘triangular’ perspective on the two policy 
areas thus taking note o f the role o f Parliament as defined by the six different 
legislative procedures, the role o f the Commission as exemplified by the rules on its 
right o f initiative and, finally, the voting rules in the Council.64
63 Interview 26, Director, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
64 It should be mentioned that the Treaty provisions on the free movement o f persons, which are o f 
relevance for the analysis o f interior policies, make also reference to the Economic and Social 
Committee as an institution involved in the legislative process. However, due to its overall 
insignificant role in foreign and interior policies, this thesis does not cover the activities o f the 
Economic and Social Committee.
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Table 4.1: Role ofj 
Procedure
Parliament in the six legislative procedures for foreign and interior policies 
Role o f Parliam ent
1. Codetision •  Three stage procedure (earlier agreement possible);
•  Parliamentary majority required in each stage (absolute majority in plenary, 
simple majority in Conciliation Committee);
•  P arliam en t can propose changes to legislation;
•  If no agreement in first two readings, Conciliation Committee between 
Parliament and Council convenes;
•  Procedure introduced with Maastricht Treaty, reformed with Amsterdam 
Treaty which further strengthened the role o f Parliament (Artide 251).
2. Cooperation •  Two stage procedure;
•  Parliamentary majority not required (but easier for Council to accept 
proposals from Parliament than to reject them);
• P arliam en t can propose changes to legislation (Parliament as ‘conditional 
agenda setter* (cf. Tsebelis 1994);
• Introduced with the Single European Act, but for foreign and interior 
polities abolished with the Amsterdam Treaty.
3. Assent • Single stage procedure;
• Parliamentary majority required;
• Parliament cannot propose changes to legislation.
4. Consultation • Single stage procedure;
• Parliamentary majority not required (but following the 1980 Isoglucose case at 
the Court o f Justice Parliament has a de facto power o f dday since Council 
has to await the opinion o f Parliament before the adoption);
• Parliament can propose changes to legislation.
5. Information •  Council and Commission are asked but not bound to keep Parliament 
informed;
•  N o powers to prevent, change or delay legislation;
•  Parliament can publicly scrutinise legislation
•  Introduced for the second and third pillars with the Maastricht Treaty.
6. No Parliament •  N o role for Parliament at all
•  Note: Applies to certain first pillar [sic.] areas
Sources: Hix 1999; Nugent 1999.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the Commission tends to adopt a cautious 
approach when initiating legislation independently on whether the right of initiative 
is sole or shared.65 It was only in those areas in which the Commission already 
enjoyed long standing Community prerogatives that it was willing to use the right of 
initiative in a more proactive manner. The economic basket of the EMP, thus trade 
issues and developmental assistance, was mentioned as such an example (Licari 
1998).66 However, also in these communitarised areas the Commission had to keep a
65 Interview 42, Legal Service, Commission, Brussels, July 2000.
66 Interview 12, Head o f Unit, Commission, Brussels, June 2000.
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watchful eye on the Council. Thus, one official lamented that the Commission ‘never 
used its right o f initiative to combine trade and politics’ since member states continue 
to regard political relations with third countries as their prerogative.67
The Commission’s legislative powers in foreign policies remained largely 
unchanged between the Maastricht and the Nice Treaty. Thus, no major changes 
occurred with regard to those institutional regimes in which the Commission has the 
sole right of initiative and those in which this right is shared with the member states. 
The sole right o f initiative covers the first pillar foreign policy areas, these being 
external economic relations and developmental assistance, while in the second pillar 
the Commission shares this right with the member states.68 When looking at the 
voting rules in the Council, however, the picture becomes more complex. While in 
developmental assistance the Council votes with qualified majority, the bulk of 
decisions in external economic relations and the CFSP is decided by unanimity. 
Parliament, finally, has its strongest role in the area of developmental assistance, 
where it is a colegislator in the framework of the codecision procedure. Whereas for 
some international agreements Parliament’s assent is required, it is a rather peripheral 
actor in the common commercial policy and the CFSP. Thus, when comparing the 
powers of the Commission and Parliament in the legislative domain of external 
economic relations, the former has been delegated the greater amount of primary 
capabilities. However, due to the predominance o f unanimity voting in the Council in 
this area, member states hold the keys for an effective control over the way in which 
the Commission uses the right of initiative.
67 Interview 32, Deputy Head o f Cabinet, Commission, Brussels, July 2000. When confronted with 
empirical findings this statement, however, could be questioned. Cases such as the ‘orange juice 
conflict* between die EU and Israel or the debate on the relationship between EU assistance to the 
Palestinian Authority and corruption cases in Palestine, show that the Commission has not been 
reluctant to combine trade and politics if  it was able to do so.
68 When arguing about the law  driven* character o f EU politics, a member o f the Commission’s legal 
service, who was previously working for the Finnish Foreign Ministry, argued that the Commission 
has developed a particular ‘initiative ethos*. Since national governments, which are thinking much 
more in political terms, do not have such an institutional approach to EU politics, the Commission 
has a structural advantage in using this instrument even when the right o f initiative is shared. Interview 
13, Legal Service, Commission, Brussels, June 2000 (M Smith 2001).
I l l
The economic dimension o f EU foreign policies has two Treaty bases, these 
being the Common Commercial Policy, on the one hand, and the provisions on 
Mixed Agreement, on the other. With regard to the Common Commercial Policy, 
Articles 132(1) and 133(2) delegated to the Commission the sole right of initiative on 
all legislative measures in this field. Moreover, with the Amsterdam Treaty, this right 
has been extended by Article 133(5) to cover also the issues o f services and 
intellectual property, which were previously not part of the Common Commercial 
Policy. The actual political weight of the sole right o f initiative in this field is 
strengthened by the provisions on the powers of the Council and Parliament. Thus, 
on all Common Commercial Policy issues the Treaty stipulates that the Council 
decides with a qualified majority. Parliament, surprisingly for such a ‘classical’ first 
pillar arena, is virtually excluded from the legislative process. Thus, the Maastricht 
Treaty does not mention Parliament at all in its provisions on the Common 
Commercial Policy. It was only with the Amsterdam Treaty that a minor change in 
favour of Parliament has been introduced. Since then, Article 133(5) allows 
Parliament, on the basis of the consultation procedure, to scrutinise legislation on the 
issues of intellectual property and services in international agreements.
Notwithstanding these provisions, the main Treaty base for economic 
relations with Middle Eastern countries is not the Common Commercial Policy, but 
the provisions on ‘Mixed Agreements’ and ‘Association Agreements’ pursuant to 
Articles 300 and 310. On Association Agreements, thus the kind of agreements the 
EU has concluded with both Israel and Palestine, the Commission’s legislative role is 
more restricted and Parliament’s powers significandy enhanced when compared to 
their respective capabilities under the Common Commercial Policy. While also for 
Association Agreements the Commission has the sole right o f initiative, its actual 
significance is circumscribed by the unanimity requirement in the Council. Article 
300 stipulates that unanimity is required for all Association Agreements and for all 
those agreements which cover ‘a field for which unanimity is required for the 
adoption of internal rules’. And indeed, both the Association Agreements and also all 
other bilateral agreements with Israel and Palestine in the 1990s did actually cover
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areas in which internal rules of the EU required unanimity.69 Qualified majority 
voting only comes into play in the case of sanctions towards countries with which 
the EU has concluded an Association Agreement Following Article 301, the 
Commission has in this case the sole right o f initiative, while the Council decides — 
without any parliamentary involvement — by qualified majority.70 Notwithstanding 
this limitation to Parliament’s role, its rights in the legislative process in this 
institutional regime are greater than in the Common Commercial Policy.
Association Agreements require the assent of Parliament Parliament has 
occasionally used its rights under the assent procedure to link its vote with political 
demands towards third countries. Since a parliamentary majority is required for die 
conclusion of Article 300 agreements, such a linkage is a quite ‘credible threat’. In 
Middle East policies such a linkage has successfully been used when Parliament in 
1988 blocked the conclusion of three trade agreements with Israel. As Hollis notes, 
‘the hold-up was temporary, but the point was made (1994: 129).71 Finally, in order 
to speed up the decision making process - and to prevent P arliament from delaying 
decisions - Article 300 allows that Council and Parliament can prior to any decision 
joindy determine a time limit for the assent
69 See the previous chapter for these additional agreements. The Commission failed when attempting 
to base those parts o f Association Agreements, which are decided internally with qualified majority, on 
Article 228. An example has been the free movement provisions in international agreements. 
Notwithstanding the Commission’s efforts, the Council succeeded in ensuring that these provisions 
remained in the framework o f mixed agreements which require a unanimous vote in the Council. 
Interview 26, Director, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
70 An interesting side note is that Article 301 is an example o f a direct link between the first and the 
second pillars. Thus, a decision on sanctions according to Article 301 by qualified majority does 
actually require a prior decisions in the framework o f the CFSP on the basis o f a joint action or a 
common decision. Note that these decisions require a unanimous vote in the Council. This equips all 
member states with a de facto veto on sanctions pursuant to Article 301.
71 Moreover, in 1993 several parliamentarians recalled that the 4th financial protocol with Israel o f  
1992 contained a specific clause on the h um anitarian  situation in the Occupied Territories. Some 
Socialist members raised the issue o f human rights’ violations in the Territories and brought up the 
possibility that Parliament could consider suspending the protocol or blocking the financing 
provisions therein (Agence Europe, 21 January 1993, N o 5902: 6). The relationship between 
parliamentary votes under the assent procedure, which confronts Parliament with a take-it-or-leave-it 
proposal, on the one hand, and the political situation in a conflict region, on the other, is exemplified 
by the conclusion o f Association Agreements in the framework o f the EMP. Thus, when die Middle 
East peace process seemed to be well under way, Parliament gave in 1996 its assent to the Association 
Agreement with Israel with almost unanimous support o f 265 to 2 with 3 abstentions (Agence 
Europe, 1 March 1996, N o 6678: 11). The 1997 Interim Association Agreement with the Palestinians 
received a similar margin with 372 to 5 votes with 4 abstentions (Agence Europe, 10 April 1997, N o  
6951: 3).
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It has been argued that the exclusion of Parliament from Article 133 
Agreements can be explained by the need to have a fast track procedure for 
international agreements between the EU and third parties alongside Association 
Agreements which, additionally to parliamentary involvement, do also require 
unanimity in the Council. This constellation brings to the fore an interesting alliance 
between those member states seeking to limit the Commissions influence under 
Article 133, on the one hand, and P arliament trying to push for international 
agreements to be concluded pursuant to Article 300, on the other (McGoldrick 1997: 
92-93).
Compared to this wide range o f institutional regimes in external economic 
relations, the delegation o f legislative capabilities to the Commission and Parliament 
on developmental assistance has been quite straightforward and establishes one 
standard procedure only. Thus, since the Maastricht Treaty the Commission has the 
sole right o f initiative in this area, whereas the Council decides across the board with 
a qualified majority. It was only with regard to Parliament’s powers that the Treaty 
provisions have undergone some changes. While the Maastricht Treaty delegated to 
Parliament a legislative role in the framework of the cooperation procedure, the 
Amsterdam Treaty introduced the codedsion procedure for all developmental 
assistance dedsions, thus rendering Parliament a powerful colegislator alongside the 
Council.
The role o f the Commission and Parliament remains much more restricted in 
the area of the CFSP. While there have been some changes from Maastricht to Nice 
with regard to the legislative process in  the second pillar, these changes only related 
to the voting provisions in the Council. The rules on the legislative capabilities o f the 
Commission and Parliament remained completely unchanged since Maastricht With 
regard to the Commission’s right o f initiative, Artide 22(1) TEU stipulates that the 
Commission, but also any member state, ‘may refer to the Council any question 
relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the 
Council*. Until today, more legislative proposals in this field are tabled by the 
member states, while the Commission remains cautious in making use o f right of
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initiative.72 According to Article 23 TEU unanimity is required for the adoption of 
legislative acts in the Council. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule. 
Thus, whereas the Maastricht Treaty provided for qualified majority voting only on 
procedural issues and on those joint actions where the Council decided beforehand 
to do so, Article 23(2) TEU o f the Amsterdam Treaty foresaw qualified majority 
voting for all legislative acts which are either based on a common strategy or for 
implementing decisions for a joint action or a common position. Moreover, the rules 
on procedural questions were further relaxed and the Amsterdam Treaty asked for a 
simple majority in the Council only.
In contrast to the role o f the Council and also the Commission, Parliament’s 
capabilities regarding its impact on decisions in the CFSP are severely restricted 
(Grunert 1997). Article 21 TEU provides for a ‘consultation’ and an ‘information’ of 
Parliament in this area. However, since these institutional rights are not enforceable, 
Parliament cannot use the second pillar consultation mechanism in the same way as 
is the case for consultation in the first pillar.73 Therefore, Parliament’s involvement in 
the decision making process o f the second pillar depends upon the goodwill of the 
member states and the Commission to keep it informed about decisions which are 
awaiting adoption in the Council.74 However, members of the European Parliament 
(MEP) usually were missing such a goodwill and one Parliamentarian criticised ‘that
72 Interview 11, Desk officer, Commission, Brussels, June 2000. Note that ‘initiatives’ in the second 
pillar differ from those in the first (and third) pillar due to differences between the requirement for 
flexibility in foreign policies and the need for codification in other areas. Most foreign policy issues do 
not involve legislation as such. This is but one reason why parliamentary scrutiny is difficult in this 
field. Taking note o f this remark, initiatives are referred to here in the more narrow (codified) sense as 
those second pillar measures that are published as legal acts in the Official Journal.
73 Consider again the ability o f Parliament to use its power o f delay under the first pillar. When 
Parliament had to adopt a bilateral agreement which established scientific cooperation between the 
EU and Israel under the 5th Framework Programme for Research and Development, a group o f 
parliamentarians suggested (unsuccessfully) to delay the vote on this agreement until the outcome o f 
the elections in Israel some three months afterwards had been known. (Agence Europe, 12 February 
1999, N o 7403:13).
74 In order to make up for this dependence on the Council and the Commission, Parliament tried to 
establish close links with the Commission’s Delegations in Israel and Palestine in order to receive 
inside information from the region. Moreover, Parliament profited from the regular exchange with the 
Special Representative to die Middle East peace process. One parliamentarian stated that the EU 
Special Representative to the Middle East peace process provided Parliament regularly with ‘detailed 
briefings* and kept a Very good communication with Parliament*. Interview 10, Desk officer, 
Commission, Brussels, June 2000 and Interview 18, Member o f the European Parliament, Brussels, 
June 2000.
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the Council always informed us after taking decisions’, thus undermining the already 
weak control function o f Parliament in the second pillar.75
Turning now towards the legislative capabilities of EU actors in interior 
policies, a similar distribution of powers can be observed. While the Commission has 
been delegated within all institutional arenas the right o f initiative, this right has to be 
shared with the member states in the third pillar as well as for most migration policy 
issues in Tide IV of the Amsterdam Treaty. While the Council decides by qualified 
majority in those institutional regimes which have been communitarised with the 
Maastricht Treaty, most decisions in migration policies do still require unanimous 
consent. Parliament, finally, is a weak actor on the legislative dimension in interior 
policies in most institutional regimes. Even the transfer of migration policies from 
the third pillar to the EC Treaty has changed little with regard to Parliament’s 
legislative powers. On most issues Parliament can, thus far, neither amend nor 
prevent legislation.
Both the Commission and Parliament have been delegated considerable 
capabilities in ‘classical’ first pillar fields o f interior policies, such as free movement 
and visa issues. However, when comparing the capabilities of these two actors, 
Parliament has profited less from primary delegation. Thus, the Commission enjoys 
the sole right of initiative in all of these policy fields, whereas Parliament’s powers are 
somewhat more restricted. In fact, the capabilities o f Parliament range from 
institutional regimes in which it is not at all present in the legislative process to 
regimes in which it acts as a powerful colegislator in the framework o f the codecision 
procedure. With one exception the Council always decides by qualified majority.
Codecision is the standard operating procedure for legislative acts related to 
the freedom of movement of workers, save social security issues before the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Thus, on freedom o f movement issues the Commission has the 
sole right of initiative and a parliamentary majority is required for every legislative act,
75 Interview 18, MEP, Brussels, June 2000.
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while the Council decides by qualified majority.76 Social security decisions related to 
the freedom of movement did already in the Maastricht Treaty require a qualified 
majority in the Council on the basis of a Commission proposal. However, prior to 
the Amsterdam Treaty, which introduced the codedsion procedure also on these 
issues, Parliament was exduded from the dedsion making process. In the field o f 
freedom to provide services, which in the past has often been linked with migration 
policy issues, Article 49 defines the decision making  procedure. Thus, the Council 
acts by a qualified majority on the basis of a C om m ission proposal, while Parliament 
had not been delegated any legislative capabilities.
With regard to those interior policy issues, which have since the Maastricht 
Treaty been part o f the first pillar and which are direcdy linked to migration polides, 
the powers of both Commission and Parliament are more limited. Thus, in the field 
of visa policies, ex-Artide 100c, on the one hand, delegated to the Commission the 
sole right of initiative. On the other hand, however, this clause was somewhat 
ambiguously curtailed by ex-Article 100c(4), which introduced a kind of Voluntarily 
shared right of initiative,, and which stated that ‘the Commission shall examine any 
request made by a member state that it submit a proposal to the Council’. This 
provision reflects the caution of member states to communitarise interior polides 
even when they are legally part o f the first pillar. This reluctance is also visible in the 
Maastricht Treaty’s two stage model for Council decisions on visa polides. During 
the first stage, until the end of 1995, the Council, thus, dedded by unanimity in the 
framework of the consultation procedure, in which Parliament only has a power o f 
delay. It was only in the second stage, i.e. three years after the Maastricht Treaty had 
finally entered into force, that qualified majority had automatically been introduced. 
No changes, however, were made regarding the involvement o f Parliament Finally, 
the reluctance of some member states to delegate capabilities to EU actors in interior
76 When in 1996 the Commission initiated legislation on three directives aiming to establish free 
movement o f persons, the governments o f the United Kingdom and Portugal initially opposed these 
measures arguing that these matters fell under the third pillar (Agence Europe, 28/29 May 1996, N o  
6736: 7).
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policies can be observed when looking at the provisions o f Article 14, which deals 
with the abolition o f internal border controls. Thus, there is until today no 
parliamentary involvement. In spite o f this exclusion of Parliament, the Commission 
has the sole right o f initiative while the Council acts with a qualified majority.
Notwithstanding certain limitations to the powers o f the Commission and 
Parliament in ‘classical’ first pillar fields o f interior policies, a look at their capabilities 
in both the third pillar and the migration policy chapter o f the Amsterdam Treaty, 
reveals much greater constraints upon their legislative roles. In  fact, the provisions of 
the Maastricht Treaty on JHA closely resembled those on the CFSP. According to 
ex-Articles K.2 and K.9 TEU, the Commission shared the right of initiative with the 
member states on both migration policy issues as well as on a possible passarelle of 
migration policies to the EC-Treaty. Moreover, following ex-Article K.4(3) TEU 
unanimity was required for all decisions, except for implementation measures for 
joint actions and conventions. In the former case a qualified majority was required 
while in die latter case the Treaty demanded a two-thirds majority. The provisions on 
the rights o f Parliament, which were set out by ex-Article K.6 TEU, mirrored exacdy 
the wording on Parliament’s powers in the second pillar. Consequendy, Parliament 
had a right of ‘information’ and ‘consultation’, but was not able to enforce the 
Council or the C om m ission to do so. Thus, Parliament had to rely on good personal 
contacts with the double executive. As one official from Parliament explained: *We 
receive a lot of documents informally through good contacts with colleagues in the 
Commission and Council. Officially, we receive them only after their adoption’. 77 
These limitations of Parliament’s role can be interpreted as the result o f a strategic 
alliance o f national and European administrations, namely the Commission, being
77 One o f the provisions o f ex-Article K.6 TEU was that Parliament holds a yearly debate on progress 
in the third pillar. However, from 1993 until 1997 Parliament only received in 1995 a prior report by 
the Council on the progress achieved in this area pointing to the problems related to non-enforceable 
‘information tights’ (Agence Europe, 3 /4  June 1997, N o 6740: 8). Moreover, when finally receiving 
reports, they often contained only a list o f adopted decisions but not a detailed description o f the 
Council’s activities as wished by Parliament. Interview 41, Administrator, European Parliament, 
Brussels, July 2000.
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both part of the same transgovemmental network in this area, at the expense of 
Parliament and also non-govemmental organisations (Guiraudon 2000: 268).
As has already been pointed out in the previous chapter, the transfer of 
migration policies to the first pillar with the Amsterdam Treaty did not result in a 
communitarisation o f this policy area. It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
provisions o f Tide IV on the legislative powers of Parliament and the Commission 
introduce only minor changes when compared to the institutional regime of the 
Maastricht Treaty. It is only after the end o f the transitory period in May 2004 that a 
complete communitarisation might take place. The legislative procedure in migration 
policies is set out by Article 67. It stipulates that during the transitory period the right 
of initiative is shared between member states and the Commission, while the Council 
continues to decide on most issues by unanimity. Parliament has only been delegated 
powers under the consultation procedure.78 It is only after this transitory period that 
the Commission will be delegated the sole right of initiative, however, with similar 
limitations as they were outlined above in the case of ex-Article 100c. Thus, even 
when it will have the sole right o f initiative, the Commission ‘shall examine any 
request made by a member state that it submit a proposal to the Council’.79 While 
this ‘voluntarily shared right of initiative’ will be introduced automatically, a complete 
shift towards a communitarised regime requires the consent o f all member states. 
Consequently, Article 67 introduced a ‘new passarelli which foresees a unanimous 
decision of the Council in order to bring about the codecision procedure - thus
78 Even after the entry into force o f  the Amsterdam Treaty, Parliament has not been consulted by the 
Council and the Commission on important decisions to be taken. Thus, prior to the Tampere Special 
European Council, Parliament has been unsatisfied with information it received from the Finnish 
Presidency (Agence Europe, 14 October 1999, N o 7572: 12). Also with regard to the aforementioned 
‘progress reports’ Title IV did not lead to major changes. Thus, when drafting the progress report on 
this issue for the year 2000, an MEP was struck by the little amount o f information received from the 
Council and the Commission. Interview 29, MEP, Brussels, June 2000.
79 Member states usually make use o f their right o f  initiative, in particular when they hold the 
Presidency. Against this background it is interesting to note that the Swedish Presidency o f 2001 has 
made clear that it will not make use o f its right o f  initiative under Tide IV and rather coordinate its 
activities beforehand with the Commission. Interview 44, Head o f Unit, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 
July 2000.
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greater parliamentary involvement as well as qualified majority voting — on all 
migration policy issues.
The only exception to these provisions of Tide IV are visa policies, an issue 
which had to a large extent been already part o f the first pillar since the Maastricht 
Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty thus established a specific regime for those visa 
policy issues which were dealt with by ex-Article 100c, these being the positive and 
negative visa lists, on the one hand, and the uniform format for visas, on the other. 
On these two issues the Commission has the sole right of initiative, while the 
Council acts with a qualified majority. Parliament had been delegated the power o f 
delay under the consultation procedure. The remaining parts of visa policies, namely 
‘procedures and conditions for issuing visas* and ‘rules on uniform format*, which 
became part o f the first pillar with the Amsterdam Treaty, are subject to yet another 
legislative procedure. While these two issues will also be initially governed by the 
consultation procedure, the codecision procedure will be introduced automatically 
after the end o f the transitory period. It is striking that this automatic passarelle does 
not cover the ‘Article 100’ visa issues which, seemingly, will be dealt with under the 
consultation procedure even after May 2004 although they had been part o f the first 
pillar since the Maastricht Treaty.
Some minor modifications towards increased communitarisation of legislative 
decisions have, finally, been introduced by the Nice Treaty. Thus, the new Article 
67(5) stipulates, that if  the Council has already agreed — by unanimity - on ‘common 
rules’ and *basic principles* in the areas o f ‘asylum policies* and ‘minimum standards 
for temporary protection of refugees and displaced persons’, that all further decision 
will be taken on the basis of the codecision procedure.
The results o f this analysis on legislative capabilities o f EU actors are 
summarised in Table 4.2. It focuses in particular upon the powers o f Parliament and 
the Commission in legislative politics in foreign and interior affairs. Note that the 
Council is pivotal in every single legislative regime. The table shows the four 
different institutional constellations under which the Commission participates in the 
legislative process (x-axis), as well as the six different legislative procedures which
120
relate to Parliament’s involvement (y-axis). The table, therefore, includes all three 
dimensions on which the analysis of this chapter has been based. Thus, it 
incorporates the voting rules in the Council, the design o f the right of initiative and 
the six legislative procedure. The table does also suggest that there is a qualitative 
difference with regard to the role of Parliament and the Commission under the 
various legislative regimes. Thus, on the y-axis Parliament’s impact decreases in 
descending order, whereas the Commission’s powers, which are represented on the 
x-axis, decrease from left to right80 A combination of these three dimensions brings 
up 24 possible legislative regimes out of which ten have been used in foreign and 
interior policies between Maastricht and Nice. The table, moreover, reveals that there 
has been a minor simplification o f legislative provisions with the Amsterdam Treaty. 
The total number of legislative regimes in both areas has been reduced from eight in 
Maastricht to seven with the Amsterdam version.
Table 4.2 illustrates further that when comparing the capabilities of the 
Commission and Parliament, the former has been delegated greater powers in both 
policy areas. Most institutional regimes are, thus, located on left hand side o f the x- 
axis on which the Commission can make greater use of its role as an agenda setter 
due to predominance of qualified majority voting in the Council.81 Parliament, in 
contrast, acts mainly in institutional arenas that appear on the lower side o f the y- 
axis, thus in the framework of those procedures in which its role as a colegislator is 
severely curtailed.
80 With regard to the ranking o f  die Commission’s capabilities, more weight is given to ‘qualified 
majority voting’ than to ‘right o f initiative’. This is based on the assumption that unanimity 
automatically undermines the impact o f the right o f  initiative since the Commission’s ability to form 
alliances within the Council is severely undermined. In contrast, when there is a shared right o f  
initiative, it has in several cases not been used by member states which tend to rely on the 
Commission to propose legislation (see the following chapter). This has also been confirmed by the 
empirical research presented in this chapter.
81 If  the Commission decides to do so. However, often it remains cautious to come up with proposals. 
See chapter 6 which discusses the Commission’s preferences in migration policies.
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Table 4.2: The legislative regimes in foreign and in
Commis
Sole /  qualified majority
teriorpolicies
sion: right of initiative /  voting provisions in
Shared /  qualified majority
the Council
Sole /  Unanimity Shared /  Unanimity
Codecision
•  All development assistance
•  *Most free movement, except 
services
Parts of visa policies after 2004 (automatically)
All!some Title IV  after 2004 /  after prior 
Council decision (unanimity required)
. . . . . . .  .  .  .  -
Cooperation All Development assistance
Assent •  *Most Association 
Agreement
•ouo
H, Consultation
• All visa policies All visa policies after 1995 •  Some Common
Commercial Policy: Article
.......133(5)....................................
•  Most Title IV (voluntarily 
shared right of initiative after2004) 
All visa policies before 1995
•I
JSTo
•So0
T? Information i*aV
1  p*
•  Some CFSP: prior Common Strategy, 
implementation of Joint Action or 
Common Position (Simple majority for 
procedure)
Some CFSP: Procedure /  prior Joint 
Action
Some JHA: implementation o f Joint 
Action, Conventions (2/3 majority)
• *Most CFSP
Most JHA
No
Parliament
• *Mo8t Common Commercial Policy: 
Articles 132(1) 133(2)
• *Some Association Agreements: 
Article 301
•  *Some Free movement: providing 
services: Article 49
• ^Internal Borders: Article 14
Some free movement: Social Security
NOTE: Bold letters /  bullet points: Amsterdam Treaty; normal letters: Maastricht Treaty; italic letters: Nice Treaty and automatic/possible changes to Amsterdam 
Treaty; asterisk: those provisions o f Amsterdam Treaty which existed already in the Maastricht version.
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In Table 4.3 this observation is taken a step further. It provides data on the way in 
which the capabilities of the Commission and Parliament in foreign and interior 
policies have developed since the Maastricht Treaty and proposes a quantification of 
their respective powers.82 Consider, for example the twelve different bullet point 
entries in Table 4.2 which represent each legislative regime in foreign and interior 
policies o f the Amsterdam Treaty. The ‘capability index* presented in Table 4.3 
shows that the Commission has profited to a greater extent from delegation of 
legislative capabilities when compared with Parliament In fact, when looking at the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the ‘capability index* of the Commission is 77.1 per cent of its 
maximum score, whereas Parliament only has 35.0 per cent o f its maximum powers. 
Both actors, however, have profited from the reform of the Maastricht Treaty and 
have been delegated more capabilities with the Treaty reforms in Amsterdam. Yet, 
there is only a minimal increase in the Commission’s capabilities of .2 per cent. The 
increase in powers of Parliament has been greater from Maastricht to Amsterdam, 
but it has to be considered that Parliament is still a far cry from its maximum 
‘score*.83 Notwithstanding this remark, Parliament had been delegated with the 
Amsterdam Treaty new powers that significantly increased its ‘capability index* from 
28.6 per cent to 35.0 per cent, thus a growth rate o f 6.4 per cent84
Moreover, what has to be considered when analysing the results in Table 4.3 
is how the powers of the Commission relate to specific legislative procedures. This
82 There are always problem with indices and quantifying ‘power*. Static figures can hardly bundle a 
dynamic process such as legislative politics in the EU. Therefore, the figures in table 4.3 aim to 
provide an indication about the diversity o f  the hybrid institutional regimes o f EU foreign and interior 
policies and to point to general paths o f how the capabilities o f  the Commission and Parliament have 
developed rather than claiming to establish an exact statistical relationship.
83 Note that the codedsion procedure has been significantly changed with the Amsterdam Treaty. 
The reforms increased the powers o f the EP’ (Ffix 1999: 66). In contrast, the role o f  the Commission 
in the reformed codedsion procedure is weaker than before. Since the indices in table 4.3 do not 
relate to die six legislative procedures as far as the Commission is concerned, this (assumed) decrease 
in powers is not induded but should be considered when interpreting the indices o f Parliament vis-a-vis 
those o f the Commission. Also the increase o f Parliament’s capabilities from Maastricht to 
Amsterdam as indicated by the figures in table 4.3 should be interpreted alongside the strengthening 
of Parliament’s role in relation to the Commission in the codedsion procedure.
84 The Capability Indices are similar when looking at fordgn and interior polides separatdy, thus 
indicating the similar functional logic o f  macro political stabilisation which relates to both policy areas 
and which translated into similar institutional rules, thus supporting the key propositions made in 
chapter 2.
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applies in particular for those parts of foreign and interior policies governed by the 
codedsion procedure. Here, the powers of the Commission are much weaker than 
under the other types of procedure since the Commission ‘is structurally unable to 
affect the decisions of P arliame n t  and the Council due to the ability of these two 
actors to come up, within the Conciliation Committee, with their own legislative 
amendments which do not need to take account of the original preferences of the 
Commission (Garrett 1995: 303). Thus, the right of initiative of the Commission 
under the codedsion procedure is considerably weaker when compared with other 
legislative procedures. Turning to Table 4.3, these remarks apply, however, to only a 
small number o f legislative domains. Under the Maastricht Treaty only one legislative 
domain, namely parts of free movement of person provisions were governed by the 
codedsion procedure. This changed only slightly with the Amsterdam Treaty which 
extended the application o f the codedsion procedure to cover developmental 
assistance polides as well. However, this is a policy area in which the Commission 
traditionally holds important executive powers. Therefore, the minor increase of the 
Commission’s capability index must be read in conjunction with the relative 
weakening of its sole tight of initiative in developmental assistance polides since the 
Amsterdam Treaty following the introduction o f the codedsion procedure.
Two main conclusion can be drawn from this analysis on primary capabilities 
of EU actors in foreign and interior polides. First, there are three actors at the EU 
level which partidpate in the legislative process and their powers vary considerably. 
Thus, the Council is the only institution that has a strong position in each of the 
various institutional regimes. There is no piece o f legislation in EU foreign and 
interior polides that does not require a majority o f votes in the Council. The 
Council’s role in both areas is, moreover, characterised by the prevalence of 
unanimous majorities required to pass a piece of legislation. Notwithstanding this 
general pattern of Council dominance, however, in many institutional regimes the 
Council has to cooperate closely with the Commission and Parliament Moreover, in 
all legislative regimes the Commission has a right of initiative. Nevertheless, it often 
has to share the right o f initiative with the member states. Parliament partidpates in
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the legislative process as the second chamber. Its powers, however, are until today 
weak when compared to the capabilities o f both the Council and the Commission.85
Table 4.3: Tegslativ 
P
legislative Procedure
e domains o f "Parliament and C 
'arliament
Maastricht Amsterdam 
Treaty Treaty
Commission and Capability Indi
Commiss
Maastricht Amsterdam 
Treaty Treaty
'ces
ion
Right of initiative /  voting 
in Council
Codedsion
Cooperation
Assent
Consultation
Information
No Parliament
1 2 
1 0 
1 1 
2 3
4 2
5 4
6 7 
3 1
2 2 
3 2
Sole /  qualified 
Shared /  qualified
Sole /  Unanimity 
Shared /  Unanimity 
No involvement
Total number o f  
legislative domains
14 12 14 12 Total number of  
legislative domains
Capability Index 
Parliament
28.6 35.0 76.9 77.1 Capability Index 
Commission
NOTE: own calculations, based on table 4.2. The indices have been calculated as follows: for 
Parliament the amount o f  entries in each legislative domain has been multiplied with a legislative 
procedure score* (codedsion = 5; cooperation =  4; assent = 3; consultation = 2; information = 1; no 
Parliament =  0), for the Commission each entry has been multiplied with a ‘right o f initiative /  voting 
in Council score* (sole/qualified =  4; shared/qualified = 3; sole/unanimity = 2; shared/unanimity = 
1). The ‘capability index’ is the total sum o f these scores divided by the maximum score possible (if all 
domains would be codedsion for Parliament or sole right o f initiative/qualified majority for the 
Commission). In other words, the index is 100 if  P arliamen t had been delegated codedsion in all 
legislative domains, or if  the Commission could act with a sole right o f  initiative and qualified majority 
voting rules in the Council in all legislative domains.
Second, the distribution o f powers between these three actors still reflects the logic 
of the pillar division. Thus, as a general picture, Parliament and the Commission are 
stronger in the first pillar whereas their capabilities in the second and third pillars as 
well as in the post Amsterdam migration policy regime remain more limited.
85 As Cameron notes this limitation with regard to the capabilities o f Parliament in the area o f foreign 
polides is not a unique characteristic o f the EU political system. Thus, Parliament’s rights in die 
second pillar ‘are akin to those o f  most national EU parliaments’ (1998: 65). Moreover, in interior 
polides the 1990s led to a similar executive bias at the expense not only o f  die EP but also o f member 
states* parliaments. Seen from that perspective the EU level allowed governments to circumvent their 
national parliaments in legislation on interior polides by turning to die EU level where parliamentary 
involvement has been low from the outset. Thus, since Maastricht also ‘many o f the Member States* 
parliaments encounter serious problems in exerdsing effective control’ over interior policy at the EU 
level (Monar 1995: 249).
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Moreover, the Council often decides by qualified majority in the first pillar, whereas 
unanimity predominates in all other institutional arenas and also in some first pillar 
fields. Thus, the pillar division is still underlying the legislative dimension in foreign 
and interior policies. As a rule, primary delegation to the Commission and Parliament 
has been less pronounced in the sovereignty related regimes of foreign diplomatic 
relations and migration policies than on those regimes which are directly related to 
economic issues. Notwithstanding this general pattern, the capabilities of Parliament 
and the Commission have overall been strengthened from Maastricht to Nice thus 
pointing to an increasing centralisation of foreign and interior policies at the EU 
level.
Primary delegation in the executive domains o f foreign and interior policies 
When looking at the Treaty provisions on the executive dimension of EU foreign 
and interior policies, similar conclusions as those on legislative issues come to the 
fore. Thus, EU actors have been delegated executive capabilities in both areas across 
all three pillars. On the executive dimension, it was the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat that were the recipients o f this delegation. However, in spite of various 
cross pillar linkages, the dividing line between the two types o f pillars is also 
characteristic of the institutional structure o f EU executive politics in foreign and 
interior affairs.
Member states have delegated executive powers in foreign and interior 
policies across the three pillars to both the Commission and the Council Secretariat. 
When compared with legislative politics, the institutional structure of executive 
relations is less complex. Thus, in all regimes which are part o f the TEC the 
Commission acts as the main executive, whereas in the second pillar as well as in 
interior policies before the Amsterdam Treaty, the ‘executive core’ at the EU level 
was located in the Council and its Secretariat. Notwithstanding this division of 
executive powers, both the Commission and the Council Secretariat have been 
delegated additional powers that allow them to encroach into institutional regimes 
beyond the narrow pillar confines. Thus, despite these divided executive capabilities
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neither the Commission nor the Council can act independently of each other in 
foreign and interior policies. Under the surface loom various bonds between these 
two actors, which install a system of power sharing between the Council and the 
Commission within all institutional arenas of foreign and interior policies. Due to the 
functional indivisibility of both policy areas this ‘tandem’ relationship between the 
Commission and the Council shapes foreign and interior policies across the 
institutional pillar divide (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997:179).
In a sense, the EU executive system in the two areas functions like two 
aeroplanes whose movements have to be coordinated. Based on the aforementioned 
pillar division, executive capabilities have been delegated to one o f the two actors — 
either the Commission or the Council — which then steers the ‘EU aircraft’. At the 
same time, however, the second actor sits right next to this captain, thus sharing 
overall responsibility for the manoeuvres o f the aircraft. While in ‘classical’ first pillar 
arenas there is only one plane in the skies, the two pillar dimension of both foreign 
and interior policies leads to rather heavy air traffic. There are two planes whose 
cruises have to be coordinated above the EU air space. In one plane, the 
Commission is the captain while the Council acts as a deputy. The powers o f the 
Council, then, stem from the comitology system which establishes a control system 
over the Commission’s decisions on direction and speed (Wessels 1998). The second 
plane, which was initially constructed for the second and the third pillars, is - 
following the Amsterdam Treaty - limited to the area of the CFSP and non-migration 
related areas of interior policies in the remaining third pillar. Here, the Council is the 
captain, with the Commission acting as a deputy who might not control the direction 
and speed but who is permanently informed about the course of the aircraft ‘As for 
the two new pillars of the TEU, here the Council Secretariat and the Council 
presidency have functions that, under the Community pillar, are the responsibility o f 
the Commission* (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 185). As a result o f these 
linkages between the Council and the Commission, the cross pillar design o f foreign 
and interior policies binds both actors to coordinate actions within their respective 
executive prerogatives if they do not want to risk a crash o f the two planes. Thus, a
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need for close executive cooperation between the Council and the Commission is an 
inherent characteristic o f the EU’s foreign and interior policy system, 
notwithstanding the more limited ‘deputy function* of the Commission in the second 
and third pillars, when compared with the role of member states in the first pillar.
Primary delegation o f executive capabilities in foreign and interior polideshas, 
thus, led to a system in which the capabilities of EU actors must be viewed against 
the background of ‘the interface o f the EU dual-executive* (Hix 1999: 41). While 
some parts o f this interface are regulated by secondary decisions, which are analysed 
in the following chapter, important provisions have also been made directly by the 
Treaties. The interface consists of two elements which are a complex committee 
system, on the one hand, and a joint responsibility of both actors vis-a-vis both other 
EU institutions and states outside of the EU, on the other. Comitology is an 
institutional mechanism that allows both the Commission and the member sates to 
be involved in all stages o f policy making at the EU level (Ballmann, Epstein and 
O ’Halloran 2002; Franchino 2000).86 However, it is important to stress that 
comitology functions in a different way when looking at the two types o f pillars. 
Thus, in the first pillar the Commission is the main actor for the execution of 
policies, while the member states are involved at all stages of policy making via 
specialised committees. In the second and third pillars, however, the main 
responsibility for executive policy making lies with the Council, while the 
Commission participates within the various Committees as a ‘16th member state*, 
albeit without any voting rights and much more reduced powers than member states 
have in first pillar committees. Consequently, the structure of executive relations 
between the Commission and the Council in foreign and interior policies can be 
described by an x-structure, as exemplified by figure 4.1. It is important to note again 
that the member states possess across the pillars greater capabilities when compared 
with the Commission. Thus, member states have in many first pillar Committees a 
veto power on decisions by the Commission, while the Commission has no such
86 Comitology will be addressed in greater detail in chapters 5 and 7.
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powers vis-a-vis the Council in the second and third pillars (Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace 1997).
However, empirical evidence in foreign and interior policies supports the 
notion o f such an x-structure of executive relations despite the obviously more 
circumscribed powers o f the Commission in the second and the remaining third 
pillars. For example, in foreign policies the second pillar foresees a joint 
responsibility for the Council (and the Presidency) and the Commission in the 
external representation o f the EU in third countries. Indeed, as far as Middle East 
policies are concerned, such a joint approach to external representation has been 
developed between the Presidencies, the Special Representative and the Commission 
Delegations in the region.87 This corresponds with the observation that it is ‘on a 
day-to-day basis [that] the Commission and the Council have to find operating 
procedures to handle external representation, {ibid.: 191). Moreover, despite its 
formally more reduced role in second pillar decision making, the Common Strategy 
on the Mediterranean Region o f July 2000 was joindy drawn up by Council and 
member state officials together with officials from D G  Relex, thus pointing to the 
considerable overlap o f powers between these two institutions which must be 
constandy coordinated in the decision making process.88 Thus, the need for this 
coordination does not primarily stem from formal Treaty provisions but rather from 
the requirements o f the functional unity o f foreign policies.
In interior policies a similar structure of first and third pillar executive 
relations can be observed, although the unity between interior policy issues across 
the pillars is not as firm as in foreign affairs. However, what matters here is that due 
to an increase o f institutional capabilities in the various Treaty reforms and a parallel 
increase in personnel resources, the Commission has consolidated its 
representational role in interior policies across the pillar divide (Peers 2000: 43). This 
has been the case with the Amsterdam Treaty reforms for the remaining third pillar 
but, o f course, also for the shift o f migration policies to their current semi-
87 Interview 9, Head o f Delegation, Commission, Tel Aviv, May 2000.
88 Interview 10, Desk Officer, Commission, Brussels, June 2000.
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communitarised framework. Given these clarifying remarks on a formally weaker role 
o f the Commission in committee representation in the second and third pillars when 
compared with the role of member states in first pillar committees, the x-structure 
nevertheless describes well the day-to-day operation of cross pillar cooperation 
within the dual executive in the areas of foreign and interior affairs. From a 
institutional perspective constant cooperation — rather than competitive battling over 
formal powers - between the two institutions is required for effective policy making. 
Thus, despite an obvious imbalance in the cross pillar distribution o f executive 
powers, the Commission and the Council ‘need to be peddling in the same direction 
for movement to be sustained. If  either brakes hard, movement is virtually 
impossible. There is a kind o f division of labour between the two institutions, but 
there is also an interweaving and overlapping o f functions’, not least in the areas of 
foreign and interior policies (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997:179).
Figure 4.1: x-structure of executive relations in foreign and interior policies
Committee representationMain responsibility
COUNCIL /  member states1st pillar COMMISSION
2nd/3rd pillars COUNCIL /  member states COMMISSION
The Treaties do not specify the comitology relations between the Council and the 
Commission with regard to every single institutional regime in foreign and interior 
policies. Hence, in first pillar arenas o f foreign policies, comitology provisions are 
explicitly outlined only with regard to external economic relations. In the field of 
developmental assistance secondary provisions on comitology apply.89 The executive 
relations between the Commission and the Council in external economic relations are
89 See chapter 5 for more details on these secondary comitology provisions.
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identical for both the Common Commercial Policy and for Association Agreements. 
In both cases it is the Commission which makes recommendations to the Council on 
the opening of negotiations with third countries and which then negotiates these 
agreements. These rules are laid down in Articles 133 and 300. Both articles, then, 
refer to a ‘Special Committee’ which consists of representatives o f the Commission 
and the member states. This committee has to be consulted by the Commission 
when negotiating international agreements. The Nice Treaty has added two new 
elements to Article 133. First, as a result o f previous tensions between Commission 
and Council over the interpretation of the relationship between certain provisions o f 
international agreements, on the one hand, and internal EC rules, on the other, the 
Treaty now stipulates that compatibility with the Community must be ensured by the 
Commission and the Council.90 Second, this consolidation o f Community 
prerogatives in trade policies has been accompanied by a tightening of the control 
exercised by the member states over the Commission's actions in the negotiating 
process on international agreements. Consequently, the Treaty now requires the 
Commission to ‘report regularly to the special committee on the progress of 
negotiations’.
The aforementioned relationship between the executive powers of the 
Commission and the Council is reversed in the second pillar. The CFSP is 
characterised by the executive dominance o f member states, in general, and the 
Presidency as well as the Council Secretariat, in particular. It is Article 18 TEU that 
sets out the powers o f the Presidency as the key institution in the framework of the 
CFSP. Thus, the Presidency, first, represents the EU on the international stage and, 
second, is responsible for the implementation of decisions in the framework of the 
second pillar. It was the Amsterdam Treaty that, then, provided for strengthened 
capabilities o f EU actors in that arena. Delegation, nevertheless, only led to a 
reshaping o f capabilities within the Council and it was, subsequently, the Council
90 These reforms o f the Nice Treaty further limit the Commission’s autonomy in trade policies and 
foster the linkages within the double executive. This follows die pattern which already characterised 
the trade policy provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty (Meunier and Nicolai'dis 1999).
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Secretariat and not the Commission that had been delegated a considerable amount 
of new powers. Accordingly, Article 18(3) TEU delegated executive functions to the 
Secretary General of the Council, who acts as a High Representative for the CFSP. 
The specific tasks of the High Representative were further specified by Article 26 
TEU which states that the High Representative ‘shall assist the Council in matters 
coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular 
through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy 
decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf o f the Council at the request 
of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties., It should 
be kept in mind that prior to the Amsterdam Treaty the Council Secretariat under the 
guidance of its Secretary General has been a central, yet mainly administrative body 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 105-109).
The differentiation of an autonomous Secretariat alongside member state 
based Council structures can be dated back in the area of foreign policies to the SEA 
of 1986 and the subsequent establishment of the EPC Secretariat. As Smith has 
pointed out, discussions on a strictly administrative secretariat emerged already in the 
early 1970s and were mainly led by the German and Italian and, later, the British 
governments. Thus, it was already the London report of 1981 that called for the 
establishment o f a small, permanent administrative EPC Secretariat. It was, however, 
due to French resistance, mainly about the location of this secretariat, that its 
establishment was deferred until the SEA, when France ultimately accepted that the 
EPC Secretariat was to be based in Brussels, rather than Paris. However, there was 
no autonomous role for the EPC Secretariat, neither from an administrative let alone 
a political perspective. The main task o f the EPC Secretariat was to assist the rotating 
Presidencies and, consequently, its political responsibility was directed towards the 
Presidencies. The EPC Secretariat also remained small in staff and its personnel was 
seconded from national ministries. Moreover, member states were careful in 
separating the tasks o f the EPC Secretariat from EC activities into which the Council 
Secretariat was involved, thereby attempting to prevent any spill over from EC 
practices into the operation of EPC {cf. M E Smith 2003:166-170).
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This situation changed with the Maastricht Treaty which can, therefore, be 
rightfully regarded ‘as a critical juncture* for the EU’s foreign policy (Lewis 2000: 
275). Thus, the EPC Secretariat was transformed into the CFSP Secretariat which 
was now formally integrated into the infrastructure o f the Council Secretariat. While 
the strong linkage between the Council Secretariat in the area of CFSP with the 
rotating Presidencies was upheld, the Maastricht Treaty nevertheless provided for 
some incremental, yet highly significant changes towards a greater autonomy o f the 
Council Secretariat in foreign policies. Thus, the formal responsibility o f the CFSP 
Secretariat was no longer primarily directed towards the Presidency (a member state) 
but towards the CFSP as a whole (thus a policy area o f the EU). Moreover, the staff 
o f the CFSP Secretariat was almost doubled when compared with the size o f the 
EPC Secretariat and officials from the Council Secretariat were added to officials 
seconded from national ministries. Hence, the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on 
the primary capabilities of the Council Secretariat provided for limited, yet significant 
provisions which fostered the autonomous role of the Council Secretariat as an EU 
actor rather than an intergovernmental body of member states. Notwithstanding the 
significance of this development, the linkages of the Secretariat with member states 
and other actors within the Council’s operating structures remain much stronger than 
those of other EU actors. However, ‘the new CFSP Secretariat was an improvement 
over the previous EPC unit* and by delegating primary capabilities to the Secretariat, 
member states fostered the centralisation of EU foreign policies without delegating 
considerable powers in the CFSP to the Commission (M E  Smith 2003:188).
It was then the merging o f the two offices o f the Secretary General and the 
High Representative with the Amsterdam Treaty, which provided the Secretariat for 
the first time with a Treaty base that established an explicit political function within 
the EU system.91 An official from the Council Secretariat has confirmed such a 
conclusion when suggesting that, when compared with his ‘invisible* predecessor,
91 According to a foreign policy analyst from the Bertelsmann Foundation the role o f the Council 
Secretariat is often underestimated. She emphasised that the Foundation would concentrate its 
lobbying efforts in foreign policies across all pillars within the Council Secretariat. Interview 5, 
Bertelsmann Foundation, Gutersloh, November 1999.
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‘Solana [the High Representative; SS] is something completely new*.92 This is further 
exemplified by the establishment of a nucleus political staff, comparable to the 
cabinets o f individual Commissioners, at the disposal of the High Representative. 
Thus, the PPEWU, which was established through a Declaration attached to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, has — in contrast to the Council Secretariat’s traditionally mainly 
administrative focus — ‘clear policy responsibilities (monitoring, assessments, early 
warning, and policy options)’ (M E Smith 2003: 229). Comprising around twenty 
officials (thus more than the initially seventeen officials which worked for the EPC 
Secretariat in 1986), it was ‘expected that this Unit [...] would establish greater 
cooperation among the Commission and EU member states to help ensure the 
coherence o f the EU’s external policy’ as well as to support the High Representative 
in building up a political capacity in foreign policies separate from the Commission 
which could make use both o f its several DGs dealing with foreign policies and of its 
web o f delegations in third countries (ibid!). Indeed, the PPEWU played in important 
role in strengthening the position of the High Representative in EU foreign policies 
vis-a-vis the Commission and it was staff from the Unit which jointly with the 
Commission (and member states’ officials) drafted the Common Strategy for the 
Mediterranean Region which was then presented to the European Council in Feira 
(<f. Heusgen 2003).93
This trend towards both delegation of foreign policy capabilities in the 
second pillar to EU actors and a simultaneous limitation o f the Commission’s say in 
this arena, is also exemplified by Article 18(5) TEU which provides the Council with 
a Treaty base on the appointment o f a special representative ‘with a mandate in 
relation to particular policy issues’.94
While the Commission is participating alongside the Council on the operative 
dimension of the CFSP, it does not yield comparable powers as, for example,
92 Interview 14, Desk officer, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
93 Interview 10, Desk Officer, Commission, Brussels, June 2000.
94 An official from the Israeli Foreign Ministry stated that Israel is ‘putting a lot o f  emphasis on 
meetings with Solana* based on the observation that the new office o f the High Representative is quite 
central to EU foreign policy making. Interview 7, EU Desk officer, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 
May 2000.
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member states do in the first pillar. Executive powers of the Commission at the EU 
level, which were originally set out by the Maastricht Treaty, are mentioned in 
Articles 18 and 27 TEU. Both articles provide for a ‘full association, of the 
Commission in this field. Article 18 TEU additionally provides for a strengthened 
role o f the Commission when compared to the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, it not only 
associated the Commission with the work done by the Presidency, but also rendered 
the Commission part o f the EU Troika. 95 Article 27 TEU, then, associated the 
Commission with all V ork carried out in the common foreign and security policy 
field’, thus, for example, the work in the second pillar Committees. It is, finally, 
Article 25 TEU that established such a special committee, the so-called ‘Political 
Committee’ (Kiso 1997).96
As mentioned above the role o f the Commission in these second pillar 
committees is weaker than the role o f member states in the first pillar. In addition to 
this general pattern of member states’ dominance, the Amsterdam Treaty added the 
conclusion o f international agreements, which previously were only mentioned in the 
TEC, to the second pillar. It is interesting to note that Article 24 TEU, which sets 
out the rules on these second pillar agreements, duplicates the provisions o f Articles 
133 and 300, however, with reversed competencies. Thus, in contrast to the first 
pillar, the central role in the second pillar has been delegated to the Presidency. 
‘Article 24 agreements’ can be initiated by the Council and they do not require a prior 
recommendation of the Commission. It is also the Presidency and not the
95 Prior to the Amsterdam Treaty there was no clear Treaty base on the Troika. At this time, the 
Troika consisted o f the Presidency as well as the preceding and the following Presidency. An inclusion 
o f the Commission in Troika or Presidency activities depended on the goodwill o f  the member states, 
which sometimes led to tensions between die two institutions. For example, a visit o f Council 
President Dick Spring to the Middle East in 1996 without any Commission involvement provoked an 
outcry within the C om m ission that such a move Vas in contradiction with the practice o f  visits by EU 
Troikas, in which the Commission also participates’. The reforms o f the Amsterdam Treaty thus 
provided for a mechanisms that attempts to avoid ‘institutional battles over this issue’ (Agence 
Europe, 9 October 1996, N o 6828: 3).
96 The work o f die Political Committee and the Committee o f Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) often leads to a ‘doubling o f activities, which is not always easy*. Thus, in the practice of  
foreign policy making, both Committees can demand from Council working groups proposals on 
specific issues. Interview 14, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
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Commission that opens and negotiates these agreements with third countries. The 
Commission can only assist ‘as appropriate’ the Presidency in this task.
To conclude, the role o f the Commission in the Comitology system of the 
com m on foreign and security policy is largely limited, as the Treaty repeatedly 
reiterates, to a ‘full association’ and the Commission lacks any direct influence over 
the decisions taken within committees or the Council. There is, however, one issue in 
the second pillar on which the Commission had been delegated stronger capabilities, 
this being the EU’s role abroad. In this field, the Treaty establishes a system of 
cooperation between the executive branches which fosters the x-structure of 
executive relations in foreign policies depicted in figure 4.1. It is Article 20 TEU 
which deals with the relationship between member states’ embassies and 
Commission delegations in third countries and which stipulates that they jointly 
ensure the implementation o f second pillar decisions on the ground as well as 
exchange ‘information, carrying out joint assessments’. It is noteworthy that 
Commission Delegations are not at all mentioned in the TEC. Their role has until 
today only been specified within the framework o f the second pillar. Since the actual 
capabilities of Commission Delegations relate mainly to trade matters, developmental 
cooperation and other first pillar issues, Article 20 TEU is, thus, not only an 
interesting example for the actual legal linkages between the pillars but also of 
delegation of capabilities to EU actors, such as the Commission, beyond the classical 
Community sphere.97 As Allen notes on the role of the Commission and the Council 
in foreign policies, ‘the TEU allowed both institutions legitimately to claim a certain 
competence over all aspects o f the Union’s external activities’ (Allen 1998: 51).
The executive relations between Commission and Council in interior policies 
follow similar patterns as regards foreign policies. In those arenas which are part of 
the TEC, the Commission is the actor with the main executive capabilities. This is
97 This linkage became visible when Council President Jacques Poos wrote a letter to Palestinian 
Authority C hairm an Yasser Arafat stating that ‘the European Union has decided to ask its 
representative in Tel Aviv to approach [Israeli] foreign Secretary Mr. Levy* in order to issue the 
protest o f the EU against certain action o f the Israeli government Note that Poos, a representative of  
a member state and the Council, refers to the head o f the Commission Delegation in Israel as the 
EU’s regional representative (Agence Europe, 9 August 1997, No 7034:1).
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the case, for example, in the field o f free movement of persons. As in foreign 
policies, however, the autonomy of the Commission is constrained by comitology 
provisions in secondary legislation. This relationship within the EU dual executive is 
reversed when looking at the provisions of the third pillar. Within this institutional 
regime, which came to an end for the area of migration policies with the Amsterdam 
Treaty, member states were bearing the main responsibility for executive politics 
while the Commission has been linked to the activities of the Council. In Amsterdam 
the role of the Commission was strengthened. While the Maastricht Treaty still 
referred to the Presidency as the main actor for executive politics in the third pillar, 
the Amsterdam Treaty provided for increased delegation of powers to the 
Commission. Due to the shift o f migration policies to the first pillar, the 
Commission was the main recipient of primary capabilities in executive politics in 
interior affairs. Notwithstanding this development, the institutional rules on 
migration policies continue to embody key elements o f the decision making structure 
of the third pillar. Thus, while the Commission has been strengthened as the core 
executive of the EU migration policy regime, its powers are not comparable to 
‘classical* first pillar areas. It is, therefore, reasonable to apply, even after the reforms 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, the basic x-structure of executive relations also to interior 
policies.
The only interior policy committee which was referred to within the Treaties, 
has been the ‘Coordinating Committee* for third pillar issues according to ex-Article 
K.4 TEU (Niemeier 1995). This so-called ‘K-4-Committee* is comparable in its tasks 
with the Political Committee o f the second pillar. As regards the role of EU actors, 
ex-Article K.4(2) TEU stipulated, thus reiterating the wording o f the parallel 
provisions in the second pillar, that ‘the Commission shall be fully associated with 
the work in the areas referred to in this Tide*.
The distinction between executive powers of EU actors in the first and third 
pillars has, however, never been categorical. As was the case with foreign policies, 
also interior policy provisions from the Maastricht Treaty onwards contained rules 
on overlapping capabilities o f EU actors. It is, thus, quite noteworthy that the
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Maastricht Treaty set the powers of the Coordinating Committee beyond the 
confines of the third pillar. This linkage between the pillars was based on ex-Article 
lOOd which extended the powers o f the committee to cover also those parts o f visa 
policies, which were already then incorporated into the first pillar. This cross pillar 
extension of the K.4 Committee’s mandate has been an encroachment into the 
capabilities of the Commission — and also COREPER - which, for policies referred 
to in the EC Treaty, usually deals with member states in first pillar Committees 
(Lewis 2000).
An important change regards the capabilities o f EU actors in interior policies 
has been the abolition of the K.4 Committee’s responsibility for those parts o f 
interior policies that have in Amsterdam been transferred to the first pillar. Due to 
this reform, executive policy making in migration policies has become part of the 
Commission’s executive competencies comparable to other fields, such as free 
movement, external economic relations or developmental assistance. There is, 
however, a reservation within the migration policy chapter regarding this transfer of 
executive capabilities to the Commission which is otherwise atypical of the first 
pillar. Somewhat recalling the provisions on the relations of member states’ 
embassies and Commission Delegations in foreign policies, Article 66 calls for a joint 
executive approach in migration policies of member states, on the one hand, and the 
Commission, on the other. Thus, the national ministries responsible for migration 
policies as well the Commission should ‘take measures to ensure co-operation’ 
between them in this area, thus again pointing to the importance o f the epistemic 
community of transgovemmental experts in this area. This provision is a reminder 
that member states continue to keep a watchful eye on how the Commission makes 
use of its new executive powers on migration policies.
In sum, the Treaties established a cross pillar system of executive relations in 
foreign and interior policies. The two bodies which manage the executive dimension 
are the Commission, on the one hand, and the Council and its Secretariat, on the 
other. Unlike in ‘classical’ first pillar areas, this double executive operates on the basis 
of pillarised capabilities. In the first pillar the C om m ission has the main executive
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capabilities while in the second and third pillars the Presidency or the Council 
Secretariat bear the main role. Both sides are linked in their executive tasks, namely 
the implementation of policies, through the comitology system. However, while the 
Council occupies a central space in those first pillar Committees mentioned in the 
Treaties, the Commission only has a weak role both in the Political Committee as 
well as in the former K.4 Committee. Thus, the pillar division still underlies the 
institutional structure of executive relations in foreign and interior policies. However, 
the two Treaty reforms in Amsterdam and Nice have led to a further centralisation 
process on the executive dimension of both areas, thus adapting to the functional 
dynamics of macro political stabilisation policies outlined in the previous chapter. 
While member states maintain the key role, EU actors, such as the Council 
Secretariat in foreign policies and the C om m ission in migration policies, have been 
delegated considerable capabilities in both areas.
Other provisions on prim ary delegation: budgetary powers and judicial 
rem edy
In both foreign and interior policies EU actors have been delegated additional 
capabilities that add to their executive and legislative powers. These additional 
capabilities are judicial remedy, on the one hand, and powers in the budgetary 
process, on the other. In a similar way as regards executive and legislative politics, it 
is also in these two domains that the Treaties establish a pillarised distribution of 
capabilities. Thus, in classical first pillar arenas, EU actors have the full tight of 
judicial remedy, thus rendering the Court o f Justice a key actor in these parts of 
foreign and interior policies. In contrast, the provisions on the second and third 
pillars, as well as those on migration policies following the Amsterdam Treaty, 
exclude or severely restrict the ability o f EU actors to seek judicial remedy. It is only 
with regard to the budgetary dimension o f EU politics that the pillarised division of 
capabilities between member states, on the one hand, and EU actors, on the other, is 
less pronounced. Here, the usual first pillar interplay between the Commission, the 
Council and Parliament extends to almost all institutional arenas o f foreign and
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interior policies. This renders the budgetary dimension the only playing field on 
which classical communitarised rules apply almost exclusively in both areas. 
Furthermore, the budgetary provisions equip in particularly Parliament with 
additional capabilities, thus, at least to some extent, balancing the overall 
marginalisation of Parliament in both the second and third pillars as well as the 
Amsterdam migration policy regime.98
In foreign economic relations and developmental assistance, the Commission 
and Parliament enjoy the complete range of judicial remedy which is offered to them 
by the TEC according to Articles 226 and 230. The former article allows the 
Commission to start an infringement procedure against a member state at the Court 
o f Justice, to ‘ensure that they comply with their obligations under the EU Treaties 
and under EU legislation’ (Hix 1999: 106). The latter article endows the Commission 
and Parliament with the right to seek a judgement of the Court o f Justice on the 
legality of legislative acts. While the Commission can bring all cases to the Court, 
Parliament — and also the Court o f Auditors — can only bring those cases forwards in 
which they want to protect their own institutional prerogatives. The third procedure 
is laid down by Article 234 which enables national courts to ask for a preliminary 
ruling of the Court of Justice.
In contrast to the powers of Parliament, Commission and the Court of 
Justice in first pillar foreign policy regimes, the provisions on the CFSP exclude the 
Court of Justice from making any judgements in this institutional arena.99 Neither 
Parliament, the Commission nor national courts can seek judicial remedy on second 
pillar issues. Until the entry into force of the Nice Treaty, however, there remains
98 It can be debated to what extent budget rely matters. But in the perspective o f  various participants 
in the policy making process it does. This has been confirmed in several interviews with officials from 
the Council Secretariat, the Commission and Parliament. There are several concrete examples for 
Parliament’s capabilities in the budgetary process (Monar 1997). To mention just some, during die 
1994 budget readings P arliamen t succeeded in including into the budget a heading o f € 50 million on 
development projects in Palestine against die wish o f the Council to have a token entry only (Agence 
Europe, 13 November 1993, N o 6106: 3). Also the inclusion of human rights’ projects between Israel 
and Palestine in the framework o f the EMP has been the result o f pressure from Parliament on the 
Commission and Council. Interview 46, Commission, Brussels, July 2000.
99 It should be noted that executive dominance also characterises foreign policies at the national level 
where usually the competencies o f parliaments and courts are also less developed.
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one important exception to this pillarised structure o f judicial remedy. Thus, Article 
300, on the basis of which the EU has concluded its Association Agreements with 
the Mediterranean countries, stipulates that ‘the Council, the Commission or a 
Member State may obtain the opinion of the Court o f Justice as to whether an 
agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty/ Parliament, 
thus, was excluded from judicial remedy in a key first pillar field of EU foreign 
policies. It is only with the Nice Treaty that this ‘executive bias’ has been rectified.100 
The new Article 300 of the Nice Treaty states that also Parliament, alongside the 
aforementioned actors, can make recourse to the Court of Justice on legal issues 
related to Association Agreements.101
The cross pillar ‘judicialisation’ of interior policies has always been a main 
demand from both Parliament and the Commission (Stetter 2000). They have based 
this claim on the strong relationship between interior policy issues, on the one hand, 
and individual rights o f EU citizens and third country nationals, on the other. 
Notwithstanding this demand, the Treaties until today reflect a pillarised division of 
capabilities with regard to judicial remedy. Only in those interior policy fields, which 
have already with the Maastricht Treaty been part of the first pillar, all EU actors 
enjoy judicial remedy without any reservations.102
There was, however, no judicial remedy whatsoever for EU actors in the 
third pillar, save ex-Article K.2(3) TEU (Druke 1995; Neuwahl 1995). This article 
allowed member states to include, by a two-thirds majority in the Council, 
jurisdiction of the Court o f Justice in the provisions of third pillar conventions. Note
too Peers, however, has dted the Chernobyl case of 1990 in which the Court o f  Justice accepted an 
appeal o f Parliament on an alleged breach o f its prerogatives although such an appeal has been 
excluded by the Treaties (2000:47).
101 Due to this provision, Parliament’s response to an alleged breach o f  its prerogatives on Association 
Agreements remained in the past declaratory. Thus, in 1995 the chair o f the parliamentary committee 
on External Economic Relations accused die Commission o f  not consulting Parliament over the new 
Agreement with Israel (Agence Europe, 27/28 November 1995, N o 6614: 11). The same problems 
were raised by Parliament on the lack o f prior consultation on the Interim Association Agreement 
with the PLO (Agence Europe, 10 April 1997, No 6951: 3). These accusations resemble complaints o f  
MEPs in the second pillar. As in the common foreign and security, judicial remedy on Association 
Agreements is not possible for Parliament until the entry into force o f the Nice Treaty.
102 On developments in the case law o f the Court o f Justice in first pillar areas related to the free 
movement o f persons see Moore 2002.
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that this jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on third pillar Conventions has, however, 
not been mandatory. Also the scope of the Court of Justice’s possible jurisdiction 
should not be equated with its first pillar prerogatives. In fact, ex-Article K.2(3) TEU 
stipulated that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction only ‘in accordance with such 
arrangements as they [i.e. the member states, SS] may lay down.’
The reform of judicial remedy in interior policies has been a key issue during 
the 1996 IGC. Notwithstanding the subsequent transfer o f migration policies into 
the TEC, the provisions on the role of the Court of Justice in the Amsterdam Treaty 
still reveal the significant difference between Tide IV, on the one hand, and classical 
first pillar areas, on the other. Thus, Article 68 lays down the rules on judicial remedy 
in migration policies, thereby limiting the role of EU actors on that issue. Firsdy, 
while Article 68(1) allows, for the first time, for preliminary rulings according to 
Article 234 on migration policy disputes, this right is severely curtailed. Thus, it is 
only national courts o f last resort that can request a preliminary ruling of the Court 
of Justice on the application of Tide IV. Therefore, contrary to all other first pillar 
areas, the well documented ‘alliance’ between the Court of Justice, on the one hand, 
and lower national courts, on the other, cannot materialise with regard to migration 
policies (Alter 1998). Second, Article 68(2) rules out any jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice on issues related to Article 14, which deals with the abolishment of internal 
border controls.103 Finally, Article 68(3) limits the capabilities o f EU actors as they 
are usually provided for by the aforementioned Article 230. Thus, similar to the pre 
Nice Treaty provisions on Article 300, only the Commission and not Parliament can 
request a judgement o f the Court of Justice on the legality o f acts in migration
103 In fact, prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, issues related to internal borders were brought to the Court 
o f Justice and were hotly disputed within the EU. A famous case has been settled with the Wijsenbeek 
judgement o f the Court o f  Justice. Wijsenbeek, a Dutch national, argued that the deadline for the 
abolishment o f  internal border controls as provided for by the Maastricht Treaty had direct effect 
This perspective was also strongly advocated by Parliament However, the Court o f Justice argued that 
direct effect did not relate to this issue. The Court of Justice stressed that the deadline has a political 
but not a legal meaning, thus supporting the point of view o f member states as well as the 
Commission’s ‘diplomatic attitude’ towards this issue (Agence Europe, 26 May 1993, N o 5987:11 and 
22 September 1999, N o 7556: 10). The judgement of the Court o f Justice on Wijsenbeek was given 
after the entry into force o f die Amsterdam Treaty and, therefore, one can only speculate on the 
extent to which the Court o f  Justice has considered the provisions o f  Article 68(2), although this 
article was not mentioned in the judgement (Case C-378/97).
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policies.104 It is quite interesting to note that the provisions of Title IV even revoke 
some o f the rights of EU actors for judicial remedy which existed prior to the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Thus, the provisions of Article 68 apply to all parts of migration 
policies including visa issues. In this field the Maastricht Treaty originally provided 
for the complete applicability of Articles 226, 230 and 234. Therefore, the provisions 
on judicial remedy on visa policies shifted from a system of complete 
communitarisation towards the more limited system which is now characteristic of 
Title IV.
Another domain in which EU actors have been the recipients of primary 
capabilities in foreign and interior policies are the rules on the adoption of the EU 
budget Indeed, budgetary powers are an important institutional resource for EU 
actors in both areas. As Laffan explains, ‘historically, budgets have been of immense 
importance in the evolution of the modem state and they remain fundamental to 
contemporary govemment, (Laffan 1996: 71). The same conclusions can be reached 
when analysing the budgetary provisions on foreign and interior policies, although 
the overall limited size o f the budget of macro political stabilisation policies, which 
has been analysed in chapter 3, should be kept in mind. In fact, it was already from 
the Maastricht Treaty onwards that the three pillars were interlinked by the budgetary 
provisions in the Treaties and that EU actors had been delegated capabilities in that 
domain.
The budgetary procedure of Articles 268 to 280 of the TEC is the only direct 
reference to the first pillar which appears in the provisions on both the common 
foreign and security policy as well as justice and home affairs. Thus, ex-Articles 
J .ll(2 ) (now Article 28(4) TEU) and K.8(2) of the TEU defined the conditions under 
which the regular budgetary procedure o f the EU applies to the second and third 
pillars. The wording o f these articles has been identical for both arenas. In the
104 Article 68(3) limits the Court o f Justice’s right to cases which do not have become res judicata. 
According to two legal experts at the Council Secretariat this means that the Court o f Justice ‘can only 
act on concrete situations and not on theoretical questions’ in migration policies, thus further limiting 
the scope o f its judgements. Interviews 27 and 28, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 
2000.
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Maastricht version, the Treaty stipulates that all administrative expenditure is charged 
to the EC budget. Moreover, for each operational expenditure the Council can 
decide by unanimity that these expenses are charged to the EC budget as well. 
Without such a decision, operational expenditure had to be charged to the budgets of 
the member states.
Due to the transfer of migration policies to the first pillar with the 
Amsterdam Treaty, all kinds of expenditure in this field now fall under the EC 
budget It was, however, also in the second pillar that some reforms on the budgetary 
provisions were decided, thereby bringing also operational expenditure into the realm 
of the EC budget. As opposed to the aforementioned provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty now makes the EC budget the automatic budgetary 
basis for all kinds of expenditure. The only exceptions are military expenditure and 
those cases in which the Council decides by unanimity not to do so. Moreover, 
Article 28(4) TEU states expresses verbis that for all expenditure, which is charged to 
the EC budget, the first pillar provisions of Articles 268 to 280 apply. This provision 
irons out some of the confusion about the unclear wording of the Maastricht Treaty 
on this issue, where the direct reference to the EU budgetary procedure was only 
made with regard to operational expenditure but not for administrative expenses. 
The rules on the budgetary process for expenditure in foreign and interior policies 
are, thus, a prime example of the ‘explicit interconnectedness’ of the pillars 
(Regelsberger 1997: 81). From that perspective, it is also interesting to note that 
Article 268(1) on the budgetary provisions is the only direct reference in the TEC to 
the second and third pillars.
It is not necessary to embark upon the precise capabilities o f EU actors in the 
budgetary process which would require a detailed analysis on its own.105 What 
matters here is that due to their capabilities in the budgetary process, EU actors have 
indirecdy been delegated additional capabilities in foreign and interior policies. This 
empowerment through the budgetary process strengthens the role o f Parliament and
105 For more details see Laffan and Shackleton 2000 and Neunreither 1999.
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the Commission on the legislative, executive and judicial dimensions o f foreign and 
interior policies. Thus, first, with regard to the legislative dimension, the applicability 
o f the budgetary procedure for parts of the expenditure in all three pillars fosters the 
standing of Parliament as the second chamber in the bicameral EU system. This 
allowed Parliament to encroach into those institutional arenas of both areas in which 
it has otherwise, due to the provisions of the second and third pillars, been 
marginalised. The importance of the budget for Parliament’s role in all three pillar 
was thus regularly emphasised in interviews with parliamentarians and was also 
acknowledged by representatives of other EU institutions.106
Second, the budgetary provisions fostered the role o f the Commission in the 
executive dimension. Due to the Commission’s overall responsibility for the 
implementation o f the EU budget, this cross pillar design o f the EU budget provides 
the Commission with a significant leverage vis-a-vis the Council in the framework of 
the double EU executive.107 Finally, the general applicability o f these first pillar 
provisions allows for greater control of the acts of EU institutions in all institutional 
arenas of foreign and interior policies. Thus, both the Court of Justice as well as the 
Court of Auditors can make use of their powers under the first pillar when dealing 
with second and third pillar issues which directly relate to Articles 268 to 280. As has 
been seen, the budgetary provisions provide the means for both a centralisation of 
foreign and interior policies at the EU level and a stronger involvement of EU actors 
than originally provided for by the executive, legislative and judicial provisions o f the 
second and third pillars.
106 Interview 33, Chair o f committee, MEP and interview 41, Administrator, European Parliament, 
Brussels, July 2000. According to a Commission official ‘many projects in migration policies were put 
on us by Parliament* which made use o f its budgetary powers. Interview 45, Deputy Head o f Unit, 
Commission, Brussels, July 2000.
107 In this context one former Head o f Delegation to the Palestinian Territories criticised the tendency 
o f  the Commission to rely mainly on its ‘money spending cultuire’ in relations with third parties. Such 
an approach is accompanied by a reluctance to act politically, foir example by making greater use o f the 
Commission’s right o f  initiative in all the pillars. Therefore, he argued that the budget functions as an 
alternative to politics.’ Interview 32, Deputy Head of Cabinet, Ciommission, Brussels, July 2000.
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Conclusion
The pillarised design of the Treaties with regard to foreign and interior policies, is an 
indication o f the hesitancy by some member states to delegate capabilities in these 
two areas to EU actors. On the one hand, it was the intention of some member 
states, when drafting the Maastricht Treaty, to establish a pillarised system of 
governance, in which the regulation of both policy areas was split into two distinct 
institutional arenas. While existing Community powers in both policy areas remained 
within the already established communitarised framework, these member states 
attempted to retain tight control over those parts of foreign and interior policies, 
which they regarded as intrinsically linked with national sovereignty and which 
became part o f the Treaty structure at Maastricht. And indeed, this pillarised 
structure of the Treaties is still central to a proper understanding of EU foreign and 
interior policies. As a consequence, this pillarisation of both areas has also affected 
the primary capabilities of EU actors whose role outside of the first pillar remains 
limited. The centralisation of foreign and interior policies at the EU level was, 
therefore, accompanied by the attempt of member states ‘to expand and strengthen 
the Brussels-based machinery [...] but to try to contain this expansion and 
strengthening within the Council structure’ (Allen 1998: 55).
On the other hand, however, a more detailed glance on foreign and interior 
policies reveals that behind this pillar structure looms a complex system which is 
characterised by multiple linkages between the pillars. The analysis of this chapter on 
primary capabilities provides evidence for this observation by exposing the degree of 
authority delegation to EU actors across the pillars. Thus, it is argued that the role o f 
Parliament, the Commission, the Council Secretariat, the Court of Justice and the 
Court of Auditors can best be understood when looking at the manifold institutional 
regimes which come to the surface when looking behind the pillar structure. Within 
these institutional regimes, the capabilities of EU actors can then be differentiated 
according to the domains of legislative, executive, judicial and budgetary politics. 
Such an excursion into the labyrinth of EU actors” capabilities in foreign and interior 
policies does not only disclose the existence of many cross pillar linkages but also
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casts some more general doubts over the allegedly sharp demarcation brought about 
by the pillar structure in both areas.
Along these lines, this chapter suggests that the main differentiation in EU 
foreign and interior affairs is not along the ‘pillar dimension’ - thus the often 
assumed ‘supranational’-'intergovemmentaT divide - but rather on an actor 
dimension that cross cuts the supranational-intergovemmentalist divide (Branch and 
0hrgaard 1999; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1999). It is argued, that the centralisation 
o f foreign and interior policies at the EU level, which has already been analysed in 
the previous chapter, has resulted in a strengthening of the executive dimension of 
the EU political system at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches. 
Consequently, the C om m ission and also the Council Secretariat have emerged as 
central actors in all institutional regimes o f both policy areas alongside member 
states, which, nevertheless, continue to hold the key political resources within the EU 
executive. On the other hand, Parliament and the Court o f Justice have not been 
delegated capabilities which are comparable to their role in those policy areas, that 
are entirely rooted in the first pillar.
Developments in EU foreign and interior policies from Maastricht to Nice, as 
exemplified in this chapter by an analysis of primary capabilities of EU actors, reveal 
the emergence of a new *hybrid institutional setting’. With this hybrid institutional 
setting member states have attempted to accommodate for the functional 
requirements stemming from the centralisation process o f macro political 
stabilisation policies at the EU level, as outlined in chapter 3. Tom  between the need 
to have a joint European approach on foreign and interior affairs, on the one hand, 
and the unwillingness o f some member states to give up on their traditional national 
prerogatives in these two areas, this process has led to the emergence o f an 
institutional regime that for the time being remains open to both communitarisation 
and on-going national predominance.108 While the developments in both areas since
108 While this hybrid institutional setting provides for manifoHd liinkages within the areas o f foreign and 
interior policies, it is rather weak in linking the two ‘intergovernmental’ pillars with each other. 
Problems stemming from this division are discussed in chapters 6 and 7.
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the Maastricht Treaty point into the direction of a more centralised approach to EU 
foreign and interior policies, the way is long and cumbersome. Incremental reforms 
will likely dominate the regulation o f both areas also in the future. An official from 
the Council Secretariat has, therefore, asked for patience and stated that ‘the 
Community method is the only way to get somewhere [...] But let us not build Rome 
in one decade. This is too much’.109
109 Interview 26, Director, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
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C h a p t e r s
Cross Pillar Institutions II
Secondary Capabilities
Introduction
Secondary capabilities are defined in tins thesis as those capabilities that EU actors 
derive from legislative acts which are decided by the Council in between Treaty 
reforms. Together with the primary capabilities discussed in the previous chapter 
they constitute the institutional dimension of cross pillar politics, as suggested by 
figure 2.2 in chapter 2. This chapter analyses the secondary capabilities of the 
Commission, the Council Secretariat, Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Court 
of Auditors in foreign and interior affairs by looking in greater detail at the two case 
studies of Middle East and migration policies. The rationale to distinguish between 
primary and secondary capabilities of EU actors is based on the observation that 
these two kinds of capabilities differ significantly with regard to the institutional rules 
from which they originate. While the delegation of primary capabilities requires the 
unanimous consent both o f all member states’ governments and of all national 
parliaments and even, for some member states, of a popular majority in national
referenda, the delegation o f secondary capabilities faces much less institutional
/
hurdles. Thus, secondary delegation does not depend upon recourse to the national 
level but solely on the adoption of legislation, either by unanimity or by qualified 
majority, at the EU centre, namely within the Council.
This chapter seeks to provide answers to the following questions. How do 
the provisions o f the Treaties on the capabilities o f EU actors in foreign and interior 
policies relate to the evolving secondary capabilities of these actors in Middle East 
and migration policies? What kind of capabilities do EU actors precisely have on the 
two issues and are there differences between them? And, how do these secondary 
capabilities actually affect the overall pillar design o f the Treaties? Finally, how do
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secondary capabilities relate to the functional dynamics of macro political 
stabilisation policies?
In an attempt to provide answers to these questions, this chapter argues that 
the relationship between primary and secondary capabilities of EU actors in foreign 
and interior policies is twofold. On the one hand, secondary legislation has ‘given 
flesh, to the provisions of the Treaties, thereby equipping EU actors with concrete 
institutional resources across the three pillars on the basis of prior Treaty provisions. 
On the other hand, secondary legislation has also brought to the fore new capabilities 
that do not explicitly appear in the Treaties. This is where, from the perspective of 
the Council, the value added of secondary delegation comes in, since day-to-day 
decision making allows member states to delegate authority without the formal 
requirements relating to overall Treaty changes. In the two cases on Middle East and 
migration policies, secondary capabilities do, thus, both sustain and enhance the 
centralisation process of foreign and interior policies which has been analysed in 
chapter 3. Seen from that perspective, the delegation of capabilities to EU actors 
through secondary legislation allows to ‘repair* some of the mismatches between the 
formally pillarised institutional provisions on the Treaty level, on the one hand, and 
the functional dynamics stemming from the centralisation of macro political 
stabilisation policies, on the other. Moreover, secondary capabilities also serve the 
purpose, on a practical level, to establish bridges between the pillars. In conjunction 
with the insights of the previous chapter, it can thus be argued that the delegation of 
bounded authority has been a key response of the Council to meet the dilemmas 
inherent in any (international) community that aims to undertake collective action 
(Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). However, the need for delegation has also a more 
EU specific background. Thus, the delegation of capabilities to ‘supranational* agents 
across the three pillars can be understood as part of a process of ‘institutional 
gaming* in order to accommodate for the need to shift between ‘a maze o f multiple 
institutions serving separate and perhaps incompatible purposes* (Goodin 2000: 531). 
While the primary capabilities o f ‘supranational* agents, as the previous chapter has 
shown, are strongly affected by the pillar structure of the Treaties in foreign and
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interior policies, secondary capabilities often served die purpose to bridge these quite 
strict demarcation lines between the pillars. Secondary decisions, thus, often 
provided for ‘procedural, institutional and functional connections* between the two 
sides of the ‘unbalanced and lopsided* structure of foreign and interior policies 
(Geddes 2000: 92-93). Somewhat ironically, these bridges stabilise the current 
institutional equilibrium in EU foreign and interior policies since they allow to 
communicate more easily across the pillars, while this very pillar structure continues 
at the same time to be characterised by two ‘different internal “logics of 
appropriateness*** (Goodin 2000: 530).110
But why is the Council interested to equip specific EU actors such as the 
Commission, the Council Secretariat, Parliament, the Court o f Justice or the Court of 
Auditors with certain capabilities in the two areas? It is argued here that the reason 
for this particular kind of delegation is that the second and third pillars were not 
created within an institutional void. They are, as has been shown in the previous 
chapter, due to the functional indivisibility of foreign and interior policies subject to 
multiple linkages with an entrenched institutionalised structure, namely the EC. Most 
importandy, this linkage exists on an organisational level and, therefore, delegation to 
already ‘established actors* is less cosdy than the creation o f an entirely new 
institutional regime with new collective actors (Bogdandy 1999). Moreover, this 
‘competition* between those parts of foreign and interior policies belonging to the 
first pillar with those parts related to the second and third pillars often led to greater 
emphasis in day-to-day policy making on the former. This is due to the simple 
explanation that deciding and implementing concrete policies — in particular those 
based on expenses from the EU budget - is much easier in the institutional setting of 
the first pillar when compared to the rules governing the adoption of policies in the
110 Seen from that perspective, the political system o f the EU, probably more than other political 
systems, must be seen as an ‘institutional experiment’. As H Wallace has noted, *when looking at the 
system o f European governance we cannot talk o f a stable equilibrium neither before nor after 
Maastricht On the contrary: both because o f the functioning o f the formal rules o f the Treaties and 
because o f the experiences made in practice, the integration process has always been characterised by 
a constant testing o f institutions and interinstitutional relations’ (1996a: 143; translation SS). These 
arguments closely relate with a more theoretical debate on institutional emergence and change (Knight 
and Sened 1995; Carey 2000: Clemens and Cook 1999).
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two ‘intergovernmental’ pillars (Monar 1997). This did also have the result that EU 
actors were able to make use of their capabilities in the first pillar within the wider 
cross pillar foreign and interior policy setting.
This chapter thus provides further evidence for the argument that EU foreign 
and interior policies are characterised by the emergence o f a hybrid cross pillar 
institutional regime, which responds to the functional dynamics stemming from the 
centralisation of macro political stabilisation policies at the EU level. However, while 
this hybrid institutional regime facilitates a moderate yet significant delegation of 
capabilities to EU actors through secondary legislation it provides at the same time 
for an exceptionally strong control and guidance function of member states, acting as 
a collective unit in the Council, in the policy making process and, in particular, 
regarding the implementation of policies (W Wallace 2000).
Secondary capabilities ofEU Actors in Middle E ast and migration policies 
This chapter analyses all secondary decisions in Middle East and migration policies 
since the Maastricht Treaty with regard to the way in which they have equipped EU 
actors with new capabilities. In migration policies a total of 132 secondary acts has 
been concluded in the Council, whereas in Middle East policies 29 such decisions 
were made.111 The main argument is that secondary decisions have both further 
strengthened the primary capabilities of EU actors and also enhanced the cross pillar 
characteristics of foreign and interior policies.
The structure of this chapter copies the design of the previous chapter, thus 
focusing upon the different institutional domains in which EU actors have received 
secondary capabilities. Consequently, the first section analyses the capabilities o f the 
Commission within the executive domain of Middle East and migration policies. The 
second part then takes a closer look at the capabilities o f the Council Secretariat and 
does also analyse the committee control mechanisms deployed by member states to
111 The decisions in migration policies comprise the legislative acts directly related to EU migration 
policies as well as those provisions o f the Schengen acquis, which deal with migration policy issues, and 
which following the Amsterdam Treaty have become part o f the European Union’s migration policy 
acquis.
152
control executive policy making by the Commission. The third part then looks at the 
powers of EU actors such as Parliament, the Court of Justice or the Court of 
Auditors.
The main arguments put forward here are threefold. First, the delegation of 
capabilities has been a significant element of secondary decisions in EU foreign and 
interior policies. Moreover, the specific design of these capabilities adds up to and 
often extents the powers which EU actors have already received through prior Treaty 
reforms. This insight spurs further scepticism regarding the argument of 
intergovemmentalist approaches to European integration which view the time in 
between IGCs as a mere ‘intervening period of consolidation' (Moravcsik 1993: 473). 
In contrast with such approaches, this thesis holds that these ‘intervening periods’ 
are rather characterised by the need to accommodate the functional requirements on 
the policy dimension with the (imperfect) institutional provisions of prior Treaty 
reforms, inter alia through additional, albeit cautious delegation of capabilities to EU 
actors. Second, however, the degree to which EU actors profit from their secondary 
capabilities varies considerably between them. Thus, particularly the C om m ission and 
the Council Secretariat have received a wide array of new powers. This development 
has even widened, when compared with the Treaties' provisions, the power gap 
between the executive centre of foreign and interior policies, on the one hand, and 
the legislative and judicial branches of government, on the other. Moreover, the 
legislative acts, which are analysed in this chapter, do also show that the specific 
shape of secondary capabilities has fostered the linkages between the Commission 
and the Council in both areas. As opposed to these two actors, the capabilities of 
Parliament are more limited and mainly indirect, such as those resulting from the 
moderate increase of budgetary resources in the two areas. This process allows 
Parliament to make use o f its capabilities as one of the budgetary authorities o f the 
EU. The Court of Auditors has also profited from this ‘budgetisation’ of EU foreign 
and interior policies and financial auditing has over time become an integral part of 
all secondary acts which set up projects financed from the EU budget.
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Third, differences do also exist between the two policy areas. For example, 
secondary capabilities in Middle East policies have since the Maastricht Treaty been 
delegated to EU actors both within the first and within the second pillars, whereas 
migration policies are characterised by the wholesale transfer of this issue to the first 
pillar with the Amsterdam Treaty. This relates to the observation that the two pillar 
structure in foreign policies is part of an institutional equilibrium whereas the original 
cross pillar design in interior policies of the Maastricht Treaty had to be replaced 
with a structure that integrates strong cross pillar features into a single institutional 
structure, somewhat half way between the classical Community model and the 
previous JHA approach.112
Notwithstanding the different institutional designs o f the two areas, both are 
today regulated by hybrid institutional regimes which contain both strong 
Community and strong member states’ components (W Wallace 2000). In the case of 
Middle East policies this hybrid institutional regime is part o f an explicit cross pillar 
institutional design, whereas in migration policies the cross pillar logic is still 
impliddy embedded within the institutional provisions of Tide IV o f the Amsterdam 
Treaty.
Executive dominance I — the role o f the Commission
Secondary capabilities in Middle East and migration policies have in particulariy been 
delegated to the executive centre at the EU level. Thus, both the Commission and 
the Council Secretariat have received powers that strengthen and add to their 
capabilities stemming from the Treaties’ provisions. Paying tribute to the 
centralisation process of both areas, member states devised a central management 
and coordination role for each of these two actors across the three pillars. This 
process, combined with the establishment of a complex ‘comitology system’, has also 
reinforced the x-structure o f executive relations in foreign and interior policies (see
112 In an interview with officials from the Council’s Legal Service the argument was put forward that 
the Maastricht Treaty still had many open theoretical questions, while after Amsterdam ‘the 
institutional balance is OK’, Interviews 27 and 28, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 
2000.
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table 4.1), thus putting in place a system of checks and balances between these two 
executive agents, on the one hand, and between the Commission and the member 
states, on the other (Holland 1999; U^arer 1999).
While in first pillar areas the Commission has been the main recipient of 
secondary capabilities, the Council Secretariat’s capabilities can be found in the 
second and third pillars as well as on those parts of migration policies that originally 
belonged to the Schengen regime. Due to the transfer with the Amsterdam Treaty of 
migration policies, including previous Schengen provisions, to the first pillar, the 
Commission has emerged in that policy area as the main executive actor in the 
implementation o f policies, however, tightly controlled by member states through the 
committee system and other control provisions contained in secondary legislation. 
Middle East policies, on the other hand, are characterised by a rivalry o f the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat with regard to the execution of policies 
since both actors have considerable secondary capabilities without a clear distinction 
between their respective spheres of competence. However, the politicisation o f the 
Council Secretariat in foreign policies, highlighted by the establishment o f the offices 
of the Special Representative for the Middle East peace process and the High 
Representative for the CFSP, does not only bear the potential for competition over 
scarce executive resources between the Secretariat and the Commission but also for 
tensions between the Secretariat and the member states (Behrendt and Hanelt 
2000).113 In other words, capability delegation to the High Representative or the 
Special Representative can hardly be understood as a continuation o f the previously 
intergovernmental approach to second pillar policies but is part of the overall 
centralisation process observed in EU foreign affairs. It reveals the inherent dilemma 
of this policy area in which member states’ principals try to establish a balance 
between the functional process of centralising macro political stabilisation policies,
113 The official title o f the Special Representative for the Middle East peace process has been, prior to 
the Amsterdam Treaty, Special Envoy. This thesis usually sticks with the term ‘Special Representative’ 
except for quotations from official documents or secondary literature and for those references which 
relate to the mandate prior to 1999.
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on the one hand, and the legacy of intergovernmental foundations o f the EU’s 
external relations, on the other.
The secondary capabilities of the Commission in Middle East and migration 
policies can be distinguished along four main dimensions. First, in an early period 
secondary capabilities comprised only certain administrative tasks in the second and 
third pillars, such as the collection of information, the writing of evaluation reports 
or the organisation o f administrative contacts with the member states’ ministries or 
embassies. These administrative capabilities had the task to give meaning to the ‘full 
association’ concept o f the second and third pillars. Second, in all secondary acts in 
Middle East and migration policies, in which a major new budget line was created, 
the Commission has become responsible for the organisation and implementation of 
these measures. These budgetary capabilities are the main new area in which the 
Commission received capabilities which have not been explicitly foreseen by the 
Treaties. Third, also legislative capabilities are a recurrent theme o f secondary decisions. 
Thus, on several occasions Council decisions demand from the Commission to 
propose new legislation even in those areas in which, according to the Treaties, its 
right o f initiative should be shared with the member states. Finally, organisational 
capabilities appear in those cases in which new data bases or organisational units were 
located within the Commission.
The capabilities of the Commission in migration policies
It was already prior to the Amsterdam Treaty that the capabilities of the Commission 
have been strengthened through secondary decisions. On the one hand, the 
Commission’s capabilities as a ‘16th member state’, yet without voting rights, as they 
appear in the Treaty provisions on Justice and Home Affairs, were reconfirmed by 
various legislative acts (Myers 1995). On the other hand, the Commission has also 
acquired capabilities that were not explicitly outlined by the Treaties. Most 
importantly, the Commission has had, from the entry into force o f the Maastricht 
Treaty onwards, the main role in the management of the financial basket of EU 
migration policies. Thus, prior to the Amsterdam Treaty seven individual measures
156
with an overall budget o f € 62.5 million have entered into force and although all of 
these measures were third pillar decisions the Commission had the main 
administrative role for dealing with these funds (Peers 2000).
When on 20 June 1994 the Justice and Home Affairs Council took its first 
three decisions on migration policies in the framework o f the third pillar, two of 
these measures directly referred to prior reports of the Commission, thus 
emphasising the attention which the Council was willing to give to the Commission’s 
activities in this policy area. First, in its conclusions on the Commission’s 
communication on immigration and asylum policies, the Council publicly signalled 
that it was willing to accept the Commission’s involvement in all institutional arenas 
o f migration policies (Council 1994d). This stands in contrast with the way in which 
the Council dealt with attempts of the Commission to get heard on migration policy 
issues prior to the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, the 1991 communications o f the 
Commission on migration were never discussed in the Council.114 Nevertheless, the 
welcoming of the Commission as a ‘somewhat awkward junior partner [...] 
envisioned as one of 16 actors in the third pillar to take initiative in JHA matters’ 
contained some implicit warnings (U^arer 1999: 251). While the Council accepted 
that the cross pillar approach suggested by the Commission for migration policies 
*has the great merit o f encompassing the various aspects of these policies’, it did not 
make any suggestions of how to translate the Commission’s proposals into law but 
rather proposed to concentrate on those issues which have been outlined by the 
Council itself as the work programme in this area and to focus upon action in the 
third pillar only rather than adopting a cross pillar approach as suggested by the 
Commission (Council 1994c!).115 Second, the Council supported the suggestions 
made in a report by the Commission in which the possible transfer o f asylum policies 
to the first pillar according to the passarelle provision of ex-Article K.9 TEU, heavily
114 Statement o f Commission President Jacques Delors reported by Agence Europe, N o 5972, 
1.5.1993:13.
115 An informal Council meeting in Thessaloniki in May 1994 discussed all aspects o f the 
Communication but made the suggestion to concentrate upon the third pillar elements therein in 
actual decision making, Agence Europe, N o 6224,5 May 1994:7.
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advocated by Parliament, was rejected (Council 1994c). While also the Commission 
would have profited from a transfer of asylum policies to the TEC, several member 
states signalled that they were at this stage, only half a year after the entry into force 
of the Maastricht Treaty, not willing to consider this issue. Due to the unanimity 
requirements in the Council the Commission, therefore, choose to adopt a cautious 
approach and to refrain from proposing any institutional innovation (Fortescue 
1995).
Both measures showed that, on the one hand, the Commission’s policy 
perspectives on migration policies were taken into consideration by the Council but 
that, on the other hand, the Commission had to be careful when making concrete 
suggestions, thereby taking into account the reluctance among some member states 
to go beyond the institutional and policy design of the Maastricht Treaty. Against this 
background it is not surprising that only one legal measure directly referred to the 
aforementioned co m m unication  from the Commission as a stimulus for a 
subsequent legislative act, namely a Council decision o f 1997 on voluntary 
repatriation (Council 1997c).
Secondary decisions in migration policies prior to the Amsterdam Treaty did 
not increase the Commission’s capabilities as a strong actor alongside the Council 
but rather provided for a stepwise integration of the Commission into the Council’s 
operations on a working level, thereby devising a more bureaucratic and less political 
role to the Commission (den Boer 1996). Consequently, explicit cross pillar links 
with Commission prerogatives in the first pillar remained the exception and only 
appeared in two legal measures during that period.116 Most measures between 1993 
and 1999 which entailed provisions on secondary capabilities o f the Commission 
consequendy had rather the purpose to give flesh to the ‘full association’ provision o f 
the Maastricht Treaty, thereby showing that this term had more than a mere 
rhetorical meaning. The concept of ‘full association’ comprised mainly administrative
116 In a Council Resolution o f 1994 on the admission o f third-country nationals direct reference is 
made to a Regulation on the freedom o f movement for workers, while a decision o f 1996 on burden 
sharing calls for a coordination o f measures under this decision with the Commission’s action in the 
area o f humanitarian aid (Council 1994b; 1996a).
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tasks which, nevertheless, for the first time involved the Commission in an active 
way with regard to policy making in the third pillar. These provisions provided for 
the Commission die adm inistrative role to gather information relating to migration 
policies at the EU leveL Thus, first, the Commission had the task to collect 
information on the implementation of migration policies at the national level. It is 
not surprising that this role was delegated to the Commission with regard to first 
pillar issues such as visa policies (Council 1999a). However, the collection and 
coordination o f information was not only taking place in the framework of the TEC 
but comprised third pillar issues such as residence permits, voluntary repatriation and 
asylum policies as well (Council 1996a; 1997b and 1997c).
Second, the Commission had the role to oversee the implementation of 
legislative acts and to publish, either solely or jointly with the Presidency, reports on 
the implementation o f these policies on the ground (Franchino 2000: 68). Such a role 
appeared in the aforementioned Council Regulation on a common visa list of 1999, 
but also in all third pillar acts relating to asylum policies as well as on provisions on 
burden sharing for displaced persons and on unaccompanied minors (Council 1995b; 
1996f; 1997c and 1997d). Third, the ‘full association’ of the Commission covered 
also some new institutional arenas. This has been the case after the entry into force 
o f the Dublin Convention, which provides for rules on determining which member 
state is responsible for dealing with asylum requests (Convention 1997). Article 14 of 
the Declaration states that the Commission receives from the Council Secretariat 
statistical data on national asylum figures. Moreover, Article 18 provides for an 
integration o f the Commission into the work of the committee and the working 
parties which have been set up under the framework of the Dublin Convention. 
While all these decisions are documenting the stepwise integration of the 
Commission into the Council’s working structure in migration policies in the 
framework of the third pillar, they can nevertheless all be interpreted as a logical 
consequence of the ‘full association’ foreseen in ex-Article K.4(2) TEU.117
117 For example, the concept o f full association did also comprise the integration o f the Commission 
in multilateral meetings at the ministerial leveL Thus, from 1993 onwards the Commissioner
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However, there have also been two areas in which the capabilities of the 
Commission exceeded its pre-existing rights under ex-Title VI TEU. Firstly, the 
aforementioned decision on burden sharing for displaced persons equipped the 
Commission with a shared right o f initiative to call for an ‘urgent meeting’ of the K.4 
committee which then would have to decide on ‘whether a situation exists which 
requires concerted action by the European Union for the admission and residence of 
displaced persons on a temporary basis’ (Council 19961). No such right was originally 
included in the Maastricht Treaty. It is, however, quite striking that there has been a 
similar provision relating to primary capabilities of the Commission in the second 
pillar already since the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, ex-Article J.4 TEU established such a 
shared right o f initiative with regard to extraordinary meetings o f the Council, in 
particular in emergency situations.
Moreover, the greatest amount of secondary capabilities o f the Commission 
in migration policies prior to the Amsterdam Treaty can be found within the 
aforementioned seven decisions which set up a financial framework for EU 
migration policies. It can be argued that this development is comparable with an 
observation made by Kiewiet and McCubbins with regard to the delegation 
phenomenon in US politics. They have argued that ‘nowhere is the logic of 
delegation more compelling than in the appropriation o f funds for the myriad 
programs and activities o f the federal government’ (1991: 12). This seems to be 
equally true for EU politics, although on a much smaller scale.
Thus, in 1997 the Council set up two one year programmes for support of 
displaced persons seeking temporary protection as well as a programme in favour of 
asylum seekers and refugees (Koser and Black 1999). The former programme had a 
budget of €  10 million, the latter o f € 3.75 million (Council 1997f; 1997g). These 
programmes were renewed one year afterwards with a budget of €  13 million and €
responsible for migration policies attended meeting o f the so-called Berlin Group (later Budapest 
Group) o f West and East European migration ministers (Agence Europe, N o 5922, 18.02.1993: 15). 
However, in most international organisations dealing with migration policies issues the Commission is 
not represented alongside member states and also the Council Secretariat participates in more such 
international fora than the Commission (Guiraudon 2000: 255).
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3.75 million respectively (Council 1998b; 1998c). The three other programmes are 
multiannual programmes addressing the exchange of officials dealing with the issue 
of identity documents (‘Sherlock’), the issues of asylum, immigration and external 
borders (‘Odysseus’) and, finally, the support for reception and voluntary repatriation 
o f Kosovo-refugees (Council 1996c; 1998a and 1999b). These three programmes, 
which add up to a rather tiny sum within the EU budget, comprised funds o f € 5 
million, € 12 million and € 15 million respectively.
The main role o f the Commission in the management of these programmes 
has been to administer the funds, evaluate and choose project proposals, monitor the 
implementation of these projects and to inform the Council on the results. In all the 
measures the C om m issio n  is, however, not entirely free in choosing how the budget 
is allocated. Its autonomy is limited by the establishment of member states’ 
committees which scrutinise the action of the Commission in the management of 
these funds.118 It is only below a financial ceiling of either € 50,000 or € 200,000 that 
the Commission has been delegated the right to administer these funds 
autonomously, whereas for all measures above that ceiling the Commission has to 
seek the support o f a majority of member states in the committee. The three 
measures which set up multiannual programmes, have more detailed provisions on 
financial management Thus, the Sherlock and Odysseus programmes ask the 
Commission to write prior to every financial year a draft annual programme which 
has to be submitted to the committee and be accepted by unanimity. Only after 
receiving this consensual mandate can the Commission proceed in allocating the 
funds and in managing their implementation. Moreover, these two measures and also 
the Kosovo fund ask the Commission to write each year an evaluation report which 
has then to be submitted to the Council and Parliament It must be noted that the 
legislative proposals for the three multiannual programmes have been made by the 
Commission itself, which thus made use o f its right o f initiative in the third pillar. In 
fact, the only Commission proposals which led to secondary legislative acts in this
118 See further below in this chapter on more details on these committees.
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area were those on funding programmes and not on ‘normative third pillar rules’ 
(Peers 2000: 21). This supports the view that member states accepted a participation 
o f the Commission in migration policies on an administrative level, but also showed 
reluctance to allow the Commission to have a more political or agenda setting role in 
this area.
Following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty this reluctance to 
accept a more active involvement of the Commission changed and subsequently, as a 
result o f the transfer o f migration policies to the first pillar, more provisions on the 
Commission’s capabilities in migration policies appear in secondary legislation. This 
new approach has become visible during the European Council’s special meeting 
during the Finnish Presidency in Tampere of 15 and 16 October 1999. This meeting 
dealt with the future objectives in the newly established ‘area of freedom, security 
and justice’ (European Council 1999b). The conclusions of the Tampere Summit 
entailed inter alia a detailed report on the precise measures to be taken in order to 
develop EU migration policies. Secondary capabilities o f the C om m ission appear as a 
recurrent theme in the Presidency’s conclusions and, for example, these conclusions 
provide for the sole right o f initiative for the Commission with regard to various 
migration policy decision. Note, that the Amsterdam Treaty did foresee only a shared 
right o f initiative for most o f these issues. Table 5.1. compares the suggestions made 
in the Tampere Conclusions on the Commission’s right o f initiative with the original 
provisions o f Title IV which, of course, from a legal perspective enjoyed supremacy 
over the Tampere provisions.
Table 5.1: The Commission’s right o f initiative: primary and secondary capabilities
Issue T ide IV EC Treaty Tam pere Conclusions
Developing a scoreboard - Sole right o f initiative
Asylum applications and subsidiary 
protection
Shared right o f initiative Sole right o f initiative
C om m on asylum procedure and 
uniform status
Shared right o f initiative Sole right o f initiative
Admission and residence o f third- 
country nationals
Shared right o f initiative Sole right o f initiative
Fight against illegal immigration Shared right o f initiative Sole right o f initiative
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Thus, following the Tampere meeting, the capabilities o f the Commission with 
regard to its role in the legislative process were increased when compared with its 
shared right of initiative as it appeared in the Amsterdam Treaty. Note, that on the 
issue of visa policies the Amsterdam Treaty did already delegate to the Commission 
the sole right o f initiative. Another important institutional innovation, which resulted 
from the Tampere Summit, has been the decision to delegate to the Commission the 
task of proposing a ‘scoreboard’ on measures to be taken inter alia in migration 
policies in the years ahead.119 This entrusted the Commission with the right to come 
up — in cooperation with the Council and on basis of the Vienna Action Plan and the 
Tampere Conclusions - with a time table and a set of issues with which the EU 
would develop its asylum policy acquis (European Council 1998; van Krieken 2000) 
Additional to these expliddy mentioned new capabilities, the Tampere Conclusions 
also talk of some other areas in which the Commission is mentioned as a central 
actor in EU migration policies. Thus, point 12 of the Conclusions entrusts both the 
Council and the Commission to report to the European Council o f December 2000 
on the work in the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration.120 Also, 
point 16 asks the Commission to explore the potential to establish a system of 
burden sharing for displaced persons, ‘on the basis of solidarity between Member 
States’
The Tampere Conclusions, in conjunction with the provisions of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, pointed to a qualitative shift in the way migration policies were 
dealt with at the EU level. The Commission profited from this change and fostered 
its role on both the administrative and the political dimension o f this policy area. Out 
of the ten legislative acts concluded in migration policies between May 1999 and July 
2002, eight were based on Commission initiatives, while two measures were based on
119 The first scoreboard was published by the Commission in April 2000 and from then onwards 
biannually. The orientations and preferences o f the Commission, as they appear in the six scoreboards 
until December 2002 will be analysed in detail in the following chapter.
120 The High Level Working Group is an interesting example for linkages between EU interior and 
foreign affairs settings. While cross pillar linkages are omnipresent within these two areas, linkages 
between die two settings are considerably less developed. The High Level Working is a noteworthy 
exemption to this rule.
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proposals from France and Germany. Out of these eight decisions, in which the 
Commission made the proposal, only two related to visa policies, in which the 
Commission enjoyed the sole right of initiative anyway. In all these legislative acts 
new capabilities of the C om m ission appear that further strengthened its role as a key 
actor in EU migration policies alongside the member states.
Thus, first, the Commission consolidated its administrative role and was 
delegated the task to collect statistical information from member states on their 
measures in visa policies or on temporary protection for displaced persons (Council 
2000a; 2001a). However, stretching beyond this role as information collector, which 
has already been a characteristic capability prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
aforementioned legislative acts provide for some steps towards an administrative 
Europeanisation at the national level. In that process the Commission is foreseen by 
several measures as being responsible for managing new European units in national 
interior ministries (Wessels and Rometsch 1996). Thus, the Joint Supervisory 
Authority of national ministries deals joindy with the Commission on the 
implementation o f the EURODAC Regulation (Council 2000f). The Directive on 
minimum standards for giving temporary protection stipulates that Tor the purposes 
of administrative cooperation required to implement temporary protection, the 
Member States shall each appoint a national contact poind (Council 2001a). The 
Commission and the member states are responsible for ensuring the coordination of 
their respective activities. Most importandy, in order to give substance to Article 66, 
which calls for intense administrative cooperation between the Commission and 
member states, the Council adopted in June 2002 a Decision on a cooperation 
programme for all Tide IV activities, the so-called ARGO Programme. ARGO, 
which is managed by the Commission, should inter alia explore whether it is useful to 
found *a common training institution’ for national civil servants working on EU 
migration policies, thus further institutionalising the cooperation within the epistemic 
community o f European and national migration policy experts (Council 2002c). The 
decision on the ERF even establishes a hierarchical relationship between the 
Commission and national administrations by allowing the Commission to pursue on
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the spot checks on the implementation of ERF programmes at the national level 
(Council 2000d).121
Second, the Commission is responsible for the implementation o f all major 
decisions in migration policies after the Amsterdam Treaty which had budgetary 
effect The budget, which the Commission has to administer comprises, for ERF and 
ARGO alone, € 241 million, thus four times as much as all funds administered by the 
Commission in the years between 1993 and 1999 combined. In die case o f the ERF 
the Commission decides, on proposals from member states, which projects at the 
national level are supported by the fund.122 Five per cent, i.e. € 10.8 million, can be 
allocated by the Commission on projects which are of a ‘com m on interest* to all 
member states. The EURODAC Regulation sets up a Central Unit which is 
responsible for collecting and managing the fingerprints o f those third country 
nationals whose data can be stored for that purpose. The Central Unit has been 
established within the Commission, thereby providing it with another adm inistrative 
unit within the emerging EU migration policy space (Guiraudon 2000). A similar case 
of access to expert information has been regulated in the provisions on the uniform 
format for residence permits for third-country nationals. The secret specifications are 
known only to the Commission and the responsible member states* institutions 
(Council 2002b).
Third, the secondary capabilities of the Commission following the 
Amsterdam Treaty do also comprise the task to evaluate the implementation o f these 
various legislative measures and to come up with regular reports which are then 
passed forward to both the Council and Parliament. Such provisions can be found 
with regard to the ERF, EURODAC, the common visa list, minimum standards for 
temporary protection and the ARGO programme. Fourth, three o f the 
aforementioned measures provide for further legislative action and in all o f these
121 From the project initiation perspective, however, the ERF is characterised by a hierarchical 
relationship from the side o f member states, which propose to the Commission the projects to be 
funded, leaving small room o f manoeuvring for the Commission.
122 Note that the ERF allocates a fixed amount to each member state each year and the Commission’s 
leverage to choose projects applies only to allocating funds wtihin each member state.
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cases the Commission has received the sole right of initiative. This is the case with 
regard to the ERF Decision, which allows for allocation o f additional funds in 
emergency situations, following a Commission proposal with a qualified majority in 
the Council. In the measures on the common visa list and minimum standards for 
temporary protection, only the Commission can initiate new legislation, i.e. for 
adding or removing countries from the visa list or for subsidiary legislation on 
specific temporary protection schemes. However, in both cases the legislative acts 
stipulate that member states can request the Commission to consider a legislative 
proposal, thus providing for a form of the Voluntarily shared right of initiative* 
similar to the provisions of Tide IV TEC.
Additional to these provisions in the third and first pillars, an important 
element o f EU migration policies have also been those decisions which form part of 
the Schengen acquis and which were integrated into the EU framework following the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Also in this institutional setting the Commission has some 
capabilities. Thus, the Commission had been guaranteed in a Council Resolution a 
third pillar style ‘full association* with the Presidency in the process o f integrating the 
Schengen acquis into the EU framework (Council 1997h). This full association 
certainly had a practical necessity given the overlap between Schengen provisions, for 
example in the fields of administrative cooperation, visa policies or carrier sanctions, 
and Tide IV provisions on similar issues on which the Commission already had quite 
considerable capabilities (Collinson 1996). For that reason the Commission was also 
granted the status as an observer in the Schengen Standing committee, the Schengen 
Central Group and the various working groups responsible for the implementation 
o f the Schengen acquis (Schengen Executive Committee 1998).
It has, however, to be noted that the Commission was quite anxious to avoid 
a ‘Schengenisation* o f its newly acquired primary capabilities in migration policies 
after the entry into force o f the Amsterdam Treaty, i.e. to avoid a penetration o f the 
intergovernmental set up o f Schengen cooperation upon the EU migration policy 
regime (den Boer and Wallace 2000). Thus, as part o f a Council decisions on the 
rules for the allocation of the entire Schengen acquis to  the first or the third pillar, the
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Commission issued a statement in which it stipulated that the provisions on the 
integration of Schengen rules into the EU framework do not encroach upon its 
traditional executive prerogatives as well as its role as the guardian of the Treaties. 
Against this background, it is interesting to note that in two important fields 
regarding the implementation of the Schengen acquis the Commission has received 
secondary capabilities. First, the Commission has taken the lead for the EU in 
negotiating with Iceland and Norway the rules on the participation of these two 
states in the Schengen cooperation and it is also the Commission which represents 
the EU in the Joint Committee set up to discuss bilateral issues between Iceland or 
Norway, on the one hand, and the Union, on the other (Agreement 2001).123 Second, 
the Commission has the task to develop the second generation o f the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) and, once it becomes operative, to manage SIS II. A 
management of this data base within the Commission goes thus hand in hand with 
the placement — in the framework of Tide IV - of other data bases, such as 
EURODAC, within the Commission.
The capabilities of the Commission in Middle East and Mediterranean 
Policies
When compared with migration issues, the secondary capabilities of the Commission 
in Middle East policies exhibit the greater emphasis on the pillar division in EU 
foreign affairs. Consequendy, in those areas of EU foreign policies which belong to 
the first pillar, such as trade and developmental issues, the Commission appears as 
the actor with the main executive capabilities. In turn, executive capabilities in the 
framework of the second pillar have primarily been delegated to the Council 
Secretariat, namely the Special Representative and the High Representative. 
Therefore, with regard to the Commission’s powers, secondary capabilities did 
reinforce existing powers rather than adding new ones. Notwithstanding this general 
division between the pillars, the capabilities of the Commission are not entirely
123 Note, that the actual negotiating mandate has been transferred to the Commission by the Council 
voting under the unanimity requirement, Agence Europe, No 7287,27 August 1998: 2-3.
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limited to classical first pillar arenas. In fact, out of die 14 Joint Actions on die 
Middle East between 1993 and 2002, 13 Joint Actions made direct reference to the 
Commission and its executive role in the context of these decisions. While these 
functions do not go far beyond the primary capabilities of the Commission, namely 
its ‘full association’ in the CFSP, their purpose is to define more precisely what the 
Treaty concept of ‘full association’ actually entails. Some of these Joint Actions do, in 
addition, direcdy refer to the first pillar and demand from the Commission to make 
use o f its foreign policy capabilities in these areas, thus establishing additional cross 
pillar linkages to those already foreseen by the Treaties.
As discussed in chapter 3, the pillarised division of EU foreign policies has to 
some extent been modified by the EMP, which is also the wider institutional 
framework of the EU’s relations with Israel and Palestine. The objective o f the EMP 
is to establish a ‘comprehensive’ EU policy towards the region, i.e. a policy that aims 
to combine all areas of EU foreign policies under one strategic umbrella. Secondary 
decisions on the EMP, such as the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region, 
consequently demand from the Commission to make use o f its first pillar capabilities 
in the framework of the CFSP. While the Common Strategy itself is a second pillar 
instrument based on A rt 13(2) TEU, most policy measures which the Common 
Strategy proposes actually belong to the first pillar.124 This development can be 
studied with regard to EU relations with Middle Eastern countries. Thus, relations 
between the EU and Israel have traditionally been based on trade cooperation given 
Israel’s economically Western outlook (Ahiram and Tovias 1995). Relations with 
Palestine, on the other hand, have mainly been based on significant financial 
assistance in an attempt to sustain and stabilise the weak economic and political 
structures of this nascent state (Stetter 2003).
In both areas, namely trade cooperation and financial assistance, the 
Commission has had since the 1970s the main responsibility at the European level
124 Such a linkage between EC measures and ‘intergovernmental’ settings has already been established 
in some areas o f foreign policies during the EPC period. The Euro-Arab dialogue could be mentioned 
as an example (Rhein 1999: 692).
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for the implementation of policies. Thus, the EMP allows the Commission to 
combine these entrenched economic powers with the political objectives of the EU’s 
second pillar. The strong preferences of the Commission in sustaining the 
institutional framework of the EMP, which will be further discussed in chapter 6, 
thus become obvious. First, the EMP has strengthened the first pillar policies 
towards Middle Eastern countries, since both trade and developmental assistance 
policies have been widened in scope when compared with the protocol period which 
pre dated the EMP. Since in both areas it is the Commission that is responsible for 
executive policy making the EMP has, consequently, also increased the 
Commission’s capabilities in Middle East policies. Second, since the EMP is a second 
pillar instrument, and given the heavy reliance of EMP on first pillar policies, the 
Commission did also foster its role as a key actor in the EU’s overall foreign policy. 
Seen from that perspective, the debate who has been responsible for the actual 
establishment of the EMP becomes somewhat subordinate. While some authors 
argue that EMP originates from within the Commission (Rhein 1999), some suggest 
that the actual driving force have been the governments o f Spain and France (Barbe 
1998) while others see the Commission and Southern EU member states equally 
responsible in a process of broad interest convergence (Gomez 1998).125 Yet, another 
question seems to be at least equally important, namely how EU actors perceive their 
own role within the EMP. The strong support which EMP receives from within the 
Commission and which is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6, seems to support 
the argument that the institutional design o f the EMP is particularly well suited to fit 
the Commission’s policy preferences.
Notwithstanding the predominance of capabilities o f the Commission in first 
pillar areas, some of its capabilities do also derive from second pillar legal measures. 
As has been mentioned before, out of the 14 second pillar acts that dealt with the
125 The view that it has been the Commission that was the main actor behind the creation o f EMP has 
in particular been raised by Com m ission officials in various interviews conducted for this thesis.
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Middle East, only one did not refer to the Commission at alL126 Although it has to be 
noted that most o f these Joint Actions do not establish a direct transfer o f authority 
to the Commission but rather delegate authority to the Council Secretariat, the 
question remains why the Council regularly pointed to the Commission in its second 
pillar decisions. It is argued here that, similar to migration policies prior to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, provisions on secondary capabilities of the Commission had the 
purpose to ‘give flesh’ to a rather unspecified provision of the EU Treaty, namely the 
concept o f ‘full association’. Moreover, the inclusion of the Commission into these 
Joint Actions resulted in the establishment of cross pillar linkages of the EU’s foreign 
policy, thereby facilitating the combination of first and second pillar instruments in 
day-to-day policy making (M Smith 1998).
It was already the first Joint Action on the Middle East that contained a 
reference to the role of the Commission in the framework of the CFSP. Thus, Article 
2 of the Joint Action ‘in support of the Middle East peace process’ encouraged the 
Commission to submit first pillar legislative proposals to the Council on the ‘rapid 
implementation o f programmes of assistance’ for the newly established Palestinian 
Authority as well as ‘to provide aid in the framework of existing guidelines’ to other 
Middle Eastern countries which are party to the peace process (Council 1994a). The 
Joint Action also set up support measures for the creation of a Palestinian Police 
Force. While the main responsibility for implementing this policy has been delegated 
to the Presidency, the Joint Action demands a ‘close coordination’ o f the Presidency 
with the Commission, in order to ensure that European and member states’ financial 
assistance to the Palestinians on this issue is coordinated.
These two kinds of references to the Commission in second pillar 
instruments, namely linkages to its first pillar capabilities and its responsibility for 
coordination o f aid with member states, do also form the backbone o f the provisions 
on the Commission’s role in other Joint Actions. There are four main dimension in
126 Only the Joint Action o f April 2002 on temporary reception o f some Palestinians, who were 
involved in the siege o f the Church o f the Nativity in Bethlehem, in the member states contains no 
reference to the Commission (Council 2002a).
170
the Commission’s capabilities in these second pillar acts and it is interesting to note 
that most of these provisions are similar to the capabilities of the Commission in the 
third pillar prior to the Amsterdam Treaty. First, the secondary capabilities of the 
Commission comprise the task to submit proposals for further legislation or 
executive measures to the Council. This has been the case in the aforementioned 
Joint Action in support for the peace process. Moreover, also the two Joint Actions 
which lay down the rules for the EU’s observer role in the Palestinian elections of 
1996, provide for such an initiative role to the Commission (Council 1995a; 1995c). 
Thus, the Council Decision in support of the Palestinian Elections asks the 
Commission to draw up a list o f observers for participation in the European 
Electoral Unit and submit this list to the Presidency which has the main role in 
deciding on the final composition of the Electoral Unit.
The main feature with regard to the role of the Commission in the various 
Joint Actions is that they establish parameters for what the concept of ‘full 
association’ entails and, therefore, specify the precise role o f the Commission in the 
execution of policies. Thus, full association does comprise the right of the 
Commission to be involved by the Presidency in the implementation o f concrete 
second pillar policies such as the creation of a Palestinian Police Force (Council 
1994a). This involvement into the Presidency’s activities did also relate to the 
decision on the final composition o f the Electoral Unit and the guidelines 
determining its operational capacities (Council 1995c). The various Joint Actions on 
the mandate of the Special Representative or the EU Adviser to the Palestinian 
Authority on security issues also demand such a coordination with the Commission 
(Council 1996d; 1997a; 1997e; 1998d; 1999c; 1999e; 1999g; 2000c; 2000g; 2001b). 
Full association, finally, does also entail the right o f die Commission to participate in 
the second pillar ‘Anti-terrorism Committee’ (Council 2000c).
Third, all the Joint Actions which relate to the Special Representative and the 
EU Adviser, but also the decisions on the Palestinian elections mention the role of 
the Commission Delegations in the region. Their task is to provide for ‘logistical 
support* for the activities of the European Electoral Unit, the Special Representative
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or the EU Adviser.127 Fourth, following the entry into force o f the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the two Joint Actions on the Special Representative’s mandate do also 
contain more detailed provisions on the financing of his activities. It is stipulated in 
these documents that the budget o f the Special Representative is subject to a 
‘contract’ between the Commission and the Council Secretariat. As an emphasis of 
the linkage between the Council Secretariat and the Commission in Middle East 
policies — and fostering the bicephalous representative functions o f the Secretary 
General o f the Council and the External Relations Commissioner - the two Joint 
Actions since the Amsterdam Treaty also state that reports by the Special 
Representative are submitted both to the High Representative and the Commission.
To summarise, secondary capabilities of the Commission in EU Middle East 
policies which are based on second pillar instruments have brought some more 
clarity to the question what ‘full association’ actually entails but, on the other hand, 
did not lead to a major increase of the overall executive capabilities of the 
Commission. The bulk o f executive capabilities, as the following section will 
elaborate in greater detail, has been delegated to other supranational agents, namely 
those located within the Council Secretariat. However, almost all Joint Actions make 
direct reference to the Commission and set out the requirement for either the 
Presidency, the Special Representative or the EU Adviser to include the Commission 
into executive policy making and do also demand from the Commission to make use 
o f its first pillar powers. Moreover, as already emphasised in chapter 4, the 
Commission profits from its diplomatic presence in the region where it is 
represented by delegations in Tel Aviv and East Jerusalem. On various issues, such as 
the Palestinian elections, the mandate o f the Special Representative or the activities 
of the EU Adviser, Joint Actions particularly refer to the need o f the Presidency or 
Council actors to coordinate their work with the delegations in the region.
127 Also the organisation o f visits o f members o f die European Parliament to die region belongs to the 
logistical support tasks’ o f the Commission Delegations. Interview 10, European Commission, 
Brussels, June 2000.
172
Among second pillar instruments it has been the ‘Common Strategy on the 
Mediterranean Region’ of June 2000 that sets out the biggest amount of secondary 
capabilities of the Commission (European Council 2000). In particular, the Common 
Strategy documents the interrelationship of and overlap between the first and second 
pillars and, thereby, the need to link the capabilities of the Commission, on the one 
hand, with those o f other executive actors, on the other. Thus, in the section o f the 
Common Strategy on ‘Instruments and Means’ the Commission is called upon to 
make use of its first pillar powers in the framework of the CFSP, while Article 25 of 
the Common Strategy reiterates that the Commission will Tie fully associated in 
accordance with Articles 18 and 27 of the EU Treaty* for all second pillar acts 
decided on the basis o f the Common Strategy. In the policy related sections, the 
common strategy does then not separate anymore between first and second pillar 
areas, but rather treats them as functionally indivisible. Accordingly, all executive 
actors, the Commission, the Secretariat, the Council and the member states are 
referred to in the Common Strategy as responsible for implementing these policies. 
The Commission is called upon to actively engage itself according to its 
‘competencies and capacities’ in the implementation of EU Mediterranean and 
Middle East policies. Article 34 asks the Commission to submit for each incoming 
Presidency its proposals for priority action, to contribute to the evaluation of 
progress, to evaluate the contribution o f the Mediterranean partner countries, and if 
need be to submit proposals for changes to this Common Strategy to the European 
Council. In none o f these tasks does the Common Strategy differentiate between the 
first and the second pillars. Moreover, the agenda setting role o f the Commission is 
also strengthened by the decision making rules in the Council, since subsequent 
second pillar decisions pursuant to the Common Strategy are decided by qualified 
majority. Finally, along similar lines as the aforementioned Joint Actions, Article 31 
o f die Common Strategy calls for coordination between member states* embassies 
and Commission delegations on the ground.
The strong emphasis which the Common Strategy makes with regard to the 
role o f the Commission must be seen against the background of its executive
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EU has shown that the Commission can even use its first pillar trade competencies in 
order to pursue more political objectives.129
All bilateral issues between the EU and the two Middle Eastern countries are 
dealt with in specialised Committees which are referred to within the Association 
Agreements. Israeli-EU relations were until 2000 institutionally embedded within the 
Cooperation Council, which was original!y established by the EC-Israel Free Trade 
Agreement o f 1975 (Giersch 1980). In this Cooperation Council only trade related 
matters were discussed, since its scope did only cover EC competencies. However, 
after the entry into force of the Association Agreement in June 2000 a two layered 
structure of bilateral relations has been put in place which consists of an Association 
Council and an Association Committee. The Association Council meets yearly at the 
ministerial level and comprises the members of the Council, the C om m ission and the 
government of Israel. The Association Council decides on the long term objectives 
relating to the implementation of the Agreement. It is then the role o f the 
Association Committee to deal with the implementation of decisions o f the 
Association Council or the problems arising from the implementation of the 
agreement (Association Council 2001).
With regard to the bilateral relations between the EU and Palestine on trade 
related matters a Joint Committee oversees implementation, which has been 
established by the Interim Association Agreement o f 1997. In relations with 
Palestine, the agreement did only establish a one layered institutional structure since 
the agreement with Palestine has been concluded on the basis o f Article 133 and 
does only cover EC policies. The cross pillar approach o f the new EMP Association 
Agreements, which are Mixed Agreements on the basis o f Article 300, has only been 
applied to agreements between the EU and recognised states in the Mediterranean
129 EC-Israel: Cooperation Committee, Press Release: Brussels (28.11.1997), Press 370. The dispute 
has centred around false export certificates for Israeli oranges, which were, in fact, originating from 
Brazil The government o f Israel says that ‘administrative cooperation’ between Israel and the EU 
would have sufficed to settle the issue. The publication o f a note to exporters within the Official 
Journals by the Commission was seen as a rather political step. Agence Europe, N o 7107, 26.11.1997: 
7. This interpretation has also been confirmed, off the record, in several interviews with EU officials.
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(Paasivirta 1999). The Joint Committee comprises members o f the Commission, on 
the one hand, and members of the Palestinian Authority, on the other.
These new agreements are an example of the hybrid institutional framework 
of EU foreign policies as it has been fostered in Middle East policies since the 
establishment of the EMP. While the Commission could consolidate its role in the 
second pillar, it had to relinquish its erstwhile exclusive executive competencies with 
regard to the implementation of bilateral agreements (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999). 
The EU-Israel Association Agreement delegates both political and economic 
capabilities to the EU centre, however, not exclusively to the Commission. Thus, it 
was the Council Secretariat that profited most from this new type of agreement. For 
example, it is an official o f the Council Secretariat and not a Commission 
representative that acts as the secretary of the bilateral Association Council. 
Moreover, the Association Council is presided over alternately by the Presidency or 
Israel, and the same rules apply to the Association Committee. It is only within this 
Council dominated institutional framework that the Commission continues to be 
responsible for the implementation o f bilateral relations on first pillar issues and, for 
example, chairs those committees related to the first pillar.130 A different institutional 
structure applies to those fields of bilateral cooperation which are not covered by the 
Association Agreement. With regard to these agreements bilateral issues are 
discussed by the Commission, on the one hand, and members of the Israeli 
government, on the other. This does, for example, apply to the role o f the 
Commission in the EC-Israel Research Committee established to oversee the 
participation of Israel as the only non European country in the fifth framework 
programme for research and development (Agreement 1999a).131
The main amount o f executive capabilities of the Commission, finally, appear 
with regard to developmental assistance. This area constitutes, moreover, alongside
130 Interview 12, Head o f Unit, Commission, Brussels, June 2000.
131 When providing the Commission with a negotiating mandate in the Research Council, some 
member states such as Belgium, France, Italy and Spain had preferred a ‘case-by-case’ participation o f 
Israel rather than a ‘member state like’ integration of Israel into the programme. Agence Europe, N o  
6316,16.9.1994: 6.
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economic relations, the main element of bilateral relations of the EU with the 
Mediterranean region. As one official from the Commission stated, ‘we have projects 
and budgets and that is why everybody looks at the Commission\132 As part o f the 
EMP, aid to the region has been particularly increased when compared to the 
protocol period. As has been mentioned before, Israel does not receive funds from 
the MEDA budget, except for some joint Israeli-Palestinian projects. Palestine, 
however, is a major recipient of EU aid. Indeed, there is no other country in the 
world which has received a similar amount of assistance from the EU as Palestine. 
From 1994 to 1998 the EU has committed € 653 million grants from the EU budget 
and Investment Bank loans to Palestine. In 1999 the assistance amounted to € 93 
million. The Palestinians receive a per capita support of € 258.7 compared to €  11.2 
for the entire Mediterranean region (West Bank and Gaza 2000).
The Commission is, according to the 1996 MEDA I Regulation, responsible 
for the implementation o f these assistance measures (Council 1996b). Moreover, 
Article 6 o f the Regulation stipulates that ‘supervision and financial control* can be 
exercised by the Commission on the spot The regulation also states that the 
Commission has the sole right of initiative to submit to the Council, voting by a 
qualified majority, the national and regional indicative programmes, i.e. those 
programmes which outline the precise scope of assistance measures for Palestine and 
for joint Israeli-Palestinian projects. The Commission has been delegated the task to 
write these National and Regional Indicative Programmes, thereby taking the Council 
guidelines on these programmes into consideration. Yet, these guidelines leave the 
Commission a rather large autonomy since they do not specify in greater detail how 
the programmes should be precisely designed (Council 1996e).
The specialised committee o f member states, the so-called MED Committee, 
must be involved for all financing decisions exceeding €  2 million. Amending 
decisions of less than 20 per cent difference to the original commitment can be made 
by the Commission without reconsulting the committee. Implementation by the
132 Interview 11, European Commission, Desk officer, Brussels, June 2000.
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Commission includes tasks such as the issuing of tenders for specific projects and the 
conclusion of project contracts with partners in the region. Moreover, the 
Commission is also responsible for coordinating the allocation of MEDA funds with 
loans by the European Investment Bank to the region. The Commission advises, 
according to Article 12 of the regulation, the Bank in its decisions. With regard to 
risk capital operations, the Commission is responsible for taking the financing 
decisions on the implementation o f projects suggested by the Bank.133 Finally, the 
regulation demands from the Commission to submit a yearly report to Parliament 
and the Council on the operation o f MEDA and to produce all three years an ‘overall 
assessment report’. An evaluation on each concrete project must be submitted by the 
Commission every two years to the MED Committee. The MEDA II Regulation of 
the year 2000 did not add major new elements to these implementing powers of the 
Commission but did emphasise on several occasions the need for a better 
coordination between the Commission and member states and quicker disbursement 
of funds in the region (Council 2000e).134 Following criticism with regard to the goal 
consistency of implementation the major innovation of MEDA II is that the 
Commission’s capabilities now also comprise the task to write country strategy 
papers which will form the basis for future allocation of funds.135
Executive dominance II  — the role o f the Secretariat and the Council 
Committees in migration and M iddle East policies
Secondary capabilities of the Council Secretariat are greater in the area of Middle 
East policies than in migration policies. It is argued here, that the reason for the quite 
uneven distribution of capabilities to the Council Secretariat relates to the differences 
with regard to the structure of the hybrid institutional setting in the two areas. Thus, 
the two pillar design of foreign policies has supported the division o f executive
133 Although there are regular meetings between Commission and EIB, the Commission was 
unsatisfied in particular about the coordination o f policies by the EIB. They had problems to stick to 
the plans. MEDA II does also provide for changes to that*. Interview 17, European Commission, 
Brussels, June 2000.
134 See further below in this chapter on the new committee rules in MEDA II.
135 See chapter 7 on the actual implementation problems o f MEDA.
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capabilities at the EU level — both on an administrative and a political dimension - 
between the two actors, thus inter alia putting in place a system of checks-and- 
balances between them. In migration policies, on the other hand, the formal two 
pillar approach has ceased to exist with the Amsterdam Treaty. As a result o f the 
transfer o f the entire policy area to the first pillar, also the main executive capacities 
at the EU level have been transferred to the Commission. The following section will 
look both at the role of the Council Secretariat and at the committee control systems 
established in both areas by member states in an attempt to control executive policy 
making by the Commission.
The capabilities of the Council Secretariat
The capabilities of the Council Secretariat in migration policies, which derive from 
secondary legislation, are significantly smaller than those o f the Commission. 
Moreover, the few references made to the Council Secretariat mainly stem from the 
period prior to the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. It has, however, to be 
emphasised that a major institutional resource o f the Council Secretariat does not 
relate to capabilities enlisted in secondary legislation, but rather relate to the day-to- 
day operations of the Council. Thus, the Council Secretariat has, in both areas, a 
central role due to its task as a ‘provider of agenda and drafts’ in this area (den Boer 
and Wallace 2000: 504). This role does also correlate with the perception o f officials 
from the Secretariat on their role in EU policy making. Thus, officials from D G  H 
on Justice and Home Affairs have underlined this perspective and an official from 
D G  E on foreign policies has described the Secretariat’s role as an institutional 
memory of the CFSP as the main source of influence. The tasks o f the Secretariat, 
thus, comprise the writing of Presidency conclusions, the cochairing of working 
group meetings and the writing of agenda notes, i.e. the policy history related to a 
specific issue, moreover, the writing of drafts for Joint Actions and the tabling of 
informal recommendations to the Presidency on compromise proposals. In the
179
words of the official from the Secretariat, ’we ensure consistence between 
Presidencies’. 136
The secondary capabilities of the Secretariat in migration policies are mainly 
its role as an information provider and collector of statistics. On this dimension an 
inverse relationship between the capabilities of the Secretariat and the Commission 
can be observed. In an initial period, which lasted from 1993 until the Amsterdam 
Summit of May 1997, it was the Secretariat and not the Commission that received on 
several occasions the right to collect information on member states’ policies and to 
write reports on specific issues. In the second period the Secretariat was no longer 
responsible for providing this kind of information, and consequently this task was 
taken over by the Commission. A similar development can be observed with regard 
to the role of the Secretariat as a management office for data bases. The two main 
data bases prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, namely CIREA and CIREFI, were 
managed by the Secretariat (Council 1994e). Due to its intergovernmental nature, the 
Secretariat of the Article 18 Committee of the Dublin Convention was also located in 
the Council Secretariat (Convention 1997).
This development has also affected the role of the Secretariat with regard to 
Schengen cooperation. While before the entry into force o f the Amsterdam Treaty, 
the capabilities of the Secretariat as defined by secondary decisions have included the 
collection of information, this has come to a sudden end in 1999.137 As the previous 
section has shown, it was also in this area that the Commission took over the 
information gathering role. A noteworthy case is the SIS. As mentioned before, the
136 Interview 14, Desk officer, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
137 It should also be emphasised that the Schengen Secretariat has been integrated into the Council 
Secretariat and not into the Commission, Agence Europe, No 7202,17 April 1998: 4-5. The decision 
to integrate the Schengen personnel into the Council Secretariat has been made by the Council voting 
with qualified majority with a negative vote from France which insisted that the number o f posts 
exceeded the actual needs o f the Secretariat (Agence Europe, N o 7458, 4/5.5.1999: 15.) The 
integration has not only led to tensions between the Commission and Parliament both preferring an 
integration o f the Secretariat into the Commission, on die one hand, and the Council on the other. It 
has also led to tensions between the Council Secretariat and the Council since the Council’s Staff 
Committee feared that the new personnel would undermine the position o f long standing Council 
Secretariat officials. The Secretary General o f the Council Secretariat even suggested to let this row be 
decided by the Court o f Justice. In order to avoid such recourse to the Court o f Justice, the Schengen 
personnel was then integrated into the Council Secretariat as trainees only and not as officials. 
(Agence Europe, 12/13.4.1999:16).
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second generation SIS is managed by the Commission. However, the initial decision 
of the Schengen Executive Committee to award contracts for the study of 
establishing SIS II stems from April 1997, thus from a period prior to the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty. At this time, it was the Council Secretariat that 
administered the implementation of SIS II (Schengen Executive Committee 1997). It 
is only with regard to the SIRENE network, which sets up the communication 
infrastructure between national governments in the Schengen framework, that 
secondary decisions after the Amsterdam Treaty provide for explicit capabilities of 
the Secretariat. In two Council decision of December 1999 and March 2000, the 
Deputy Secretary General of the Council is appointed to negotiate on behalf of the 
Schengen states the contracts leading to a second generation SIRENE network and 
to administer the financial aspects of the tender procedures (Council 1999f; 2000b).
In the area of Middle East policies, the secondary capabilities of the Council 
Secretariat have played a greater role than in migration policies. This is due to the 
explicit ‘two pillar structure’ which characterises EU foreign policies. Examples for 
these capabilities are the establishment of three foreign policy units within the 
Secretariat. First, in 1996 the office of the EU Special Envoy for the Middle East 
peace process has been created, second, an EU Adviser for security issues has been 
appointed in 1997 and, third, with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, the office of the 
High Representative for the CFSP has been created.
It is quite noteworthy that secondary legislation in Middle East policies has 
mainly had the purpose o f providing for such new capabilities o f the Secretariat 
Thus, all Joint Actions on the Middle East between 1995 and 2001 deal exclusively 
with this issue. As a result, there has been a further institutionalisation o f policy 
making capacities at the EU centre beyond the first pillar Community sphere and the 
establishment of two parallel executive centres for EU foreign policies in Brussels, 
the one being located in the Commission the other in the Council Secretariat (Forster 
and Wallace 2000).138 The rationale behind this approach to strengthen the executive
138 It is on the one hand a ‘member states based structure* (Interview 5, Bertelsmann Foundation, 
Gutersloh, November 1999.). On the other hand, the new units ‘make a difference’. After all, the
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capabilities of the Secretariat in the second pillar can be understood when it is 
contrasted with the capabilities of the C om m ission in Middle East policies. Thus, the 
Commission is a collective actor separate from the Council and is equipped with a 
mandate to operate as the ‘guardian of the Treaties’. The Commission enjoys more 
autonomy than other agents, such as the Special Representative or the High 
Representative, who are politically responsible to the Presidency and institutionally 
located within the Council. Moreover, the yearly mandates of the Special 
Representative provide for much closer control of his activities than for the 
hypothetical case that the Special Representative’s office had been attached to the 
Commission.
The first Joint Action which provided for the creation of capabilities at the 
EU level dealt with the creation of the European Electoral Unit which had the task 
to observe the first Palestinian elections in January 1996. Notwithstanding the 
significance of this decision, the Electoral Unit has been a ‘one issue agent’ only and 
its mandate expired after the elections. In an attempt to permanently strengthen the 
political weight o f the second pillar as a counterweight to the C om m ission’s 
executive powers under the TEC, the Council then decided in November 1996 upon 
the creation of the office o f an EU Special Envoy for the Middle East peace process. 
His mandate has been limited to one year and has since then been prolonged five 
times, the last time being 2001. From an institutional perspective, the mandate of the 
Special Representative is interesting for two reasons. First, it underlines the 
importance of secondary delegation in EU policy making. Consider that no such 
office has been foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty, which in fact has been very 
cautious with regard to the centralisation of the CFSP. The creation of the office of 
the Special Representative was, in comparison with the creation of a Treaty base, less 
costly. As mentioned before, the institutional requirements for a Joint Action are 
significantly less than those for Treaty changes. As a result, Joint Actions are also 
under less public scrutiny and member states, which at Maastricht might have
Special Representative is ‘not a member state figure’ (Interview 6, MP, House o f Commons, London, 
May 2000).
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resisted such a move could enter more easily into institutional experiments. In any 
way, if need be, the mandate could also more easily be revoked than a much more 
solid Treaty base. Overall, the experiment seems to have worked satisfactorily from 
the perspective of member states since it was, finally, the Amsterdam Treaty that 
provided for an explicit Treaty base for the appointment of a Special Representative 
(Peters 2000).
The capabilities o f the Special Representative were gradually increased. 
Initially, he has had a mandate to establish links with the various ‘parties to the peace 
process’ in the region and on the international level.139 His mandate did also comprise 
the task to direcdy report to ‘Council’s bodies’ on his activities and the results of his 
work. This close linkage with the Council is also highlighted by the institutional 
anchoring of his office, which has since 1996 been permanently located within the 
Council Secretariat, although this has not been explicitly outlined in the various Joint 
Actions. Moreover, the Special Representative is politically responsible to the 
Presidency. While the mandate remained unchanged in 1997, a Joint Action of 
October 1998 provided for some widening in the scope of his responsibilities. Thus, 
the Special Representative should now also participate in the ‘EU-Palestinian Security 
Committee’, which was created in early 1998. Following the entry into force o f the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the mandate of the Special Representative underwent a 
reorientation with regard to political responsibility. While Article 3 o f the Joint 
Action of December 1999 does still render the Special Representative responsible to 
the Presidency, it also establishes an indirect responsibility to the High 
Representative via the latter’s role in assisting the Presidency. This new hierarchy 
within the Secretariat is further highlighted by Article 5 o f the Joint Action which 
stipulates that reports by the Special Representative will only be distributed to the 
Presidency or the Commission after they have been channelled through the office of 
the High Representative. Finally, the Joint Actions on the Special Representative’s
139 According to a member o f staff o f the Special Representative, it was easier to get accepted by 
Israeli and Palestinian officials than by Americans. *It is difficult to deal with them, they never call’. 
Interview 19, Council Secretariat, Brussels, July 2000.
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mandate do also provide for institutionalised linkages with the Commission, thus 
documenting the close cooperation between both actors on the ground.140 Thus, all 
Joint Actions on the mandate since 2000 state that ‘the management of the 
operational expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the Special 
Representative and the Commission’, thereby formalising the informal practice 
between both institutions which existed since 1996.
The second agent who has been equipped with executive capabilities is the 
EU Adviser on counter terrorism in the Palestinian Territories, whose mandate dates 
back to a Joint Action of April 1997, which since then has been regularly renewed. 
Also the EU Adviser is politically responsible to the Presidency and his main task has 
been to advise the Palestinian Police Force on counter terrorist measures and, since 
1998, to participate in the EU-Palestinian Security Committee. Following the entry 
into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU Adviser has, moreover, the chance to 
make recourse to an increased budget since a multiannual assistance programme of 
the EU for counter terrorist measures has been introduced with a total volume of € 
10 million. The mandate o f the EU Adviser, furthermore, calls for a coordination of 
his activities with the Special Representative as well as with the High Representative.
The High Representative has not been subject to an individual Middle East 
Joint Action but is mentioned, as has been shown, in the various Joint Actions since 
1999 as hierarchically superior to the Special Representative and the EU Adviser, 
thus providing for new communication channels within the Secretariat. This new 
relationship is well documented by the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean 
Region in which the role of the High Representative in the second pillar is referred to 
on equal terms as the Commission’s role in the first pillar. However, the Common 
Strategy does also document the somewhat experimental structure o f the Secretariat 
Thus, Article 25 o f the Common Strategy does not — opposed to the wording of the 
Joint Actions — render the Special Representative politically responsible to the 
Council or the Presidency but rather provide for political responsibility to the High
140 See chapter 7.
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Representative. Consider the different wording of both second pillar instruments. 
The Common Strategy states that ‘for the aspects of this Common Strategy falling 
within the CFSP ... the High Representative for the CFSP, supported by the Special 
Envoy .... shall assist the Council and the Presidency’. In contrast, the Joint Actions 
on the mandate of the Special Representative usually have the following provision: 
‘The Special Representative shall be responsible for implementing his mandate ... in 
consultation with the Presidency, assisted by the ... High Representative’. Thus, both 
documents state that the High Representative ‘assists’ the Presidency, yet there is a 
somewhat blurred institutional anchoring of the Special Representative. According to 
the Common Strategy his role is to support the High Representative, whereas 
according to the Joint Action his political responsibility is p rimarily directed towards 
the Presidency which he has to ‘consult’.
Provisions on committee control
All secondary decisions after the Amsterdam Treaty which provide for executive 
capabilities of the Commission with regard to the implementation o f migration 
policies contain provisions on committees which oversee the implementation. Given 
the reluctance of some member states to wholly communitarise migration policies, 
this seems to support Franchino’s argument that ‘the establishment of control 
procedures is also the result o f substantive issue-specific conflict’ (2000: 66). 
Therefore, he concludes, ‘more conflictual policy issues are invariably linked to their 
[i.e. control committees; SS] establishment’ {ibid.: 86).
Prior to the entry into force o f the Amsterdam Treaty, such committees were 
only put in place for those seven third pillar decisions in which the Commission 
managed the budget for specific programmes in migration policies. Two kinds of 
committee procedures have been set out for these financial decisions. In both cases 
the Commission has an autonomy for minor expenses, whereas above a certain 
ceiling the committee has a veto power on Commission proposals. Thus, first, those 
programmes which established administrative cooperation between the Commission 
and national ministries, namely the Sherlock and Odysseus programmes, require
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from the Commission to submit a draft annual programme to the committee which 
has to adopt this programme by unanimity. In case the committee rejects the draft 
annual programme the Commission must either withdraw it or present it to the 
Council where, however, unanimity is required for its adoption. In the Sherlock and 
Odysseus programmes, as well as for those funds earmarked for repatriation of 
refugees two committee procedures apply. On the one hand, for projects of less than 
€ 50,000 the Commission must only take ‘full account’ of the committee’s decision 
taken by qualified majority, i.e. the Commission is not bound by the vote. On the 
other hand, projects above that sum require a positive vote of the committee by 
qualified majority. Otherwise the project must either be withdrawn or presented to 
the Council which then decides by qualified majority.
With regard to the four other programmes, which establish EU funds for 
displaced persons, asylum seekers and refugees for the years 1997 to 1999 as well as 
the Kosovo emergency funds, three committee procedures are set o u t For 
programmes which comprise expenses of less than € 200,000 the Commission does 
not need to submit proposals to the committee and can implement these measures 
immediately. For those programmes which require a budget between € 200,000 and € 
1 million the committee votes with qualified majority on the Commission’s proposal. 
The vote of the committee does nevertheless not have any binding effect upon the 
Commission’s decisions and the Commission does only need to take ‘full account’ of 
the committee’s vote. Lasdy, for projects which require a budget o f more than € 1 
million, the Commission needs the support by a qualified majority o f the committee. 
If it fails to gain that support, the Commission must either withdraw its proposal or 
submit it to the Council which then decides by qualified majority. As opposed to first 
pillar comitology provisions, these decisions do not specify what happens if the 
Council fails to take a decision within the time limits set out by the secondary acts. In 
the first pillar, however, it is practice that the Commission can then start to 
implement the measure in question.
Since after the entry into force o f the Amsterdam Treaty migration policy has 
shifted to the first pillar, the five decisions which have been adopted since 1 May
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1999 and which refer to committee procedures all make direct reference to the new 
Comitology Regulation of June 1999 (Council 1999d). Table 5.2 summarises those 
comitology procedures which have since then been applied to the areas of migration 
and Middle East policies. There is a significant variation with regard to the ‘degree of 
freedom’ the Commission enjoys under these three procedures (Hix 1999: 42). Thus 
under the advisory procedure, the Commission is not bound by the opinion of the 
committee. In the management procedure member states’ representatives have 
greater influence on the activities o f the Commission but they need to gather a 
qualified majority in order to reject Commission proposals, i.e. a negative majority has 
to be formed. Member states have the greatest say over the Commission’s proposals 
in the case of the regulatory committee. Here, Commission projects need the support 
of a qualified majority in the committee in order for the Commission to proceed with 
implementation. If there is no such positive majority in the committee, the Commission 
can only hope that the Council fails in forming a qualified majority against the 
project. In that case the Commission can implement the project Note, that with 
regard to the aforementioned financing decisions prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
committee procedures closely resembled the provisions of the advisory committee 
for minor expenses, on the one hand, and the regulatory committee for all 
expenditure above a certain ceiling, thus a tighter form of committee control 
(Ballmann, Epstein and O ’Halloran 2002).
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Table 5.2: Committee procedures in migration policies after the Amsterdam Treaty
Procedure D ecision m aking process
Advisory 
(Article 3)
1. Commission submits draft measures to committee;
2. Committee gives opinion (within time-limit) to Commission, formal vote not 
necessarily required;
3. Member states can ask to have their opinion recorded in the minutes
4. Commission should take ‘utmost account5 o f the derision. It should inform 
committee on how it has taken the opinion into account.
Management 
(Artide 4)
1. Commission submits draft measures to committee;
2. Committee gives opinion (within time-limit) to Commission by a qualified majority;
3. Commission can implement immediately if  committee supports the measure or fails 
to adopt an opinion,
4. Commission has to refer the measure for a maximum o f three months if  the 
committee does not support the measure and in that case submit the measure to 
the Council;
5. Council can take a different decision within this three month period. If there is no 
decision the Commission can implement the measure.
Regulatory 
(Article 5)
1. Commission submits draft measures to committee;
2. Committee gives opinion (within time-limit) to Commission by a qualified majority;
3. Commission can implement immediately if committee supports the measure.
4. Commission must submit measure to the Council (and inform Parliament) if  the 
committee does not support the measure or fails to adopt an opinion.
5. Council can reject the proposal within three months. Then Commission has to 
present new proposal If there is no decision the Commission can implement the 
measure.
Source: Council 1999d
For first pillar decision in migration policies, the advisory committee had been put in 
place for the ERF and those decision of the ARGO programme on which there has 
been prior agreement between the Commission and the committee in the process of 
discussions on the annual work programme and concrete actions to be taken. 
However, these very decisions are overseen by a management committee, which can 
thus be described as the dominant committee procedure for issues relating to the 
ARGO programme. The regulatory procedure, at last, applies to EURODAC 
decisions and the execution o f policies by the Commission with regard to the 
uniform format for visas, on the one hand, and residence permits, on the other.
Finally, it has also been in the context of the Schengen cooperation that 
comitology procedures have been used to define the relationship between the 
Commission and the member states in the execution o f policies. This has been the 
case with regard to the SIS II which is developed by the Commission. Article 4 of the 
Council Regulation contains a detailed list of issues for the implementation o f which 
the member states have reserved an oversight role in the framework o f the regulatory
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committee. For all those decisions taken by the Commission which do not appear on 
that list, the management procedure will apply (Council 2001c).
The establishment of c o m m ittee  control mechanism does also characterise 
secondary decisions in Middle East policies across the pillars. With regard to the 
second pillar, the aforementioned Joint Actions on the establishment o f an EU 
assistance programme to counter terrorism in Palestine, provided for the 
establishment of a specialised committee of member states’ anti-terrorism experts — 
and Commission representatives — which has the task to advise the Presidency. The 
Presidency, however, according to Article 3 of the Joint Action has the final say over 
‘specific implementing decisions’. This procedure could, thus, be described as a ‘light 
advisory committee’ since the Presidency must consult the committee but is not 
bound by the vote nor does it have to take ‘utmost account’ o f the opinion o f the 
committee, such as is the case for the Commission in regular first pillar advisory 
committees.
The major area in the framework of the first pillar in which committee 
control applies, is the area of developmental assistance. When implementing MEDA, 
the Commission has to consult a specialised committee o f member states’ experts. 
The MEDA I Regulation of 1996 establishes such a specialised committee, the so- 
called MED Committee.141 The Regulation provides for a regulatory committee type 
procedure (ex-procedure Ilia), thus a relatively tight control system. Accordingly, the 
MED Committee decides by qualified majority on proposals by the Commission. If 
the committee supports the measure, the Commission can implement i t  However, if 
there is no qualified majority or if the committee fails to vote, then the measure has 
to be submitted to the Council, which must decide by qualified majority in order to 
allow for implementation. The Commission can implement the measure, if the 
Council supports the measure or has not acted within a period of three months. As is 
discussed at length in chapter 7, this tight control has led to various problems regards 
the implementation o f MEDA funds. Against this background, the MEDA II
141 See Chapter 7.
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Regulation of 2000 provides for the replacement of the regulatory committee by a 
management committee, in which the Commission’s degrees of freedom, as can be 
seen in Table 5.2, are higher. However, this relaxation of committee provisions must 
also be seen against the background of the intensity by which the MED Committee 
must be involved by the Commission in the implementation of MEDA assistance. 
Thus, the so-called ‘project circle’ comprises six institutional layers out of which the 
MED Committee is directly involved in five of them, thus ensuring that member 
states keep track of executive policy making by the Commission in all stages of the 
implementation process.142
On the sidelines — the role ofParliament, the Court o f Justice and the Court o f 
Auditors
The executive bias, which has already been quite pronounced with regard to the 
primary capabilities o f EU actors, is even stronger when secondary capabilities are 
considered. Provisions on secondary capabilities of Parliament or the Court of Justice 
are rare and, consequently, most capabilities of these two actor stem from the 
provisions of the Treaties. With regard to secondary decisions on Middle East and 
migration policies it should, however, be noted that secondary decisions on several 
occasions provide for an oversight and control function o f the Court of Auditors for 
those decisions in which the Commission has to operate with the EU budget.
Parliament has not received any new capabilities as a result o f secondary 
decisions in migration policies.143 References to Parliament in the various measures 
do only emphasise its ‘right o f information’. Thus, prior to the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty three out of the seven financial measures, namely the Sherlock, 
Odysseus and Kosovo programmes, state that the Commission must forward its 
yearly evaluation of these programmes to both the Council and Parliament. 
Additional to that, the Odysseus programme goes a step further than Sherlock and
142 See chapter 7.
143 O f course, Parliament has been involved in the decision making process in all first pillar secondary 
decisions in migration and Middle East policies due to its role as one o f the two legislative chambers 
o f the EU. See chapters 6 and 7 on Parliament’s role in legislation.
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demands from the Commission to inform Parliament also about the decisions taken 
within the committee which oversees the functioning of Odysseus and to report back 
to the Council on Parliament’s view. Since the entry into force o f the Amsterdam 
Treaty the light o f information appears on a regular basis in most secondary 
decisions both with regard to migration policies and Schengen cooperation. Thus, 
mid term reports or evaluation reports by the Commission are forwarded to Council 
and Parliament with regard to the ERF, EURODAC, minimum guarantees for 
temporary protection, the ARGO interministerial cooperation programme as well as 
the development of SIS II. Moreover, with regard to the activities o f the Central Unit 
of EURODAC, Parliament is also kept informed about the way in which the 
Commission aims to ensure data protection with regard to the information stored in 
the U nit
In Middle East policies Parliament has some minor additional capabilities 
both in the first and second pillars. There have been references to Parliament in the 
first two Joint Actions on Middle East policies. In 1994, the Joint Action in support 
o f the peace process announced that if there will be Palestinian elections, as foreseen 
by the Declaration o f Principles between Israel and the PLO, that Tarliament will be 
invited to participate in those arrangements’. This has been the case one year later 
when the Council decided in a Joint Action that out of the 300 members o f the 
European Electoral Unit 30 will be members of the European Parliament. With 
regard to the first pillar, it has been one of the side effects of the new generation of 
Association Agreements that, for the first time, Parliament has been acknowledged as 
an institutionalised actor in bilateral relations. Thus, Article 74 demands from the 
Association Council to facilitate ‘cooperation and contact between the European 
Parliament and the Knesset*. This interparliamentary dialogue does also exist at the 
multilateral level o f the EMP and already four interparliamentary forums were held, 
in which representatives o f all 27 national parliaments and the European Parliament 
participated. Against the background of this institutional arrangement it is quite 
telling that interparliamentary cooperation in the framework of the EMP is not at all 
mentioned in secondary Council acts but only an the conclusions o f the various
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Barcelona follow up conferences. For example, the Common Strategy on the 
Mediterranean Region does not contain a single reference to the European 
Parliament or to interparliamentary cooperation.
Finally, secondary decision in Middle East policies provide for the right of 
Parliament to be informed about implementing decision o f the Commission in 
developmental assistance measures. Thus, the MEDA Regulations stipulate that 
Parliament must be regularly informed by the Commission about the implementation 
o f assistance and that Parliament, together with the Council, does also receive the 
yearly implementation reports by the Commission.
Even more meagre are the references to the Court of Justice. As Guiraudon 
has argued, this ‘circumscribed role o f the ECJ is testament to its influence in other 
areas of European integration and its expansive jurisprudence on the free movement 
of workers’ (2000: 262). In the entire migration policy acquis since the Maastricht 
Treaty both with regard to EU and Schengen cooperation there is no single reference 
to the Court of Justice, save the Association Agreement for Iceland and Norway to 
the Schengen acquis. Articles 9 and 10 of this agreement lay down the rules for the 
involvement of the Court o f Justice. Thus, if a request for a preliminary ruling 
reaches the Court of Justice regarding the application of the Schengen acquis in the 
member states, the governments of Iceland and Norway are allowed to submit 
written opinions to the Court of Justice on the pending issue. In secondary acts of 
the Council in Middle East policies there is no reference to the Court of Justice.
While Parliament and the Court of Justice did, thus, not gain much from 
secondary decisions, this is not true for the Court of Auditors. While there is no 
direct reference to the Court o f Auditors in the Treaties’ provisions on foreign and 
interior policies, several secondary decisions provide for additional capabilities o f the 
Court o f Auditors. Thus, the Court of Auditors has been entitled to implement 
audits on the management o f the EU budget by the Commission in the case of the 
Sherlock and Odysseus programmes, the Kosovo emergency funds as well as the 
ARGO programme. Also with regard to the Schengen cooperation financial audits 
have been established with regard to the management by the Deputy General o f the
192
Council Secretariat of the SISNET project. Articles 47 and 48 of the Council 
Regulation provide for the auditing of the account, which is managed by the 
Secretariat, by the Court of Auditors.
The Court o f Auditors does also have capabilities in foreign policies. 
Consequently, it has been referred to in the Joint Action on support for the 
Palestinian elections, where it was given the right to control the expenditure of the 
European Electoral U nit Also, in the framework of Israeli-EU scientific and 
technical cooperation, the Court of Auditors was given the right to pursue financial 
audits in Israeli research organisations which participate in the Fifth Framework 
Programme. Finally, the MEDA Regulations provide for an auditing of the aid 
projects implemented by the Commission and do also encourage the Commission to 
take the findings of reports by the Court of Auditors into consideration when 
implementing its policies.144
Conclusion
The insights of this chapter on secondary capabilities of EU actors build upon the 
prior analysis on their primary capabilities. Responding to the functional dynamics 
stemming from the centralisation of macro political stabilisation policies, both 
foreign and interior policies are subject to a ‘partial Communautarization,, the former 
policy area with an explicit emphasis on the pillar structure, the latter, since the 
Amsterdam Treaty, with a mixture of first and third pillar rules under one 
institutional umbrella (Kostakopoulou 2000). This hybrid institutional design of both 
areas has also affected the secondary capabilities of EU actors. On the basis of this 
observation, the leading questions, which have been introduced at the very beginning 
o f this chapter, can now be tackled with some tentative conclusions.
First, what is the relationship between primary and secondary capabilities? 
Secondary decisions on Middle East and migration policies have, as a general rule, 
contributed to foster and, on some occasions, even to increase the capabilities o f EU 
actors in both areas which stem from primary delegation. Applying a demand and
144 See chapter 7.
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supply perspective can only partially help in understanding why this has been the case 
(Pollack 1997). This is, because the question arises why member states’ principals 
have not already in the Treaties delegated these additional capabilities to EU actors. 
It is argued here, that the different majority requirements relating to Treaty reforms, 
on the one hand, and secondary Council acts — both by unanimity and by qualified 
majority - on the other, account for this variation. A second reason for the delegation 
o f additional capabilities to EU actors, however, pertains to the manifold linkages 
between the pillars in the implementation of concrete legislative acts in Middle East 
and migration policies. Due to these overlaps and due to the emphasis on first pillar 
policies and instruments in both areas, the capabilities of EU actors within the two 
hybrid institutional regimes were fostered by secondary decisions.
Second, what kind o f secondary capabilities do EU actors have and are there 
differences between them? Here, a pattern, which has already been observed in the 
previous chapter, becomes again visible. Thus, when looking at secondary capabilities 
o f EU actors, the power gap between the EU executive and the other branches of 
government becomes even more obvious. An interesting exception to this rule, 
however, are the references to the Court of Auditors in secondary decisions. In a 
sense, this follows Pollack’s verdict that ‘almost every EC institution besides the 
Commission plays a role in monitoring and checking the Commission’s behaviour’ 
(ibid.: 116). The advantage, from the perspective of the executive, with a delegation 
of capabilities to the Court o f Auditors and not to Parliament or the Court of Justice 
is that the Court o f Auditors is much less subject to ‘shirking’ than these two other 
institutions. Nevertheless, the bulk of secondary capabilities which have been 
delegated in both areas were directed towards the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat The Commission is tightly controlled by member states’ committees in 
those areas in which it has taken over the main role with regard to the 
implementation of policies. Yet, it has to be noted that both in Middle East and 
migration policies committee control has slightly decreased over time, with greater 
emphasis on management committees, whereas prior to the Amsterdam Treaty 
regulatory committees did prevail.
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All this suggests, third, that the pillar structure continues to shape the overall 
capabilities of EU actors but it is doing so under the pressure emanating from the 
functional frame emerging from the centralisation of macro political stabilisation 
policies. This is the background against which the approach by member states to use 
secondary legislation in an attempt to iron out the major problems stemming from 
the two pillar structure of foreign and interior policies can be understood. Thus, the 
secondary decisions analysed in this chapter do indicate that the distinction between 
the pillars has decreased in between Treaty reforms as a result o f regular legislative 
acts, thereby challenging intergovemmentalist assumptions on these intervening 
periods in between IGCs. Notwithstanding this development, the nature o f change in 
EU foreign and interior policies continues to be incremental and only gradually 
might the ^{Uarised’ structure of the Maastricht Treaty merge into a single 
institutional arrangement in better fit with the functional indivisibility of macro 
political stabilisation policies.
This chapter has also shown that in both areas there has been a huge amount 
of secondary decisions. Ten years after the integration of foreign and interior into the 
EU framework, these two areas have become an integral part of the EU polity and 
legislation has given substance to the functional frame which structures policy 
making in the two areas.145 However, this should not avert attention from the 
shortcomings relating to both policy areas. Decision making still suffers from a lack 
of political leadership and a subsequendy strong emphasis on first pillar areas in the 
case o f foreign policies and on budgetary programmes and projects in both areas. 
Overall, this lack of leadership has until today prevented the emergence of 
comprehensive foreign and interior policies at the EU level that would set out a 
strategic direction, comparable to a governmental programme. As W Wallace notes, 
‘incremental policy-making, learning by doing rather than strategic choice, marks 
both these major policy domains’ (2000: 535). The primary and secondary capabilities
145 A Council officials has, during an interview for this thesis, presented a table with data on all 
documents with which the Council Secretariat had dealt with from the Maastricht to the Amsterdam 
Treaty. 21 per cent related to the third pillar and 15 per cent to the second pillar. Interview 26, 
Director, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
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of EU actors appear in a different light when confronted with this lack of strategic 
underpinning. Indeed, as this chapter has shown, EU (executive) actors certainly do 
have capabilities, but the question remains, what for? ‘Given the fact that there is no 
common vision, civil servants are deprived of dear direction* (Niessen 1996: 62).
To conclude, for the time being a key characteristic of EU foreign and 
interior polides is that the institutional equilibrium in both areas has somewhat 
stabilised in relation to the functional indivisibility of macro political stabilisation 
polides and that the system is flexible enough to accommodate gradual reforms 
through day-to-day legislation. With the integration of foreign and interior polides 
into its political system the EU has nevertheless entered into new territory. For 
Europhils, the good message ten years after the Maastricht Treaty, thus, is that the 
costs of reversal have become very high (Pierson 2000). This is, however, also true 
with regard to radical changes in the other direction, which might calm those who 
prefer both areas to be tightly linked with national institutions. However, the 
precedent has been set, the EU has its own foreign and interior polides and EU 
actors have taken over considerable capabilities with regard to policy making in these 
two areas. By drawing from historical examples of US politics, Kiewiet and 
McCubbins have shown convincingly what unforeseeable consequences the 
delegation to new actors o f seemingly piecemeal powers might entail. Thus, events 
which ‘present no serious problems [...] until long after the precedent had been set’ 
have finally unfolded when ‘times changed* (1991: 10). We do not know when times 
will change and, certainly, the future shape of EU foreign and interior polides 
remains open. But the analysis of the primary and secondary capabilities o f EU 
actors provides some indication that the process of centralisation o f EU macro 
political stabilisation polides, albdt with slow speed, is already well under way.
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C h a p t e r  6
The Policy Preferences of E U  Actors 
The Divergence of Preferences
Introduction
EU actors are more than passive recipients of primary and secondary capabilities 
which have been delegated to them by member states’ governments. Making use of 
these capabilities they did not only develop specific preferences on the two areas but 
also actively channelled these very preferences, as part of their day-to-day 
involvement in EU foreign and interior policies, into the policy making process. This 
chapter sets out to account for the way in which the preferences of the Commission, 
Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors and the Council Secretariat 
have developed with regard to foreign and interior policies, in general, and Middle 
East and migration policies, in particular. This chapter inter alia tackles the following 
questions.
How can the emergence and shape of preferences of EU actors in the two 
areas be explained? What is the relationship between these preferences with both the 
functional frame o f macro political stabilisation policies and the specific capabilities 
of each actor? Moreover, are preferences a stable or a rather dynamic phenomenon? 
To what extent do they converge or differ between the various actors? And, why 
should that be the case?
This analysis is based on two key propositions which both challenge those 
conceptualisations that impliddy assume self interested, (bounded) rational actors 
with fixed preferences (Moravcsik 1998; Dowding 2000). Thus, in this thesis 
preferences are not regarded as exogenously given. Instead, it will be shown that the 
preferences o f EU actors can best be understood against the background o f the 
functional characteristics of the specific policies they relate to. In other words, 
preferences are analysed as relational to a complex environment of which actors
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constantly have to make sense of. Moreover, preferences, as will be shown, are thus 
based not so much on rational choices but rather on functionally induced and 
contingent perceptions which actors hold on the two areas. Hence, this chapter also 
challenges the understanding of preferences as being fixed. The empirical data 
analysed reveals that the preferences of EU actors are quite dynamic, often unstable, 
and subject to changes over time.146 This does not exclude the appearance of lock-in 
effects regarding these preferences. Yet, lock-in effects should rather be studied as 
the result o f a temporary accommodation with the functional and institutional 
environment rather than as a permanent feature.
This chapter elaborates on the actor related dimension of the model 
presented in figure 2.2. Accordingly, macro political stabilisation policies set the 
frame within which both cross pillar institutions and actor preferences evolve. The 
preferences of EU actors in the two areas, which are constantly fed into the policy 
making process are, thus, in a much more dynamic relationship with the institutional 
surrounding than assumed by many institutionalist approaches. The patterns of 
interaction between national and European actors, which emerge out o f the interplay 
between these three dimension, will then be discussed in chapter 7. One of the key 
results stemming from the analysis o f this chapter is, however, that the preferences 
of EU actors in the two areas do not fit into a simple intergovernmental- 
supranational dichotomy. As much as EU actors perform quite different institutional 
roles, they also developed divergent preferences which cannot be subsumed under 
one integrationist heading.
146 The same applies to die preferences o f national governments, which are not analysed in this thesis. 
However, the same epistemology on contingent and dynamic preferences, which cannot be 
understood from a rational choice perspective, relates not only to EU actors but, o f course, also to 
other actors, including national governments. Thus, it is argued that also the preferences o f national 
governments in EU foreign and interior policies must be understood against the background o f the 
functional environment o f macro political stabilisation policies within which they are embedded. 
Indeed, the literature which focuses on the preferences o f member states in both areas reports 
regularly on such ‘embedded preferences’ o f national governments in both areas (Wallace and Wallace 
2000). This empirical observation is also integrated in propositions 1 and 2 as well as figure 2.2 in 
chapter 2. Thus, the functional features o f EU macro political stabilisation policies apply equally to 
EU and national actors engaged in policy making at the EU level.
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Divergent preferences ofEU  actors
The preferences of EU actors in Middle East and migration policies can be 
understood in their relation with the functional characteristics of foreign and interior 
policies. Thus, preferences are not given but are constructed against the background 
of the emerging functional frame of EU macro political stabilisation policies 
(Checkel 1999; Checkel and Moravcsik 2001). This argument does not, however, 
imply that preferences are completely dependent upon policy functions. Yet, these 
functions render certain sets of preferences more likely than others and help to 
identify the individual and often divergent nature of preferences of EU actors rather 
than implicitly assuming an allegedly institutionally determined division between 
‘intergovernmental’ and ‘supranational’ preferences (Moravcsik 1998).
The analysis of preferences of EU actors in foreign and interior policies 
reveals four main insights. First, all actors share the characteristic that they had to 
develop their individual preferences on the two areas against the background of the 
formative period o f EU foreign and interior policies following the Maastricht Treaty. 
With little institutional and policy history on stock, this early period can, therefore, 
also be understood as a period of preferencesformation in which EU actors had to draw 
for themselves a ‘picture’ o f the two fields.147 Lacking both solid ‘institutional data’ 
and organisational experience, preferences in this period were primarily shaped by 
the functional requirements o f providing macro political stabilisation for the EU 
polity. This explains the initially quite similar preferences o f most EU actors. This 
observation directly lends attention towards the second main argument which relates 
to the dynamic nature of preferences. Learning processes as part of day-to-day policy 
making as well as constant adaptation to the emerging functional frame of both 
areas, required from EU actors to regularly adjust their preferences. This adaptation 
went hand in hand with a lock-in effect Thus, the preferences o f EU actors
147 There is, o f course, an EC history for both areas prior to the Maastricht Treaty. However, only in 
1993 were both areas formally integrated into the ‘single institutional setting’. Thus, while EU actors 
had already developed specific perceptions on the two areas prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty 
allowed these perceptions to unfold within and become directed towards a functionally unified setting, 
albeit an institutionally highly fragmented one.
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stabilised as a result o f constant interaction with both EU and national actors in the 
policy making process, an accommodation with the own institutional role as well as 
the establishment of internal organisational structures. Due to the quite different 
institutional roles and experiences in the policy making process it can, finally, be 
shown that the orientations of EU actors vary considerably between them. It is this 
divergence o f orientations which will particularly be emphasised throughout this 
chapter.
Preferences in the two areas are much less driven by a supranational- 
intergovernmental divide, that would put EU actors in collective opposition to 
national governments, but rather by a complex accommodation process during 
which EU actors — and also national governments - develop and constantly adapt 
their specific orientations (Tallberg 2002: 33-36). This does not exclude a shared 
interest of EU actors in supranational policies and institutions in foreign and interior 
policies but does also emphasise the divergence which often prevails over these 
integrationist tendencies when looking at specific policy areas. Therefore, the 
dominant executive-control dimension of foreign and interior policies, which has 
already been identified in the previous chapters, also leaves its mark upon the 
preferences of EU actors. Consequently, the preferences o f the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat are strongly related to the executive roles performed by both 
actors. Being part of the same ‘epistemic community*, subject to similar and shared 
learning exercises and in constant professional exchange with each other and 
member states* governments, the preferences of both actors reveal important 
similarities (Richardson 1996b; Sebenius 1992).148 These executive preferences can then 
be differentiated from the controlpreferences o f Parliament, the Court of Justice and the 
Court o f Auditors, without ignoring that in both subgroups each actor has again 
developed individual preferences which are closely linked to its respective 
capabilities.
148 Officials from the Council Secretariat and the Commission confirmed in various interviews that 
they have a regular and permanent exchange. They also know each other personally. Officials from 
both institutions, however, confirmed that they hardly ever meet their counterparts in Parliament.
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In sum, this chapter argues that the preferences o f EU actors have to be 
understood against the background of the functional characteristics o f macro 
political stabilisation policies and it is within this context that EU actors developed 
their individual orientations. While the shared preferences in favour o f further 
communitarisation of both areas do indeed lead to some convergence, this trend is at 
the same time countered by a divergence of preferences between EU actors on the 
basis o f their divergent capabilities brought about by the specific functional features 
of macro political stabilisation policies.
This chapter breaks down the analysis of preferences into three main 
categories. It firstly looks at the polity orientations of EU actors in Middle East and 
migration policies, thereby exploring how these actors have developed specific 
‘lenses’ with the help of which they observe the two areas. It will be asked what kind 
of objectives they have in both areas, what kind of action they propose for pursuing 
these objectives and how these objectives are subject to change and adaptation. In a 
second step these orientations are then put in context with their wider normative 
orientations in foreign and interior policies and, in particular, the long term 
perspectives held by EU actors on these two areas. Therefore, the proposals of EU 
actors for institutional reform, as they were tabled during the 1996 and 2000 
Intergovernmental Conferences as well as during the current Convention, are 
analysed. Finally, this chapter looks at the internal structures o f each actor in foreign 
and interior policies in an attempt to detect how they have responded to the 
organisational requirements stemming from the centralisation o f macro political 
stabilisation policies. The first part analyses the preferences o f executive actors, 
starting with the Commission, followed by a study on the preferences o f the Council 
Secretariat. Accordingly, the second part accounts for preferences o f executive 
‘control actors’, namely Parliament, the Court o f Auditors in Middle East policies 
and, finally, the Court of Justice in migration policies.
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Formation, adaptation and stabilisation o f preferences
The considerable degree of variation in the preferences o f EU actors towards foreign 
and interior policies, in general, and Middle East and migration policies, in particular, 
has been shaped by the different roles performed by EU actors in macro political 
stabilisation policies. These differences between executive actors, on the one hand, 
and actors, which are controlling executive policy making, on the other, should, 
however, not lead to the conclusion that within these two constituent groups 
orientations would be the same. As this chapter shows, the orientations o f the 
Commission are different from those of the Council Secretariat, while Parliament, 
the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors have also each developed unique 
orientations. Somewhat balancing this divergence, the functional dimension of macro 
political stabilisation has fostered convergence among EU actors regarding the 
shared long term objective of further centralisation of foreign and interior policies at 
the EU level. These similarities in orientations have, in particular, been visible in the 
early period after the Maastricht Treaty as well as in the proposals o f EU actors for 
Treaty reforms.
When in 1993 the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, EU actors already 
had developed orientations regarding both areas as part of their integration into 
policy making in EC foreign and interior policies at the Community level as well as 
their (marginal) roles in the intergovernmental EPC and Trevi cooperation. The 
Maastricht Treaty introduced an element of change, since EU actors — as well as 
member states - had to adjust these old orientations to the new functional and 
institutional environment of macro political stabilisation policies. In this early 
formative period, preferences on Middle East and migration policies were shaped by 
shared perspectives of EU actors on the functional need to establish ‘comprehensive 
frameworks’ for both areas at the EU level. As a result of adaptation to the their 
quite different capabilities, however, divergent orientations soon counterbalanced 
this partial convergence and led to a stabilisation o f different orientations, thus 
promoting the emergence of specific and individual identities. This accommodation 
process with the cross pillar institutions of foreign and interior policies is in
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particular reflected in the reform of internal organisational structures in both areas. 
With these reforms each actor responded to its own role in policy making, thus 
providing further mechanisms for a stabilisation of orientations.
The Commission’s orientations in Middle East and migration policies have 
shifted from an initially quite ambitious, political and unified perspective on both 
areas to a more technical and managerial approach. The Commission’s orientations 
reveal a strong focus on its entrenched first pillar capabilities and those policies, 
which it regards as being largely consensual among member states. Notwithstanding 
this accommodation of the Commission with the cross pillar design of both areas, its 
proposals for Treaty reforms reveal a tension between its short and long term 
orientations. The Council Secretariat’s preferences are a different matter and have to 
some extent be separated from those of other EU actors, since the Secretariat has 
not as autonomous a position in the policy making process as the other four actors. 
Its traditional function as an apolitical secretariat has, thus, characterised the 
Secretariat’s orientations from the outset Notwithstanding the persistence of these 
orientations, the politicisation of the Secretariat following the establishment of the 
offices of the Special Representative and the High Representative, has led to an 
emergence of more independent orientations that no longer can be defined as being, 
in a sense, the mere reflection of the joint will o f all 15 member states.
Parliament’s orientations reveal its high degree of autonomy from member 
states and from the implementation of policies by the executive, Commission and 
Secretariat alike. Consequently, the formulation of alternative policy agendas as well 
as fundamental criticism about the institutional features of cross pillar politics, has 
been the prime characteristic o f Parliament’s orientations, although a gradual 
decrease o f opposition to the policy agenda of EU foreign and interior policies can 
be attested. Moreover, Parliament has in both areas developed a specific expertise of 
providing a platform for representing the interests o f those affected by EU foreign 
and interior policies, namely third countries and third country nationals. The Court 
o f Justice issued two important judgements in the area of migration policies in the 
years under consideration and these judgements bring to the fore orientations that
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emphasise the comprehensive, functionally unified policy dim ension of both areas. 
The Court o f Auditors, finally, has been active in the area of foreign policies and 
scrutinised the administration in this area of EU funds by the Commission and 
member states. The orientations of the Court of Auditors do, as those of the other 
‘control actors’, reflect a much more comprehensive perception of the two areas than 
is the case for the Commission and the Council Secretariat
The Commission
The orientations of the Commission in Middle East and migration policy are linked 
to its executive powers. As a result o f the x-structure of executive relations in these 
areas (see figure 4.1), the Commission’s orientations reflect the shared perspective on 
these policies within the executive ‘epistemic community’ of member states, 
Commission and Council Secretariat (Haas 1992). The precise shape of these 
orientations, however, differ and has been the result o f a dynamic process 
characterised by a formation, adaptation and (dynamic) stabilisation of orientations 
(Luhmann 1984). Thus, also the orientations of the Commission in both areas were 
subject to significant changes. In the formative period following the entry into force 
o f the Maastricht Treaty, the orientations of the Commission in Middle East and 
migration policies were primarily based on a functionally unified understanding o f what 
the concept o f the single institutional framework entailed. Orientations revealed a 
quite ambitious and political approach based on the assumption that the single 
institutional framework would lead to comprehensive policies that stretch beyond the 
pillar confines and at the same time ensure a dominance of first pillar policies. This 
orientation, however, soon gave way to a more managerial and cautious approach. 
The Commission’s orientations shifted to a more pragmatic understanding which 
recognised that the cross pillar institutional setting implied significant limitations to 
its own executive capabilities. In this adaptation period the Commission’s 
orientations shifted to a more moderate focus on its entrenched first pillar powers, 
whereas in the second and third pillars emphasis was put on fostering its role as an 
‘associated member’ within the Council dominated working structures of these two
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pillars, thus acknowledging the lead taken in these institutional settings by member 
states. Notwithstanding this development, an uneasiness regarding the overall 
institutional design o f EU foreign and interior policies has been expressed by the 
Commission in the various Treaty reforms. This reveals an underlying tension 
between the long term normative orientations, on the one hand, and policy 
orientations, on the other. In sum, in both areas the Commission has developed 
individual orientations that can best be described as a preliminary acceptance of the 
political primacy of the Council and member states combined with a cooperative, 
administrative approach regarding its own role in the policy making process rather 
than political assertion.
Coinciding with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 
1993, the C om m ission published, in September of that year, two communications in 
which it outlined its agenda for EU Middle East policies. The Commission advocated 
an ambitious political perspective for EU foreign policies in the region, while the 
suggested instruments were mainly directed towards the ‘economic front*, thus those 
areas in which the Commission possessed considerable capabilities and prior 
experience (Commission 1993b: 1). As part of this political assertion, the 
Commission claimed to set out the guidelines for a ‘longer term approach* o f Middle 
East policies (Commission 1993a: 1). It suggested to centre EU Middle East policies 
on the promotion o f ‘economic integration* in the region, thereby developing 
‘regional cooperation and institutions (for example water and energy management)* 
(Commission 1993a: 4). Against the background of the EU*s own history, the 
Commission proposed a ‘progressive institutionalisation* of the Middle East (Peres 
1996: 104-111, d*Alancon 1994).149 It considered the Regional Economic 
Development Working Group, which includes officials from Israel, Palestine, Jordan 
and Egypt and whose permanent secretariat is based in Amman and which was
149 There are, o f course, very different readings to European history, in general, and European 
integration, in particular. Among these, the perspective o f the Commission is but one o f many 
contending views. This thesis does not elaborate on this interesting debate on regional integration. 
However, a few o f these intriguing accounts on European integration — old and new - should be 
mentioned on this occasion (Milward 1992; Caporaso 1998; Cram 1996; Lindberg and Scheingold 
1971; Mazey 1996; Schmitter 1971).
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initially directed by a Commission official, as the nucleus for such a creation of 
supranational working methods in the Middle East (Commission 1993a: 3; Peters 
1996).150 The focus on economic policies has been further emphasised by the 
Commission’s proposal to establish a huge financial assistance programme to the 
nascent Palestinian Authority, consisting of € 500 million aid measures for the period 
1994-98. With regard to the Union’s relations with Israel, the Commission suggested 
to give priority to an upgrading of the 1975 Free Trade Agreement and to equip the 
Commission with a negotiating mandate that covers ‘a wide range of sectors’ 
(Commission 1993b: 5). This linkage between regional institutionalisation, trade 
policies and financial assistance also characterises the Commission’s suggestions for a 
new design o f Mediterranean policies, with which the EU should pursue its strategic 
interests in the region. Thus, a network of Association Agreements that links the EU 
with all non member states in the Mediterranean both on a political and an economic 
level, the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by the year 2010, 
an assistance package of €  5.5 billion and support for regional integration are the 
main policies proposed by the Commission (Commission 1994b). In an attempt to 
foster its own central role in relations with the Palestinian Authority, the 
Commission stressed the need that the ‘Commission’s representative in the territories 
should take up his position shortly’ (Commission 1993b: 3). Indeed, the 
Commission, for political reasons, considered the opening o f this office as a key 
objective and engaged in month long negotiations with the Israeli authorities until 
the opening of a representative office of the Commission in East Jerusalem, with the 
main administrative task being to oversee the allocation and implementation of aid, 
was finally accepted.151
150 In the early years o f the peace process the Commission has regarded the multilateral track and its 
own impact on the Regional Economic Development Working Group as a key inroad for EU 
influence. Expectations on REDWG were high. Thus, the Commission was quite enthusiastic about 
the relaunch o f REDWG at a multilateral Steering Group meeting in Moscow in February 2000 
(European Union 2000). However, these expectations did not materialise and although REDWG 
formally exists until today it has not moved from institutionalisation to concrete joint action by Israel, 
Palestine, Jordan and Egypt (Agence Europe, No 6055,2 September 1993: 5-6)
151 Agence Europe, N o 6095,28 October 1993: 7.
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The political ambitions of the Commission were, however, soon challenged 
by both external as well as internal developments. While the political crisis of the 
Middle East peace process rendered the link between economic support and political 
influence less strong as has been assumed, the impact o f cross pillar institutions 
within the EU foreign affairs system brought to the fore the limits which the 
Commission faced in defining the overall direction of EU policies (Monar 1998 and 
2000). As a result o f this learning process, the Commission adapted its orientations 
and developed a more cautious assessment of its own role in policy making. The 
Commission acknowledged that trade and assistance measures are not a replacement 
for diplomatic foreign policies, thus an institutional arena of EU politics in which 
member states continued to take the lead. The Commission, consequently, concluded 
that although the Union’s economic involvement in the region ‘had a very important 
political result’ such as the political survival of the Palestinian Authority or the 
‘decisive [financial] support for modernisation’ in the Arab world, it nevertheless 
‘seems to have failed to achieve its original goals’ (Commission 1998b: 7). The 
vulnerability of its own ambitious agenda for Middle East policies from external 
developments also affected the Commission’s orientations on Mediterranean policies 
when it argued that the EMP *has increasingly faltered since it was based on the 
implicit assumption that the peace process would at least remain on track’ (ibid.: 14). 
While the Commission mainly blamed external factors, such as Israeli closures as 
‘preventing the success’ of its policies, the modification o f orientations was also the 
result o f an adaptation to EU internal developments (ibid: 16). While somewhat 
defiantly arguing that economic policies were the main policy o f the EU whereas 
only ‘in parallel [...] the Union maintained its supportive complementary role’ on the 
political level, the Commission’s preferences in the area adapted to the recognition of 
an internal division o f powers which foresaw political guidance o f the Council and 
the pursuit o f diplomatic activities by the Special Representative and, later, the High 
Representative (ibid: 3; emphasis added). Thus, ‘diplomatically and politically’, the 
Union should — ‘complementary [...] to the US’ — be represented by the ‘Ministerial 
level and through its Special Envoy’ (ibid.: 22-23).
The adaptation o f orientations was mitigated by the Commission’s 
experiences within the executive system of EU foreign relations. On the one hand, 
this system guaranteed a permanent involvement of the Commission in policy 
making, for example in the working groups of the Council or the specialised Middle 
East working groups of the Special Representative.152 On the other hand, the 
Commission realised that the political dimension of foreign policies and the 
definition of overall objectives would not be its own task (Gomez 1998). This 
adaptation with its own cross pillar capabilities in foreign policies can be exemplified 
by the way in which the Commission was involved in the drafting of the Common 
Strategy on the Mediterranean region. Thus, the Common Strategy was drafted 
jointly by officials from the Council Secretariat and the Commission, the 
Commission taking the lead for those aspects related to the first pillar while the 
Secretariat was responsible for those devoted to the second pillar and the overall 
objectives.153 The Commission thus had a seat at the table but had to pay the price of 
accepting political guidance by the Council This adaptation has also affected the 
orientations of the Commission with regard to the EMP. N ot forgetting to 
emphasise its own pivotal role within the institutional structures o f the EMP, the 
Commission reluctantly consented with the political leadership of the Council in this 
cross pillar institutional setting. ‘The Common Strategy o f the European Union on 
the Mediterranean region was adopted to guide the policies and activities o f the 
Union’ (Commission 2000d: 5; emphasis added). This statement documents the 
adaptation of orientations to the functional and institutional features of macro 
political stabilisation policies. Whereas in the early period the C om m ission has 
viewed policies almost exclusively from the economic, first pillar perspective and has 
attempted to define a political agenda for EU Middle East policies, learning 
experiences within the cross pillar institutional setting of the double executive as well 
as an accommodation with the prerogatives of the member states and the Council
152 Interview 19, Advisor to Special Representative, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
153 While conducting the interviews for this thesis, several interviewees from the Commission and the 
Secretariat were in a permanent shuttle between the offices o f both institutions in order to prepare the 
last bits o f the draft Common Strategy.
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Secretariat on both the wider cross pillar political dimension of EU foreign policies 
and the more narrow second pillar policies, led to an adaptation of orientations 
towards a more cautious stance which devises for the Commission a rather 
administrative role mainly on the economic dimension.154
It is around this new understanding that the reforms of the internal 
organisational structures of the Commission must be understood. It was already in 
1996 that the Commission started a major restructuring process of its internal 
organisation in foreign policies in an attempt to foster its capabilities in this area. The 
suggested reforms relate to several layers. First, ‘the internal structures of the 
External Relations D G  were reformed and adapted to comply with those of the 
second pillar, inter alia via the creation of a separate CFSP Directorate and a 
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Division7 (European Parliament 2001 f: 
17). Second, in 1999 the Commission has merged the previously three foreign policy 
DGs into one foreign policy D G  (Allen 1998). Third, it has set up a cross-DG unit, 
named EuropeAid, that has the task to improve the implementation of assistance 
measures, thus the Com m ission’s main foreign policy instrument (Santiso 2002). 
Fourth, the Commission initiated a long term process of reforming the entire 
external service structures with the objective of establishing an ‘integrated External 
Service’ (Commission 2000c: 2). These new structures should guarantee that the 
Commission’s organisational structures, which initially were set up to ‘represent the 
Commission in trade negotiations and in some industrialised countries’, respond 
better to the ‘broad scope of EU external relations as well as the new profile and 
potential of CFSP’ (Commission 2001a: 2-3). The reform of the external service, 
which focuses mainly on an improvement in the coordination of policies between the 
Brussels headquarter and the more than 120 Commission delegations in third 
countries, in particular regarding aid management, documents both the adaptation to 
the cross pillar institutional setting as well as a shift o f orientation towards a stronger 
focus on its traditional first pillar capabilities. Thus, reform is defined as enabling ‘the
154 See further below on the preference o f the Commission to include the office o f the High 
Representative within the Commission.
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Commission to contribute at all levels to the CFSP. It also enables it to tailor its 
actions under the First Pillar so as to be coherent with the EU’s wider political 
objectives, which, however, are set by the European Council (Commission 2000c: 6). 
The reform of the external service includes, finally, a professionalisation o f internal 
structures. The Commission plans to establish structures for career planning within 
the Commission’s external service, regular alteration of staff between headquarter 
and delegations and the establishment of specialised training structures. While the 
reform proposals provide evidence for a stabilisation of orientations regarding its 
own role in EU foreign policies, they also indicate that the Commission concentrates 
on fostering its main capabilities in the first pillar rather than building up a political 
counterweight to the Council.
While it is true that on the dimension of executive policy making the
Commission has adapted to the cross pillar institutional setting, it did not entirely
refrain from proposing far reaching changes to the very structure o f the Union’s
foreign relations. Leaving its day-to-day orientations largely unaffected, the
Com m ission proposals during Treaty reforms reveal an underlying tension of these
orientations with the normative orientations held on the long term design of EU
foreign affairs. Thus, during the 1996 IGC the Commission fundamentally criticised
the cross pillar setting.
The very fact that two different working methods - the Community approach and the 
intergovernmental approach - coexist in the same Treaty is a source o f incoherence. 
Experience has confirmed the fears previously expressed on this subject. The single 
institutional framework which was supposed to ensure harmony between the various “pillars” 
o f  the Treaty has not functioned satisfactorily. The proper lessons have to be drawn 
(Commission 1995b: 2)
The reform proposal of the Commission did, however, not amount to a complete 
communitarisation of foreign policies. Rather than direcdy proposing institutional 
reforms, the Commission focused on the functional dimension of policies. It urged 
to tackle the ‘disappointing’ performance of the common foreign policy which was 
described as being ‘inherent in the existence of separate “pillars’” (ibid.: 69). 
Accordingly, the Commission and member states should foster the linkages between
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the pillars in an attempt to assure a better management of the two pillar architecture 
within the single institutional framework. By doing so, they should then concentrate 
on improving the effectiveness of policies. Thus, while emphasising the objective 
that ‘the Union must be able to present a united front’, the Commission did not 
propose major institutional changes, besides greater recourse to qualified majority 
voting and providing the Union with legal personality (Commission 1996). A similar 
reform perspective was then again put forward by the Commission in the 2000 IGC. 
It explicitly stated that all proposals work ‘on the assumption that the pillar structure 
will be kept* (Commission 2000b: 4). It was only in the framework of the current 
Convention, that the Commission became more explicit about its general criticism of 
the pillar architecture of EU foreign policies and called for an abolition o f the cross 
pillar institutional setting. Somewhat intricately, the Commission argued that in 
‘certain relatively new policy fields’, such as foreign affairs, ‘we need to create systems 
to agree and implement policy which reflect the effectiveness and legitimacy o f the 
Community method’ (Commission 2002a: 4). Regarding foreign policies, the 
Commission suggested a ‘stepwise institutional change’ that, ultimately would result 
in an exclusive usage of the Community method of decision making. The 
Commission proposed to introduce not only qualified majority voting in foreign 
policies but also to, gradually, provide the Commission with the sole right of 
initiative.155 As a first step in that direction, the Commission supported the idea to 
merge the offices of the High Representative and the external relations 
Commissioner into the office of a ‘Secretary of the European Union’ and proposed 
to institutionally locate the Secretary within the Commission. For that purpose the 
foreign policy services of the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the 
delegations should merge into a ‘single administration’. The Secretary should be 
appointed joindy by the Council and the President-designate o f the Commission. 
The right of initiative would rest with the Secretary, shared with member states
155 For Parliament’s role, die Commission was less concerned and pleaded for die introduction of 
consultation only. It should be noted, however, that in the area o f foreign policies also national 
parliaments are generally weaker than in other policy areas.
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during the transitory period, and at the end of this period solely with the Secretary - 
after a vote of the Council with an enhanced qualified majority. Moreover, the 
Secretary would also be responsible for representing the Union abroad and 
implementing common decisions (Commission 2002a).
The formulation, adaptation and stabilisation o f the Commission’s 
orientations in interior policies reveal many parallels to the aforementioned 
developments in foreign affairs. Thus, a similar adaptation process from an initially 
ambitious and political agenda, which was based on a functionally unified approach 
to migration policies, was replaced by a more managerial, issue-oriented attitude. This 
adaptation has been triggered by an accommodation with the constraints posed by 
the cross pillar institutional setting (Myers 1995). Notwithstanding the stabilisation of 
these orientations, the Commission continues to uphold its long term normative 
orientations for a complete communitarisation of this area.
In the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission’s 
orientations were guided by its ambition to develop a functionally coherent model 
with the help of which migration policies could become embedded within ‘a 
European area without internal borders’ (Commission 1994a: 23). Elaborating on a 
quite assertive understanding of its role in policy making, the Commission 
deliberately looked ‘beyond the existing work programme of the Union’, set by the 
European Council {ibid.: foreword). And, indeed, its political ambitions were 
reflected in the objective of ‘providing a general framework within which a European 
immigration and Asylum policy can be developed’ {ibid.: 5). This, ‘comprehensive 
approach’ was only marginally affected by considerations about the impact which the 
cross pillar institutional setting might exert on policies {ibid.: foreword). Quite to the 
contrary, the framework has been based on ‘die wisdom of a comprehensive multi­
disciplinary approach’, that combined three main policies which, if implemented, 
would have stretched across all three pillars {ibid.: 11). Thus, the Commission’s 
approach consisted o f reducing migration pressure through first and second pillar 
policies, controlling migration flows through first and third pillar measures and, 
finally, integration policies for legal immigrants through a combination o f first and
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third pillar policies. The Commission recognised that the realisation of this 
‘combination of policies [...] requires the co-ordination of traditional areas of 
activity, such as social policy, aspects of common foreign and security policy and 
trade, co-operation and development instruments as well as migration and migration 
management policies* {ibid.: 5). Nevertheless, the Commission was optimistic with 
regard to prospects of rapid implementation and argued that ‘the TEU brings all of 
these policies within a single institutional framework and therefore creates new 
possibilities for the development o f the comprehensive approach which is now 
required’ {ibid.: 5). Possible obstacles were not addressed and hence the Commission 
was also confident that the pre Maastricht approach of ‘approximation rather than 
harmonisation* could be overcome {ibid.: 9). Suggesting a far reaching transfer o f first 
pillar methodologies and concepts to this new EU policy area, the Commission 
argued that the overall objective now would be to ‘harmonise immigration and 
asylum policies* {ibid.: 20). In this early period after the entry into force o f the 
Maastricht Treaty, the orientations o f the Commission on migration policies showed 
little concern for the impact of the cross pillar institutional setting and were rather 
based on the assumption of a ‘Treaty obligation to co-operate within a single 
institutional structure* {ibid.: 2; emphasis added).
The political ambition to set out a ‘comprehensive* agenda for migration 
policies was, however, soon confronted with the complexities o f policy making in the 
area.156 In a process of adaptation to the cross pillar institutional setting of macro 
political stabilisation policies, the Commission adjusted its orientations and shifted to 
a more narrow focus on those parts of asylum and immigration policies which 
promised a realistic chance o f being adopted at the Council level (den Boer and 
Wallace 2000: 508).157 This adaptation is well documented in the way in which the 
Commission dealt with the application of ex-Article K.9 TEU, which provided for a
156 Note that the Council issued an official statement on the Commission communication. This is a 
difference to the two 1991 proposals o f the Commission on migration policies, which were not even 
discussed in the Council. This points to the argument that ov<er time the Commission was gradually 
accepted within the previously intergovernmental dub, Agence Europe, N o 5972,1 May 1993:13.
157 It was already with the Maastricht Treaty that the Commission announced that it will only make 
cautious use o f its (shared) right o f initiative in this area. Agence Europe, N o 6018,9 July 1993: 5.
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transfer of parts of migration policies from the third to the first pillar. Whereas in 
1994 the Commission regarded a transfer of migration policies matters quite 
positively and proposed to consider the application of Article K 9  ‘to asylum policies 
[....] in the light of experience’, the Commission shifted subsequently to a more 
cautious approach (Commission 1994a: 6). Thus, when readdressing the question of 
a transfer, the Commission concluded that the ‘article did not at present seem [...] to 
be the most appropriate instrument, not to say an impossible one* (Commission 
1995a). In particular, the Commission referred to the complex decision making 
procedures in the Council with regard to an application of ex-Article K.9. The 
procedure laid down is cumbersome and requires the Member States’ unanimous 
approval and ratification in accordance with their respective national constitutional 
provisions. In one Member State this means that a national referendum will 
inevitably be triggered if Article K 9  is invoked’ {ibid.). This adaptation to the 
incremental decision making procedures of cross pillar politics as well as of the 
political dominance of member states in this area led the Commission to readjust its 
orientations in migration policies towards a managerial, issue-oriented approach. The 
Commission ultimately acknowledged that ‘the JHA acquis [...] is different in nature 
from other parts of the Union’s acquis’ (Commission 1998a: 4). On the issue of 
policy making, the Commission stressed the need of ‘interinstitutional cooperation’, 
since in the area of migration policies ‘more than in others it will therefore be 
necessary to continue a constructive dialogue between the Member States and the 
Commission’ {ibid.: 3). It also qualified its own approach to making use of its right of 
initiative. Thus, the Commission ‘will, o f course, make use of its right of initiative, 
but in doing so it will set priorities which take account o f the timetable fixed by the 
Treaty itself rather than suggesting, as previously announced, a ‘comprehensive’ 
framework {ibid.: 6). No longer, finally, is harmonisation o f migration policies 
described as the objective but rather the goal ‘to develop more sim ilar approaches 
and closer co-operation’ o f member states {ibid.: 6). The Commission, thus, became 
aware of the ‘admittedly real difficulties of adjusting national approaches to these 
sensitive issues’ (Commission 2001b: 5). Self restraint and increased awareness of the
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constraints posed by the cross pillar institutional setting for autonomous action are 
the main characteristics of this adaptation period. Hence, ‘the Commission regards 
the design and implementation’ o f migration policies as a ‘joint effort with the 
CoundT and will only make use o f its ‘existing know-how, before developing specific 
know-how in areas in which hitherto the Commission had no formal powers’ 
(Commission 1998a: 10).
The stabilisation of these orientations can be exemplified by looking at the 
Commission’s approach to policy making in the aftermath o f the Amsterdam Treaty. 
The C om m ission no longer pursued an ambitious political agenda but rather had 
accommodated with a more managerial role within the dual executive. The political 
guidance o f the Council for the policy agenda in migration policies was accepted and 
the Commission pointed out that that in policy making ‘the starting point has to be 
the elements already endorsed by the European Council’ (Commission 2000a: 4). The 
shift towards a more managerial and less political definition o f its own role is well 
documented by the Commission’s focus on the scoreboard. Thus, the Commission 
defined its own role in this process as one of ‘implementing the necessary measures 
and meeting the deadlines’ (Commission 2000e: 3). It refrained, for the time being, 
from developing a ‘comprehensive’ agenda for migration policies. Indeed, by 
prioritising the management of the scoreboard, it does ‘not attempt any 
comprehensive coverage o f the potentially vast area of legislation’ as it was, for 
example, outlined in the 1994 communication on asylum and immigration 
(Commission 2000a: 6). The narrowing down o f its executive activities into 
predefined — and together with member states consensually agreed — bits and pieces, 
as they are entailed in the scoreboard, has shifted the Commission’s focus towards 
the mechanisms that would guarantee the proper functioning o f the various 
initiatives contained therein.158 This shift towards a greater emphasis on the short 
term perspective nurtured the Commission’s demand that the scoreboard, at least,
158 This is underlined by the importance the Commission attached to studying national interests prior 
to publishing the first scoreboard. In a torn: to all national capitals the responsible Commissioner thus 
explored the possibilities and constraints and only then did the Commission publish its own approach.
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‘must be sufficiently detailed and structured that precise targets to be reached by the
end o f each calendar year are clearly identified and visible’, thus reflecting the hope
that proper technical management would trigger off political dynamics at the Council
level (Commission 2000a: 5). Yet, actual experiences with the implementation of the
scoreboard made way to disillusion.
It would be satisfying to report to the European Council that the “pillar switch” has led to a 
greater sense o f urgency and flexibility than was the case before the Amsterdam Treaty came 
into force, particularly in the light o f the clear deadlines set at the highest political level 
Unfortunately, that is not yet the case (Commission 2001b: 6).
It should be mentioned that the Commission has not entirely abandoned its ambition 
to develop a ‘comprehensive* approach to migration policies. However, it has 
adjusted these orientations to the constraints posed by the cross pillar institutional 
setting of macro political stabilisation policies. Thus, for all measures, which go 
beyond the initiatives enlisted in the scoreboard and which entail a combination o f 
policies beyond the narrow legislative agenda of the scoreboard, the Commission 
came up with the concept of an ‘open method of co-ordination* (Tallberg 2002; 
Hodson and Maher 2001). The Commission envisaged that the open method o f 
coordination, as it was suggested for both asylum and immigration policies, would be 
managed by the Commission itself and, essentially, provide for the removal of certain 
(cross pillar) policies from legislation in order to establish, in the long run, non­
legislative, administrative ‘flanking measures and techniques for convergence* 
(Commission 2001c: 3; Commission 2001b). This method, which documents again 
the adaptation to more managerial orientations, should, by providing for 
administrative cooperation between the Commission and member states and regular 
exchange of information and reports, ‘provide the necessary policy mix to achieve a 
gradual approach to the development of an EU policy, based [...] on the 
identification and development of common objectives to which it is agreed that a 
common European response is necessary* (Commission 2001a: 5).
The Commission’s internal organisation in migration policies has changed 
fundamentally since the Maastricht Treaty and has gone hand in hand with the
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overall centralisation process in this area. Thus, in 1992 the Commission established 
a nucleus administrative unit on Justice and Home Affairs that was located within the 
Commission President’s office. This unit consisted of three officials only and was 
later slightly upgraded to a total staff number of five. Following the entry into force 
of the Amsterdam Treaty a DG for Justice and Home Affairs was established. Small 
staff numbers were, however, also in this new setting perceived by the Commission 
as a major hindrance for efficient action. Thus, the two units dealing with migration 
issues comprised a staff of ten officials with regard to free movement and borders, 
on the one hand, and 16 in the area of immigration and asylum, on the other. While 
the semi-communitarisation o f migration policies, as provided for by the Amsterdam 
Treaty, was perceived as ‘positive for us’, the personnel situation was depicted as 
putting the Commission in ‘an awkward position’.159 The almost exclusive 
concentration of the Commission on ensuring progress in the implementation of the 
narrow, albeit extensive legislative horizon sketched out by the scoreboard 
corresponds with the small number of officials working within the Commission on 
this agenda.
Despite the current accommodation of the Commission with its managerial 
role in migration policies, an entire communitarisation o f this area and, thus, the 
abolishment of the current semi-communitarised institutional setting, continues to be 
the long term preference of the Commission. Seen from that perspective, the 
Amsterdam Treaty reforms were only a first step away from the heavily criticised 
policy making processes under the Maastricht Treaty. During the 1996 IGC, the third 
pillar was described as being based on ‘outdated methods and resources’. The 
C om m ission criticised in particular the ‘ineffectiveness and the absence of 
democratic and judicial review’ and argued ‘that the best way of attaining all these 
objectives would be to transfer justice and home affairs to the Community 
framework’ (Commission 1996). There were, thus, three main demands from the 
Commission. Since ‘the unanimity requirement is probably the main reason why Title
159 Interview 45, Deputy Head o f Unit, Commission, Brussels, July 2000 and interview 25, Head of  
Unit, Commission, Brussels, June 2000.
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VI has proved ineffective’ the Commission proposed the introduction of qualified 
majority voting for all migration policy issue. Moreover, since legislation in this area 
‘directly affects individual rights’ it also requires — in opposition to foreign policies 
which ‘has to deal with fluid situations’ — the transfer of jurisdiction to the Court of 
Justice. Finally, communitarisation is also deemed necessary because ‘in complete 
contrast to foreign policy, where the same arrangements apply, the option of 
charging expenditure to the Community budget has not been exercised as it has 
proved impossible to secure unanimous agreement of the very principle o f using the 
Community budget in this area’ (Commission 1995b). During the 2000 IGC as well 
as in the current Convention, the Commission has been even more precise regarding 
its normative orientations. It proposes the introduction of an entirely 
communitarised institutional setting in this area, thus the sole right of initiative for 
the Commission, qualified majority voting in the Council on all decisions as well as 
across the board introduction o f the codecision procedure (Commission 2000a; 
2002a).
The Commission has undergone a noteworthy adaptation o f its orientations 
in Middle East and migration policies. As part of this process the Commission had to 
adjust its political ambitions to the limitations posed by the cross pillar institutional 
setting upon its actual impact on policy making. It should, however, also be noted 
that the incorporation o f the Commission into executive policy making across the 
pillars provides the Commission with the opportunity to develop skills and 
knowledge beyond the narrow confines of its main responsibilities. It is against this 
background, that the Commission’s approach to develop specific ‘labels’ for EU 
policies can be understood. Thus, the Commission attempted to develop ‘cultural 
frames’ for both Middle East and migration policies in a similar way as it has 
happened in the framework of the Single Market Programme (Fligstein and Mara- 
Drita 1996; Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002). If successful, the European dimension 
of particular policy area will be identified with these ‘cultural frames’ and inter alia 
foster the role of the Commission as an ‘indispensable’ actor within the institutional 
setting established for implementing these flames. Indeed, in both areas there exist
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strongly institutionalised, executive biased structures, which are built around such 
‘cultural fam es’ and which are strongly promoted by the Commission. In foreign 
policies, for example, the Commission reveals a strong focus on the frame of 
‘Barcelona’. In that context, the debate about who could rightly claim ‘ownership* on 
the EMP is an intriguing example for the Commission’s approach to become 
associated with such institutionalised frameworks. While some argue that the 
Barcelona process has initially been designed by the Spanish and French 
governments, in an attempt to establish a counterweight to the effects from Eastern 
enlargement, Commission officials are strongly insisting that the origins of 
‘Barcelona’ come from within its own ranks (Barbe 1998; Gomez 1998; Rhein 
1999).160 In a similar way, the Commission has associated itself with the concept of 
an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.
Council Secretariat
It is not apparent to analyse the preferences of the Council Secretariat as an 
autonomous variable. Given the traditional public invisibility o f the Secretariat, ‘it 
might be tempting to view the General Secretariat as nothing more than the notary 
o f the Council’. However, ‘this rather limited view would belie the reality of the 
situation’ (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 102). Indeed, also in Middle East and 
migration policies, the orientations of the Secretariat cannot be simply derived from 
knowledge about the interests of member states (Christiansen 2002). This section 
emphasises two features which structure the Secretariat’s orientations. First, it looks 
at those orientations which are derived from the ‘traditional’ role o f being a 
professionalised, facilitating secretariat of the Council. Second, it discusses the 
increase o f autonomy o f orientations which accompanied die centralisation process 
o f macro political stabilisation policies and the subsequent establishment of two new 
offices in the Secretariat in the area of foreign policies, namely the offices of the 
Special Representative and the High Representative.
160 Interview 34, former Head o f Unit, Commission, Brussels, Judy 2000.
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The traditional public invisibility of the Council Secretariat has, at least in the 
area of foreign policies, given way to a particular visibility. Media coverage o f the 
activities o f the Special Representative for the Middle East peace process since 1996 
and, after 1999, of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy has intensified significantly.161 But it was also within the Secretariat itself, that 
the establishment of these two offices was perceived as a significant change. An 
official dealing with the CFSP compared the new General Secretary of the Council 
with his predecessor and argued that ‘Solana is something completely new. Trumpf 
was invisible’. What was perceived as new was not only the personalisation in the EU 
foreign affairs systems as a result o f this institutional innovation as such, but also 
changes to the operating structures of the Secretariat in foreign policies. Thus, 
several officials from the Secretariat noted that there has been an increase of 
autonomy of the Secretariat One official from the Special Representative’s staff 
concluded that she was ‘not sure that member states understood this consequence of 
their decision’ to establish these two offices.162 Overall, the internal perception was 
that, due to these changes, the ‘role o f Secretariat is in flux’.163
These new features must, however, be distinguished from the continuity 
regarding the way in which the Secretariat still deals with many o f its traditional 
functions such as writing agenda notes, assisting the Presidency, suggesting 
compromise proposals, drafting Joint Decisions or cochairing working group 
meetings without attempting to acquire an autonomous role in the decision making 
process. These long established features guarantee a great degree o f continuity and, 
consequently, foster the solidity of the linkage between the Secretariat and member 
states (Forster and Wallace 2000).
Nevertheless, institutional innovation has also led to the emergence o f more 
autonomous orientations of the Secretariat in EU foreign policies. Yet, unlike the
161 Take, for example, the data base o f the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeiiung. The High Representative is 
cited from 1 May 1999 until the end o f 2002 in 642 articles. The Special Representative is referred to 
from 1996 until 2002 in 85 articles.
162 Interview 19, Advisor to Special Representative, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
163 Interview 14, Desk officer CFSP, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
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Commission, the Secretariat does not put in question the cross pillar design of the 
EU foreign affairs system but rather works on the assumption that it is the 
‘advantage* of the EU that the Commission is responsible for the first pillar and the 
Secretariat for the CFSP.164 The pillar division is, thus, not perceived as an obstacle 
for ‘coherent* policies but as a guarantor of the Secretariates newly acquired 
capabilities. It is against this background that the Secretariat, on a normative 
dimension, does not seek entirely harmonised foreign policies. The High 
Representative could, therefore, argue ‘that ours is a common foreign policy, not a 
single one’ (Council Secretariat 2002a: 3).
This cautious approach is nurtured by sometimes painstaking experiences of 
both the Special Representative and the High Representative in developing jointly 
with the member states common positions. The Special Representative, for example, 
must take these practical difficulties into consideration although they might hamper 
the effectiveness of his mandate. In the words of one adviser, ‘the main problem is: 
what messages he has to present. He cannot move without full support of member 
states, this reduces his speed’.165 While there is, thus, criticism about the cumbersome 
procedures of the CFSP, this view is balanced by the interest o f the Secretariat to 
maintain the two pillar design of foreign policies, which in turn allows the Special 
Representative and the High Representative to perform executive tasks independent 
from the Commission. This also explains why the Secretariat did not come up with 
proposals for overall Treaty changes in foreign policies. During the 2000 IGC, the 
Council Secretariat made suggestions for reforms but ‘none of them requiring an 
amendment o f the Treaties* (Council Secretariat 2002b: 2).
It is, however, not only with regard to Treaty provisions but also on the 
dimension of concrete policies, that the Secretariat puts less emphasis on institutional 
architecture than does the Commission. In Middle East policies this has, for 
example, supported the formation of quite divergent preferences o f the Secretariat
164 Interview 38, Desk officer CFSP, Council Secretariat, Brussels, July 2000. The interviewee was 
adding that the main actor within the Council, as far as Middle East policies were concerned, was the 
Special Representative.
165 Interview 19, Advisor Special Representative, Council Secretariat, June 2000.
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and the Commission about the priorities of action. While die Commission attempted 
to keep the EMP separated from current problems in the peace process hoping that 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not lead to a blockage o f the Barcelona 
structures, in which the Commission had invested considerable resources, the 
Secretariat was less concerned with such considerations. During the second EMP 
meeting of foreign ministers in Malta in 1997 the Special Envoy brokered a meeting 
between the Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy and PA chairman Yasser Arafat. 
This meeting was perceived by the Secretariat as a signal both for the increased 
diplomatic importance o f the EU and as a step to overcome the ‘artificial separation 
of Barcelona and the peace process’, the Commission considered this event as an 
infringement upon its own institutional terrain and ‘since then tries to keep the 
Special Envoy out o f Euro-med’.166 This ‘protectionisation, by the Commission of 
the EMP has met harsh criticism by officials from the Secretariat and was regarded as 
being detrimental to the overall strategic objectives of the EU while serving the 
institutional interests o f the Commission only (Peters 1998).167 Since the Secretariat 
shows little interest either in sustaining a particular institutional frame o f EU Middle 
East policies or in entrenching into Commission prerogatives in the first pillar, its 
orientations are mainly directed towards die diplomatic arena. Both the Special 
Representative and the High Representative regard their role as an open ‘talking 
mandate’ rather than as being embedded in a particular institutionalised setting.168 
The diplomatic initiatives o f the Special Representative and the High Representative 
have affected the EU internal equilibrium in foreign policies. While both emphasised 
their close relationship with the member states and accepted the latter’s prerogatives 
in the second pillar, a diplomatic assertion from within the Council Secretariat can 
also be observed. Thus, an official from the Secretariat pointed out that some 
‘member states do not push for a political role o f the EU’ in foreign policies. Yet, it 
is this political role which the Special Representative and the High Representative
166 Interview 31, Advisor Special Representative, Council Secretariat, July 2000.
167 Interview 31, Advisor Special Representative, Council Secretariat, July 2000.
168 Interview 31, Advisor Special Representative, Council Secretariat, July 2000.
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repeatedly claimed to represent169 Both the Special Representative and the High 
Representative have on several occasions referred to themselves as the people behind 
the single EU telephone extension Henry Kissinger always asked for. *The EU now 
has a phone number’ (Council Secretariat 1998). Even more than that, only one 
person picks up the phone and the EU now speaks with ‘one voice’ (Council 
Secretariat 2002a: 3).
The orientations o f the Secretariat regarding its own role in international 
politics complemented this ‘one voice* perspective. Thus, visible acts o f diplomacy as 
well as formal and informal contacts with third parties are perceived by Secretariat 
officials as the key elements of EU Middle East policies pursued by the Special 
Representative or the High Representative. The acceptance by Palestinians, and 
surprisingly, by Israel and the US, o f the Special Envoy to be actively involved in the 
1997 Wye River Agreement was repeatedly cited as one of these diplomatic successes 
which documented the ‘advantages of complementarity* of US and EU approaches 
to Middle East policies (Perthes 2002b: 52).170 Similarly, the participation o f the High 
Representative in the Mitchell Commission or the Middle East quartet could be cited 
as such examples o f diplomatic assertion. Being represented with ‘one voice* also 
allowed the Special Representative and the High Representative to develop personal 
relations with actors from the US and the Middle East. Officials from the Secretariat 
perceive this as an important value added of their own activities and contributing to 
the overall effectiveness o f EU policies. In Middle East policies, they highlighted the 
intense contacts with the Palestinian Authority. Thus, an advisor to the Special 
Representative pointed out that — prior to the A1 Aqsa intifada — ‘every second week 
he [the Special Representative; SS] meets Arafat Our asset is access to Arafat* and we 
‘get a lot of information from the PA*.171
Less visible than these meetings between Middle Eastern politicians and the 
Special Representative, but not necessarily less efficient, are the diplomatic initiatives
169 Interview 19, Advisor Special Representative, Council Secretariat, June 2000.
170 Interview 31, Advisor Special Representative, Council Secretariat, July 2000.
171 Interview 19, Advisor Special Representative, Council Secretariat, June 2000.
223
of the EU Special Advisor who is responsible for security relations with the Israeli 
army and the Palestinian security forces. Regular personal contacts between the 
Security Advisor, who has a professional army background, with his Israeli and 
Palestinian counterparts and mediation efforts, have paved the way for an ‘informal 
EU involvement’ on the security dimension of the conflict. This is noteworthy, since, 
in public statements by the Israeli government such an involvement of the EU is 
rejected (Economic Cooperation Foundation 2002: 22). The professional, issue 
oriented approach of the Special Advisor has convinced an initially quite sceptical 
Israeli army establishment of the usefulness of EU involvement. This approach has 
been contrasted with — in the Israeli perspective — less successful public shutde 
diplomacy o f the Special Representative.172 A vivid description o f this secretive 
approach was given by the Special Advisor himself, when referring to his 
contribution to the implementation o f a cease fire after a Palestinian suicide attack in 
Israel
It was a process that we did on a daily basis. I went down to see the [Palestinian] security
leaders in order to deal with particular security problems, then went back to Arafat every night
with a list o f problems, and then returned to the field with Arafat’s endorsements/instructions.
Was a very time-consuming effort’ {ibid.: 2)
The establishment of the offices of the Special Advisor, the Special Representative 
and the High Representative has not only led to an adaptation o f the orientations of 
the Secretariat but has also triggered organisational adjustment Prior to this 
institutional change, Middle East policies were, on the Council level, exclusively dealt 
with by the Middle East and Maghreb-Mashrek working groups, in which officials 
from the Secretariat performed their ‘traditional’ administrative tasks (Regelsberger 
1997). Parallel to these working groups, the Special Representative has set up two 
autonomous task forces on Middle East issues. These task forces, on water issues 
and refugees, are chaired by an official from the Special Representative’s unit and
172 Interview 47, former Israeli army official, Berlin, November 2002. See also about the EU Special 
Advisor, a British national, the article ‘Our man's lonely search for a Middle East ceasefire: MI6 agent 
uses skills honed in Belfast to woo Palestinians’, Ewen MacAskill, Tuesday September 3, 2002, The 
Guardian.
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cochaired by the Commission (Peters 2000). They have the objective to develop 
proposals for post conflict concepts on these two issues, but, in practice, serve the 
purpose o f providing a ‘think thank* for die Special Representative on Middle East 
policies at large. The bulk of the budget of these task forces is spent on expert 
briefings and consultants* reports.173 According to officials from Directorate General 
E  (CFSP), the Special Representative has been successful in shifting the agenda 
setting power within the Council away from the ‘traditional* CFSP working groups 
into these task forces.174 The considerable size of his unit has been jealously referred 
to by officials from other (CFSP) units.175
In addition to this internal reorganisation of the Council Secretariats 
structures, three other new institutional structures, on the bilateral level, are worth 
mentioning. Thus, the EU-Israel Forum in Tel Aviv, its first chairman being an 
advisor to the former Prime Minister Netanjahu, has the task to provide information 
about the EU in Israel and to initiative debates about bilateral relations.176 Largely 
unrecognised in Europe, this debate has gained momentum in recent years and led to 
intense discussions in the Israeli media, academia and politics — with the active 
participation of the EU-Israel Forum - about the future relationship between Israel 
and the EU, inter alia discussing the issue of a possible membership (Schael 2002).177
173 Interview 31, Advisor Special Representative, Council Secretariat, July 2000 and Interview 19, 
Advisor Special Representative, Council Secretariat, June 2000. The work of the task forces is covered
from the CFSP budget. It is a small budget o f approximately € 60,000 which is mainly spent on
reports.
174 Interview 38, Desk officer CFSP, Council Secretariat, July 2000.
175 Interview 14, Desk officer CFSP, Council Secretariat, June 2000.
176 The non acceptance o f the EU as a ‘player* in Middle East polices by the Israeli government is 
often referred to as a major hindrance for a greater role of the EU in the peace process. Yet, the story 
o f the EU Special Advisor seems to tell another story. While it is true that the current Israeli 
government has been very critical o f the EU, reflected in Prime Minister Sharon’s dismissal o f the 
usefulness o f the Quartet, previous governments have been more open towards EU involvement 
Moreover, even in the current government alternative voices can be heard. Thus, the former Israeli 
foreign minister Netanjahu has surprised the EU by discussing with Italian officials a possible EU 
membership o f Israel In a briefing in the German foreign ministry the author o f this thesis has been 
asked about his opinion on this issue and what ‘the Israelis have in mind with the Italians’. Largely 
unobserved from European officials, a lively debate has emerged in the last two years in Israel 
discussing the pros and cons o f a closer alliance with the EU, even debating pros and cons o f  
membership. This debate does not fit into the simple picture o f  Israeli opposition to the EU (Tovias 
2003). For more on this debate see also Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2002a; 2002b and 2003.
177 Already in 1993 the Israeli Foreign Minister Peres suggested an associate membership o f Israel in 
the EU, Agence Europe, no 6116.
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Second, the EU Special Advisor directs the aforementioned European-Palestinian 
Security Committee. Lastly, four European-Israeli working groups have been 
established by the Special Representative which address the economic needs of the 
Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories. They deal with passage of goods 
and people, fiscal issues, labour issues and the long term economic development of 
Palestine. These working groups meet in Israel and bring together officials from the 
Special Representative’s staff, from member states’ embassies, the Commission 
delegation and officials from the respective Israeli ministries.
In migration policies the capabilities of the Council Secretariat are more 
limited than in foreign affairs. Its tasks are mainly based on the traditional function 
o f being the Council’s bureaucracy. These capabilities also shape the orientations of 
the Secretariat in migration policies (den Boer and Wallace 2000: 504). Therefore, 
political assertion is not sought by the staff of DG H, the SIS unit and the legal 
service, which comprise together approximately 15 officials. They describe their role 
as being *a service provider for Council meetings’, whereas on the political 
dimension, ‘there is no Secretariat agenda’.178 Assessments o f their own impact on 
migration policies is modest. Thus, an official concluded that ‘an influence is there, 
but it is not enormous and works mosdy through [assisting] Presidencies’.179
These cautious political orientations do, however, not impede upon the 
development of specific norm orientations on migration policies, which are not 
necessarily consensual with all member states. Thus, the Secretariat has quickly 
adapted to the semi-communitarised institutional setting of migration policies. An 
interesting institutional explanation for this adaptation was offered by a Council 
official who argued that when compared with the Commission ‘the Council Legal 
Service is even more progressive [on migration issues]. We can do that since we not 
need to be so careful’.180 Thus, when discussing new approaches to migration policies 
following the Amsterdam Summit of 1997, it was the Secretariat that has ‘told
178 Interview 26, Head o f Unit, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, June 2000.
179 Interview 44, Head o f Unit, Council Secretariat, July 2000.
180 Interview 26, Head o f Unit, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, June 2000.
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member states that they should not continue pre Amsterdam Conventions’ 
ratification. But the Commission did not dare saying that’.181 Somewhat transcending 
the role of a mere neutral service provider is, therefore, the self set objective of the 
Secretariat to explain member states what kind of consequences the shift of 
migration policies to the first pillar had. As one official pointed out, ‘member states 
are slow in understanding EC competence’ in migration policies.182 While being 
convinced that ‘the Community method is in the end the only way to get somewhere’ 
a pragmatic and patient strategy was preferred over a more active one. Since the path 
o f integration has already been entered, there was no perception o f a particular hurry. 
It was rather suggested to slowly le t the Community law develop’. On this path of 
integration the role o f the Secretariat would then be one o f a scout or a sign post 
*We make member states accustomed with that*, an official concluded.183
There are marked differences with regard to the orientations o f the Council 
Secretariat when the two areas of migration and Middle East policies are compared. 
In the former area, the Secretariat continues mainly to perform the classical, 
administrative function of a bureaucracy. In contrast, the latter is characterised not 
only by the emergence of new institutional structures but, in the wake o f these, a 
change of preferences towards a more political and autonomous understanding. 
Note, however, that this change of preferences is stronger for those officials directly 
attached to the offices of the Special Representative or the High Representative than 
for those working on foreign policies in DG E where much of the traditional close 
working relationship with the member states, in general, and the Presidency, in 
particular, continues to shape preferences. The Secretariat has to shift between these 
two kinds of orientations. While in both areas the dominant role of the Council and 
member states is generally accepted — this also shields the Secretariat from executive 
competition by the Commission — the adaptation of orientations to new institutions, 
as far as foreign policies are concerned, resulted in the emergence of new kinds of
181 Interview 26, Head o f Unit, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, June 2000.
182 Interview 44, Head o f Unit, Council Secretariat, July 2000.
183 Interview 26, Head o f Unit, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, June 2000.
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orientations which are based on a more active understanding than previously known 
about its role in the policy making process.
Parliament
The orientations of Parliament in Middle East and migration policies are shaped by 
its rather weak position vis-a-vis the EU executive within the cross pillar institutional 
setting o f macro political stabilisation policies. As a result o f its marginal role, 
Parliament has focused on voicing harsh criticism about the substance of EU policies 
in both areas and, consequently, on developing alternative policy agendas. Since this 
critical approach is related to both Council and Commission it has fostered the 
dominant executive-control divide in EU foreign and interior policies. The focus on 
alternative agendas can be observed on three dimensions. First, by laying emphasis 
on the issues o f democracy and human rights, Parliament combined its alternative 
policy agenda with an underlying normative frame.184 Second, Parliament gave a 
particular voice to the way in which it perceived the interests and demands o f those 
affected by EU policies, be it the southern Mediterranean countries in the EMP, in 
general, and Israel and Palestine, in particular, with regard to foreign policies, be it 
migrants and third country nationals in the area of m igration policies. Third, 
Parliament did not stop at criticising the content of policies but proposed an 
alternative institutional setting and — also in its day-to-day operations — demands a 
complete abolition o f the pillar structure in both areas. Parliament legitimised this 
demand arguing that the need for efficiency, coherence and strategic outlook o f EU 
policies requires such an overall communitarisation.
The scepticism of Parliament in the area of Middle East policies relates to the 
perceived lack of political results in the framework of both the EMP and the EU’s 
efforts in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the strong focus of official EU
184 P arliam en t started with the entry into force o f the Maastricht Treaty to publish annual human 
rights’ reports, Agence Europe, No 5936,10 March 1993: 5. When looking at all reports dealt with in 
the foreign affairs committee another interesting observation comes to the fore. Thus, Parliament has 
after the Maastricht Treaty laid greater emphasis on scrutiny of policy making in die first pillar than on 
the second pillar. Most reports adopted in this committee have thus dealt with either first pillar or 
cross pillar issues, such as Association Agreements, accession treaties or financial assistance rather 
than mere second pillar areas.
228
policies on trade and assistance measures meets certain reservations and Parliament 
emphasises the shortcomings of this narrow economic focus o f policies.185 Against 
this background, Parliament criticises the results of the EMP and argues that ‘the 
progress achieved to date and described by the Commission [...] is in actual fact 
much less obvious than the Commission appears to believe’ (European Parliament 
2001c: 16). Parliament links this critique regarding the substance of policies with an 
analysis o f what it considers to be weak instruments of EU foreign politics which are 
then, in turn, leading to a lack o f political strategy. Accordingly, it argues that 
shortcomings are the result o f ‘Member States’ inability to give practical effect to the 
common foreign and security policy’. This inability then translates into the shape of 
actual policies. For example, the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region is 
criticised because it only ‘reproduces’ the Barcelona Declaration while ‘nothing is said 
about how the measures and instruments to be set in motion under the new strategy 
will be financed [and] strangely, the long list of specific initiatives to be launched 
under the Common Strategy is followed merely by a scanty set o f provisions relating 
to instruments and institutions’ (European Parliament 2001b). These inefficiencies 
are, according to Parliament, the main factor which accounts for the secondary role 
which the EU plays in international politics. This becomes in particular obvious in 
the Middle East where ‘the European Union is not involved in the discussions on the 
political future of the region’ while all it ‘has done is to inject money without having 
any clear strategy and without drawing adequate benefits therefrom, such as the 
recognition of the fact that it has a special role to play in this area’ (European 
Parliament 1999a).
As a result o f this scepticism regarding the substance o f current EU policies 
in the Middle East and the wider Mediterranean area, Parliament has focused on 
developing alternative policy agendas which are not dealt with as extensively by other 
EU actors. A main focus of this alternative agenda has been the area of democracy
185 Also in the academic discourse there is some scepticism whether the EMP has embarked on the 
right agenda to develop, through economic and security policies, a stable Middle East See on this 
debate, among others, Al-Khouri 2000; Bertelsmann Group 1999 and 2000; Erzan 1999; Halbach 
1995; Kienle 1998; Steinberg 1996 and Vasconcelos and Joffe 2000.
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promotion and human rights (Gillespie and Youngs 2002; Youngs 2002). In these 
areas Parliament was able to make use o f its capabilities in the budgetary process and 
has, for example, succeeded in 1994 in including the ‘European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights’ into the EU budget out of which, for example, 
MEDA Democracy projects had been funded (Stetter 2003).186 Less successful was 
the attempt to establish, within the Commission, a European Centre for Democracy 
and Human Rights, which would bundle all human rights’ related activities, 
previously spread over 19 different units and DGs (European Parliament 1997e). 
While Parliament introduced already in 1995 a specific budget heading referring to 
this centre, it has subsequently not been set up. The focus on democracy and human 
rights is furthermore reflected in Parliament’s follow up activities to the 
implementation o f the Association Agreements with Israel and Palestine. In a 
resolution of April 2002 Parliament called for sanctions against Israel and a 
suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement due to Israeli military action in 
Palestine and the human tights situation there (European Parliament 2002a). 
Although this resolution was not binding and the call for sanctions had later been 
rejected by the Council and, albeit with some hesitation, by the Commission, 
Parliament’s decision was widely covered both in the Arab world and in Israel In the 
former case the decision was praised as providing a counter agenda to US policies, in 
the case of the latter the decision was largely rejected and portrayed as being a proof 
for traditionally anti Israeli or even anti Semitic policies of the Europeans. Indeed, in 
many reports the resolution was presented as the new policy of the EU, thus 
confirming the observation made by one parliamentarian that often ‘abroad they do 
not differentiate between Parliament, the Commission and member states’.187
The focus on alternative policy agendas has rendered Parliament also more 
receptive to those demands from third countries which are not covered by official 
EU policies. Thus, Parliament combines its criticism of the EMP with an emphasis 
on those items which are regarded by Southern Mediterranean countries to be
186 MEDA Democracy has now been integrated into the MEDA budget line.
187 Interview 40, MEP, European Parliament, July 2000.
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neglected within the Barcelona framework. This is particularly true for Parliament’s 
approach to the economic provisions on free trade, which apply mainly to industrial 
products, and which are perceived as being biased in favour of the EU. Indeed, there 
is widespread critique by Southern Mediterranean governments of the exclusion of 
agricultural products from free trade arrangements, thus, one of the few areas in 
which these countries could provide considerable exports to the EU, is serving 
European interests only. This critique has been taken up by Parliament which 
demands ‘the rapid liberalization of trade in agricultural products’ (European 
Parliament 1997b). Reflecting an even greater opposition to the official priorities of 
the EU executive in the Barcelona process, Parliament called for a more liberal 
approach to migratory movements, blatantly termed ‘organised free movement of 
persons’ (European Parliament 2001b; Hakura 1998). Regarding relations with 
Palestine, Parliament argued following the entry into force o f the 1997 Interim 
Association Agreement that there is ‘still a need to extend the scope of trade 
concessions for agricultural products of which the Palestinians have special 
requirements’ (European Parliament 1996e). Also in other areas Parliament has 
provided a platform for policy demands from Middle Eastern countries. Thus, calls 
for Palestinian statehood have become since the mid 1990s a regular feature of 
Parliament’s Middle East policies, whereas the Council, much more cautiously, 
adopted this position at the Berlin European Council of May 1999 only (European 
Parliament 1996a; Peters 2000). Largely unobserved from EU media, but widely 
covered in Israel, an initiative of some MEPs has brought up the issue o f possible 
Israeli membership in the EU.188 A petition in support of this issue has been signed 
by more than 50 MEPs, thus around 10 per cent of all member of Parliament as well 
as several members of the Israeli Knesset (Tovias 2003).
It was not only with regard to policies that Parliament has been a forum for 
alternative agendas. Also on the issue of the institutional design o f EU foreign
188 Those who stop short o f proposing membership could, nevertheless envision a closer relationship 
between Israel and the EU to be built, for example, on the lines of the relations between the EU and 
the European Economic Area or the EU and Turkey (Inbar 1998; Sadeh 1998). For EU-Israeli 
Relations see Matem 1997.
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policies Parliament has maintained a sceptical stance. It views the institutional setting 
in foreign policies as being largely insufficient and argues that EU decision making is 
blocked by ‘the intergovernmental nature of its foreign policy’ which is why ‘the 
Union has not yet succeeded in playing a credible role in the Middle East’ (European 
Parliament 1996e). Indeed, Parliament argues that the ‘intergovernmental method 
[...] threatens to paralyse totally the operations of the CFSP’ (European Parliament 
1997d). These efficiency related arguments are then linked with a normative 
argument, namely that the main problems faced by EU foreign politics is the 
democratic deficit caused by the intergovernmental setting. Against this background, 
Parliament calls for the introduction of ‘Community procedures’ in all areas of 
foreign policies (European Parliament 2001d). This demand comprises the 
introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council, exclusive use o f the EC 
budget and the consultation o f Parliament on all issues (European Parliament 1997d). 
With regard to the Commission, Parliament suggested the creation of a ‘common 
diplomacy’, inter alia supported by the establishment of a College of European 
Diplomacy and the transformation of Commission Delegations into ‘C om m unity 
delegations’ (European Parliament 2001 d). Parliament is explicit about its main 
objective in this institutional reform and, therefore, pledges for ‘at least in the long 
term [...] overcoming the three pillar structure’ (European Parliament 2002d). With 
regard to more immediate reforms, as they were proposed during the 2000 IGC, 
Parliament came up with separate proposals for the first and second pillars, yet 
expressed its hope that these reforms would ‘progressively diminish’ the pillar divide. 
Thus, in the area of external economic relations, in which Parliament’s capabilities 
are much less developed than in developmental assistance, the introduction of the 
codecision procedure as well as an involvement of Parliament during trade 
negotiations between the Commission and third countries is demanded.189 As a major 
reform for the entire area of foreign affairs, Parliament suggested that the 
C om m ission be delegated implementing powers for all non military decisions, while
189 See chapter 4.
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the office of the High Representative should be fully integrated into the Commission, 
rendering the appointment procedure the same as the one for the election of the 
Commission President (European Parliament 2000c). These reforms were meant to 
pave the way for even further integration, ultimately resulting in the ‘integration of all 
“pillars” into the Community structure’ and the creation of a ‘European Foreign 
Office’ (European Parliament 2000b).
Turning, finally, to the internal organisation of Parliament in Middle East 
policies. Two main features characterise Parliament’s organisational responses. First, 
Parliament has developed organisational structures with a strong focus on 
interparliamentary cooperation both in the EMP as well as in relations with Israel 
and Palestine. The lack of inclusion in the set up of the Barcelona conference was 
heavily criticised and Parliament demanded from the Com m ission and the member 
states to provide for a stronger involvement of Parliament into these frameworks 
(European Parliament 1999d). While Parliament was initially quite optimistic that the 
establishment o f the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum, which held four 
meetings - 1998, 1999 and 2001 in Brussels and 2002 in Bari - would provide a 
counter-weight to the executive dominance in the EMP, these hopes did ultimately 
not materialise (Stavridis 2001). Consequently, the agenda of these meeting has 
shifted from a general focus on the entire Barcelona process to a more narrow issue 
oriented approach in which the EP and the southern Mediterranean Parliaments 
mainly focus on issues related to the aforementioned alternative policy agenda.
Regarding its internal organisation in Middle East policies, two parallel 
structures have been established, namely parliamentary delegations, on the one hand, 
and the so-called Inter Groups, on the other. Delegations deal with the official 
relations between Parliament and parliaments in third countries. Only for ‘important 
countries’ — and Israel and Palestine are considered by Parliament as such — is there a 
single delegation, whereas most delegations cover wider regions.190 Inter Groups, on 
the other hand, are lobby groups in favour of a particular issue or country and are set
190 Interview 16, MEP, Vice-President, European Parliament, June 2000.
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up by parliamentarian s out of their own initiative. Doubling the already established 
relationship of the delegations with Israel and Palestine, the Israel Inter Group was 
founded in 1992. This step was described as being a response to the existence of the 
Inter Group for Peace, which was set up in the 1980s and which supported the cause 
of the Kurdish People Party (PKK) and the PLO. While the delegations, except for 
yearly visits with their counter parts from the Knesset or the Palestinian Legislative 
Council, ‘do not work very strongly’, the Inter Groups do take a ‘more proactive 
approach’.191 They reveal strong orientations on ‘defending’ die interests of Israel, on 
the one hand, or Palestine, on the other. Hardly suiprising, therefore, that the 
establishment o f the Israel Inter Group was based on a joint initiative of several 
MEPs and the former ambassador o f Israel to the EU. Occasionally, the quite 
divergent orientations between these two Inter Groups get carried into the plenary. 
An initiative of the Inter Group for Peace to agree on a parliamentary resolution 
condemning Israeli policies on the rules of origin provisions for Israeli products 
originating from setdements in Palestine has failed to gain the necessary support ‘due 
to pressure from the Israel lobby’ in the Israel Inter Group.192 Membership numbers 
in both Inter Groups are similar. The Inter Group for Peace comprises some 60 
members, whereas the Israel Inter Group consists of around 80 MEPs.193 The 
activities of these Inter Groups did, however, not only relate to external relations. 
Thus, the head of the Israel Inter Group referred to a successful motion for a 
resolution on establishing a European day for remembrance o f the Holocaust, as the 
most noteworthy initiative from the Inter Group. Another member of the Israel 
Inter Group stressed the usefulness of Inter Groups for information gathering. He 
referred in particular to several expert briefings prior to the conclusion of the Science 
and Technology agreement between Israel and the EU. Being a member of the 
Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy, he acknowledged the 
quality o f three meetings organised by the Inter Group in which MEPs were briefed
191 Interview 15, MEP, Head o f Inter Group, European Parliament, June 2000.
192 Interview 15, MEP, Head o f Inter Group, European Parliament, June 2000.
193 Interview 15, MEP, Head o f Inter Group, European Parliament, June 2000 and Interview 33, 
MEP, Head o f Inter Group, European Parliament, July 2000.
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on these agreements. He pointed out that, when compared to the information 
received in the Inter Group meetings, the ‘Commission briefing was weaker*.194
Turning to migration policies, Parliament’s orientations show remarkable 
similarities with those outlined on foreign policies. The lack of direct influence over 
executive policy making has led Parliament to adopt a general scepticism with regard 
to the overall policy agenda in migration policies. Notwithstanding this remark, a 
certain shift in Parliament’s orientations towards less fundamental opposition to the 
policy agenda of EU migration policies following the Amsterdam Treaty and a greater 
focus of its critique on the institutional structures in this area points to the integrative 
dynamics of the semi-communitarised institutional framework as well as to an 
anticipation of a possible introduction of the codedsion procedure by May 2004.
Following the establishment of the third pillar, Parliament initially adopted a 
very sceptical stance towards the executive, member states and Commission alike 
(Monar 1995). The orientations of Parliament regarding policy making in migration 
policies related to two main dimensions. First, it opposed the policy agenda pursued 
in this area by criticising the priorities set which were regarded as one sidedly serving 
the security interests of national governments.195 Arguing that ‘Member States are far 
more interested in police cooperation and the exchange of information than in 
citizens’ rights’ has led, according to Parliament, to a biased design of policies 
(European Parliament 1997c). Member states, the prime decision-makers in the third 
pillar, are thus portrayed as ‘overemphasizing [...] migration-limiting policies and the 
maintenance of order’ (European Parliament 1997a). For example, the rights of 
asylum seekers and refugees are scrutinised and Parliament blames the Council of 
having adopted ‘a restrictive interpretation’ of rights (European Parliament 1998). 
This general critique about the content of policies was strongly interwoven with an 
opposition to the very decision making mechanisms in migration policies. Parliament,
194 Interview 37, MEP, European Parliament, July 2000.
195 This links up to the description o f EU migration policies as serving the creation o f a ‘fortress 
Europe’. This notion has been in particular popular in the 1990s when positive integration was seen as 
being primarily focused on restrictive policies rather than a so-called ‘comprehensive’ approach to 
migration and integration policies (Geddes 2000; Huysmans 2000; Peers 1998; Morris 1997a)
235
thus, not only rejects that ‘Member States are curtailing the right to asylum* but *has 
been critical of the way in which decisions on asylum and immigration are taken 
behind closed doors*. Decisions are described by the chairwoman of the responsible 
committee as lacking ‘any form of democratic accountability* due to the lack of 
parliamentary and judicial control mechanisms and termed as ‘pseudo-legislation 
[being] unacceptable as forms of Union legislation* (European Parliament 1996c).
Following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, Parliament 
somewhat modified its stance and the content of legislative proposals from member 
states and the Commission became subject to a more constructive criticism. While 
parliamentarians still warned that some measures ‘do not appear to strike the right 
balance between security and integration* it was acknowledged that Council and 
Commission have became more receptive to proposals from Parliament (European 
Parliament 2000a). While criticism regarding decision making structures continued to 
figure prominendy, Parliament often put this critique in the form o f a warning not to 
repeat the ‘mistakes* o f the pre Amsterdam period. Parliament could thus attack ‘the 
illegal behaviour of the Council in the past* but emphasise that due to a more open 
attitude of Council and Commission it would now be ‘prepared to pass over this’ 
(European Parliament 1999c).
Notwithstanding these changes in the interinstitutional climate, Parliament 
still regarded the detection of those decision making modes, which reflect a ‘thinking 
and working typically associated with intergovernmental cooperation*, as one o f its 
main responsibilities (European Parliament 2000e). While Parliament still, 
occasionally, referred to the perceived democratic deficit in EU migration policies, 
the focus of institutional critique shifted to more subde observations. First, 
Parliament began to detect the implementation problems of EU migration policies 
rather than those directly related to decision taking. It pointed out that migration 
policies differ from other areas of the first pillar to the extent that the Council 
attempts as a rule to circumvent the implementing rules o f Article 202. ‘No 
convincing reason has been given by the Council for departing from this principle 
and reserving the most important implementing powers for itself* (European
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Parliament 2000g). Second, Parliament criticised the ‘inchoate way o f legislating’ in 
migration policies, the reasons for which were related to the piecemeal legislating 
strategy prescribed by the scoreboard approach (European Parliament 2002b). The 
reasons behind such an approach of ‘artificially dividing’ interrelated aspects of 
migration policies has, finally, been seen as being inherent in the institutional 
provisions o f the Amsterdam Treaty institutional rules (European Parliament 2000h). 
It is against this background, that Parliament has been more receptive to legislative 
proposals from the Commission than to several proposals tabled by member states 
although it did not object the content of these proposals.
Regarding its own policy agenda, Parliament has focused on two main 
aspects, these being an emphasis on the cross pillar characteristics of migration 
policies, on the one hand, and — similar to the way in which Parliament provides a 
forum for views from third countries in foreign affairs — a representation of the 
interests o f third country nationals vis-a-vis national and European executives. Prior to 
the Amsterdam Treaty, Parliament has stressed the cross pillar dimension of 
migration policies by linking third pillar policies with the free movement of people as 
it is provided for by the EC Treaty.196 Arguing that ex-Article 7a would transfer a 
direct legal obligation on member states to abolish all internal border controls by the 
deadline o f 1 January 1993, Parliament sought to speed up the parallel development 
o f rules in migration policies. While noting ‘that measures required for the 
functioning o f the internal market, comprising an area without internal frontiers, may 
not under any circumstances be dependent on a measure which has to be taken on 
the basis o f Tide VI’, it was clear to Parliament that prior to the attainment of this 
objective member states would insist on the establishment o f flanking measures in 
the area o f migration policies, such as external border controls, visa policies or
196 On this issue has emerged a years long argument between Parliament and the Commission. 
Parliament accused the Commission o f not taking action in this area. It even threatened to go to the 
Court o f Justice. Ultimately, the Commission presented die three Directives on this issue. Agence 
Europe, N o 6772,17 July 1996: 11-12. The Commission was occasionally threatening member states 
to take legal action but refrained from doing so, Agence Europe N o 5991,2 June 1993: 5. The notion 
o f most member states that there was no direct effect in free movement provisions o f the TEC was 
supported by the Court o f  Justice in the Wijsenbeek judgement, Agence Europe, N o 7556, 22 
September 1999:10.
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asylum and refugee issues (European Parliament 1996b). Noting, however, that 
member states and the Commission were not willing to implement these internal 
border provisions without the establishment of prior legal measures on migratory 
issues, and recognising that there was no legal support from the Court o f Justice on 
Parliament’s interpretation of a direct effect of ex-Article 7a, its policy proposals 
consequently focused on demanding a ‘comprehensive’ and ‘holistic’ approach to 
migration policies (European Parliament 2000h and 2002c). Challenging the 
scoreboard approach o f Commission and Council, Parliament suggested ‘to seek 
overall solutions regarding immigration and asylum, thus avoiding piecemeal 
measures’ (European Parliament 2000g). Such a ‘comprehensive’ setting would not 
only include cross pillar linkages with both first and second pillar foreign policies but 
also cover social or employment issues.197 As far as migration policies in the narrower 
sense were concerned, Parliament expected the Commission and the Council to 
combine ‘a future consolidated proposal, covering all the arrangements applying to 
the right of asylum, temporary protection, and subsidiary protection’ into one single 
legal instrument laying down the rules of an EU migration policy regime (European 
Parliament 2000f).
Perceiving a shortcoming of executive policy making in migration policies 
regarding the rights* dimension of this area, Parliament has from the outset laid 
particular emphasis on providing a platform for the perspective and interests of 
migrants. It warned against creating ‘new forms of discrimination between citizens of 
the Union [...] against citizens of third countries’ by reminding of the personal 
situation of many migrants (European Parliament 1997a). Asylum seekers, for 
example, are subject to a ‘shaky legal status’ which renders their daily life very 
difficult (European Parliament 1996c). Authorities should also be more aware that 
for individual asylum seekers, ‘the decision in ques tion can be of great importance 
[and] can make the difference between life and death’, and, therefore, to do 
everything to avoid that they ‘fall victim to a game of ping-pong contemptuous of
197 Interview 29, MEP, European Parliament, June 2000.
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their humanity* (European Parliament 1997f and 1999b). Authorities should 
recognise that asylum seekers are ‘invariably desperate people who have taken many 
risks in order to find safety* and that the European society should be prepared to 
ensure their ‘integration into social and economic life* rather than keeping them 
separate from society (European Parliament 2001e and 1998).
As already mentioned, Parliament has been highly critical of the institutional 
setting of migration policies, not least because o f its own marginal role with regard to 
policy making.198 From the establishment of the third pillar onwards, Parliament has, 
therefore, called for steps helpful in ‘attaining our ultimate objective, i.e. the 
“communautarisation** of the third pillar* (European Parliament 1996d). During the 
1996 IGC, Parliament demanded that migration policies ‘should no longer be 
artificially distinguished from closely-related policies within the full Community 
domain* and that, consequently, they ‘must be progressively brought within the 
Community domain*.199 This demand comprised the strengthening of rights of 
Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the Court of Justice as well as overcoming the 
unanimity requirement in the Council (European Parliament 1995). While noting that 
the Amsterdam Treaty has provided for some improvements, Parliament’s main 
demands have not been subject to change. During the 2000 IGC it again called for 
steps to ensure that the institutional framework of migration policies ‘be substantially 
simplified*. Its proposals included full jurisdiction of the Court of Justice *by 
removing the limitations and restriction in force*, abolishing the time limit on both 
parliamentary opinions and amendments in the framework of the codedsion 
procedure, extending the scope of the (first pillar) Schengen provisions to all 
member states while renegotiating their current exemptions and, last but certainly not 
least, introduction o f the codedsion procedure as well as qualified majority voting in 
the Council for all legal measures to be taken in migration polides (European
198 As one interviewee noted, the only ‘influence we have* is the budget, where, for example, 
Parliament claims ownership for budget lines such as the ERF-budget or budget line B7-677 on 
support measures for third countries on migration matters. Interview 41, administrator, European 
Parliament, July 2000.
199 On the 1996 IGC see also Bieber 1995 and van Outrive 1995.
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Parliament 2000b and 2000c). It was, finally, also in the framework of the current 
Convention that Parliament tabled proposals for a future EU migration policy 
regime, thereby demanding additional steps for a full communitarisation. Thus, 
within the catalogue of competencies drawn up by the Convention, Parliament 
foresees the free movement of persons as well as the legal basis for the common 
area o f freedom5 to be amongst the Union's exclusive fields of competence. 
According to Parliament's proposals, the focus for migration policy would, therefore, 
shift from the national to the EU level Immigration policy and other policies linked 
to the free movement o f persons’ would, according to Parliament's proposal, be a 
shared area o f competency, meaning that member states could only act within the 
limits defined by Union legislation' (European Parliament 2001a).
More so than in foreign policies, Parliament has been affected by the impact 
of the 1999 European elections and the shift of its majority towards the centre-right. 
This has also affected the composition of the Civil liberties and Internal Affairs 
committee in which after the elections the European Peoples' Party (EPP) was the 
strongest party, replacing the Party of European Socialists (PES), which now came in 
second. This change in the balance of power has, according to MEPs, also influenced 
the policy agenda pursued by Parliament. Thus, while Parliament is united in claiming 
more rights in the policy making process vis-a-vis the executive, on a policy level an 
increase of divergence was perceived. As one liberal MEP argued, on ‘content there 
are differences. They get more pronounced'.200 An official of Parliament consented 
with that view and suggested that the committee ‘after '99 has become more 
conservative than ministers'.201 Conservative MEPs argued, on the other hand, that 
the changes were necessary in order to be taken more serious by Council and 
Commission and, in this perspective, the ‘Council expects more than exaggerated 
proposals which often could not be implemented'.202 Another explanation has been 
offered by a Socialist MEP, who argued that the reason behind the more moderate
200 Interview 43, MEP, European Parliament, July 2000.
201 Interview 41, administrator, European Parliament, July 2000.
202 Interview 30, MEP, European Parliament, June 2000.
240
position of Parliament in the fifth legislature is that there has been a shift within the 
PES away from the aforementioned alternative policy agenda. ‘More socialists [are] in 
government and Parliament gets more responsible’, since a grand coalition of EPP 
and PES effectively dominates the committee. Hix reminds that ‘even without a 
common EP interest vis-a-vis the Council, an oligopolistic relationship between the 
two largest groups is enforced by the absolute-majority requirement’ when voting on 
legislative proposals. Therefore, ‘the PES and EPP must cooperate to ensure 
legislative coherence and protect their partisan interests and policy goals’ (1999: 
84).203
The arguments presented in this chapter about a decrease in emphasis on an 
alternative policy agenda largely support the perception of a more moderate stance of 
P arliament on migration issues. It could, however, be argued that the main reason for 
the shift is not so much related to the issue of centre-left national governments and a 
loyalty of Socialist MEPs. It could rather be argued that the increase of legislative 
responsibilities of Parliament with the Amsterdam Treaty has made Parliament more 
receptive for the need to respond constructively to the official migration policy 
agenda. As far as the internal organisation is concerned, there seems to be no 
increase in internal fragmentation as suggested by the aforementioned 
parliamentarian. Table 6.1 presents data on all reports voted in the Civil Liberties 
committee during the 4th and 5th legislature. While there is a minor increase over time 
in the amount of ‘no’ votes on parliamentary reports, this increase has been small 
indeed. There is no indication that a majority-opposition pattern would replace 
Parliament’s main orientation, namely to scrutinise executive policy making.
203 Interview 29, MEP, European Parliament, June 2000.
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Table 6.1: Internal Fragmentation of the Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs Committee, 1996-
2002
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999a 1999b 2000 2001 2002 4th legislature 5th legislature
“No” votes 
(average)
2.2 3.5 2.8 1.3 3.2 2.6 3.5 4.4 2.5 3.4
Abstention
(average)
3.5 0.9 0.7 0.2 3.0 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.9
N  reports 13 21 30 18 6 41 53 45 82 145
Data: own research; includes all reports, also those on non migration issues. This provides a picture o f 
the degree o f fragmentation in the committee. Usually around 25 to 30 members are present at votes. 
1999a refers to reports o f die 4th legislature prior to the 1999 European elections, 1999b for those o f 
the 5th legislature after these elections. On this committee see also Esders 1995. On voting patterns in 
the foreign affairs committee see Viola 2000.
The orientations of Parliament in Middle East and migration policies are, as has been 
shown, significantly influenced by die cross pillar setting of EU macro political 
stabilisation policies. Parliaments orientations in both areas are, in particular, shaped 
by the executive-control dimension, which has been identified as the main 
institutional characteristic o f these two areas. Accordingly, Parliaments often 
assumed closeness to the Commission has not materialised in the two cases analysed 
here. In both areas Parliament perceives its own role as being a provider for an 
alternative policy agendas to official EU policies as they are pursued by the dual 
executive. It is, however, true that Parliament and Commission do share some 
similarities regarding the long term objectives for both areas in which they both push 
for largely communitarised settings. Notwithstanding this element o f convergence 
between EU actors, its impact on the overall actor constellations in this area remains 
rather small. Comparing Parliament’s orientations on the two areas a striking 
difference comes to the fore. While in Middle East policies, Parliament’s virtual 
exclusion from directly shaping the policy agenda, save developmental policies, has 
contributed to an ongoing focus on an alternative agenda, this is not to the same 
extent true in migration policies. The perspective of a wholesale introduction of the 
codedsion procedure has contributed to a more positive attitude on official polides. 
As it seems, however, this process has not been one sided. While certainly Parliament 
has come closer to the executive agenda on migration polides, a greater acceptance
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of Parliament’s views on die side o f the Council and the Commission can also be 
observed, thus underlining the highly dynamic nature in the formation, adaptation 
and stabilisation of actor preferences.204
‘Courts*: financial auditing and legal judgements
Both the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors have made active use of their 
capabilities in foreign and interior policies. While the Court o f Justice has issued two 
judgements on migration policies, which addressed the relationship between the 
pillars, the Court of Auditors has, in several reports, scrutinised EU policies in 
Middle East and foreign policies. These actions have not been marginal to policy 
making in both areas and underline the significance of the executive-control 
dimension in these areas. Moreover, the orientations of the Court of Justice and the 
Court of Auditors exhibit a strong scepticism of both actors regarding the pillar 
construction.
The Court of Auditors
The Court of Auditors has on several occasions scrutinised the implementation of 
those parts of foreign policies that involve expenditure from EU budgetary 
resources. While, over time, an improvement in the quality of implementation is 
acknowledged this progress has been slow and the Court o f Auditors has pointed to 
various inefficiencies within the decision making structures of both the Commission 
and the Council. The strongest criticism was raised in 1996 in a report on the 
implementation by the C om m ission of the MED programmes on decentralised 
cooperation (Giammusso 1999). As mentioned in chapter 3, this report has 
contributed to the corruption charges against the responsible Commissioner and has 
aggravated tensions between Parliament and Commission, which ultimately resulted 
in the resignation of the college of Commissioners in 1999.205 In its report, the Court 
o f Auditors accused the Commission of being responsible for a situation in which ‘at
204 This has been confirmed by several interviewees from Parliament, the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat
205 See chapter 7.
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all levels of the financial management of the MED programmes there are serious 
shortcomings and irregularities’. The Court of Auditors was in particular bothered by 
‘insufficient analysis’ by the Commission of the means and instruments for successful 
implementation and has argued that the ‘structure and procedures o f the 
Commission to oversee and monitor the implementation [...] were inadequate and 
deficient’. Therefore, the overall success of policies themselves was questioned since 
‘on the basis of the data currently available and its own observations in the field, the 
Court considers that the impact of the MED programmes remains to be proven’. 
However, the critique went even further and transcended a mere disapproval of 
decision making modes in the Commission. The Court of Auditors pointed the 
finger at a ‘serious confusion of interest’ which die Commission, although being 
aware o f it ‘from the outset’, did not ‘put an end to in a timely manner’. The Court of 
Auditors referred to the delegation by the Commission o f almost the entire 
implementing powers for the MED programmes to a private contractor and that ‘in 
spite o f several warnings, this de facto delegation of powers was not revoked’ (Court 
of Auditors 1996).206
While corruption charges were not repeated in other reports, the Court of 
Auditors, nevertheless, remained highly critical of the way in which the Commission 
implemented policies in foreign affairs. The argument put forward by the 
Commission, that the lack of staff or unfavourable external circumstances in third 
countries were the main reason behind implementation problems, was not accepted 
by the Court of Auditors. Quite on the contrary, the Court of Auditors argued that 
problems had to be searched in the way in which the dual executive worked. First, 
implementation problems in developmental assistance could generally be related to 
‘the very cautious approach adopted by the national authorities [of EU member 
states] in this field’. Second, as far as the EU level was concerned, ‘the way in which 
humanitarian aid is organized by the institutions’ had to be blamed (Court of
206 The case became even more problematic since a close personal relationship between the 
Commissioner, on the one hand, and the firm to which implementation had been delegated, on the 
other, has been disclosed.
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Auditors 1997). Regarding this internal dimension the Court of Auditors emphasised 
organisational problems within the Commission which could not all be related to its 
precarious personnel situation. Thus, the Commission did not take the necessary 
steps to overcome the lack o f clarity in the division of tasks between the 
departments and of competencies between the Commission’s headquarter in Brussels 
and the Delegations, (Court of Auditors 1998). Adding up to these serious 
coordination problems between the D G  and the Delegations, the Court of Auditors 
criticised the organisational structures of the Commission in Brussels. It pointed to 
the way in which the Joint Service (SCR) — which was established by the Commission 
to provide an organisational roof to all assistance measures — operated.207 Thus, while 
the ‘implementation o f projects is the responsibility of the SCR, [...] project 
preparation remains the responsibility of the various RELEX DGs’ (Court o f 
Auditors 2001a). According to the Court of Auditors, the Commission was not able 
to handle its internal organisations thus severely hampering the impact of EU 
policies.
This has also affected Middle East policies. A report on the implementation 
of assistance in Palestine, once more, emphasised that within the Commission 
‘decision-making is heavily centralised, slow and cumbersome’. While it was 
acknowledged that ‘the Commission’s implementation of assistance to Palestinian 
society has had positive results’ such as the support for the peace process through 
funding the Palestinian Authority or the positive effects on educational and 
infrastructure programmes, the ‘impact of these programmes has been reduced by 
structural weaknesses in the Commission’s programming and management 
procedures and systems’ (Court o f Auditors 2000). Thus, contrary to consultancy 
reports sponsored by the Commission, which emphasised the heavy control by 
member states on the Commission’s implementing powers as the main reason for 
these shortcomings, the Court of Auditors took a much more critical stance on the 
internal operations o f the Commission (MEDA 1999; MEDA Democracy 1999). A
207 SCR was later renamed as EuropeAid.
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divergence in the orientations of the Commission and the Court o f Auditors did, 
therefore, prevent the emergence o f a supranational alliance between these two 
institutions. This was only partly reduced by the shared orientation o f both actors in 
overcoming the pillar divide in foreign affairs.
The Court of Auditors did not only scrutinise developmental assistance but 
also budgetary expenses from the second pillar and in one report dealt direcdy with 
the CFSP. While recognising that steps had already been taken by the Council 
towards an intensified application o f first pillar budgetary rules such as the setting up 
of particular budget headings on CFSP expenses, ‘the creation o f a budget line for 
preparatory costs’, the ‘abandoning of budgetary reserve’ as well as the setting up of 
employment conditions for Special Envoys, the Court o f Auditors demanded 
additional changes.208 In particular, it criticised that ‘the question of the definition of 
administrative and operational expenditure’, thus whether expenses are covered by 
the EC budget or by member states, ‘is still not resolved’ (Court o f Auditors 2001b). 
As far as the implementation of measures was concerned, the Court of Auditors, 
finally, pleaded for a stronger role o f the Commission.
The Court of Justice: Constructing rights across the pillars
In spite of the letter o f the Maastricht Treaty, which provided allegedly for an 
exclusion of the Court o f Justice from having a role within the institutional setting of 
EU policy making in the third pillar, the Court, surprisingly, adopted a proactive 
approach on this issue and constructed rights across the pillars in a way not foreseen 
by member states in the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. While the ECJ already had 
ruled in the Demirel case on first pillar related aspects of migration policies, such as 
the rights conferred on third country nationals by Association Agreements, the 
Maastricht Treaty has sought to prevent the ECJ from developing legal doctrines for 
asylum and immigration policies.209 However, in its two judgements of 1997 and
208 It is in this context that the Joint Actions on the mandate o f die Special Representative contain 
specific budgetary clauses since the year 2000 only.
209 Judgement o f the Court o f 9 July 1987, Meryem Demirel v  Stadt Schwabisch Gmiind, Case C- 
12/ 86.
246
1998 on the Visa L ist and Airport Transit Visas cases, the Court fostered the legal 
dimension of EU migration policies, thus providing yet another example for the 
‘legal autonomy approach* (Oliveiro 1999; Alter 1998; Mattli and Slaughter 1998).210
In Visa List, the Court of Justice dealt with the interinstitutional balance 
between Commission, Council and Parliament in the decision making process. In this 
case, Parliament filed an annulment charge against a Regulation on a common visa 
list which was adopted by the Council of 25 September 1995 on the ground that 
Parliament was not re-consulted after the Council had introduced some amendments 
to the original proposal by the Commission, on which Parliament had been initially 
consulted (Peers 2000). The Court of Justice then indeed annulled the Regulation and 
fostered both the Community dimension of migration policies as well as the control 
o f the executive in migration policies. The ECJ criticised that the Regulation ‘departs 
from the aim of harmonization in the matters of visas* since the Council had 
excluded a time limit for the expiry of parallel national visa lists as it was originally 
provided for in the legislative proposal by the Commission. However, ‘any 
discontinuity in the harmonization of national rules of visas’ should be avoided. 
Based on this observation, the Court of Justice considered the changes by the 
Council to the original proposal as being substantial Since ‘the text finally adopted, 
taken as a whole, differs in essence from the text on which Parliament has already 
been consulted* a fresh consultation was seen as being ‘essential to the maintenance 
o f the institutional balance intended by the Treaties*. The argument by the Council 
that reconsultation would result in the tacit introduction of a second reading in the 
consultation procedure was rejected by the Court. T o  accept the Council’s argument 
would result in seriously undermining that essential participation [...] and would
210 Judgement o f the Court o f 10 June 1997, European Parliament v Council o f the European Union: 
Nationals o f third countries -  Visas -  Legislative Procedure -  Consultation o f the European 
Parliament, Case C-392/95 and opinion o f Mr Advocate General Fennelly delivered on 20 March 
1997(Court o f Justice 1997).
Judgement o f the Court o f 12 May 1998, Commission o f the European Communities v  Council o f the 
European Union: Act o f the Council — Joint action regarding airport transit visas — Legal basis, Case 
C-170/1996 and opinion o f Mr Advocate General Fennelly delivered on 5 February 1998 (Court o f 
Justice 1998).
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amount to disregarding the influence that due consultation of Parliament can have on 
the adoption of the measure in question*.
Limiting the discretion of member states in the legislative process in 
migration policies was, however, not the only doctrine established by the Court of 
Justice. Thus, while visa issues were the only part of the migration policy acquis, 
which already with the Maastricht Treaty had been integrated into the first pillar, this 
judgement went beyond the narrow confines of the first pillar. The opinion of the 
Advocate General, although not repeated in the judgement, directly questioned the 
factual validity of the pillar divide in migration policies. The Advocate General hinted 
that the case brings up the issue of ‘the role of the Court in interpreting the Treaty 
on European Union*. Arguing that — in spite of the express exclusion of judicial 
review in the two ‘intergovernmental’ pillars by ex-Article M TEU - a ‘parallel 
reading* of provisions from the first and the third pillar could become necessary. It 
was pointed out that for considering the ‘scope of Community competence under 
Article 100c (TEC], the Court o f Justice will look at that provision in its Treaty 
context and cannot, in my view, qualify or restrict that interpretation by reference to 
a provision which it is expressly prohibited from interpreting*. Somewhat 
paradoxically, while being excluded from any interpretation of Title VI TEU, at the 
same time ‘the Court were entitled to have regard in a general way to the existence 
and content of Title VI*.
This opinion o f the Advocate General, not rejected by the Court of Justice, 
sent out shock waves in some member states and was an invitation for EU actors to 
challenge, at the next opportunity, a third pillar measure. This happened only some 
months later when the Commission appealed against a Council Joint Action on 
Airport Transit Visas o f 4 March 1996. The Commission announced, to the surprise 
o f the Council, in a meeting of the permanent representatives, that it would challenge 
this third piikr act in court, arguing that the measure should rather have been 
adopted in the framework of the visa provisions of the first pillar. The Commission 
based its appeal on the arguments of the Advocate General, a former Commission 
official, as they were set out in Visa Lists: In an attempt to defend the separation of
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the pillars, the national governments argued that hy  virtue of Article L [TEU] the 
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the Commission’s 
application’. Indeed, the Court o f Justice upheld the legality o f the adoption o f the 
Joint Action in the framework of the third pillar, arguing that Airport Transit Visas 
were not visas in the definition of ex-Article 100c, since they did not, in a legal sense, 
provide for the crossing of the EU’s external borders. In contrast to regular visas, 
Airport Transit Visas did not bestow their holders with the right o f movement in the 
internal market and were only meant for movement in the international areas of EU 
airport Notwithstanding the rejection of the Commission’s appeal on the case in 
question, the judgement itself resulted, in the view of officials in the legal service of 
the Council Secretariat, in a ‘clear victory for the Commission’. This is, because the 
Court o f Justice rejected the opinion by member states that it was not entided to rule 
on the case due to the legal base of the Joint Action in the third pillar. Opposing this 
perception, the Court of Justice pointed out that it is its own task ‘to ensure that acts 
which, according to the Council, fall within the scope of Article K.3(2) (TEU] do not 
encroach upon the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community’. From 
that, ‘it follows that the Court has jurisdiction’.211
In Airport Transit Visas the Court of Justice, thus, undermined the dominant 
legal opinion of a strict separation of the pillars. The provisions on judicial review on 
migration policies, as they appear in the Amsterdam Treaty, are from this perspective 
not merely an autonomous decision of national governments, but have to some 
extent already been autonomously codified by the case law o f the Court of Justice, 
thereby challenging key intergovemmentalist assumptions. Moreover, Airport Transit 
Visas also tackles the institutional design of migration policies from another angle. 
The Court of Justice followed the argument of the Advocate General to apply the 
‘functional approach* of legal reasoning, thereby looking ‘at content and effect rather 
than form*. This approach of an institutional division within a functionally defined
211 The Advocate General put it fairly clear. While Artide M excluded jurisdiction, Artide L 
reintroduced it. Hence, he argued that ‘the power o f judicial review which the Court enjoys under the 
jurisdictional clauses o f each o f the Community Treaties is extended by Artide L \
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policy area such as migration policies has met criticism from the Court of Justice on 
other occasions as well. Thus, during the 1996 IGC the Court voiced criticism on the 
pillar structure arguing that the ‘sometimes artificial compartmentalization entailed by 
the system of three pillars [...] run[s] counter to the need for transparency and put 
citizens o f the Union in an unsatisfactory position from the point o f view of legal 
certainty’ (Court of Justice 1995a).
This argument, finally, points to the potential impact of Airport Transit Visas 
on the institutional design of EU foreign and interior policies at large. Thus, although 
not carried out until today, the Commission or Parliament would be able to challenge 
acts in the second and the (remaining) third pillar if they were able to show that, in 
the words of the Advocate General, certain ‘matters [would] more properly fall 
within the Community sphere’. Take, for example, a second pillar decision such as 
the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region which includes mainly policies 
and instruments from the first pillar. While the provisions on the common foreign 
and security policy indeed refer to the adoption o f Common Strategies by the 
Council, it could be argued that — looking ‘at content and effect rather than form’ — 
this measure should rather have been adopted in the framework o f the first pillar. 
This view was not contested by officials in the legal service of the Council 
Secretariat212
Conclusion
The preferences of EU actors in foreign and interior policies cannot adequately be 
described by reference to intergovernmental-supranational patterns. As this chapter 
has argued, the preferences of EU actors can rather be understood against the 
background of their different capabilities which in turn can be accounted for as being 
shaped by the specific functional features of macro political stabilisation policies. 
This has fostered rather than undermined the dominant executive-control dimension 
and has only occasionally been countered by shared preferences between EU actors, 
which all, to different degrees, perceive the pillar design as impeding on the
i
212 Interviews 27 and 28, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
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emergence of a ‘comprehensive’ approach to foreign and interior policies. Against 
the background of the analysis put forward in this chapter, the questions raised in the 
introduction can now be readdressed.
First, the emergence o f preferences o f EU actors in foreign and interior 
policies is mainly defined by the cross pillar institutional capabilities in macro 
political stabilisation policies which these actors hold rather than an a priori 
preference for overall communitarisation. While all EU actors consider the need for 
locating both areas firmly at the EU level as important, the precise shape of their 
individual orientations cannot be covered by such a supranational perspective. 
Instead, it is argued here that the preferences o f EU actors in both areas respond to 
the characteristic features of macro political stabilisation policies, amongst them the 
cross pillar institutional framework. This explains why the preferences of the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat reveal some important similarities, whereas 
Parliament, but also the Court of Justice and the Court o f Auditors have developed 
quite different preferences. The incorporation of the Commission into the Council’s 
working structures and joint learning efforts therein, have fostered a managerial 
approach of the Commission to policy making. The Commission limits its activities 
to those areas in which it already holds executive powers and does only very 
cautiously challenge the overall political guidance by the Council. It is only outside of 
the daily policy making process, thus by submitting long term reform proposals 
during Treaty reforms, that the preferences for an overall communitarisation are 
clearly expressed by the Commission. The Council Secretariat has, in particular in the 
area of foreign policies, only started to develop somewhat autonomous preferences. 
The High Representative and the Special Representative, thus, not only provide an 
institutional counter weight at the EU level vis-a-vis the Commission, but also indicate 
the linkage between authority delegation and the emergence of autonomous 
orientations vis-a-vis the member states (Tallberg 2002).
There is a marked difference in the preferences of executive actors and those 
controlling the executive. This can be explained by the marginal position o f these 
‘control actors’ in most institutional settings of foreign and interior policies. The
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pillar structure o f both areas and the high degree of discretion of the executive have 
been heavily criticised by Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Court o f Auditors. 
It is quite noteworthy that this criticism has not merely been directed towards the 
member states or the Council, but has covered the Commission’s role in both areas 
as well. Although EU actors indeed share some preferences on further centralisation 
o f macro political stabilisation policies at the EU level, this does not prevent the 
dominance of quite divergent preferences which appear mainly on the executive- 
control dimension.
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Ch a p t e r  7
Patterns of Interaction 
Executive-control Relations and Inner Executive Coordination
Introduction
As the previous chapters have shown, European integration in foreign and interior 
policies is a rather complex endeavour and so is an analysis on the role of EU actors 
in that process. Foreign and interior policies have been subject to quite contradictory 
developments between the poles of centralisation and incrementalism. Hence, 
centripetal dynamics stemming from the functional requirement of providing the 
Union with macro political stabilisation are constantly balanced by the incremental 
process of giving ‘policy flesh* to the ‘skeleton* of the emerging functional frame of 
macro political stabilisation policies. The cross pillar institutional setting reveals at 
the same time both the significance of centralisation at the EU level as well as the 
continuous constraints and often deadlocks to centralised policy making. And, while 
the preferences of EU actors, on the one hand, disclose their autonomous role in the 
policy making process, they do also highlight the manifold limitations to a more 
powerful role of EU actors in the policy making process.
The arguments o f this thesis pertaining to the functional dynamics of macro 
political stabilisation policies, suggest that characterisations of ‘intergovernmental* or 
‘supranational* EU politics are more often than not imprecise. From a functional 
perspective it can be argued that centralising foreign and interior policies is not a 
zero sum game in which gains regarding centralisation at the EU level necessarily 
translate into losses of the national level. Seen from that perspective, the hybrid cross 
pillar setting of both areas ensures an equilibrium between both the centre and the 
periphery of the EU political system.213 Moreover, the preferences o f EU actors
213 The teems centre and periphery, dating back to Seymour Martin Upset’s and Stein Rokkan’s 
seminal study on European party systems, do not contain any implicit normative judgement about the 
distribution o f competencies between the centre and the periphery. In EU foreign and interior
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show that the centralisation of macro political stabilisation policies is neither under 
the complete control of national governments, nor is it a plot by supranational agents 
to undermine traditional state authority in these areas. As the analysis of this thesis 
has shown, the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ are not antagonistic entities. Neither 
‘member states’ nor “EU  actors’ are homogenous blocs with quasi identical, fixed and 
mutually exclusive orientations.
As a result o f these insights, any new categorisation o f patterns of interaction 
in EU foreign and interior politics has to be aware of these complexities rather than 
trying to reduce them to a point of invisibility such as often inherent in ascriptions of 
‘supranational’ or ‘intergovernmental’ logics of European integration (Moravcsik 
1998; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998). Having said this, is there, after all, any 
possibility left to categorise and systematise policy making in EU foreign and interior 
policies?
This chapter argues that the analysis of functions, institutions and actors of 
macro political stabilisation policies allows us to develop such a new typology of the 
main patterns of interaction in the policy making process. It proposes a 
categorisation of policy making in both areas based on the main characteristic 
features of interaction in EU foreign and interior policies as they have been identified 
in the previous chapters, namely executive-control relations, on the one hand, and 
inner executive coordination, on the other.
First, as the arguments put forward in the previous chapters have 
emphasised, the main dividing line o f EU foreign and interior policies is not located 
on the intergovernmental-supranational dimension but rather on the executive- 
control dimension. Member states’ government, the Council and its Secretariat as 
well as the Commission jointly hold the key institutional resources in the policy 
making process and their respective cross pillar capabilities often tend to overlap, 
thus inducing the necessity for a cooperative approach to policy making within the 
dual executive. The capabilities of Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Court of
polities, for example, the periphery continues to hold the major institutional resources (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967).
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Auditors to control policy making by the executive are limited. This combination 
between constraints to parliamentary and judicial control, on the one hand, and a 
high degree o f autonomy o f the executive has structured policy making in EU 
foreign and interior affairs. This chapter suggests to look at the policy making 
process in foreign (Middle East) and interior (migration) policies from the viewpoint 
o f this dominant dichotomy.
Second, such an assertion does not imply that either of these two main blocs 
are in any way homogenous. Indeed, an analysis of inner executive coordination 
reveals not only the considerable degree of overlap between the capabilities of the 
Commission, the Council Secretariat and the member states. It also brings to the fore 
manifold coordination problems, divergent orientations as well as various deadlocks 
for decision making and implementation.
Two dom inantpatterns o f policy making in E U  foreign and interiorpolicies 
The identification of these two main patterns of interaction of policy making in EU 
foreign and interior affairs can be explained by the combined effect, within the 
functional frame set by the centralisation process of macro political stabilisation 
policies, o f the various institutional and actor related variables discussed in the 
previous chapters. Thus, the analysis of the functional dimension of macro political 
stabilisation policies directs attention towards the relationship between the 
emergence of a distinct EU sovereignty and the parallel endurance of traditional 
national notions of sovereignty. These functional features not only rendered 
decisions on the substance o f policies in both areas a highly incremental process but 
also explain the emergence o f the complex institutional provisions o f cross pillar 
politics and the quite divergent preferences of EU actors in both areas, which have 
been identified in chapters 4 to 6.
These functional dynamics of the centralisation process in macro political 
stabilisation policies also form the background against which the specific patterns of 
interaction between EU actors and national actors in the policy making process can 
be understood. In both areas, those actors that control the executive but often lack
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any significant influence, such as Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Court o f 
Auditors, have been highly critical of executive policy making. What is interesting is 
that this criticism was not only related towards the member states, the Council or the 
Council Secretariat It included to the same extent criticism about executive policy 
making by the Commission. Even more than that, since the capabilities in particular 
o f Parliament to put pressure on the Commission are higher than its ability to 
pressurise the Council, the Commission has actually been a preferred anchorage of 
parliamentary scrutiny.
Notwithstanding the dominance of the executive-control dimension, inner 
executive relations have not always been smooth. While there is a requirement for 
close executive coordination in both areas, the meshed capabilities within the dual 
executive have often resulted in coordination problems at all stages of the decision 
making process. Thus, the Commission often had to take into account the reluctance 
of some member states to use communitarised allays for policy making in foreign 
and interior affairs. Being aware of the sensitivity of both areas to national 
sovereignty, the Commission has developed a cautious, largely non confrontational 
approach to solve coordination problems and has only exceptionally referred to 
direct opposition such as seeking conflict resolution by the Court of Justice.
The relations between Parliament, the Court of Justice and Court of Auditors 
are not based on permanent coordination as is the case within the dual executive. 
Activities o f these three actors remain only loosely coordinated. It is particularly 
Parliament which can strategically use reports from the Court of Auditors or file 
charges against the dual executive with the Court of Justice. These ad hoc alliances do, 
however, not amount to a somewhat institutionalised opposition from Parliament, 
the Court o f Justice and the Court of Auditors vis-a-vis die executive, nor are they 
necessarily successful given divergent orientations between these ‘control actors*.
Patterns o f policy m aking I: executive-control relations
Interaction among EU actors is heavily shaped by the cross pillar institutional setting 
of macro political stabilisation policies. This setting sets the main dividing line in EU
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foreign and interior policies not on the supranational-intergovernmental axis but 
cross cuts this dimension along the distinction between executive actors 
(Commission, Secretariat, Council and member states), on the one hand, and those 
actors controlling the executive (Parliament, Court of Justice and Court o f Auditors), 
on the other. The distribution of power on the two sides o f this executive-control 
dimension is, however, not balanced. While executive actors jointly hold the main 
institutional resources in the policy making process, the powers o f Parliament, the 
Court o f Justice and the Court of Auditors are, as has already been outlined in 
previous chapters, much less pronounced. This pattern has, in turn, impacted 
interaction between the two sides on four main dimensions.
First, in most institutional arenas of foreign and interior policies there is 
actually only very limited interaction between the two sides and this lack of joint 
decision making mechanisms enables both executive actors and ‘control actors’ to 
pursue quite different policy agendas. The effect of these ‘different spheres’, with the 
Commission and the Council, on the one side, and Parliament, the Court o f Justice 
and the Court o f Auditors, on the other, is threefold. Thus, both the dual executive 
and ‘control actors’ have been able to pursue their policy agendas with a considerable 
degree o f autonomy. Moreover, actual policy making is characterised by a strong 
dominance of executive actors while the influence of ‘control actors’ on day-to-day 
decision making has been rather weak. Lastly, successful assertion by ‘control actors’ 
against the executive is rare and often takes the form of quite confrontational 
measures, such as referral to the Court of Justice or even threatening the 
Commission with a motion of censure. It is striking that in particular in those rare 
instances in which ‘control actors’ have jointly confronted the executive they have 
been able to exert some influence on policy making.
As far as the legislative process is concerned, Parliament’s role in both 
foreign and interior policies remains limited. It is only with regard to budgetary issues 
that Parliament has been able to regularly assert its role in the policy making process. 
However, recourse to the budget cannot conceal the overall limited impact on the 
substance of EU policies, given the overall small size o f the budget. Even more
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limited is the role of the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. Their 
involvement in the policy making process largely depends upon recourse made to 
them by other actors, which has in practice mainly been the European Parliament. 
Yet, recourse to the Court of Justice is a cosdy weapon, the deployment of which has 
to be exercised cautiously since the hierarchical direction’ of judgements by the 
Court renders this option a rather confrontational step (Scharpf 1997: 171-194). In 
migration policies, Parliament has on two occasions made use of this option. In the 
Visa U st case Parliament has been successful in annulling a Council act after 
Parliament felt that its institutional prerogative of consultation in the legislative 
process has been neglected by the executive. Indeed, after this judgement has 
occurred, member states and the Commission have become much more willing to 
consult Parliament on legislative proposals. The threat of making recourse to the 
Court o f Justice on an alleged failure to act by the executive regarding the 
abolishment of internal border controls has led a hesitant Commission to finally 
make legislative proposals on that matter (Peers 2000: 75). A confrontational stance 
was also taken by P arliament in its motion of censure against the college of 
Commissioners in 1999 when Parliament accused the Commission of corruption 
following allegations made by the Court of Auditors.
It is quite noteworthy that on all these occasions in which Parliament 
adopted a confrontational stance it was not acting alone but based its action on 
support from other ‘control actors’. Moreover, a look at policy making in foreign and 
interior policies reveals another approach of Parliament, namely to pressurise mainly 
the Commission in order to ensure its greater involvement in the decision making 
process. The reluctance of some member states to delegate further capabilities in the 
two areas to the Commission can inter alia be related to this susceptibility of the 
Commission to pressure from Parliament This susceptibility is smaller for other 
executive actors, such as for example the Council Secretariat This helps to explain 
why it was the Council Secretariat that has, in the area o f foreign affairs, emerged
214 Interviews 27 and 28, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
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following the Maastricht Treaty as the EU actor which has been delegated the 
greatest amount of new capabilities.
Notwithstanding these examples, direct interaction between executive actors 
and ‘control actors’ is, due to the institutional rules in both foreign and interior 
policies, limited. The small amount o f joint decision making institutions between the 
executive, on the one hand, and ‘control actors’, on the other, has also left its mark 
on the policy preferences o f these actors. Thus, not only are the capabilities within 
the dual executive often overlapping but so are the very preferences on concrete 
issues in the policy making process. These jointly derived assessments are, however, 
not developed jointly with Parliament, let alone the other ‘control actors*. While 
these ‘different spheres’ of communication have met widespread criticism about the 
lack of parliamentary control in EU foreign and interior policies, they have also 
provided Parliament with the space to develop an alternative agenda o f EU politics 
in both areas.
The small amount o f interaction of Parliament, on the one hand, and the dual 
executive, on the other, has been emphasised by several officials.215 Thus, a member 
of the Commission’s legal service pointed out that by focusing on an alternative 
policy agenda in the area of Middle East policies, such as human rights and 
democracy issues, ‘Parliament is leading a different life’.216 These ‘different lives’ of 
Parliament, on the one hand, and the executive, on the other, did also affect relations 
between the two sides. A member o f the Special Representative’s team argued that 
‘Parliament is an outside actor’, while a member of the Council Secretariat pointed 
out that ‘with Parliament we have almost no contact*.217 These limits to interaction 
posed by the different spheres in which both sides act, has been similarly 
pronounced in migration policies. An official from the Secretariat confirmed that
215 The limited amount o f interaction does also relate to relations between the executive with the 
Court o f Justice and the Court o f Auditors. It must, however, be considered that these two ‘control 
actors* remain outside o f the day-to-day political process regarding decision making. Their 
involvement is very much dependent upon recourse to their judgements or their reports made by 
other actors.
216 Interview 12, Head o f Unit, Commission, Brussels, June 2000.
217 Interview 19, Advisor to Special Representative, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000. Interview 
35, Desk Officer, Commission, Brussels, July 2000.
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‘contacts with Parliament are sporadic and mainly one way, if Parliament needs 
something like documents or legal advice’.218 This lack of interaction has to be 
contrasted with the regular, institutionally induced, day-to-day interaction between 
Council and Commission. Officials from the legal service of the Council Secretariat, 
dealing with migration policy issues, have thus held that ‘the institutional interplay is 
closer with the Commission. With Parliament contact hardly exists. We do not know 
our counterparts [there]’.219 Laconically, another official from the Secretariat added 
that ‘there are many meetings with the Commission legal service. Parliament’s legal 
service we only met in the Court o f Justice’ during the Visa Lists case.220
Second, these different spheres of action must, however, not be considered 
being synonymous with a somewhat equal division of powers to these two spheres. 
In fact, patterns of interaction between executive actors and ‘control actors’ in EU 
foreign and interior policies are characterised by an unequal distribution of powers 
regarding their capabilities in the policy making process. With most institutional 
arenas in foreign and interior policies exhibiting limited space for effective 
parliamentary or judicial control, the dominance of the dual executive looms as one 
of the most characteristic features o f macro political stabilisation policies. It should, 
however, also be noted that executive dominance, at least as far as foreign policies 
are concerned, is a quite common feature also of national politics. Along these lines, 
a member o f the British House o f Commons has argued, while comparing the 
powers of the European Parliament with those of national parliaments, that also ‘the 
influence of the House o f Commons on foreign policies is small and only indirect’.221 
Within the cross pillar institutional setting of macro political stabilisation policies, the 
dominance o f the executive reaches beyond foreign policies and covers interior 
affairs as well. An MEP, involved in the area of migration policies, blatantly
218 Interview 44, Head o f Unit, Council Secretariat, Brussels, July 2000.
219 Interviews 27 and 28, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
220 Interview 26, Director, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
221 Interview 6, MP, House o f Commons, London, May 2000.
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conceded this lacking impact Influence from Parliament? For God’s sake there is 
,222none.
Only on those instances in which Parliament has been able to bring a certain 
issue onto the official (executive) EU agenda, a limited impact on policy making 
could be detected. According to another MEP this has been the case in migration 
policies with Parliament’s years long insistence that the issue of the abolishment of 
internal border controls must be tackled more actively by the executive.223 While the 
SEA originally set the deadline for achieving the free movement of persons by 1 
January 1993, this deadline passed without an abolishment of internal border 
controls. Subsequendy, interaction between Parliament and the executive in the years 
1993 to 1995 on interior policy issues was dominated by Parliament’s repeated calls 
for action to be taken particularly in this area.224 Parliament specifically pressured the 
Commission to initiate legislation on that regard and ultimately brought an action on 
the Commission’s alleged failure to act before the Court of Justice. It was only after 
the Com m ission had presented the three so-called ‘Monti Directives’ on an 
abolishment o f internal border controls in March 1995, that the Court o f Justice 
issued an opinion on Parliament’s request in which the court stated that ‘it had no 
need to rule on the EP’s “failure to act” case’ (ibid.: 75). Parliament subsequendy 
continued to push for action in this area but refrained from filing another failure to 
act charge, although the Council did not vote on the Commission’s three proposals. 
This once again points to the approach by Parliament to pressure in particular the 
Commission when demanding action from the executive.
This unequal distribution of powers also affected executive-control relations 
in EU foreign policies. As a Head of Unit from the Commission specified, 
‘Parliament’s influence is small and its focus is on political projects. There is more 
cooperation between us and the Council.’225 Such as in interior policies, Parliament’s
222 Interview 30, MEP, European Parliament, June 2000.
223 There was a central role for Parliament around the Article 8a issue on which, through continuous 
insistence, there has been some limited influence/ Interview 20, MEP, Brussels, June 2000.
224 See Agence Europe, various issues.
225 Interview 12, Head o f Unit, Commission, Brussels, June 21000.
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impact on policy making remained mainly limited to voicing its alternative policy 
agenda hoping that some of its demands might be taken on board by the executive. 
An MEP confirmed that ‘our influence is mainly through information and debates’. 
Yet, overall she had Tittle belief in Parliament besides resolutions’ which might 
convince, over time, the dual executive of the need to deal more intensively with a 
certain issue in the policy making process. As a concrete example of such continuous 
insistence could be mentioned Parliament’s long standing record o f focusing on 
issues such as the rules of origin provisions with regard to Israeli products originating 
from the Occupied Territories. ‘Commission and Council seem to pay more 
attention to our views and we should [therefore] keep the pressure’.226 Another 
example for this emphasis on alternative issues is Parliament’s pressure to openly 
deal with the allegations that EU funds, managed by the Commission, are used by the 
PA to sponsor terrorist activities. While the Commission has tried to keep this issue 
off the agenda, Parliament has organised several debates, supported by intense media 
coverage, in which it has questioned the allocation of funds by the Commission in 
Palestine. Once publicity on this case was installed, a further concealment by the 
Commission was no longer possible and the case is now formally investigated by the 
EU fraud office.
Third, a permanent, institutionally regulated interaction between executive 
actors and ‘control actors’ (in particular Parliament) with somewhat balanced powers 
o f the two sides has been established with regard to budgetary issues. An official 
from the Middle East Unit of the Commission conceded that Tarliament has in 
particular its budgetary powers. Concrete examples are the blocking o f financial 
cooperation with Turkey. Parliament wants a say over every single operational 
decision of the CFSP’.227 Moreover, Parliament used its budgetary powers to create 
new budget lines, such as in 1994, when the MEDA Democracy funds were 
established following a proposal by Parliament A committee chairman from 
Parliament supported this view and argued that ‘our main role is the budget’ and that
226 Interview 15, MEP, Head o f Inter Group, European Parliament, June 2000.
227 Interview 10, Desk officer, Commission, Brussels, June 20001
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Parliament has been able to ensure greater consideration of funding, within the 
MEDA budget, o f human rights related projects with NGOs in third countries 
without direct governmental involvement228 Similarly, an official from the 
parliamentary Administrative Service on migration policies regarded the budget as 
the ‘big force of Parliament’ for example regarding the establishment o f the ERF.229
The way in which this limited impact, which Parliament can exert through its 
role as one of the budgetary authorities of the EU, is used meets with mixed 
emotions on the side of the dual executive. Being otherwise largely unaffected by 
parliamentary involvement, not all officials fed that ‘P arliam en t was correct in 
pressing us to include also financing of human rights’ projects’ since these projects 
were very difficult to implement.230 Commission officials hence criticised that 
Parliament’s demands are often unrealistic. ‘The Commission cannot deliver what 
Parliament wants in the human rights budget line’, one official argued.231 And in the 
area o f migration policies a deputy Head of Unit from the Commission pointed out 
that ‘many projects were put on us by Parliament’ against the will o f the executive.232 
Commission officials were particularly concerned of being trapped between non 
reconcilable expectations by member states, on the one hand, and by Parliament, on 
the other. *The problem is that the Commission is often in the middle between 
Parliament and the Council’.233 Moreover, Commission officials criticised that 
Parliament uses its budgetary authority as a political tool against the EU executive, in 
general, and the Commission, in particular. Thus, one Commission official compared 
Parliament with other ‘control actors’ and considered that when compared with 
Parliament, ‘the Court of Auditors is more balanced. We are not afraid to be under 
scrutiny but the way in which it is done matters’234
228 Interview 33, MEP, Head o f Inter Group, European Parliam ent, July 2000.
229 Interview 41, Administrator, European Parliament, Brussels, July 2000.
230 Interview 47, former Israeli army official, Berlin, November 2002.
231 Interview 10, Desk officer, Commission, Brussels, June 2000.
232 Interview 45, Deputy Head o f Unit, Commission, Brussels, July 2000.
233 Interview 45, Deputy Head o f Unit, Commission, Brussels, July 2000.
234 Interview 17, Desk Officer, Commission, Brussels, June 2000.
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Fourth, the overall limited amount of direct impact on policy making in both 
areas has occasionally rendered attempts to use ‘hierarchical direction’, either through 
the Court o f Justice or the Court o f Auditors, Parliament’s main instrument in 
executive-control interaction (Scharpf 1997: 47). The search for allies against 
executive dominance is based on Parliament’s scepticism ‘with the Commission’s 
willingness’ to seriously consider parliamentary demands and the perception that the 
Commission is ‘member states’ oriented’.235 It has already been pointed out that in 
the area of migration policies Parliament has brought up a charge against the 
Commission relating to the free movement of persons. Another example of this 
quest for hierarchical direction is the Visa Lists case of 1997, which has already been 
discussed in the previous chapter. It seems that Parliament has been able to foster its 
role in the policy making process as a result of its successful intervention with the 
court. Officials from the Council Secretariat confirmed that following this case ‘we 
pay more attention to Parliament. We reconsult them generously on a couple of 
files’.236 This perception of a gradually increased interaction between executive actors, 
on the one hand, and Parliament, on the other, has also been shared by MEPs 
themselves. An official from Parliament, dealing with migration policies, argued that 
‘openness increases from the Council and member states’, a perspective which also 
pertains to interaction on foreign policies.237
The use of ‘threat’ instruments did, overall, not increase trust between the 
two sides. The aforementioned failure to act charge of Parliament was seen by 
officials from the Council as ‘a political decision o f Parliament’ lacking serious legal 
backing, thus rendering smaller their willingness to share powers with Parliament in 
the policy making process.238 Even more strained were relations in Middle East 
policies when Parliament has in 1999, supported by corruption charges against a 
Commissioner responsible for financing projects in the framework o f the EMP 
brought up by a report of the Court of Auditors, called for the resignation of the
235 Interview 41, Administrator, European Parliament, Brussels, July 2000.
236 Interviews 27 and 28, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
237 Interview 41, Administrator, European Parliament, Brussels, July 2000.
238 Interviews 27 and 28, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
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entire college of Commissioners. A Commission official accused Parliament that this 
was a politically inspired ‘campaign* of Parliament. *There was no corruption with 
EU money* he argued and maintained that Tarliament acted irresponsible* with the 
only goal in mind to foster its role vis-a-vis the executive in the policy making 
process.239 This perspective, although not shared by parliamentarians, points 
nevertheless to an inherent dilemma of executive-control relations in EU foreign and 
interior policies. The overall impact of ‘control actors* remains limited and often 
‘threat*, such as repeatedly filing charges with the Court of Justice or threatening the 
Commission, remains the only option for Parliament to get heard by the executive. 
This option, however, is costly since it undermines the development of cooperative 
working relations between the two sides. Moreover, Parliament has to be cautious in 
using this option since future delegation of additional capabilities in both areas 
depends on the goodwill o f member states which can, of course, only be assured if  
Parliament is considered ‘responsible* - whatever that might entail.
To conclude, patterns of interaction between executive actors and ‘control 
actors* are structured by the functionally induced unequal distribution o f capabilities 
between these actors in the area of macro political stabilisation policies. Both sides 
often act within different spheres, the executive being involved in day-to-day 
decision making while Parliament focuses on an alternative policy agenda. Constant 
interaction remains mainly limited to the budgetary dimension of foreign and interior 
policies, where Parliament has some limited influence to establish budgetary headings 
for some of its alternative policy issues. The lack of significant parliamentary control 
in most institutional arenas o f both areas has rendered the option of threat one of 
the few, albeit costly, fields of interaction. Due to these costs, however, this option 
has been only used by Parliament in small doses. While the willingness o f 
Commission and Council to deal with parliamentary demands has, according to 
statements from both sides, slightly increased, the unequal distribution o f capabilities
239 Interview 34, former Director, Commission, Brussels, July 2000.
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within the policy making process remains the characterising feature o f interaction in 
EU foreign and interior policies.
Patterns o f interaction II: inner executive coordination
As has been outlined in the previous section, executive actors dominate the policy 
making process in EU foreign and interior policies. Notwithstanding their 
considerable capabilities for autonomously shaping policies in both areas, the 
competencies o f each single executive actor are nevertheless constrained, affecting in 
particular die autonomy of the Commission. These constraints do, however, not 
mainly emanate from parliamentary or judicial control, but rather from a complex 
system of inner executive checks and balances between the Commission, the Council 
Secretariat and member states’ governments. Policy making in most institutional 
arenas of EU foreign and interior affairs is highly dependent upon negotiated, 
consensual and often unanimous agreement within the dual executive.240 Inner 
executive coordination takes place at all levels of the policy making process and 
applies to the initiation of legislation, the adoption of legislative acts and the 
implementation of policies on the ground. There are two main rationales behind 
these often overlapping competencies. On the one hand, the strong joint decision 
making mechanisms serve a particular function for centralising an area as closely 
related to sovereignty as macro political stabilisation policies. This function is to 
ensure cautious and incremental policy m aking which would not as easily be assured 
if macro political stabilisation policies were governed across the board by qualified 
majority voting in the Council, a sole right of initiative for the Commission, 
codedsion in the legislative process, and full jurisdiction o f the Court o f Justice. On 
the other hand, there is a less functionalist reading of these consensual institutions 
and such a perspective lends attention towards the manifold deadlocks and frictions 
in policy making caused by joint dedsion making mechanisms. It is hence argued 
here that inner executive coordination in macro political stabilisation polides is
240 The more the Council Secretariat takes on features of an autonomous actor, as for example in 
foreign policies, one could even talk o f a triple EU executive consisting o f Commission, Council 
(member states) and Council Secretariat.
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characterised by intense patterns of consensual policy making, on the one hand, and 
deadlocks with regard to policy initiation, decision taking and implementation 
resulting from these joint decision making mechanisms, on the other. The remainder 
o f this chapter looks at these deadlocks in greater detail. It should, however, be 
emphasised that often deadlocks in strong joint decision making system, such as in 
EU foreign and interior policies, serve a systemic function, namely to reinforce the 
functionalist features of the ‘consensus principle [which] is to let all o f the important 
parties share executive power in a broad coalition’ (Lijphart 1984: 23).
There is a strong sense among executive actors about the need for such a 
consensual coordination and this understanding results not least from the 
assumption that without strong inner executive coordination an excess o f deadlocks 
would ultimately block policy making. An official from the Council Secretariat 
pointed to the requirement for inner executive coordination by emphasising the 
extent of overlapping competencies in macro political stabilisation policies. Thus, 
while the Council is responsible for political foreign affairs, ‘the Commission is a 
heavy actor in Middle East policies due to its knowledge and administration o f funds’ 
and these two tracks have constantly to be coordinated.241 A less positive but 
nevertheless similarly intriguing assessment has been put forward by members of the 
Special Representative’s staff. One official argued that ‘the Commission is very 
important’ but deplored that the ‘Commission is not willing to share information 
with us and also the delegation do not. So the Special Envoy and the Secretariat are 
little informed’, thus pointing to possible frictions in inner executive coordination.242 
Similar arguments have been expressed by officials in the area o f migration policies. 
Members from the legal service of the Council Secretariat argued that ‘the 
Commission has a lot of power’ and that Vorking parties are often dominated by 
Presidency and Commission’.243
241 Interview 14, Desk officer, Council Secretariat, Brussels, Jiune 2000.
242 Interview 19, Advisor to Special Representative, Council Secretariat, Brussels, June 2000.
243 Interviews 27 and 28, Legal Service, Council Secretariat, Birussels, June 2000.
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As far as the initiation of legislation by the dual executive is concerned, both 
areas are characterised by a cautious approach of the Commission to make use of its 
right o f initiative. The main reason for this reluctance, obviously, relates to the 
difficulties of getting proposals adopted due to considerable divergence of member 
states’ preferences which in most areas vote on legislative proposals by unanimity. 
These difficulties have given rise to an ‘initiation deficit’. Moreover, the Commission 
has been extremely cautious in proposing new legislation fearing that some member 
states would oppose a too active use of the right of initiative. As has already been 
outlined in previous chapters, the main approach of the Commission was to become 
accepted by member states rather than to develop an assertive attitude regarding its 
own policy preferences. While the Commission did, for example, propose long term 
visions for the development of EU migration policies, such as in the 1994 
communication, it usually refrained from suggesting controversial pieces of 
legislation. This cautious attitude did not fundamentally change after the Amsterdam 
Treaty entered into force. It is quite telling that the new Commissioner for Justice 
and Home Affairs, prior to the publication of the first scoreboard in December 1999, 
conducted a tour o f capitals in which the concrete measures to be enlisted in the 
scoreboard were piece by piece hammered out between the Commission and each 
national interior ministry. Being aware that the shared right of initiative as well as the 
predominance of unanimous decision making modes could potentially provoke a 
stalemate of policy making in this area, the Commission’s main focus was directed 
towards intense inner executive coordination prior to the initiation o f (consensually 
agreed) legislation.
It should be noted that while the Com m ission is quite cautious in proposing 
new legislation, member states, in both areas, have been much less reluctant to make 
use of their right o f initiative. It was in particular the changing Presidencies which 
sought to bring certain issues onto the EU agenda. In migration policies, these 
member states’ proposals have not always been in consistence with the commonly 
agreed scoreboard priorities. A similar tendency can also be observed in foreign 
policies. A Commission official argued, while referring specifically to the Common
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Strategy on the Mediterranean Region, that the ‘Council tries to limit the 
Commission. More proposals come now from member states’. Being aware o f this 
importance which member states attach to (diplomatic) foreign relations, ‘the 
Commission plays a cautious role in political relations’.244
The joint decision making mechanism at the stage o f initiating legislation are 
further exacerbated by the consensual patterns o f concrete decision taking. This is, 
for example, underlined by the difficulties into which the actual translation o f the 
scoreboard into concrete decision has run. Indeed, decision taking in migration 
policies has been a painstakingly slow process. About one year before the expiry, in 
May 2004, of the five year period for the adoption o f all scoreboard measures, key 
legislative proposals in migration policies got stuck in the legislative pipeline due to 
continuing disagreement among member states. The scoreboard of December 2002 
hence states that contrary to the dates o f adoption originally set in 1999, ‘only a few 
of the objectives defined for the establishment of a common asylum and immigration 
policy have been met* (Commission 2002b: 5). The Commission’s hope that yet 
another call from a European Council to accelerate the speed o f decision taking 
would cut the Gordian knot are decreasing. Disappointment is only scantily covered 
up when the Commission points out that ‘the Seville European Council did 
endeavour to accentuate the dynamism flowing from the Laeken European Council 
(ibid). In the very same document, however, the Commission expresses its scepticism 
about the significance o f this ‘flow o f dynamism’ much more openly and argues that 
‘the backlog referred to by the Laeken European Council has not been cleared in 
some areas, notably as regards the common policies on asylum and immigration, 
though the necessary proposals are all before the Council’ (ibid.: 4).
The final stage on which the virtues and perils of strong inner executive 
coordination have become visible relates to the implementation o f policies. They can 
well be exemplified when looking in greater detail at the implementation of 
developmental assistance by the Commission. Thus, several detailed reports from
244 Interview 11, Desk officer, Commission, Brussels, June 200ft.
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external consultants have scrutinised the implementation of EU developmental 
assistance in the Mediterranean region, in general, and Palestine, in particular. These 
reports mainly dealt with the responsibilities of the Commission but also touched 
upon the issue of coordination o f assistance between the Commission and member 
states within specialised committees, such as the MED committee already referred to 
in chapter 5. Indeed, these reports highlight a multitude of implementation problems 
emanating from within the institutional structure of the EU foreign affairs system, 
mainly from cumbersome procedures regulating the relations between the 
Commission, on the one hand, and member states, on the other (Stetter 2003).
Such an analysis of a gap between the ambitious political goals o f the EU as 
they were, for example, defined in the Common Strategy and the actual 
implementation of MEDA assistance measures by the EU on the ground should, 
however, not lead to the conclusion that problems of inner executive coordination 
could completely be avoided. Politics, after all, is a process of complex interaction 
and necessarily consumes time and this is particularly true for a sensitive area such as 
macro political stabilisation policies. Nevertheless, observations from the case of 
developmental assistance show that some of the problems in implementation could 
have been avoided without harming the inter-institutional balance between the 
European and the national levels. While the improvements of EU assistance in the 
framework of the EMP, when compared with the period prior to the Barcelona 
Conference, has been generally acknowledged by these reports, MEDA assistance 
was nevertheless severely hampered by a very slow disbursement o f assistance in 
partner countries (MEDA 1999; COWI 1998: 42). Thus, in the period from 1995 to 
1998 only 25 per cent o f promised assistance has been disbursed to partner 
countries. Figures for Palestine were significantly higher, reflecting the priority the 
EU attached to Middle East policies, but did also not surmount 48 per cent. While 
some o f the shortcomings in implementation can be related to deadlocks in bilateral 
negotiations or resistance from partner countries to engage in political and economic
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reforms, EU internal features help to account for most of these implementation 
problems.245
Implementation o f EU assistance had already been criticised for its 
disbursement of funds during the protocol period, which predated the EMP. Thus, it 
is striking that the much more demanding procedures for EU assistance under the 
new MEDA regime did not go hand in hand with a streamlining of inner executive 
coordination. On the contrary, more complex programmes were added to  the 
Commission’s workload without consideration of how this would affect the 
operation o f projects. The MEDA Regulation stipulates three different levels at 
which the member states, within the MED Committee, are to be involved in the 
implementation of aid by the Commission. These levels are on the strategic level o f 
annually updated Regional and National Indicative Programmes, the operational level 
o f individual, country related Financing Decisions and Financing Protocols and, 
finally, the implementation level concerning concrete tendering procedures.
When deciding on National and Regional Indicative Programmes, the MED 
Committee approves, on the Commission’s suggestion, ‘sector priorities for a Project 
[as well as] portfolio according to country-specific and regional sector policy criteria’ 
(MEDA 1999: 21). While the coordination between member states and the 
Commission at the strategic level is important to ensure the achievement o f the 
overall objectives of EU developmental policies, this is not valid to the same extent 
for involvement of member states at the operational and implementation level. Thus, 
with regard to commitments of the Commission concerning individual projects, the 
specific involvement o f the MED Committee created many significant delays in 
implementation (ibid.: 36).
Problems at the operational and implementation level are exacerbated by the 
lack of coordination between EU and member state developmental assistance to
245 It must be also be mentioned that the implementation o f  polities in the framework o f the EMP 
was not only problematic regarding financial assistance. Also progress relating to other polities or 
other 'baskets’ o f  die EMP was lacking behind schedule, such as, for example, on the EMP security 
charter, on the conclusion o f some Association Agreements or on the establishment of a Euro- 
Mediterranean Free Trade Area, including flanking measures such as the rules o f  origin provisions.
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partner countries {ibid.: 37). The demand from the MEDA Regulation to define 
priority sectors on a national or a regional basis does, moreover, just apply for the 
EU level and not to member states’ policies, hence further decreasing effectiveness 
of policies.
Overall, the commitment procedures of the MEDA Regulations created a 
time consuming workload of information and communication exercises for both the 
Commission and the member states. The outcome of this communication process is 
questionable since member states were in practice only informed about the 
‘intermediary status’ of projects but were not able or willing to really engage in 
discussion on ‘substantial, policy-related issues’ (ibid). Nevertheless, this information 
exercise took the form of huge reports prepared by the Commission, which required 
a heavy input of human resources which were consequendy not available for 
reducing the time delays in negotiating and implementing the necessary agreements 
for launching MEDA assistance.
Moreover, the involvement o f the MED Committee has resulted in often 
inefficient ‘extra operational work-load’ for the Commission (ibid.: 39). This has 
actually hampered the effectiveness o f inner executive coordination since the MED 
Committee was involved in micro financing decisions while losing track of ensuring 
the ‘coherence and consistency of strategic programming’ (ibid.: 39). A similar 
criticism was raised with regard to the time consuming control by the MED 
Committee at the implementation stage, for example when deciding on tender 
procedures for individual projects (MEDA 1999: 47). While the Commission was 
closely controlled in its decision making, the reverse did not happen, ‘i.e. that 
Member States programmes be planned in co-ordination of complementarity with 
Commission programmes [...] It would perhaps appear to be an infringement on the 
Member States’ highly sensitive foreign policies’ (ibid.: 90).
It has been estimated that insufficient procedures within the MED 
Committee resulted in a delay o f around one year with regard to the implementation 
o f MEDA assistance (ibid.: 57). This figure points to a problematic emphasis in the 
workload of both the Commission (preparing interim reports for the MED
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Committee) and the committee itself (dealing with too many details). A shift towards 
more cooperation on the strategic planning level seems the more justified since the 
rate o f approval for projects suggested by the Commission is already high. Out o f 87 
projects throughout the Mediterranean region from 1995-97, the committee 
approved 38 projects unanimously and another 39 with some qualified suggestions. 
Only nine projects had to be redrafted but were then approved. Only one project 
was turned down (C O W I1998: 33).
The strict requirements for financing projects were another factor of 
implementation problems. The misuse and mal-administration of funds during the 
protocol period explains why such a complex system as the MEDA assistance had 
been established. The problem of the new procedures, however, was that the 
Commission now was confronted with an even greater workload — negotiating 
financing provision with partner countries and communicating these negotiations to 
the MED Committee — without a real change in human resources at its disposal. A 
former head of delegation in the Middle East cynically summarised his experience 
about the workload in delegations as follows. There is an optimistic version that 95 
per cent of our time was related to solving problems of implementation of the 
project cycle.’246
Besides the time delays and problems in coordination within the MED 
Committee, the work load o f the C ommission appears as a third issue related to 
implementation problems. The MEDA case actually shows that the Commission was 
faced with a dilemma resulting from the requirements of complex and time 
consuming procedures, on the one hand, and lack of human resources, on the other 
hand. These had to be balanced with expectations from partner countries in quick 
assistance, from member states in intense coordination and by Parliament in correct 
implementation.
The Commission was only able to employ additional staff for the 
implementation o f the MEDA funds in 1998 when country based MEDA Teams
246 Interview 32, Deputy Head o f  Cabinet, Commission, Brussels, July 2000.
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were formed {ibid.: 41). While the MEDA Teams were useful in improving facilitating 
work on the operational and implementation level they could not contribute to a 
more effective approach with regard to the strategic level o f planning. Even after the 
launch o f MEDA assistance the Commission did little for the development o f proper 
‘strategic planning instruments, (MEDA 1999: 32). And also the delegations were 
cautious in adjusting projects to the new MEDA requirements. In the light o f the 
complexities of inner executive coordination and the absence o f a ‘programming- 
and-monitoring unit o f the Commission’, ^Delegation staff [...] prefer to stick to 
what they know’ {ibid.: 73). The multi annual programming  of MEDA even 
supported these traditional working methods. Delegations felt under immense time 
pressure to inform the Directorate General about projects for fund commitments 
because ‘otherwise, the funds earmarked for MEDA could be “lost” for “their 
Country” by the end o f the Financial Year’ {ibid.: 73).
To sum up, inner executive coordination in foreign and interior policies is 
characterised by a tight overlap o f executive powers between the different branches 
of the EU executive. This pattern of interaction has affected all stages o f the policy 
making process, namely the initiation of legislation, actual decision taking as well as 
implementation. It was not so much the speed or the scope of decisions that was 
attributed the greatest importance but rather the emphasis on upholding consensual 
patterns of interaction within the dual executive.
Conclusion
This chapter has elaborated in greater detail the way which the dominant executive- 
control divide in macro political stabilisation policies has affected patterns of 
interaction between national and EU actors in the policy making process. It has 
provided several examples o f how this relationship is characterised by a remarkable 
dominance of executive actors at the expense o f parliamentary or judicial control. 
‘Control actors’, most prominently Parliament, have often only been able to use 
rather confrontational means for asserting their role in policy making. However, the 
use o f these measures, such as frequent recourse to  the Court o f Justice or even
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threats to seek the demise of the Commission, are costly for both sides and do not 
substitute for a permanent, balanced sharing of power between executive actors and 
‘control actors* in the policy making process. Executive dominance does, however, 
not imply that the executive remains completely uncontrolled. A striking feature of 
the EU foreign and interior affairs system is that the executive is, in a sense, 
controlling itself. A complex system of inner executive checks and balances ensures 
that action is usually only taken after a negotiated, consensual agreement among 
executive actors has been reached. While such patterns o f interaction serve the 
functional requirement of ensuring a cautious approach to the centralisation of 
macro political stabilisation policies, in particular through tight control of the 
Commission, it also brings with it several institutionally induced shortcomings 
regarding executive policy making at all stages of the policy making process.
The problems in effective parliamentary and judicial control, on the one 
hand, and over complex inner executive coordination must, however, be balanced 
with the fundamental significance o f integrating two areas as strongly linked to 
sovereignty such as foreign and interior policies. Anything but a highly incremental, 
often painstakingly slow policy making process in these areas would be surprising 
and possibly detrimental to integration. Such an acknowledgement of the systemic 
purpose, which the various institutional brakes to quick policy making serve, points 
directly to the characteristic functional features of macro political stabilisation 
policies, as they have been outlined in chapters 2 and 3. Such an argument should, 
however, not lower expectations to a point at which all deadlocks are justified by the 
functional requirement of intense inner executive coordination. What remains, 
however, interesting from a comparative perspective about the political system of the 
EU is not so much the existence o f such patterns o f a consensus democracy 
ubiquitous in semi-sovereign states (Katzenstein 1987). What is rather striking is that 
these patterns of policy making do not (only) relate to industrial relations, health 
issues or educational policies but to areas as closely linked with sovereignty such as 
foreign and interior affairs.
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Chapter  8
Conclusion
This thesis has provided an explanation of policy making in EU foreign and interior 
affairs that focuses on the functional dynamics in these two areas and how these 
have affected the role of EU actors in this process. The focus of this thesis on EU 
actors had the purpose of bringing to the fore those features which reveal the 
emergence of a cross pillar institutional setting within a functionally unified policy 
space.
Detecting the main elements of such a functional setting, the thesis has 
argued that it is the shared identity formation function for the political system of the EU, 
which allows us to conceptualise foreign and interior policies as constituting a single 
policy type. Hence, in both areas the EU allocates, through decisions made at the 
central level, political rules which establish and sustain the distinction between an 
inside and an outside. Due to this shared policy function, which provides the EU 
with both identity and sovereignty, this policy type has been referred to as ‘macro 
political stabilisation*, thereby drawing analogies to the way in which monetary 
policies provide the framework for macro economic stabilisation within a political 
system. As this thesis has shown, in the course of the last ten years, these macro 
political stabilisation policies have indeed become an integral part of the EU political 
system.
As has been pointed out throughout this thesis, the focus on EU actors does 
neither explicidy nor impliddy imply that these actors would hold the main power 
resources in foreign and interior affairs. Thus, as a direct result o f both areas* close 
linkage with traditionally national prerogatives, the price which EU actors had to pay 
for their systematic and permanent inclusion into policy making processes in macro 
political stabilisation policies was the acceptance by EU actors of the (cross pillar) 
leadership by the (European) Council, the rotating Presidencies or, occasionally, 
individual member states. However, notwithstanding the importance of these actors
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in providing leadership and continuity o f policies, policy making processes in both 
areas can no longer be understood from an (intergovernmental perspective. As a 
result o f the centralisation process of macro political stabilisation policies, EU actors 
have — to varying degrees - become increasingly involved in policy making in foreign 
and interior affairs.
Based on this observation of the emergence and consolidation of the policy 
type of macro political stabilisation policies at the EU level, the thesis has identified 
three main variables which account for the characteristic patterns of policy making in 
the two areas of foreign and interior policies. First, it has emphasised the crucial role 
of the junctional dimension of macro political stabilisation policies. More specifically, the 
function of providing the EU with macro political stabilisation through the allocation 
of sovereignty, understood as the establishment of a distinction between insiders 
(EU/EU citi2ens) and outsiders (third countries/third country nationals) has led to 
the emergence of a functional frame to which both institutions and actor preferences 
relate. As has been argued in chapter 3, the tension emanating from the centralisation 
o f macro political stabilisation policies at the EU level with the traditionally national 
context of this ‘insider-outsider dimension’ explains the incremental and slow 
process of integration on the policy dimension. Moreover, the functional focus 
supports the argument that both areas can most fruitfully be studied from a policy 
perspective rather than from a more narrow institutional focus on the second and 
third pillars only. What stems from this analysis on the functional dynamics of 
integrating foreign and interior policies at the EU level is that through the provision 
o f public policies in both areas, the EU is acquiring both an internal and an external 
identity. As a result o f this emerging internal and external identity, the EU is, 
moreover, developing political sovereignty in parallel with but autonomous from 
member states. And it is then this process which allows EU actors to shape policies — 
alongside member states — across the pillars.
In a second step, these functional characteristics o f macro political 
stabilisation policies help to understand the institutional dimension which has been 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Thus, building upon Theodore Lowi’s famous
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statement that policies determine politics, these shared functional features have led to the 
emergence of a cross pillar institutional setting of EU foreign and interior policies 
that is distinct from other areas o f EU policy making. Notwithstanding the visibility 
o f the pillar divide at the formal Treaty level, the role of EU actors is not restricted to 
first pillar policies but stretches across the three pillars. Moreover, the analysis of this 
thesis is able to account for the considerable variance in the capabilities which have 
been delegated to EU actors. Hence, a main feature of macro political stabilisation 
policies is that in particular the Council Secretariat and the Commission possess 
relatively balanced cross pillar capabilities, whereas Parliament, the Court of Justice 
and the Court o f Auditors draw mainly from their capabilities set out in the first 
pillar. Finally, as has been analysed in chapter 6 the preferences o /E U  actors in the two 
areas vary considerably between them. Based on this observation, this thesis claims 
that assumptions o f a somewhat shared interest of EU actors, as subtly suggested by 
the term ‘supranational actors’, does not reflect accurately the factual divergence of 
orientations.
Taken together, these characteristic features of macro political stabilisation 
policies help to account for the dominant patterns of interaction between EU and 
national actors in the policy making process of foreign and interior policies. Thus, 
the dominant characteristic o f policy making is the functionally induced distinction 
between executive actors, such as the Commission, member states and the Council 
Secretariat, on the hand, and ‘control actors’, such as Parliament, the Court of Justice 
and the Court o f Auditors, on the other. The relationship between executive actors 
and ‘control actors’ is subject to a remarkable dominance o f the EU executive. 
However, both sides must also not be treated as somewhat unified blocs. A look at 
inner executive relations reveals not only mechanisms of a complex system of checks 
and balances but also brings to the fore deadlocks at all stages o f  the policy making 
process.
The theoretical arguments o f this thesis are questioning the usefulness of 
those theoretical approaches that continue to centre around the distinction between 
‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ conceptualisations of European integration in
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order to account for policy outcomes. This thesis argues instead that the 
centralisation of policies renders the EU level the ‘space* to which institutions and 
actors (both national and EU actors) primarily relate. Centralisation is thus an 
analytical concept that helps to account for the process o f a vertical transfer of 
powers, in which the EU acquires authority for regulating foreign and interior 
policies in parallel but autonomous from member states. At the same time, 
‘centralisation* is not based on the assumption that such a transfer would necessarily 
result in a ‘supranationalisation* of policies or a loss of power o f member states as a 
collective unit. Hence, ‘centralisation* leaves open the question of how the transfer 
o f policy areas affects the horizontal distribution of powers at the EU level. An 
answer to this question requires empirical analysis on the basis o f concrete case 
studies. Accordingly, this thesis has shown that both foreign and interior policies are 
indeed characterised by a functionally induced centralisation process in which 
member states (most often acting as a collective unit) keep control of the main 
resources in policy making, provide for political leadership and play an important 
role in ensuring continuity of policy making. Thus, the European Council, the 
Council of Ministers, the Presidencies and, occasionally, individual member states 
remain the most powerful actors in EU foreign and interior policies across the pillars. 
Notwithstanding this argument, this thesis has at the same time provided ample 
evidence that centralisation has not only led to an increasing blurring o f the pillar 
structure, which originally divided both policy areas, but also enabled EU actors to 
consolidate their role in policy making in both areas across the pillars.
As far as foreign and interior policies are concerned, it is not the allegedly 
intergovernmental nature of the institutions in the second and third pillars nor the 
interests of member states alone, that can account for politics and policies in the two 
areas. Instead, institutions and preferences must be understood against the 
background of the specific functional features which macro political stabilisation 
policies have for the political system of the EU. The incremental centralisation 
process in both areas, thus, leads to the consolidation o f a specific functional frame 
relating to this distinct policy type. As a consequence, the results o f this thesis do not
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only relate to cross pillar politics but also apply to the study of politics in the first 
pillar. Thus, institutions and preferences in macro political stabilisation policies as 
well as institutions and preferences in mere first pillar policies do both operate within 
the same ‘space’ of EU politics. Hence, differences in outcomes and patterns of 
interaction must primarily be accounted for by looking at the functional differences 
which are related to different policy areas or policy types.
It is, consequently, argued that policy outcomes in different policy areas can 
primarily be explained by focusing on the unique functional dynamics o f distinct 
policy types and the way in which these set a frame for actors and institutions. As a 
word of caution, it must, once more, be emphasised that this argument on underlying 
functional dynamics in EU foreign and interior policies does not make the case for a 
quasi-deterministic model on European integration. Neither preferences nor 
institutions are fixed. Yet, in contrast to key assumptions o f the aforementioned 
theoretical approaches on exogenously given preferences, the functional dynamics 
certainly create a framework to which both actors and institutions must relate when 
they engage in policy making in EU foreign and interior affairs — and, as far as macro 
political stabilisation policies are concerned, this framework cannot be fully 
understood from an ‘intergovemmentalist’ or ‘supranational’ perspective.
Having said this, it can be argued that EU foreign and interior policies have, 
some ten years after the entry force o f the Maastricht Treaty, emerged as key areas of 
EU policy making. Moreover, both areas have been subject to a centralisation 
process, albeit a quite incremental one. Given the slow process o f centralising foreign 
and interior policies at the EU level and the challenge this centralisation ultimately 
poses to traditional understandings of sovereignty, any prognosis on future 
developments becomes inherendy difficult, if not impossible. To pick up the analogy 
with monetary policies suggested in chapter 1, we simply do not know where the 
snake heads to. Surely, the band of fluctuation in foreign and interior policies has 
been narrowed down in the last decade or so. Moreover, the institutional frameworks 
of EU foreign and interior policies, not least the participation of EU actors in this 
process, provides for a stable setting o f repeated and permanent interaction.
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However, until today this setting is far from providing the basis for 
somewhat single foreign and interior policies, while integration on issues of internal 
and external security remain even to a larger extent subject to national reservations. 
Having said this, a key insight from monetary union is also vital for macro political 
stabilisation policies. Notwithstanding the significance of functional dynamics for the 
incremental centralisation of sovereignty related policies at the EU level, a formal 
decision on creating a strong and, possibly, single EU framework for the regulation 
o f foreign and interior affairs remains a decision that requires political will and 
societal backing that have until today not really been shown as far as these two policy 
areas are concerned.
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Annex: List of Interviews
Number /  Date Place Institution Expert’s position
1. August 1998 Brussels Commission Director JHA
2. August 1998 Bonn German Interior Ministry Desk officer task force JHA
3. August 1998 Brussels Council Director (JHA)
4. August 1998 Brussels Parliament MEP (chairwoman civil liberties)
5. November 1999 Giitersloh Bertelsmann Foundation CFSP expert
6. May 2000 London House o f Commons MP (foreign policies)
7. May 2000 Jerusalem Israeli Foreign Ministry EU desk officer
8. May 2000 Tel Aviv Friedrich-Ebert-
Foundation
Director Israel Office
9. May 2000 Tel Aviv Commission Head o f Delegation
10. June 2000 Brussels Commission Desk officer (RELEX)
11. June 2000 Brussels Commission Desk officer (RF.TF.X)
12. June 2000 Brussels Commission Head o f Unit (RELEX)
13. June 2000 Brussels Commission Legal Service (Foreign affairs)
14. June 2000 Brussels Council Desk officer CFSP
15. June 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (foreign policies)
16. June 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (foreign policies)
17. June 2000 Brussels Commission Desk officer (Assistance)
18. June 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (foreign policies)
19. June 2000 Brussels Council Advisor Special Representative
20. June 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (civil liberties)
21. June 2000 Brussels NGO Director (migration policies)
22. June 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (civil liberties)
23. June 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (civil liberties)
24. June 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (civil liberties)
25. June 2000 Brussels Commission Head o f Unit (JHA)
26. June 2000 Brussels Council Director Legal Service
27. June 2000 Brussels Council Desk officer Legal Service
28. June 2000 Brussels Council Desk officer Legal Service
29. June 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (civil liberties)
30. June 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (civil liberties)
31. July 2000 Brussels Council Advisor Special Representative
32. July 2000 Brussels Commission Deputy Head o f Cabinet 
(assistance)
33. July 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (foreign policy, committee 
chairman)
34. July 2000 Brussels Commission former Director (foreign policies)
35. July 2000 Brussels Commission Desk officer (RELEX)
36. July 2000 Brussels Council Director (foreign policies)
37. July 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (science and technology)
38. July 2000 Brussels Council Desk officer (CFSP)
39. July 2000 Brussels Parliament Administrator (foreign policies)
40. July 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP (foreign policies)
41. July 2000 Brussels Parliament Administrator (civil liberties)
42. July 2000 Brussels Commission Legal Service (interior)
43. July 2000 Brussels Parliament MEP
44. July 2000 Brussels Council Director (JHA)
45. July 2000 Brussels Commission Deputy Head o f Unit (JHA)
46. July 2000 Brussels Commission Desk officer, represent WBGS
47. July 2002 Berlin NGO Former Israeli Army official
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